The politics of industrial change: government involvement in the U.K. shipbuilding industry 1959-73 by Hogwood, Brian W
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and 
duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be 
duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational 
purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non-
commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to 
quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the 
copyright holder/s. 
THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE: GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE UK 
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 1959-73
BRIAN U. HOGli/OOD
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
/UNIVERSITY OF KEELE, 1977
LIBRA
RY
H
Sim
iR
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk
BEST COPY AVAILABLE.\
VARIABLE PRINT QUALITY
ABSTRACT
This study uses a policy analysis approach to examine the development 
of government policy towards the UK shipbuilding industry in the 
period 1959-73 as a case study of government involvement in an industry 
undergoing change. The focus is primarily at the UK level and policy 
towards individual yards is considered within this national context.
In addition to examining the formulation of policies, the study analyses 
the political aspects of implementing them. After describing the 
main influences on the industry and outlining government policy before 
1959, the study discusses in detail the development of government 
policy between 1959 to 1973. A short chapter describes subsequent 
developments up to the introduction of legislation to nationalise the 
industry. The role of information in the policy process relevant to 
shipbuilding and the institutional framework of government policy are 
analysed in detail. The concluding chapter discusses the effect of 
shipbuilding policy on relationships between government and industry, 
the extent to which governments can make an industry competitive, the 
relevance of models of policy making and the general implications of 
the study for government involvement in industrial changB.
ii
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT iiABBBEVIA TIONS viFOEEWOED “ viii
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Analysing industrial policy 1
1 . 2  Within the industry 5
1.3 Shipyards and their environment 24
1.4 Shipbuilding and the world economy 31
1.5 The shipbuilding policy process 45
Appendix* Coverage of the study and definiticns^of measurement 57
2 GOVERNMENT POLICIES AFFECTING SHIPBUILDING BEFORE 1959
2.1 Policy before the First World War 60
2.2 The period between the wars 61
2.3 After the Second World War 65
204 Conclusion 70
3 INITIAL RESPONSES TO DECLINE
3.1 Recognising a problem 71
3.2 The resignation of Sir Graham Cunningham 74
3.3 The DSIR Report 76
3.4 The SAC Report 85
3.5 Developments up to the Shipbuilding Credit Scheme 96
3.6 The Shipbuilding Credit Scheme gg
3.7 Taking stock 104
iii
4 FROM COMMITTEE TO LEGISLATION
4o1 The setting up of the Geddes Committee 106
4.2 Policy before the publication of the Geddes Report 109
4.3 Fairfields n 2
4.4 The Geddes Report 1 2 1
4.5 The Shipbuilding Industry Act 14 3
4.6 A good way to make policy? 1 5 1
5 FROM LEGISLATION TO REALITY
5«1 The situation facing the SIB 1 5 5
5.2 Post-Geddes groupings 160
5.3 The return to rescue operations 109
5.4 Shipbuilding Credit Guarantees 207
5.5 Shipping Investment Grants 210
5.6 Shipbuilding and regional policy 216
5.7 Assessing government involvement 1967-70 217
Appendix: Errors in calculating subsidies by Denton et al.. 1975 234
6 SHIPBUILDING UNDER THE CONSERVATIVES 1970-3
6.1 The commitment to non-intervention 237
6.2 Implementing non-intervention 240
6.3 The collapse of UÇS 248
6.4 Other ad hoc interventions 269
6.5 Institutionalising intervention 271
6.6 The Booz-Allen Report - 275
6.7 The July 1973 policy statement 282
6.8 The politics of non-intervention 285
iv
7 POSTSCRIPT: DEVELOPMENTS UP TO NATIONALISATION
7.1 Introduction 289
7.2 The Court Line Affair 289
7.3 Further involvement in Harland and Wolff and Govan 293
7.4 Drypool: an interesting case of non-intervention 300
7.5 Other developments involving the government 301
7.6 Nationalisation proposals 305
7.7 A scenario for the future 3 1 1
8 INFORMATION IN THE POLICY PROCESS
8.1 Introduction 3 14
8.2 Reacting to problems and anticipating problems 314
8.3 The role of inquiries 323
8.4 Interest group representations and advisory committees 331
8.5 Monitoring 333
8 .6 Conclusion 348
9 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
9.1 Introduction 352
9.2 Departmental responsibility for shipbuilding 353
9.3 The role of paragovernmental agencies 373
9.4 Departments and agencies in the policy process 384
10 CONCLUSIONS
10.1 A typology of government-industry relationships 386
10.2 Can governments make an industry competitive? 393
10.3 The relevance of models of policy making 410
10„4 The politics of industrial change 416
REFERENCES 427
v
ABBREVIATIONS
AEU Amalgamated Engineering Union
ASW Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers
BOT Board of Trade
BSRA British Shipbuilding Research Association (up to 1961); 
British Ship Research Association (from 1962)
CAWU Clerical and Administrative Workers Union
Cd, Cmd, Cmnd Command (prefix to number of White Papers; see section 3 
of the references)
CIB Commission on Industrial Relations. , r  ,
C P R S
CSEU
Central Policy Review Staff
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions
DEA Department of Economic Affairs
DMSR Directorate of Merchant Shipbuilding and Repair
DSIR Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
dut deadweight (refers to measurement of tonnage; see 
appendix to chapter 1).
ECGD Export Credit Guarantee Department
ECS Shipbuilding, Electrical Engineering and Chemical Plant
® c
EFTA
Economic Development Committee 
European Free Trade Area
grt gross registered tons (for definition see appendix to 
chapter 1)
HC House of Commons (prefix to number of House of Commons 
papers; see section 2 of the references)
HC Deb. House of Commons Debates
HL Deb. House of Lords Debates
IRC Industrial Reorganisation Corporation
IDAB Industrial Development Advisory Board
3ICC Doint Industry Consultative Committee
vi
MOT Ministry of Transport
MPBW Ministry of Public Building and Works
NEB National Enterprise Board
NEDC National Economie Development Council
NI Northern Ireland
NUGMW National Union of General and Municipal Workers
OECD Organisation for Economie Cooperation and Development
PAR Policy Analysis and Review
PAMETRADA Parsons and Marine Engineering Turbine Research and 
Development Association
PEP Political and Economie Planning
PESC Public Expenditure Survey Committee
REP Regional Employment Premium
SAC Shipbuilding Advisory Committee
SBSRC Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Council
SET Selective Employment Tax
SIB Shipbuilding Industry Board
SITB Shipbuilding Industry Training Board
SNP Scottish National Party
SRNA Shipbuilders and Repairers National Association
S&SR Shipbuildinq and Shippinq Record
STUC Scottish Trades Union Congress
TGWU Transport and General Workers Union
UCS Upper Clyde Shipbuilders
vii
FOREWORD
The study of an area of public policy can be approached in various 
ways, depending on the concerns of the researcher. The concern 
may be to use a case study approach to illustrate points about 
individuals, groups and institutions involved in policy advocacy, 
decision-making and implementation. Alternatively, the policy 
may be viewed as a process by which an initial state of affairs 
is transformed into a new state of affairs as a result of 
government action. Rose, in a discussion of the study of public 
policy, argues that the most useful framework for organising 
knowledge at present is a process one.*- He lists three advantages 
of process models, and it is worth analysing these critically in 
turn, since by doing so we can assess whether such models provide 
a valuable tool for analysing a specific area of policy in practice.
First of all, given our ignorance about public policy, it is
an advantage of a process model that it is open. It is possible to
'introduce additional steps or influences into the process without
violating logical assumptions - as long as the research can demonstrate
2the significance of any concept to the study of public policy’.
Thus a process model enables us to systematise existing knowledge 
without precluding the integration of future insights into the same 
framework. However, this very openness itself reduces the value of
1. Rose, 1973, p.73.
2. Rose, 1973, p.74.
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the processual approach as a guide to the researcher in determining 
which aspects of the policy area are worth investigating. Even 
with a relatively narrowly defined policy area such as shipbuilding 
the total number of influences and interactions involved is 
enormous. This is particularly true when considering the impact 
and outcomes of government policy: a policy can have both 
expected and unforeseen impacts, some directly related to the 
policy area and other ’external' impacts on other policy areas.
The final outcome in the given policy area is also affected by a 
number of influences in addition to the government’s declared policy - 
some from non-governmental sources and some reflecting the impact 
of government measures directed at other policy areas. To examine 
all impacts and all influences on outcomes within the scope of a 
thesis is impossible, yet a process model as such tells us nothing 
about which ones we should concentrate on.
The second advantage of a process model referred to by Rose 
is that 'it emphasises relationships between political phenomenon, 
and not the mere cataloguing of information'. The concern is not 
with simply listing influences which might affect a policy but 
with understanding how such influences relate to one another. An 
additional stage should be fitted into the model only if the researcher 
can specify where it fits into the process, how it is influenced by 
previous stages, and how it influences subsequent stages. Again, 
this provides us with a criterion by which we can fit information into 
the model. It does not tell us which of the multitude of possible
3. Rose, 1973, p.74
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relationships are worth examining in the first place, nor does it tell 
us what is the appropriate level of disaggregation at which to 
operate. It is possible to draw ’black boxes’ round various sets of 
relationships and concentrate on the relationships between these 
'black boxes'. The process model does not itself provide guidance 
about Where these black boxes should be drawn. Government actions 
can have many objectives, both explicit and imputed, and the relation­
ships or processes studied will reflect concern with particular sets 
of these objectives.
Finally, an undoubted advantage of the process model is that
it is dynamic. It does not abstract government activity from the
sequence of events now does it assume that policy is determined at one
point in time. This is an improvement on a policy-making framework,
which is relatively narrow,concentrating on the decision-making stage
of the policy process and perhaps on the steps leading up to it. The
policy-making framework therefore implies a division between politics and
administration which this study shows is not appropriate, since politics
clearly enters into the implementation stage. In contrast, a process
approach stresses that policies are not advocated, adopted, implemented
4and evaluated at a single point in time. The process model is concerned 
with the consequences of a policy and not simply with what led to the 
adoption of the policy. This concern with consequences includes the 
consequences for future government decisions in the policy areas concerned. 
However, in the real world it is not easy to characterise policy in terms 
of simple cycles of the policy process feeding neatly back into new cycles. 
The policy process in relation to specific decisions may be truncated 
and within any policy area at any one time specific issues may be at 
different stages of the policy process. It may prove difficult to 
characterise a particular event as unambiguously related to one 
stage of one cycle in the policy process.
4, Cf.Rose,1973, p.74
The process model therefore has considerable advantages 
over other approaches to the study of public policy, but it does not 
by itself provide clear guidelines for the research which should 
be conducted in a specific policy area. It is an approach which 
must be further interpreted by the researcher in tackling his area 
of concern.
What the present study does is to use a process model as an 
approach to analysing government activity in terms of declared
government policy and declared expectations of outcome. It does not/
therefore seek to examine in detail the relationships which would be 
involved^for example, one imputed the objective of shipbuilding 
policy as being party electoral advantage. Considerable attention 
is devoted to analysing why the outcomes of government policy 
deviate from those envisaged in declared policy and the implications 
of those outcomes for future government policy. This has inevitably 
meant that other possible foci for research are referred to in less 
detail and are not selected for separate analysis. For example, partly 
for this reason and partly because c£ the problems of access referred 
to below, the policy process is not analysed in terms of departmental 
bargaining within Whitehall, or ministerial-civil service relationships. 
Thus, to a considerable extent, a 'black box' is drawn round the 
detailed relationships involved in policy formulation within 
government; the major emphasis is on the relationship between 
government and other bodies involved in the policy process. Similarly, 
while the significant features of management and unions are described 
in the introduction and their role in important developments is 
outlined, they are not singled out for detailed analysis. No attempt
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is made to analyse the internal decision-making processes of the 
fifteen or so unions with members in shipbuilding or to 
undertake a comparative analysis of the role played by each in 
initiating or responding to shipbuilding policy developments. To 
have done justice to this interesting theme would have involved a 
substantially longer research programme and thesis and a sizeable 
diversion from the focus on declared government policy.
This emphasis on the government perspective reflects 
the ’top downwards' approach adopted in this study. Clearly, 
this is not the only approach which could be adopted in studying 
shipbuilding policy. An alternative approach would have been to 
study shipbuilding policy from the ’bottom upwards', that is, to 
adopt a firm-focussed approach. Thus, instead of concentrating 
on how the government went about implementing its policy and how 
it responded when the desired outcome was not achieved, one would 
examine the implications for the firm of government policy. A 
detailed analysis of the impact of specific government measures 
can only be carried out at the level of individual fin® since only 
there can the researcher attempt to disentangle the effects of 
government policy measures from all of the other influences which 
affect the final outcome. Even then, the task would be a very 
difficult one and conclusions about impact would depend on which 
assumptions were adopted by the researcher, as is illustrated by 
the case of Fairfields, discussed in section 4.3. Thus the 
detailed analysis of the impact of government policy on a selected 
number of shipbuilding firms would itself form a research project •
• •Xll
outside the scope of the present project. The impact of government 
policy is referred to here only in general terms. The emphasis 
is rather on the implementation of policies and the outcome 
of government actions in terms of declared policy and declared 
expectations of outcomes. The conclusion emphasises the various 
influences which can cause outcomes to deviate from those publicly 
expected by the government.
The prime concern of the approach adopted in this study 
lies clearly with answering empirical questions about government 
involvement in industry. What were the circumstances in which 
declared policy evolved? Can a pattern of policy over time be 
discerned and does this have consequences for government-industry 
relationships? Can governments be sure of securing the 
outcomes they seek in industrial policy and if not are the failures 
due to poor initial policy design, switches in policy, or 
unforeseeable and uncontrollable events? However, although the 
main concern is empirical, the last question in particular relates 
to much more general issues of the way governments make decisions 
and follow them through. The best way of considering these general 
issues is by comparing them with their treatment in theoretical 
models of policy-making. The researcher considering this approach
i j .
is confronted with a large and continually increasing number of 
models of how policy-making is or ought to be conducted. Some of 
these have been developed in the context of particular case studies, 
while others make general claims as theories of policy-making. To 
select only one of these models would mean that only one set of 
assumptions and their implicdions were being compared to policy in
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practice, and this would do little to illuminate the issues 
involved. The approach adopted here is to select as paradigms 
two substantially contrasting models so that comparison with 
policy in practice can be made in terms of which model or parts 
of a model approximate most closely to shipbuilding policy in 
practice. The models used are an 'incremental* model based on 
Lindblom's writings and a 'rationality' model based on Simon, 
since these make contrasting assumptions about rationality, 
consistency of policy, knowledge available to policy-makers 
and control exercised by government. In the introduction the 
main characteristics of the models are outlined, while on the 
basis of the evidence and analysis in the intervening chapters 
the conclusion examines how far shipbuilding policy in practice 
can usefully be described in terms of these models and whether 
prescriptions contained in the models have any relevance to the 
conduct of shipbuilding policy in practice. The primary purpose - 
of using the models is not therefore to 'test' the models, but 
to use them to highlight important features of shipbuilding policy.
Given the emphasis in this study on how policies are 
delivered, it is worth exploring the issues involved in policy 
implementation in more detail. The introduction outlines analyses 
by Pressman and Wildavsky and by King which, focussing as they do 
on the chain of activities which are necessary to follow through 
a government policy, appear particularly relevant to the study of 
the outcome of declared government policy. However, in the light 
of the analysis in the thesis, this approach to the analysis of 
implementation is critically re-examined in the conclusion, and an
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approach to implementation more relevant to industrial policy is 
outlined.
To establish a preliminary outline of the shipbuilding 
policy issues which required examination under this approach, a 
systematic review was carried out of references to British 
shipbuilding in The Times and House of Commons Debates (including 
parliamentary questions); these were supplemented by reference 
to the Shipbuilding and Shipping Record. None of the indexes 
of these publications was ideal for this purpose; the index to 
the House of Commons Debates was particularly unsatisfactory since 
there was no consistent system fcr entries, and it was necessary 
to check possible entries for individual firms or shipbuilding 
areas to ensure that even government statements were not overlooked.
All the relevant published official documents, including inquiry 
reports, were reviewed, as were relevant books and articles dealing 
with shipbuilding, generally from a shipbuilding industry or economic 
focus rather than a political science one.
A major source for the research was evidence presented to 
House of Commons Select Committees, which have on a number of occasions 
investigated government involvement in the industry as a whole or in 
specific firms. It should be stressed that the most useful material 
came from the evidence rather than the reports themselves, which are 
generally of interest only as expressions of the agreed attitudes of 
the committees. In addition to oral evidence given before Members 
of Parliament - largely from civil servants, but also from shipbuilding 
management and politicians - written evidence was frequently presented 
as a preliminary to oral examination; in addition, some documents
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originally intended only for internal departmental use are 
included in appendices to the reports in response to requests 
from committee members. It is striking that many of these 
reports fail to make much use of the raw material presented in 
evidence and also that little or no attempt is made to incorporate 
into reports the findings and evidence accumulated by previous 
committees. This material once systematically reviewed is 
particularly valuable in contributing to an understanding of how 
government departments and their agencies set about implementing, 
and re-interpreting declared policy.
As with all sources, the researcher should be aware of the 
context in which the evidence to these conmittees was presented.
Many of those giving evidence were placed in the position of defending 
their own roles and therefore their evidence taken in isolation should 
not be used as a basis for generalisation. Civil servants, for example, 
are precluded from drawing politically sensitive conclusions in giving 
their answers, since by convention this is a matter for thé minister. 
There are certain features in the procedures of taking evidence which 
assist the researcher in assessing the value of such evidence, both 
on matters of fact and on opinions expressed. First of all, the 
civil servants in particular obviously check transcripts of the 
evidence they give; where this involves corrections, a note is 
incorporated in the evidence as published. Secondly, although all 
those giving evidence had some kind of vested interest, most 
committees took evidence from a variety of sources; for example, 
shipbuilding management, Shipbuilding Industry Board officers and
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departmental civil servants. Thus it was normally possible to 
obtain a variety of perspectives on any one issue. In addition it 
was possible to cross-check some items from other printed sources 
used or from interviews. In using evidence to these committees it 
is therefore important not to pick out any single replies in isolation. 
It is essential°read the whole of the relevant evidence, both to be 
aware of the context in which a remark was made and to be sure of 
picking up corrections, identifying contradictions and discovering 
differences of interpretation.
The interviews conducted by the researcher performed a 
supplementary role rather than constituting the major source for the 
study, though some sections of the thesis do rely primarily on 
material collected through interviews. Those interviewed included 
a number of politicians, civil servants, members of committees of 
inquiry, and officials of representative organisations, all of whom 
had been involved in shipbuilding policy during the period with which 
this study is concerned. Some of those interviewed had been involved 
in more than one role during that period. Typically, an interview 
would commence with the researcher asking a number of specific 
questions about issues in which the interviewee had been involved, 
with particular emphasis on aspects where available evidence was 
inadequate or conflicting. These would be followed by questions or 
discussion about the general background to these issues, in 
particular features of the organisation in which the interviewee 
worked. In a number of cases this background material proved more 
valuable than the answers to questions about specific issues; for 
example, chapter 9 on the institutional framework had benefitted
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from interviews with civil servants and others involved in the 
various departments or organisations. A number of interviews 
provided opportunities for obtaining unpublished documentary 
material.
The potential value of interviews to the research was 
limited by two factors. The first was the poor results obtained 
from many of the interviews. This was largely due to the imperfect 
recall of events by some interviewees; some important features of 
issues had simply been forgotten, while some replies were clearly 
incorrect given the actual sequence of events. The systematic 
review of available sources helped to prevent errors creeping into 
the study in this way. The second adverse factor was the inability 
of the researcher to obtain access to some individuals; the main 
problem was the refusal of some politicians who had been involved in 
shipbuilding policy to be interviewed. In all such cases numerous 
public statements by these politicians were available, but the 
inability to obtain access made it impossible to develop an analysis 
of the importance of ministerial-civil service relationships or 
interministerial bargaining in the formulation of declared 
shipbuilding policy.
The nature of the interviews conducted, many of which were 
of the only holder of a unique post, causes problems in presenting 
material from the interviews, since some of this material was 
’off-the-record'. As far as possible, where material in the thesis 
is largely based on or was confirmed by material collected in an 
interview, the source is named. On other occasions the general 
nature of the source is indicated, but in a very limited number of 
instances it has proved impossible to give even a general indication •
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of the source because of the uniqueness of the position held by 
the interviewee.
The chapters which rely most heavily on material 
collected from the various sources described above are those 
describing the evolution of shipbuilding policy during the period 
of the study. These chapters are preceded by an introduction 
which outlines the major influences on the British shipbuilding 
industry to back up the contention that government is only one of 
such influences and also provides background information for the 
succeeding chapters. The final section of the introduction outlines 
the theoretical perspectives referred to earlier. The central 
chapters of the thesis, chapters 3 to 6, examine the development 
of shipbuilding policy in the years 1959 to 1973. Each chapter 
is concerned with developments in successive time periods. This 
presentation of shipbuilding policy over time reflects a concern 
with the dynamics of the policy process. It is not, of course, 
possible or desirable to analyse developments entirely sequentially.
As was pointed out above, at any given time there are a number of 
relevant 'policy cycles' in operation and these may be at different 
stages. Thus within a chapter it may be desirable to devote a 
section to a particular policy issue; for example, shipping 
investment grants.
As well as describing the circumstances surrounding the 
formulation of each major policy pronouncement, these chapters 
examine the implementation of the policies. In contrast to statements 
of policy, which even in statutory form are couched in general terms, 
implementation of policies frequently had to take place on a firm-by-firm
xix
basis. There are often distinctive features between different 
firms in the way a particular policy has been implemented, and in 
order to justify the conclusions drawn it has been necessary to 
describe these features in some detail and at some length. The 
material presented in these chapters does, of course, represent 
only a small fraction of the total material collected.
The chapters examining the evolution of shipbuilding policy are 
followed by two chapters which develop some of the major themes which 
emerged in the central chapters and merit separate and fuller 
treatment. Thus the chapter on information in the policy process 
could be said to fill out some of the 'arrows’ connecting 'black 
boxes' in the policy process; while the focus is on information, 
the political implications for declared policy are stressed. The 
chapter on the institutional framework analyses some of the 
characteristics of the government bodies involved in shipbuilding 
policy, with particular emphasis on policy delivery aspects.
The conclusion draws together the main themes of the study, 
moving away from policy detail to more general policy characteristics, 
in particular those with general relevance to industry policy. 
Naturally enough, given the perspective of the study, these 
conclusions are largely concerned with the implications of 
government involvement for government-industry relationships and 
the constraints in the achievement of the outcomes which declared 
policy was designed to achieve.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 ANALYSING INDUSTRIAL POLICY
This study is concerned with the analysis of government industrial 
policy, a topic relatively neglected by political scientists, who 
have tended to regard it as the province of economists. A purely 
economic analysis will, however, fail to take account of the political 
environment in which policies are formulated and attempts to implement 
these policies are made. The approach adopted here is to study 
government involvement in one industry,shipbuilding, over a period 
of fourteen years. An alternative approach would have been to 
compare government involvement in a number of different industries 
within a short period of time; for example, the Labour government 
1964-8. This approach would, however, have a number of disadvantages: 
it would not permit full discussion of all the influences affecting 
each industry, nor would it be possible within the constraints of 
such a short time period to assess the impact of policies. Such an 
approach would also have the disadvantage of concentrating on a 
collection of single decisions rather than examining the implications 
of long-term involvement.
The approach adopted here is to study shipbuilding over a 
longer period, 1959-73. The selection of these dates is necessarily 
rather arbitrary. The reasons for choosing these particular dates 
are that by 1959 the relative decline of UK shipbuilding was fully 
apparent and calls for government action to deal with this were 
being voiced, while 1973 saw the last government policy statement on
shipbuilding before a new Labour government took office in 1974 
with a commitment to nationalise the industry. This period is not, 
of course, entirely self-contained, so brief summaries are given 
of developments before and after these dates. Within this period, 
an account is given of developments in the UK shipbuilding industry 
as a whole, supplemented by chapters on recurring themes, rather 
than a yard-by-yard approach or concentration solely on comparative 
topics, such as legislation, inquiries and administration. Policy 
towards individual yards is considered within the context of national 
developments of policy. Bringing out developments over time in 
this way enables discussion of the relationship between the various 
policy announcements and analysis of how these policies were 
implemented and what impact they had.
The examination of one industry over a relatively long period 
does, of course, have its disadvantages. For the researcher the 
disadvantage is the volume of material which must be collected and 
then used in an appropriate way. More importantly, the degree 
of permissible generalisation about government involvement in 
industry generally which can be made from the study of one industry 
is fairly small. Thorough study of individual industries is,however, 
necessary before any useful generalisations can be made at all.
One important aspect of the approach adopted here is that it is 
misleading to view government involvement in shipbuilding in isolation 
from all the other influences on the performance of the industry, 
including other government policies, or in isolation from the effect 
which the performance of the industry can have on other parts of 
society. Some of these influences are internal to shipyards,(e.g. 
the interaction of manpower and technology); while others are external,
both in the sense of external to the shipyard (e.g. the supply 
of components and labour), and external to a single country (e.g. 
the demand and supply of ships, which in turn depends on international 
trade and involvement by foreign governments in their shipbuilding 
industries). Shipyards also affect the societies in which they 
are situated: this is seen most vividly when a shipyard closes.
We cannot, therefore, view individual shipyards or the UK 
shipbuilding industry as a whole as a closed system (fig.1.1).
Fig. 1.1 | SHIPYARDS ~“j
Nor must we fall into the more likely trap for a student of politics 
of viewing our relevant system as being government acting on the 
shipyards (fig.1.2).
Fig. 1.2 GOVERNMENT SHIPYARDS
Or even interacting with the shipyards (fig.1.3).
Fig. 1.3 | GOVERNMENT► iSHIPYARDS
The influences on government and shipbuilding are much more complex.
Fig.1.4 provides a simplified illustration of the more important ones.
The problem now is that in a literal sense we have included the
whole world in our system. To understand how all these interactions
influence government involvement in shipbuilding we will have to
examine the relevant features of the industry in some detail. The
chapter will then be concluded with an outline of relevant analytical
approaches to the study of decision-making and other aspects of 
policy
the shipbuilding/process.
Fig. 1.*f Major influences on the UK shipbuilding industry
1.2 Within the Industry
Obviously, what goes on within the firms themselves is relevant 
to government involvement, so initially shipbuilding can be considered 
in terms of a simple model of a firm which has inputs and an output, 
(see fig.1.5).
Fig.1.5
It is therefore appropriate to start by examining the importance 
of each of the elements which affect activities within the firm.
1,2.1 Labour
Between mid-1956 and mid-1964 employment in shipbuilding steadily 
declined, while between 1967 and 1972 the number fluctuated without 
indicating an overall decline. Within these totals there have been 
considerable variations; for example, the number of riveters and 
associated trades dropped much more sharply than the average, while 
craftsmen such as platers, burners and welders were in short supply 
by 1965. This reflects the changing technology of shipbuilding, 
with welding replacing riveting. Total figures also conceal 
variations between firms, with some firms expanding their labour 
force while others were contracting. This last point is of political 
significance, since we will want to examine whether it is the problems 
of specific firms in specific locations rather than global figures
1. This presentation owes much to an Open University programme in the 
T241 Systems Behaviour course,broadcast on BBC Television on 21 
September 1975,but the analysis here is taken much further. The 
Appendix at the end of this chapter defines the coverage of this 
study in terms of the size of ships built and also provides definitions 
of the various tonnage measurements used.
SHIPBUILDING
FIRMS t  SHIPS
which seem to be most important for government involvement (see 
Section 1.3.2).
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The average age of shipyard workers is high compared to 
manufacturing industry, with over half of the workforce aged 
over 40 in 1972. During the period covered by this study, 
the earnings of shipbiiLding workers changed from being lower than 
industry generally to being slightly above those in all engineering 
industries. However, there was wide variation between companies 
and between sections of the workforce in average earnings, a source 
of possible friction when the industry is nationalised. Another 
development during the period is that the number of pay grades has 
been considerably reduced.
The relative proportions of salaried, skilled and unskilled 
workers varies according to whether merchant or warships are 
primarily built, as can be seen from table 1.1. The manual workers
Table 1.1 Industry workforce by labour category,major UK shipbuilders.
1972.
Salaried staff Skilled Semi- and Apprentices Total
Unskilled
Merchant builders 8,382 22,449 14,255 4,233 49,319
Warshipbuilders 5,831 5,952 4,773 1,127 17,683
Total 14,213 28,401 19,028 5,360 67,002
Source: Booz-All®n Report,1973, exhibit 61, p.160.
can in turn be classified according to the particular trades pursued
(see table 1.2). This classification into trades is reflected in the
membership of trade unions, which are largely craft-based (see table
1.3). Of these, the Boilermakers (Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers,
Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers) can be seen as
distinctive and has frequently taken a stand in negotiations separate
2from that of other shipbuilding unions.
2. For details of union organisation in shipbuilding,see Cmnd 4756, 
chapters 8-11.
7Table 1.2 Manual labour force in shipbuilding by occupational 
grouping, Great Britain 1970.
Occupational group % of total manual labour force
Steel trades
Platers/shipwrights 14.1%
Welders 11.3%
Calker/bumer/driller/riveters 6.1%
Others 3.6%
Total steel trades 35.1%
Other craft occupations
Fitters^umers and Machinists 8.7 %
Plumbers/coppersmiths 6.3%
Electricians 5.8%
Joiners 5.1%
Painters 2.4%
Woodworking shipwrights 0.9%
Others 3.6%
Total other craft workers 32.8%
Non craft manual workers 19.7%
Other employees 12.4%
Total all employees 100.0%
Source: Cmnd 4756, appendix 3, table 1, p.153.
The coordinating body for the shipbuilding unions is the 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU). Like most 
of the individual unions, the CSEU covers industries other than 
shipbuilding: foundries, engineering, railways and aircraft. 
Shipbuilding is dealt with by a shipyard committee, which is the 
full CSEU executive council with the president of the Boilermakers as 
Chairman, and by a Shipyard Negotiating Committee which conducts 
CSEU business with the Shipbuilders and-Repairers-National  ^- J 
Association. The Negotiating Committee was set up following the 
Geddes Report to deal with all problems in the shipbuilding and ship 
repairing industries, including 'all aspects of'the Geddes Report'.
3. Times, 16 September 1966.
8The Unions regarded the Negotiating Committee as an alternative 
to the Geddes Committee's suggestion that there should be 'only' 
five unions in the industry - in contrast to single shipbuilding 
unions in many of Britain's competitors.
Table 1.3 List of unions in the shipbuilding industry and details 
of membership, 1965-6.
Union Membership
Approximate 
percentage of 
total operative 
labourforce in 
shipbuilding
The Amalgamated Society of 
Boilermakers,Shipwrights, 
Blacksmiths and Structural 
Workers.
The Electrical Trades Union
The Amalgamated Engineering 
Union.
The National Union of 
General & Municipal Workers
The Amalgamated Society of 
Painters and Decorators.
The Plumbing Trades Union,
The National Union of Sheet 
Metal Workers and Copper­
smiths.
The Transport and General 
Workers Union.
Angle-iron smiths,boiler- 33
makers,platers,riveters, 
caulkers,burners,welders, 
holders-up,sheet-iron workers 
drillers,loftsmen,ship­
wrights (wood and steel) 
riggers »blacksmiths.staff 
foremen,certain supervisory 
grades and ancillary workers.
Skilled electricians,staff 4.6
foremen,certain supervisory 
grades and semi-skilled grades
Fitters,turners,blacksmiths, 9.6
welders.drillers »machinis ts, 
turret operators,brass 
finishers,brass moulders, 
pattern makers,coppersmiths, 
electrical fitters,ship fitters, 
millwrights,tinsmiths,riggers, 
semi-skilled and unskilled 
grades,staff foremen and 
certain supervisory grades.
Semi-skilled and unskilled
grades. 15.0
Craftsmen painters and 6.3
decorators.
Plumbers. 3.6
Sheet metal workers and 2.8
coppersmiths.
Semi-skilled and unskilled 7.3
grades.
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Table 1.3 (contd.)
The Amalgamated Society of Joiners,carpenters,cabinet 7.1
Woodworkers. makers and some woodworking
machinists.
The United French Polishers French polishers NA
Society .
The Heating and Domestic Pipe fitters and whitesmiths NA
Engineers Union. (mainly employed on contract
in the industry).
The United Patternmakers Patternmakers. NA
Association.
The Amalgamted Society of Woodcutting machinists. NA
Woodcutting Machinists.
The Clerical and Clerical grades.
Administrative Workers'
Union.
The Draughtsmen's and Allied Draughtsmen,planners and 
Technicians' Association. female tracers
There are a number of dher unions with members in the shipbuilding industry 
but they represent only a small proportion of the total work force.
Source: Cmnd 2937, appendix Q, p.190.
1.2.2. Management.
The quality of management in shipbuilding has often come under
severe criticism. The Geddes Report (1966) thought that it was
necessary to recruit specialised management skills and to improve
4qualified supervision in the shipyards. The Booz-Allen Report, 
seven years later, thought that company organisation structures were 
often unbalanced, with most shipbuilding companies strongly biased 
towards production and technical functions.^ This bias was reflected 
in the formal qualifications of senior management, though the report
4. Cmnd 2937, chapter 16.
5. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, chapter 11.
found that the age profile of management and some recent appointments 
suggested that attitudes were changing. The relatively self-contained 
and traditionally oriented nature of shipbuilding management during 
much of the period considered in this study did have implications 
for government involvement: it affected the reluctance of management 
(with notable exceptions) to introduce significant changes in 
technology and management structure in the early 1960s, and accounts 
for much of the suspicion with which the Fairfields Experiment in 
using new techniques was regarded by other shipyards on the Clyde 
(see section 4.3).
Until May 1967 shipbuilding employefs were represented at a 
national level by two separate organisations: the Shipbuilding 
Conference, which was a trade association, and the Shipbuilding 
Employers Federation, which was a federation of local employers' 
associations and dealt mainly with industrial relations matters.
The role of local associations declined sharply following the mergers 
of shipyards which took place in the late 1960s with government 
assistance. One of the influences which led to the merging of the 
two national organisations (together with the Dry Dock Owners and 
Repairers Central Conference, which was a trade association for 
shiprepairing) to form the Shipbuilders and Repairers National 
Association (SRNA) was that the same officials were backing up 
representatives from both organisations in making representations 
to bodies such as the Geddes Committee but were not able to answer 
questions which were the function of the other organisation.^
6. Interview w.th former Director of the SRNA. For a description of
the organisation and functions of the SRNA see Cmnd 4756, pp.32-5.
(Date of interview: 11 December 1972.)
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Thus the structure of the national organisations of both employers 
and unions has been modified in response to government involvement 
in the industry.
1.2.3. Ownership and Structure.
The structure of the industry changed considerably during the 
1960s as a result of a number of mergers, which are illustrated in 
fig. 1.6. Apart from the mergers, the other feature to be noted 
from fig. 1.6 is that many shipyards went out of production 
altogether. The nature of ownership of shipbuilding firms has obviously 
been affected by these changes of structure. For example, many 
of the shipyards on the upper Clyde in the early 1960s were virtually 
family companies; following the formation of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
(UCS) in 1968 the state shareholding became increasingly important.
The Booz-Allen Report (1973) identified three types of 
ownership:7
1. Controlled by large and diversified firms: e.g. Appledore 
Shipbuilders and Doxford and Sunderland were controlled by Court 
Line until 1974. Companies controlled in this way accounted 
for 39% of total industry turnover in 1972.
2. Partly or wholly controlled by government: e.g. Cammell Laird 
(50% owned by government); Govan Shipbuilders (wholly owned).
Such companies produced 23% of the total industry turnover.
3. Independent companies primarily involved in shipbuilding: e.g.
Swan Hunter, Scott Lithgow. Such companies accounted for 38% of 
the total industry turnover.
The nature of ownership of the industry will,of course, undergo a 
considerable change with the nationalisation of most shipbuilding 
companies in Great Britain. It is important to emphasise that it is
7. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.108.
Robb
Caledon
Burntisland
Lithgow
Hamilton
Scott
Greenock
Denny
John Brown 
Connell
Stephen
Fairfield
Yarrow
Blythswood  ^
Barclay Curie
Vickers
Swan Hunter
Smith 's Dock 
Redhead
Hawthorn Leslie
Furness
Grey
Short Bros.
Blyth
Austin & Rickersgill 
Bartram
DoxfordLaing + Thompson
Appledore
Drypool
Cochrane
Cammell Laird
Vosper
Thornycroft
S: White
Harland & Wclff';
Fig. 1.6 Major changes in the structure of the UK shipbuilding industry
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or receiver.
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Fig. 1.6 (continued)
Notes: 1. New company, Fairfields (Glasgow) Ltd, took over yard.
2. Owned by Swan Hunter until 197^-
3* The three companies (Doxford, Laing, Thompson) continued to 
operate in relative independence until 1968-9.
*+. Taken over by the government in 197^»
3- Harland and Wolff's Govan yard on the upper Clyde was closed 
in 1963.
shipbuilding companies in Great Britain rather than the United
Kingdom which are affected: Harland and Wolff, although wholly 
state owned, will remain outside British Shipbuilders.
1.2.4. Suppliers: Steel.
In 1972 steel represented about 15% of the cost of building merchant
ships in the UK, compared with 20% in 1965. By 1972 shipbuilding
was the second largest user of steel plate in the UK,whereas in
1965 it had been the largest user. The Geddes Report argued that
shipbuilders and steelmakers had a joint interest in maintaining and
increasing the British share of the growing world market for ships
and it recommended that the eventual objective should be a 10%
reduction at constant prices in the steel cost of British-built ships
and that as a start the arrangements for a differential price for
8plate supplied to shipbuilders should be reinstated. This
recommendation was not accepted, and there were a number of rises
in the price of steel in subsequent years. However, the Booz-Allen
Report found that UK plate prices had been competitive over the
9previous five years up to 1972.
Marine Engines: In 1965 it was estimated that main engines cost *8910
10-15% of the total cost of a ship, and in 1972 this figure was put 
at 15%. Historically, main engine building in the UK has been carried 
out within the shipbuilding industry, with many shipyards having 
engineering shops in the yard. However, the Geddes Report felt that 
the advantages of the proximity were not of great significance.^
8. Cmnd 2937, chapter 10.
9. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.189.
10. Cmnd 2937, chapter 11.
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The report argued that main engine building was particularly 
suited to series production and that existing engine builders were 
too small to use the best equipment in the most effective way. 
Accordingly, Geddes recommended that engine building should be 
concentrated into four production units specialising in engine 
building, and separate from shipbuilding. However, by 1972 the 
eighteen builders of large main engines identified in the Geddes 
Report had been reduced to nine rather than four, and five of the 
nine were linked to shipbuilding companies. The Shipbuilding 
Industry Act 1967, the shipbuilding provisions of which are considered 
in detail in chapters 4 and 5, also provided for assistance to the 
marine engine builders. However, only £309,000 was paid in grants, 
the bulk of which was to one company. This reflected the failure 
to group companies to the extent desired by Geddes and the fact 
that capital expenditure in the industry was relatively low.
Other suppliers. Other equipment accounted for upward of a third of 
the cost of a ship in 1965, while by 1972 it was considered to
Represent about 25% of the cost. Several hundred firms may be
<
involved in supplying a single shipyard. These firms will vary both 
in the size of their sales to shipyards and the extent to which they 
depend on shipbuilding orders. A survey carried out by the 
Department of Trade and Industry and referred to in the Booz-Allen 
Report found that only 15% of companies engaged in the supply of 
marine equipment are more than 50% dependent on sales to UK shipbuilders 
in terms of employment, while only 10% of the total combined workforce 
of the supplying companies was dependent on sales to UK shipbuilders!*
11. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, pp.193-4.
UK marine equipment manufacturers were by no means solely dependent 
on UK shipbuilders: for the six major suppliers in the UK, export 
sales exceeded UK sales in 1971. UK merchant shipbuilders found 
that the quality of the supplies was good but that delivery 
performance was often unsatisfactory.
Relationship of cost of materials to labour and overheads. Fig.1.7
illustrates the proportion of costs attributable to materials, labour
and overheads in the years 1967-71. Overheads accounted for a significantly
larger proportion of costs in 1971 compared to 1967, while the
proportion of labour costs showed a slight rise. Table 1.4 compares UK
figures with those of its major European competitors, illustrating
that overheads were a higher proportion of costs in the UK.
Table 1.4 Proportion of shipbuilding costs between overheads, labour 
and materials: European shipbuilders.
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UK Spain France Germany Norway Sweden Average of Europe
Materials 5 5 64 70 56 68 67 65
Labour 2 6 31 27 26 18 24 25
Overheads 19 5 3 18 14 9 10
Source: Booz-Allen Report, 1973. Exhibit 84, p.213.
191.2.5. Shipbuilding production and technology.
Production. Shipbuilding as an activity resembles both civil engineering 
and vehicle production. It resembles civil engineering in that it 
is concerned with constructing large structures, normally in the 
open air and frequently as 'one-off' orders. Though a number of yards 12
12. For much fuller accounts of this topic see Parkinson,1960;Alexander 
and Jenkins, 1970. Chapter 2; Patton Report, 1962; Cmnd 2937,chapter 
13; Booz-Allen Report,1973,chapters 4,8,15,23. *
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Fig* 1.7 Proportion of shipbuilding costs between overheads, labour and materials, UK 1967-71~ .
Source: Booz-Allen Report, 1973, exhibit 49, p.127.
now have covered berths, the traditional method of constructing 
in the open air has contributed to the poor working conditions 
m  the industry. Shipbuilding resembles vehicle operation in 
that it is largely an assembly industry, putting together components 
from a variety of suppliers and in that its product is highly mobile, 
so that it competes in a world market.
The actual construction of the ship is only part of the 
activities which have to be carried out by a shipbuilding company: 
marketing, planning and design are obvious prerequisites. Fig.1.8 
illustrates the variety of activities involved in constructing a 
ship. Good contact between all departments in a shipyard is obviously 
essential, but the Booz-Allen Report commented that contact between 
design and other departments, particularly production, was infrequent!3 
Of particular significance for activities 12-15 in fig.1.8 was the 
finding that costs were analysed on different bases by estimating 
and financial control departments in several yards.
Fig. 1.8 also illustrates another important feature of the 
industry - the long time scale involved in building a ship,typically 
three years from design to completion. This long time scale 
obviously affects the industry's ability to adapt to sudden changes 
in costs or demand.
Technology and production facilities. One of the major changes in 
the technology of shipbuilding took place before the period covered in 
this study - the change, from riveting to welding, as the main method 
for joining the plates which make up the ship's hull. Like many 
technological changes this had profound human implications in that it
18
13. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, pp.121,186.
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altered the relative demand for skills. The.period covered by this 
study saw changes such as the greater use of computers, both in 
design and controlling machine operations and a trend towards greater 
préfabrication of modules for assembly in the berth. This last 
development obviously required a well-planned yard and improved 
crane facilities.
However, despite significant changes in a few yards all reports 
on the UK industry during the 1960s and early 1970s echoed criticisms 
that Britain lagged behind its competitors in improving its facilities 
The Booz-Allen Report, for example, found that in many yards there was 
an urgent need for further replacement of antiquated equipment.1^
Most berths and supporting facilities were designed for constructing 
ships smaller than those currently being built, and this caused 
congestion and restricted change in production techniques.
One of the aims of government assistance to shipbuilding 
companies has been to encourage them to increase investment in new 
facilities. However, as we shall see in chapter 5, relatively little 
of the government assistance available under the Shipbuilding Industry 
Act 1967 was used to improve production facilities. Considerable 
capital expenditure did, however, take place at Harland and Wolff, 
Scott Lithgow and Swan Hunter and, on a smaller scale, at Appledore.
1.2.6. Relationships and conflict.
The way in which all the above components of shipbuilding activity 
interact obviously has profound implications for the success of a 
company and for the effect which government involvement will have. 
Obvious conflicts will arise where there are differing objectives: 
management may wish to improve output per head while unions will wish
14. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, pp.145-6.
groups are,to maximise the number of their members employed. Both 
however, likely to have a common interest in the survival of a yard 
and may cooperate in seeking government assistance. There may also 
be differing interests within a union between yard shop stewards 
and national officials, as is illustrated by the role of national 
officials after the collapse of UCS (see section 6.3.5.)
The introduction of new equipment or new processes may 
profoundly affect the total labour force required or the relative 
need for specific skills. Because there is no recognised skill as a 
'shipbuilding worker' and because the fragmentation of largely 
historically based trades is reflected in the multiplicity of trade 
unions, any dispute about redundancies or about\ho should operate 
new equipment may develop into an inter-union dispute. To avert 
such disputes management may accept manning levels which mean that the 
maximum benefit is not obtained from new investment.
Demarcation between the trades has been exacerbated for historical 
reasons. Prior to the period covered by this study it was common 
for workers to be laid off on completion of a ship - this could arise 
even when a new keel could be laid immediately after a launch, since 
some trades, such as outfitting, were only required at some stages of 
construction. Apart from the obvious result that this encouraged 
workers to delay completion of ships, it also encouraged each union to 
establish certain activities as the prerogative of their members. 
Management effectively abdicated its role of allocating workers to 
particular activities and left the unions to resolve disputes among 
themselves. A National Demarcation Agreement which came into force 
in May 1969 helped to produce a decline in stoppages arising from 
demarcation disputes, but the existencee£ fragmentation of trades and 
unions in the UK^but not in its major competitor^has obviously affected
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Table 1.5 Stoppages in shipbuilding and other Industries in the UK
(days lost per 1000 employees through stoppage in progress in Year-).
Indus try Annual
average
1960-4 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Annual
average
1965-70
Shipbuilding and
marine engineering 1,450 800 150 750 1800 1000 2050 1100
Port and inland
water transport 1,200 750 1000 4450 850 3500 6850 2900
Motor vehicles n.a. 1750 7Ó0 1000 1800 3100 2150 1750
Coal mining 650 850 250 225 125 2700 3050 1200
All industries and
services. 140 130 110 125 200 300 475 225
Source: Cmnd 4756, table 18.1, p.89.
the ability of the UK industry to adapt and to improve productivity 
sufficiently to compete in world markets.
A high incidence of strikes obviously affects both an industry's 
profitability and its ability to deliver on time. Unreliable delivery 
performance has been regarded by shipowners as a major weakness of the 
UK shipbuilding industry.^
Table 1.5 shows that days lost in shipbuilding and marine engineering 
were well above the national average for all industries and services 
during 1965-70, with only docks, motor vehicles and coal mining being 
worse, though there was an improvement in shipbuilding's relative 
position between 1960-4 and 1965-70. Shipbuilding also compared badly
15. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, chapter 7.
with other UK industries in terms of number of stoppages (see 
table 1.6). More importantly, industrial relations has not been 
a problem for major European shipbuilders, who have experienced 
relatively few strikes.
Table 1.6. Number of stoppages per 1000 employees, UK.
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Shipbuilding and marine
engineering 0.64 0.42 0.49 0.71 0.47 0.61
All industries and services 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.17
Source: Cmnd 4756, table 18.2, p.89
The theme of industrial relations has been treated very briefly
here, but the coverage given to industrial relations in government-
sponsored reports on the industry underlines the importance of good
industrial relations for the prosperity, indeed survival, of the 
16industry. However, it does appear that there is little the
government itself can do to affect industrial relations within firms,
though where the government itself controls a shipyard, as at Harland
and Wolff, it has tried to improve relations by encouraging worker
participation. Government involvement can in certain circumstances
make industrial relations worse: where government policy is concerned
with making the industry more competitive and this has required
redundancies, this may conflict with government objectives of improving
industrial relations and avoiding high localised unemployment. It will
be argued in this study that this dilemma can only be resolved if the 
government has a specific and visible policy for dealing with the social 
consequences of industrial change. 16
16. See Cmnd 2937, chapters 20 and 21; Cmnd 4756; Booz-Allen Report 
1973, chapter 16. *
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1.3. SHIPYARDS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT.
Even from the above discussion of activities within the shipbuilding 
industry it has become clear that shipbuilding is affected by influences 
from outside the shipyard walls, and that what goes on inside the 
shipyard affects life outside. The political implications of this 
can be seen more clearly by discussing the social environment, but 
it is useful to consider first the physical and other determinants 
of the location of shipyards.
1.3.1 Location.
The location of early shipyards in the UK was largely determined by 
the availability of materials used in construction.17 When ships 
were constructed of wood the cost of moving timber encouraged the 
establishment of shipyards in estuaries whose rivers flowed through 
oak forests, e.g. the Thames estuary. The development in the 
nineteenth century of iron-hulled and later steel-hulled ships and 
of steam power, in which Britain played such an important role, 
encouraged the setting up of shipyards in areas with coastal 
coalfields and where iron and steel manufacturing were well-developed, 
such as Clydeside and the North-East of England. Thames estuary yards 
suffered a complete decline. However, not all thejards had their 
location completely determined by the availability of the new materials: 
there were important yards at Belfast, Barrow and Birkenhead, of which 
only Barrow was on a coalfield.
The distribution of shipbuilding in the UK still reflects these 
nineteenth century influences. However, since then the significance of
17. This section draws on Riley, 1973, pp.196-210; see also 
Parkinson, 1960, pp.7-9.
steam power has declined and more efficient methods of transport 
have reduced the cost of moving many bulky materials. Since the 
Second World War there has been a considerable increase in the 
number of coastal steelworks in other countries, especially Japan, 
which enables steel supplies to be moved to shipyards by water. As 
we saw in section 1.2.4, suppliers of equipment for modern ships 
are specialist firms for whom shipbuilders are only one of many 
customers. Although in the UK the historical pattern of trades 
has remained of significance to the present day, in the international 
context changes in the method of assembly, including préfabrication, 
have reduced the requirement for local skilled labour. This, in 
addition to rapidly rising wages in industrialised countries, has 
encouraged the establishment of yards in less industrialised countries. 
West European nations other than the UK have nevertheless managed to 
increase their output in absolute size, if not in terms of share of 
a growing market.
The importance of proximity to materials has therefore declined, 
but this has not been replaced by market orientation. Although up to 
and including the period covered by this study British shipyards 
expected British shipowners to provide their basic order book, it 
is clear that British shipyards must be able to compete in an inter­
national market for both UK and foreign orders if they are to survive. 
Given the nature of the product, transport costs of the completed ship 
are negligible, so there is no disadvantage to a customer if he 
literally has his ship built half way round the globe.
Apart from the obvious requirement for deep water for launching - 
a requirement which many British yards no longer fulfil
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for larger ships - there are therefore few restrictions on the 
location of new shipyards. This has led Riley to classify shipbuilding 
as a ’footloose’ industry. The significance of this is not simply 
that the present distribution of shipbuilding within the UK is a 
product of geographical inertia rather than continuing locational 
advantages, but that the industry is now footloose on a global scale, 
with the level of national production depending on competitiveness 
in the world market. As Riley remarks, 'If prices are too high in 
one area or yard, there will be contraction, while in other areas 
there will be expansion and the construction of new d o c k s . N e i t h e r  
the present British shipbuilding areas nor the UK as a whole any 
longer have any special locational advantages.
1.3.2 Shipbuilding at national and regional level.
Considered in terms of turnover and number employed, the UK shipbuilding
industry is fairly insignificant compared to many other industries
and, indeed, some single companies. The Booz-Allen Report pointed out
that in 1971 the twelve major shipbuilding companies would have
ranked as 56th in turnover and 123rd in capital employed if considered
20as a single company. The twelve companies employed 0.25% of the
total UK working population, and if they had been considered as single 
company they would have been 18th among UK industrial companies in 
terms of employees.
Shipbuilding has clearly absorbed amounts of central government 
attention out of all proportion to these national figures. To understand 
why, we must look at the distribution of the industry within the UK.
18. Riley, 1973, pp.196-210.
19. Riley, 1973, p.210.
20. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.107.
Major shipyards are overwhelmingly concentrated in development areas 
(Vosper Thornycroft in Southampton and Portsmouth being the only 
exception), and within development areas there is a concentration in 
special development areas such as Clydeside and Tyneside (see fig.1.9). 
As we might expect from this, unemployment in the areas in which 
shipyards are located is generally high (though assisted areas and areas 
of high unemployment need not coincide: Coventry, with unemployment 
well above the UK average in 1976 is not in a development area, 
whereas Aberdeen, which has below UK average unemployment, is in a 
development area). Shipyards do, in fact, tend to be located within 
development areas in places with above the average unemployment rate 
for the development area as a whole. The percentage of total 
unemployment in such areas which is accounted for by shipbuilding is, 
of course, considerably higher than the UK figure, so we would expect 
the local effects of closure to be much more severe. Table 1.7 shows 
the proportion of total employment rate for major shipbuilding areas 
shortly before the package of assistance to shipbuilding embodied in 
the Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967.
Table 1.7 Employment situation in major shipbuilding areas.
Area Approximate % of total % of total employment Unemployment
employment in area in area in shipbuilding Rate ( % ) in
engaged in manufacturing and shiprepair, mid- area,
_________________industry,mid-1964________ 1964__________________  August 1975
Upper Clyde 40 2.4 3.1
Lower Clyde 35 6.0 4.0
Dundee Area 49 1.1 2.5
Tyne (incl.Blyth) 39 6.0 2.8
Tees 49 2.7 2.7
Wear 42 7.9 3.9Barrow-in-Furnes s 58 15.0 3.1
Mersey 36 7.1 3.0
Southampton 34 4.7 1.2
Belfast 37 5.0 5.0
Source: Cmnd 2937, table 6, p.98
Note: For comparison, the UK unadjusted unemployment rate for Ai.ono«- 1 0 7 c was 1 .4%  august iso
2 8
Govan
Marathon
Yarrow
(UCS)
•Robb Caledon
----Austin & Pick.
Doxford & 
Sunderland
Vosper Thornycroft
Fig. 1.9 Location of major shipyards in relation to assisted areas
Note: Assisted area boundaries are as at 1976.
Source: Base map showing assisted area boundaries taken
from Department of Industry pamphlet 'Areas for Expansion'
1976.
The relatively high unemployment rate for many of these areas 
stemmed partly from the decline of industries such as coal, which 
as we saw had in the nineteenth century given locational advantages 
to shipbuilding, and partly from the decline of shipbuilding itself. 
However, we should be careful not to exaggerate the extent to which 
shipbuilding is responsible for this decline in employment. In West 
Central Scotland shipbuilding, shiprepairing and marine engineering 
combined lost 19,000 net jobs between 1959 and 1968, but the bulk 
of this came not from shipbuilding itself, but from marine engineering 
The effect is even more marked in the period 1963-8, when the decline 
in the overall figure was due entirely to marine engineering. This 
might seem to conflict with the accounts of sizeable redundancies in 
shipbuilding on the Clyde given later in this study, but this apparent 
contradiction is resolved when we examine the highly location-specific 
nature of employment changes, even within the regional distribution 
of shipbuilding. While the difficulties of some firms are causing 
dramatic political problems for the government, other firms may be 
quietly expanding or even suffering from labour shortages.
The economic impact of shipyards on their local communities is 
not confined to the number of men they employ directly. Many suppliers 
to the industry are also located in shipbuilding areas, and the 
closure or substantial running down of a yard may lead to the suppliers 
having to lay off some of their own workers. Shopkeepers and others 
who depend on the spending power of shipyard workers are also likely 
to be affected. However, it is important to avoid assuming that 
the effects of a closure are always drastic enough to justify saving 
the yard at any price. Despite the importance which politicians 
attach to these consequential effects of closure, we do in fact have
21. For a more detailed analysis of this point see Hogwood, 1976a
very little information of how large they are, arid there is a natural
tendency for the figures to be exaggerated in the absence of firm
figures (for, example, after the UCS collapse; see section 6.3).
A shipyard's interaction with the local community is not
confined to its employment impact. The existence of a yard imposes
a need for adequate transport to work. The nature of housing can
have an important impact on the kind of policies which a government
can introduce to cope with the decline or closure of a shipyard.
Government policy at local or national level to provide relatively
cheap council house accommodation with its associated waiting lists,
and to improve security of tenure in the private rented sector has
provided a disincentive to leave existing accommodation to seek a
new job. It should be noted that this disincentive operates not
only between regions, but between local authority areas within the
same region. About 91% of unemployed men and 95% of unemployed women
are unwilling to seek work beyond daily travelling distance from
22their present homes. This reluctance is not entirely due to the
effects of housing policy and reflects other economic costs and social
values associated with moving. It. does, however, provide a pointer
to why governments have concentrated on maintaining existing jobs
in existing communities. If incentives to promote labour mobility
are to be effective, they have to be linked to changes outside the
traditional confines of 'industrial' and 'regional' policy: 'Linking
housing to enployment policies, designed to encourage mobility might
therefore mean radical changes in the financing and purposes of public 
23housing'. 23
22. Roberti, 1975, p.53; see also Craven, 1975.
23. Craven, 1975, p.124.
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Shipbuilding is affected by a vast number of policies which are 
designed to affect the whole country and all industries, while some 
are aimed at particular regions or particular industries. These 
possibilities are illustrated in table 1.8. Shipbuilding is affected 
by nationwide policies on such matters as company law (though with some 
differences in Scotland), taxation, safety, pollution and labour (e.g. 
over redundancies). Shipbuilding's concentration in assisted areas 
makes it eligible for the whole range of regional grants and loans 
in addition to those specifically available to shipbuilding. The word 
'explicit' in the column headed 'No explicit spatial discrimination' 
in table 1.8 is of significance, because although the Shipbuilding 
Industry Act 1967 was defined in terms of aid to a specific sector it 
clearly had a spatially skewed impact.
Table 1.8 Spatial and sectoral discrimination in policies affecting 
Shipbuilding.
No explicit spatial Spatial
discrimination discrimination
No explicit sectoral 
discrimination
Sectoral discrimination
e.g.taxation, safety, 
labour,pollution
e.g. Shipbuilding policy
Regional policy
e.g.aid to individual 
yards
Finally, in addition to benefiting from industrial incentives at 
national level, regional level and industry level, many shipyards have also, 
as we will see in subsequent chapters, received aid specifically directed 
to dealing with their individual problems.
1.4 SHIPBUILDING AND THE WORLD ECONOMY.
1.4.1 How demand for ships is determined.
Demand for merchant ships, unlike demand for, say, washing machines, does
not depend directly on consumer demand, but is derived from trade 
in other commodities. Thus demand for new ships will depend on 
the size of the existing fleet, the scrap rate of the existing 
fleet, and the growth of world trade in various commodities, which 
will in turn depend on relative demand and supply and rates of 
growth of national income in various countries. Both the scrap 
rate and the rate of growth of national incomes are subject to 
changes which can result in large fluctuations in demand for ships.
To be more accurate, demand for new ships depends on expectations 
about the growth in world trade; because of the length of time 
taken to construct a ship - or even more a series of ships - 
estimates have to be made of the likely demand for (and supply of) 
ships at the time when the ship is completed rather than at the 
time it was ordered. If these estimates turn out to be too optimistic 
as with the orders for tankers placed by Maritime Fruit in 1973, the 
shipowner may be left with ships with no cargo to carry and 
cancellations may result. For any yard or country contemplating 
constructing or replacing shipbuilding facilities the problem is one 
stage further back, since the demand for new capacity depends on 
expectations about demand for ships in future years and about other 
new capacity which may be constructed elsewhere.
Discussion of demand in terms of total number or total tonnage 
is not very helpful, both because of the nature of the measurements 
(see appendix to this chapter) and because what matters is a yard’s 
ability to produce a type of ship for which there is demand. Because 
of their relatively narrow rivers many British yards were incapable 
of building the very largest ships which made up a large proportion of
the demand in the late 1960s and early 1970s. An important point to 
note is that demand for a particular kind of ship, such as large 
tankers, may well be more volatile than total demand for ships.
The share of world demand obtained by any one yard or country 
will depend on its relative competitiveness in terms of price and 
delivery; this will in turn depend on the quality of lAbour and 
management, industrial relations, quality of facilities and 
reliability of suppliers (see section 1.2). Another influence on 
the share obtained will, of course, be the capacity available to 
construct the ships required. Not all parts of the market for ships 
are open to UK shipbuilders; the Booz-Allen Report estimated that 
nearly one third of the Western world's demand for new vessels was 
not open to international competition. Even where demand is open 
to international competition the relative competitiveness of a 
country is affected by the international pattern of government 
support for shipbuilding (section 1.4.3).
However, even with these reservations the relative performance 
of the UK has been disappointing. Table 1.9 shows that while there 
was no clear decline in absolute terms of output in gross registered 
tons there has been a steady decline in the UK share of a rising world 
output. Catherwood suggests that 'A declining volume with an increasing 
market share is normally a more healthy sign than an increasing volume 
and a declining market share. In the latter case, the business is
usually in for some horrible shocks at the next decline in the trade
i » 25 cycle . 245
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24. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.65.
25. Catherwood, 1966, p.74.
Table 1.9. World and UK output and UK market share 1947-71
Year
delivered
Ships delivered 
World
(000 grt) 
UK
Uk share (%)
1947 1,880 944 50.2
1948 2,482 1,213 48.9
1949 3,114 1,353 43.4
1950 3,254 1,389 42.7
1951 3,557 1,340 37.7
1952 4,211 1,264 30.0
1953 4,938 1,250 25.3
1954 5,450 1,496 27.4
1955 4,967 1,322 26.6
1956 6,291 1,457 23.2
1957 8,117 1,421 17.5
1958 9,059 1,464 16.2
1959 8,697 1,383 15.9
1960 8,382 1,298 15.5
1961 8,058 1,382 17.2
1962 8,182 1,016 12.4
1963 9,028 1,096 12.1
1964 9,724 808 8.3
1965 11,763 1,282 10.9
1966 14,105 1,074 7.6
1967 15,157 1,188 7.8
1968 16,845 1,047 6.2
1969 18,739 828 4.4
1970 20,980 1,327 6.3
1971 24,388 1,233 5.1
Sources: Cmnd 2937, appendix K, p.185; Booz-Allen Report.1973 
Exhibit 30, p.9l. * ,a»
Table 1.10 World Market share of leading Shipbuilding C o i m f n W
grt completed as a percentage of total
The UK was in fact the only leading shipbuilding country which achieved 
no growth in the period 1955-71. As table 1.10 shows the bulk of 
the increased world output has come from Japan.
There is one aspect of the demand for new ships which is directly 
under the control of the UK: the demand for new naval ships. As 
table 1.11 shows, naval work formed an important though fluctuating 
proportion of total UK output by value in 1957-64. However, a 
contracting naval programme since then has, if anything, increased 
instability in the industry. The government, in placing the remaining
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orders has actively followed a policy of concentrating naval shipbuilding 
in a few specialised yards. As table 1.11 illustrates, UK shipyards 
have traditionally undertaken work for foreign navies. However, 
their ability to continue to do so has been reduced by the policy 
of Labour governments of banning the supply of warships to regimes 
which are abhorrent to them, such as South Africa and post-Allende 
Chile. Thus UK shipyards are affected by government defence and 
foreign affairs policy as well as by economic and industrial policies.
Table 1.11 Naval work as percentage of total output by value,1957-64.
Merchant ships 
£m 1
Royal Navy 
Em2
Other Naval 
Em 2,3 Naval work as %age of 
total
Royal Navy work 
as percentage 
of total.
1957 200 18.7 3.4 9.9 8.4
1958 200 23.3 8.5 13.7 10.0
1959 200 26.1 12.1 16.0 11.0
1960 210 25.0 7.6 13.4 10.3
1961 220 24.6 4.7 11.8 9.9
1962 140 30.7 5.1 20.4 17.5
1963 140 29.5 4.5 19.5 16.9
1964 106 26.9 5.9 23.6 19.4
Source: Cmnd 2937, table 3, p.32
Notes: 1. Approximate. Ships over 100 gross tons. Includes fleet
auxiliary vessels.
2. Excludes value of weapons systems and fleet auxiliary vessels.
3. Estimated.
1.4.2. Forecasting.
Two features of shipbuilding demand emphasise the desirability of 
firm forecasts: (1) the time taken to build ships (see fig.1.8) or to 
construct new facilities; (2)the size of investment involved in the
construction both of ships and of new building facilities. Unhappily,
demand is subject to vast fluctuations within a short period which 
can quickly render forecasts inaccurate, sometimes even before they 
are published - a classic example is the EEC's Report on the Long and 
Medium Term Development of the Shipbuilding Market.26 27 Demand forecasts 
are very sensitive to assumptions about growth of world trade, while 
demand for particular types of ship may be affected by price changes 
in the commodities transported. Although this section concentrates 
largely on demand forecasting, a shipbuilder will try to forecast 
a range of other items, such as availability of skilled labour and 
the future rate of inflation - particularly important where he has 
taken on fixed price contracts. An important feature of most causes 
of changes in demand is that they are not for the most part within 
the control of a single national government and even some which are, 
such as the exchange rate, are unlikely to be used solely to aid 
shipbuilding.
Demand forecasts will affect the kind of assistance governments
will be prepared to give, so it is of interest to examine the
forecasts contained in some of the government-sponsored reports on
the industry. The forecast, if it can be dignified with that name,
contained in the 1961 report of the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee
27on Prospects was very crude. Basically it assumed that UK shipyards 
would get most of the orders of UK shipowners plus a share of foreign 
orders. The assumption about UK shipyards taking the bulk of UK 
shipowners' orders turned out to be completely wrong. In 1965 only 
43% of tonnage ordered for British registration went to UK yards;
26. EEC, 1972.
27. SAC Report, 1961; see also section 3.4.
during 1966-67 68.7% of UK vessels (86.4% of tankers) were imported.
The SAC Report’s assumptions illustrate the complacency of the UK 
industry at the beginning of the 1960s and the failure to appreciate 
the international nature of the market in which the industry was 
now competing.
The Geddes Report in 1966 emphasised this international market.28 29
The Geddes Committee commissioned forecasts from a firm of 
consultants, Science in General Management Ltd. Their forecasts 
of world demand were based on analysis of past trends in the demand 
for the main types of ship with adjustments where there were reasons 
for believing that experience in the future might be different.
The overall estimate for world completions was 15-19m grt by 1972/5.
For the UK, the Report presented three possible outcomes: (1) decline 
(output lm grt); (2) holding on (l|m grt); (3) growth (2jm grt). 
However, it soon became clear that the Geddes forecasts were a 
considerable underestimate: output was 15.16 m grt by 1967 and by 
1970 output had exceeded the top end of the range forecast for 1972/5. 
Despite this larger than forecast growth in world demand and despite 
government assistance, the UK industry fell into the category 
described by Geddes as ’decline’.
The Booz-Allen Report in 1973 presented a forecast based on a
model which included the main determinants of world ship requirements,2  ^
Although the report commented on the sensitivity of its assumptions
to changes in the forecast rate of growth of world trade, the demand
forecast itself was based on a single figure for the growth of world
trade.
28. Cgmd 2937, especially chapters 5 and 6.
29. Booa-Allen Report, 1973, chapters 1-3.
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Nine possible futures were outlined for the UK industry based on 
different assumptions about its future performance and the level 
of government assistance. However, these possible futures were 
also based on the surely unjustified assumption that foreign 
competitors would not achieve substantial cost reductions through 
improved performance over existing levels (for further comments 
see section 6.6). While the report was still being considered by 
the Department of Trade and Industry, a surge of tanker orders 
suggested that the forecast was going to be too pessimistic; however, 
the savage cutback in the demand for tankers following the Arab- 
Israeli War in 1973 and the oil price rise made the forecast seem 
too optimistic (see fig.6.1).
The lesson of these and other forecasts is that single figure 
forecasts or forecasts within a wide range are almost certain to 
be wrong or vague or both. To such an extent is this the case 
that certainty of deviation from the forecast seems at least as 
important as the size of the forecast itself. Indeed, as table 1.12 
shows, even forecasts made at about the same time contain a wide 
range of estimates. This suggests that the most useful type of 
forecast is not a single figure (or rather a collection of figures for 
different types of ship) nor a range, but a description of possibilities 
with the assumptions on which they are based made explicit and with the 
effect of changes in these assumptions outlined.
Table 1.12 Forecast annual requirements for new ships (million grt)
Study Annual average To 1975
demand
1975-80
Shipbuilding Association of Japan 33 33
EuroEconomics 23 27
Association of West European 
Shipbuilders 23 29
Maynard PRC 17 23
European Economic Commission 15 20
Mean of above studies 22 26
Booz-Allen and Hamilton 20 27
Source: Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.33.
The implication of such forecasts for the shipbuilder would be 
that his plans should be robust against plausible changes in demand 
either by building a type of ship for which demand is always likely 
to be steady, as Austin and Pickersgill appear to have been successful 
in doing in the late 1960s and the 1970s or by ensuring the flexibility 
to construct several types of ship. A further implication is that 
shipbuilders (and government) should be reluctant to commit large sums 
on the basis of assumptions about one kind of demand; for example,
Harland and Wolff’s building dock, ideal for building giant tankers, 
for which demand collapsed in the mid 1970s, may prove to be a less 
useful i n v e s t m e n t  t h a n  S c o t t  Lithgow's building mat.
Forecasting clearly has political implications. The above analysis 
suggests that governments too should seek to make their plans robust 
against all too likely deviations from forecast; the extent to which 
they have attempted to do so will be analysed in the subsequent chapters.
} d>
Forecasting is not politically neutral in an international 
context either. As table 1.12 clearly shows, the Japanese have 
forecast greater growth in demand for new ships than their competitors, 
and this has been reflected in the greater growth of Japanese 
shipbuilding capacity. As both the Japanese and their competitors 
have recognised, any international agreement about reducing world 
over-capacity will have to start with agreement about forecast demand.
1.4.3. Involvement by foreign governments in their shipbuilding industries. 
That their competitors have been more heavily subsidised than themselves 
has been a constant cry of British shipbuilders.30 This is a plea 
which deserves serious consideration, and the best way to examine it 
is to look at the evidence, an approach which has not always been 
adopted by those who argue that Britain is at a disadvantage. There 
are measurement difficulties involved in making a complete cross-national 
assessment. The wide range of measures which can be used to assist 
shipbuilding was illustrated in a 1965 report by the OECD which 
classified measures into six groups, many of which had several subdivision!.
A. Measures to protect the national market.
(a) customs duties
(b) import restrictions
(c) preferential treatment granted to national owners for
ships built in national yards.
B. Direct subsidies for shipyards.
C. Assistance in the field of taxation.
(a) exemptions from or rebates of customs duty
(b) tax exemptions or rebates.
D. Assistance in the field of credit and credit insurance.
(a) assistance for the equipment of yards
(b) assistancefor the purpose of facilitating the production
activities of yards.
30. See for example, HC347,Session 1971-2, paras 97-8: HC347-T
1971-2, Q.486-91, 885. .session
OECD, 1975.
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E. Other forms of public intervention.
(a) assistance to other sectors affecting shipbuilding
(b) public purchasing 6
(c) public ownership
F. Remedial policies for the sector.
It will be appreciated that it would be difficult to assess 
the value of many of these measures individually and even more 
difficult to assess the total value of all the measures for one 
country. However, it is possible to make some comments about Britain' 
relative position. It is important to bear in mind that if it is 
shown that some of Britain's competitors have at times had the benefit 
of more advantageous measures than those available to UK shipbuilding 
this does not m  itself prove that this is the sole cause of the 
poor position of the UK - it could be that even in the absence of 
discriminatory measures the British shipbuilding industry, or to be 
more accurate, parts of the British shipbuilding industry, would have 
failed to be competitive.
Some of the measures listed above, especially A, might have 
the effect of excluding UK shipbuilders completely from some national 
markets. The Booz-Allen Report argued that in Japan, Itaty, Spain, 
the USA and, to a lesser extent, France legislation, administrative 
practice or economic strength ensured that these countries bought 
ships only from their own shipbuilders and estimated that the fleets 
of those countries constituted 29% of world demand for new ships.32 
To this extent the claims that the UK industry is at a disadvantage 
are justified; it is arguable that the existence of a secure home 
market provides a cushion for an industry which is not now available 
to UK shipbuilders. However, the question of government aids in that 
part of world demand for ships open to international competition 
remains to be considered.
32. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.59.
6 /
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The available evidence suggests that, while during the early
1960s the UK industry did not receive as much benefit from aid
measures as most of its competitors, by the early 1970s the UK
industry was receiving aid of similar if not greater value than its
competitors. In 1965 the OECD published a report which outlined the
measures of assistance available to some member countries (Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Germany,France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, US) at the end of May 1964 or which had
33been available prior to that date. Although the report itself 
does not draw up a league table it is clear that the measures 
available in Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Spain and the United States 
were much more favourable than those available to UK shipbuilders.
The OECD report commented that 'The historical and traditional role of 
the United Kingdom in the provision of shipbuilding services is 
probably the reason why the United Kingdom Government policy has been 
to keep both shipping and shipbuilding as free from restriction as 
possible'. The only government intervention which the report
considered to have had a decisive effect on the output of the UK 
industry and its role in the international market was the government 
Credit Scheme (considered in section 3.6), which had already been 
terminated by the time the report was published.
By 1972, however, the UK had introduced a wide range of assistance 
to the shipbuilding industry - the grants, loans and credit guarantees 
under the 1967 Shipbuilding Industry Act, rescue aid for a number of 
shipyards, and, in 1972, direct subsidies. The effect of all this 34
33. OECD, 1965.
34. OECD, 1965, p.90.
Oassistance, according to the Booz-Allen Report^was that UK subsidy 
and export credit arrangements compared favourably with those of 
other shipbuilding countries except the USA (that bastion of free 
enterprise !)3? However, as the report pointed out, the situation 
fluctuated from year to year according to the different credit terms 
and subsidies offered by different governments.
The relatively much more favourable position of the UK shipbuilding 
in terms of the pattern of international government assistance by 
1972 was reflected in the switch from the UK government's traditional 
stance of trying to eliminate discriminatory practices. The OECD 
was the international body involved in attempting to reduce ftie level 
of subsidies. However, at an OECD meeting at the beginning of 1972 
the UK representatives, while still supporting the principle of 
reduction in subsidiesjwere unwilling to commit themselves to the 
abolition of subsidies by 1974. The DTI feared that a very rapid 
reduction of aid mould have a troublesome effect on firms which were 
not currently competitive. Further evidence of the UK's reluctance 
to cooperate in international measures to reduce subsidies came at 
the end of November 1973 when Britain had serious reservations about a 
number of recommendations of the EEC for limiting state aids under a 
proposed new directive (to which France was also opposed). Similarly, 
in 1975 the EEC toned down its original insistence that emergency 
shipbuilding aids must be subject to its approval in advance in 
response to mainly British objections.
The relative decline of the UK shipbuilding industry cannot, 
therefore, be blamed solely on 'unfair' government assistance to its 
competitors. Clearly UK shipbuilders have effectively been excluded
35. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.59.
36. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2290-1.
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from some parts of the world market and particularly in the early 
1960s many of its competitors received more favourable assistance. 
However, even when UK shipbuilding received aid comparable to its 
competitors its relative decline continued. By 1972 some parts of 
the UK industry had become dependent on continuing government 
assistance for their survival.
1.5 THE SHIPBUILDING POLICY PROCESS.
The preceding sections have shown that there is a wide range of 
influences on shipbuilding, from the impact of new technology to 
international politics. Are there any themes which can draw these 
topics together? There seem to be at least four:
1. The range of influences which affect the success of UK shipbuilding 
is wide, and direct government involvement is only one of such 
influences.
2. The government's ability to affect those other influences ranges 
from its ability to change its own policy on, say, regional aid 
to its comparative impotence in dealing with a sharp fall in the 
demand for oil tankers.
3. The impact of these influences changes over time, with various 
degrees of predictability.
4. The success or otherwise of shipyards can have important 
implications for the communities in which they are located and 
for other government policies.
What are the implications of all these interactions for government 
policy to meet a problem affecting the industry? The first difficulty 
is to decide 'What is the problem?'. Lindblom points out that 'Policy
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* • 37makers are not faced with a given problem. Instead they have 
to identify and formulate their problem'. The observable problem 
may be that a shipyard is short of cash, but what is the 'real' 
problem - inflation, industrial relations, high localised unemployment? 
Lindblorn's view is that
'there is all kinds of room for controversy over what 
"the problem is", and no way to settle the controversy 
by analysis. Here already, then, is a limit on analytic 
policy making and a necessary point of entry for "politics" 
and other "irrationalities" in policy making'. 38
The view taken in this study is that analysis can at least 
separate the two different aspects of 'a problem': 'what is the 
state of affairs which the government wishes to avert', and 'what 
brought about this state of affairs'. Since policy to avert a 
state of affairs need not necessarily require tackling the causes 
of that state of affairs, Lindblorn's politics do enter into 
the definition of the problem. However, it is important to maintain 
the distinction between the two aspects of a problem, otherwise a 
government may adopt a particular policy to deal with a problem in 
the short term, but if the initial causes of the situation remain in 
force the policy may be ineffective. An example would be where the 
government gives a grant to a shipyard in difficulties to avert 
high localised unemployment but does nothing about the causes of 
the difficulties: if these difficulties remain in force the problem 
will recur. However, attempting to tackle these causes need not 
necessarily avoid the undesired state of affairs: given its existing 
output, making a yard more competitive might involve reducing the 
size of the labour force. 37
37. Lindblorn, 1968, p.13.
Governments need information to enable them to deal with these 
problems. We can categorise these information needs into information 
needed to identify a problem, information needed t»formulate a 
policy, information needed to implement a policy and information about 
the impact of a policy, though we may find that some kinds of 
information will be needed at more than one stage. There is, 
indeed, a danger that if information collection and appraisal for 
each of these activities is carried out by a different organisation 
there may be wasteful duplication or harmful omissions. However, 
information collection and appraisal are not costless: at some point 
the likely improvement in policy making from more information will 
be outweighed by the cost of obtaining the information. Por decisions 
about an industry such as shipbuilding, with all the interactions 
shown in fig.1.4, the costs of obtaining the information needed 
under a 'rational-comprehensive' model of policy making (table 1.13) 
or voider the Simonian pure rationality model (table 1.14) would 
tend to infinity. Even if all the information required was available, 
there may be ambiguity about how it should be interpreted, or its 
complexity may be beyond our ability to analyse.^
' . _, In contrast to the vast information
requirements of the rational-comprehensive and pure rationality 
models, Lindblom asserts it as a positive virtue of his successive 
limited comparisons (or incremental) model (table 1.15) that 
'simplifying by limiting the focus to small variations from present 
policy makes the most of available knowledge'.^0 In subsequent 
chapters the information available to the government at various 3940
39. March and Olsen, 1975, pp.154-5.
40. Lindblom, 1959, p.85.
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stages will be outlined, and in chapter 8 the role of information 
in the shipbuilding policy process will be examined in detail.
Table 1.13 The rational-comprehensive model.
1. Clarification of values or objectives is distinct from, and 
usually prerequisite to, empirical analysis of alternative policies.
2. Policy formulation is therefore approached through means-end 
analysis: first the ends are isolated, then the means to achieve them 
are sought.
3. The test of a 'good' policy is that it can be shown to be the most 
appropriate means to desired ends.
4. Analysis is comprehensive; every important relevant factor is 
taken into account.
5. Theory is often heavily relied upon.
Source: Lindblom, 1959, p.81.
Table 1.14 Simon: pure rationality model.
1. Three types of activity:
(a) intelligence activity: finding occasions calling for a decision;
(b) design activity: identifying all possible types of relevant action;
(c) choice activity: selecting the best course of action.
2. Characteristics of rational decision-making:
(a) the decision-maker would know all the possible alternative
courses of a c t i o n  o p e n  t o  him;
(b) he would foresee the consequences which would follow from 
each (or at least, be able to attach a probability to each 
consequence);
(c) he would relate each consequence to a complete and consistent 
value-system or preference-ordering system;
(d) make an optional choice from all the alternative courses of 
action.
Source: See Simon, 1976.
Table 1.15 Lindblom: successive limited comparisons (or 
incremental) model.
1. Selection of value goals and empirical analysis of the need for 
action are not distinct from one another but are closely intertwined.
2. Since means and ends are not distinct, means-end analysis is 
often inappropriate or limited.
3. The test of a 'good' policy is typically that various analysts 
find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without their 
agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective).
4. Analysis is drastically limited:
(a) important possible outcomes are neglected;
(b) important alternative potential policies are neglected 
(comparisons are limited to those policies that differ
in relatively small degree from policies presently in effect);
(c) important affected values are neglected.
5. A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance on theory.
Source: Lindblom, 1959, pp.81,84.
The kinds of information a government seeks to collect will also 
depend on what kinds of consequences of its policy the government 
wishes to explore. Government decisions about one issue can have 
important consequences for government policy in other fields. How 
far should decision makers dealing with one problem take these 
consequences into account? The rational-comprehensive model and the pure 
rationality model would include all the consequences, which would make 
the analysis prohibitively expensive, particularly because of the loops 
of influence involved (see fig.1.4). Lindblom's advice would be to ignore 
even some important consequences.
Clearly, our views about all the points considered above 
will depend on what model of decision making we have in mind. 
Should we view the government as setting objectives, reviewing 
all the alternatives and selecting the best policy to fulfil 
its objectives (see table 1.13)? We do not need all the evidence 
collected here to tell us that British government policy on 
shipbuilding was not formulated in this way. Similarly, Simon 
himself recognises that limits to the skills of decision makers, 
limits to knowledge and limits to values mean that his pure 
rationality model (table 1.14) is rarely, if ever,'an accurate 
account of how decisions are actually taken. ^  However, it 
will be of interest to see whether a ’constrained' or ’bounded' 
rationality model can serve as a useful framework for analysing 
UK government involvement in shipbuilding.
Lindblom's successive limited;comparisons model (or 
’incremental' model as it is called in one of its variants) might 
seem to be a more suitable model for our purposes, since we are 
concerned with a fairly large number of separate decisions. This 
would not be the same as endorsing incrementalism as a good 
prescriptive model. Even the value of the model as a relevant 
description is affected by crucial assumptions about terminology, 
in particular about the word 'increment' itself. Another important 
point to bear in mind is that not all the decisions which will be 
examined are of the same kind in terms of scale, lumpiness and 
reversibility: a decision to give several million pounds to 
construct a building dock is different in kind from a decision to 41
41. Simon, 1976, pp.39-41.
pay wages for a week to delay the liquidation of a company. The 
first decision would require much more analysis.
Although the rational-comprehensive model has been ruled 
out as a useful one for the purposes of this study, this does not 
imply that governments do not have objectives. Governments often 
state that they see their policies as fulfilling certain objectives.
We should not, of course, simply take such statements at face 
value but look to see whether other or different objectives are 
also involved. In other words, by examining the impact of 
policies we can try to compare the objectives which appear to 
be served in practice with the government's stated aims. Nor 
should it be assumed that decisions involving the same activities 
are necessarily fulfilling the same objectives; the same sum of 
money put into the same firm at different times may be concerned 
with different objectives: on one occasion the long-run 
competitiveness of the firm may be the stated objective, while 
on another occasion, job preservation may be the immediate objective. 
There need not, of course, be only one objective involved in any one 
decision, and where there are multiple objectives we will want to 
consider how far they were mutually compatible.
Since a relatively long period is being considered here, we
can examine not only the formulation of policies but also how they
were implemented. Should we be critical of any failure to implement
policies or should we paraphrase the subtitle of Pressman and Wildavsky'
book on Implementation and discuss 'How great expectations in Whitehall
are dashed on Clydeside, or, Why it's amazing that government
42programmes work at all'? Pressman and Wildavsky's book remains 42
42. Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973.
the only full-length case study of implementation. Although their
book concentrates on the failure of an experimental programme
aimed at creating employment for minority groups in Oakland,
California, their analysis has much wider relevance. They argue
that policies imply theories about a chain of causation between
initial conditions and future consequences. Failures of a programme 
. designmay be due to incorrect/rather than a mistake in carrying it out. 
Secondly, policies which depend on a long sequence of cause and 
effect relationships (which certainly applies to shipbuilding policy) 
have a particular tendency to break down, because the longer the 
chain of causality, the more numerous the reciprocal relationships 
along the links and the more complex implementation becomes.
Thirdly, where implementation requires not only a complex series 
of events but also agreement at each event among a large number of 
participants then the probability of a successful outcome is again 
reduced. An occasion when an act of agreement has to be registered 
for the programme to continue is described as a 'decision point' 
and each instant in which a separate participant is required to 
give his consent is called a ’clearance’. Given an 80% probability 
of agreement at each clearance, the probability that no disagreement 
will take place over 70 clearances is computed to be little more 
than one in a million. One of the most important points in the book 
is that implementation must not be regarded as separate from policy 
design (and vice versa): 'There is no point in having good policies
A ^if they cannot be carried out’.
Anthony King, though dealing with the more general issue of 
overloaded government, also touches on the reasons why governments 43
43. Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973, p.143.
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might fail to achieve what they set out to do. One of the reasons 
he gives is that governments may depend on the actions of others 
to achieve what is wanted, and these others might fail, for 
some reason, to dovhat was required. He argues that 'If Britain 
has become harder to govern, it is almost certainly partly 
because the number of dependency relationships in which the 
government is involved has increased substantially, and because 
the incidence of acts of non-compliance by the other participants 
in those relationships has also increased substantially.'^
Like Pressman and Wildavsky (though without reference or 
acknowledgement to them), King expresses these relationships 
more abstractly by using numerical examples to illustrate the 
point that even if there is a high probability of compliance by 
any one individual then if the final goal depends on a series of 
such acts the overall probability of success is low.
Certainly, given the complexify of the influences affecting 
the shipbuilding industry outlined earlier in the chapter, it will 
be worth examining whether such approaches can be applied to 
industrial policy. After examining the development of shipbuilding 
policy we can return to these approaches and consider whether it is 
useful to analyse the outcome of shipbuilding policy in terms of 
chains of causality, clearances, dependency relationships or non- 
compliance, and how far we can assess the probability of each of the 
main types of influence on the shipbuilding industry being 
favourable to the success of government policy.
It will also be useful to bear in mind some important distinctions
44. King, 1975, especially pp.290-3.
45. King, 1975, p.290.
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concerning implementation. The first of these is the distinction
U P. iL-’CCtS- i H 1
between non-implementation and implementation which, though carried 
through in full, fails to produce the results intended.46 Non­
implementation occurs when the activities involved in carrying out a 
programme do not occur or occur only in part. For example, where funds 
are allocated by the government for assisting an industry and these 
are not taken up in full by firms in the industry we can say 
that there has been only partial implementation of the government’s 
policy. If, however, the allocation is taken up in full but the 
aid fails to produce the results intended we can talk in terms of 
unsuccessful implementation: implementatinn has failed to produce 
the effects desired, or these effects have been offset by 
influences on the final outcome ether than the government's programme. 
Similarly, partial implementation might fail to produce the effects 
which might be expected of even partial implementation, though if 
achievement of a threshold is involved full implementation may be a 
prior condition of successful implementation.
Potential confusion over the distinction between non-implementation 
and unsuccessful implementation arises because of the role of non-govern­
mental actors in both. Thus the full allocation of funds may not be
taken up because industrialists fail to submit suitable projects, and
\
implementation may fail to have the desired effects because 
industrialists fail to use the money in the way expected, or management 
and unions fail to respond in the way expected. The conceptual 
distinction between non-implementation and unsuccessful implementation 
does, however, remain useful.
46. My attention was drawn to the importance of this distinction 
by Professor Richard-Rose.
\  l  >
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Another important distinction for the policy area 
considered here is the distinction between policy recommendations 
directed at and accepted by the government and recommendations 
directed at non-governmental actors such as management and unions.
We have already seen that whether or not the government's programme 
is implemented and whether implementation is successful depends 
to a considerable extent on the response of non-governmental actors, 
but the importance of this response is different in kind from the 
implementation of recommendations directed primarily at groups 
and individuals other than the government. Where there is a 
package of recommendations, some of which are directed at the 
government and some of which are directed at non-governmental 
actors, then even if the government’s programme is implemented 
in full and achieves the immediate effects expected of it, then the 
outcome envisaged in the package of recommendations may fail to 
occur if recommendations directed at others are not implemented 
or are unsuccessfully implemented.
Any attempt to evaluate the 'success' of government policy 
will be complicated by the ambiguity of the government's objectives. 
Weiss argues that evaluation is probably not worth doing 'When 
people who should know cannot agree on what the program is trying 
to achieve. If there are vast discrepancies in perceived goals, 
evaluation has no ground to stand o n ' W h i l e  this will indeed 
prevent the carrying out of any quantifiable evaluation research, 
it will not prevent us from drawing more generalised conclusions. 47
47. Weiss, 1972, pp.10-11.
Since this is a study of the policy process as a whole, 
we will want to study the relationship between the various 
decisions affecting shipbuilding which took place during the 
period. Is this relationship best seen in terms of a homeostatic 
model with negative feedback,^! series of incremental decisions^ 
or as fragmented responses to individual crises? Since both 
major political parties held power during the period, the 
influence of party ideology can also be assessed.
By studying the whole of the policy process affecting 
shipbuilding, it should be possible to gain a fuller picture 
than by studying only, say, the formulation of the major policy 
statements. Inevitably, this means the relative neglect of 
aspects of politics which would be highlighted if different 
focuses were adopted - for example, the importance of interest 
groups, or the role of House of Commons committees. Covering 
policy over a period of fourteen years also means that some detail 
has to be omitted. However, the approach adopted here should 
provide particularly useful insights into the politics of 
industrial change in the UK. 489
48. Cf. Deutth, 1966.
49. Lindblom, 1959.
APPENDIX.
COVERAGE OF THE STUDY AND DEFINITIONS OF MEASUREMENT.
As the Labour government discovered in 1976 at the cost of a 
parliamentary row over the hybridity of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding 
Industries Bill (see section 7.6), it is very important to be clear 
about the exact coverage of any item dealing with the shipbuilding 
industry. This study is concerned with shipbuilding firms which 
build ships of greater than 100 gross registered tons (grt). This 
coverage conforms with that of the Shipbuilding Industry Training 
Board (SITB) and the Shipbuilders and Repairers National Association 
(SRNA). However, the main concern is with yards capable of building 
ships of over 5,000 grt, i.e. the level covered by the Geddes Report.5® 
This study is not, therefore, concerned with boatbuilding, nor is 
it concerned with shiprepairing or marine engineering even though 
these are often carried on by firms which also build ships. The 
justification for this is that shipbuilding as an activity is distinct 
in kind from repairing and engine building, with the demand for new 
ships being determined in a different way from the demand for 
shiprepairing services. The construction of oil rigs is also excluded 
from this study, except where they are built by shipbuilding firms.50 1
In defining coverage in terms of gross tons, some mention must 
be made of the terminology involved - there are a number of ways of 
measuring the 'tonnage' of a ship (see table l.A). The term most 
frequently used to describe shipbuilding output - gross tons - can be 
seen to be similar to measuring the output of lorries in terms of
50. Cmnd 2937.
51. For a discussion of oil rig construction sites in the UK, see 
MacKay and Mackay, Chapter 7.
their cubic capacity. It should be clear that to use the total 
number of ships launched as a measure of output is not a satisfactory 
way of comparing output either between yards or countries or over 
time because of the different mix of output in terms of different 
kinds of ships. For example, during the period considered in this 
study passenger ship production has virtually ceased, while production 
of oil tankers has greatly increased. The effect of converting 
to compensated tons, as used by SRNA in 1968, was to reduce the 
apparent dominance of Japan's order book from 17m gross tons compared 
to Britain's of 3m gross tons to 8m compensated tons for Japan 
and 2m compensated tons for Britain. Unfortunately, most figures for 
output are given in terms of gross tonnage, and this is the measure 
most referred to in this study.
Table l.A Definition of measurements
* 7
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Gross tonnage is a measure not of weight but of the cubic capacity 
of enclosed spaces both under and above deck and including 
holds and deck houses, where one ton is taken to equal 100 cubic 
feet; this is the normal measure of size of merchant fleet or 
shipbuilding output.
Deadweight tonnage is the measure of a ship’s total carrying capacity 
in tons weight avoirdupois including cargo, fuel, passengers and 
crew when fully laden down to her permitted load line; used in 
references to size of dry cargo ships and tankers; the size of 
passenger ships is more usually given in gross tons.
Compensated tonnage is an attempt to adjust the gross tonnage to 
take account of the differing work content involved in constructing 
different kinds of ships.
Relationship between different measures; For a passenger liner the 
gross tonnage may be several times the deadweight tonnage. For a 
cargo ship or tanker the deadweight tonnage will generally be the 
higher figure, up to approximately twice as high in the case of giant 
tankers. The effect of compensated tonnage is greatly to increase 
the relative tonnage of, say, a warship compared to a tanker.
Sources: Cmnd 2937, appendix C, p.168; Cmnd 4756, p.Viii; Times 31 
October, 1968. *
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CHAPTER 2
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AFFECTING SHIPBUILDING BEFORE 1959
2.1 POLICY BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR
When examining a particular period in detail it is all too easy to assume
that the important features of that period uere unique. To obtain a
sense of perspective before examining government shipbuilding policy in
the period 1959 to 1973 it is worth surveying briefly the ways in which
government policy in earlier periods affected the industry. During the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, UK shipbuilding benefited from
government subsidies paid to the shipping industry in the form of mail
subsidies and subsidies for the construction of fast merchant ships.1
The value of the postal subsidies declined by the 1870s, but from the late
1880s onwards subsidies again became important in the form of payments
for the retention of Admiralty cruisers, in loans, and in the hire of
2troop transports. Although these were subsidies to shipowners rather 
than shipbuilders, British shipbuilding was then so dominant that the 
effect was to increase demand for ships from British yards. The 
government assisted shipbuilding in two other ways* the Admiralty played 
an important part in promoting research in the shipbuilding industry, and 
warship building grew between 1B70 and 1914 'from a minor specialist 
activity to the cornerstone of prosperity in the shipbuilding industry1.* 23
1 , 3ones, 1957, pp.141-3; Cairncross and Parkinson, 1958, p.93.
2, Pollard, 1952-3.
3 , Pollard, 1952-3, p.108.
2.2 THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE WARS
Wartime expansion of shipbuilding laid the seeds of future problems, 
capacity was increased by 1m gross tons to a total of 4m, but from 1921 
to 1939 launchings never exceeded 1.7m and were usually far less. 
Shipbuilding did benefit from Treasury guarantees for loans raised to 
finance industrial projects under the Trade Facilities Acts, 1921 to 
1 9 2 6 , which were designed to maintain employment following the collapse 
of the postwar boom in the economy. Of a total of £75m guaranteed under 
the Acts, £21.66m, about 30# of the total, went to shipbuilding.4 The 
guarantees were also available to foreign owners building in British 
yards, and guarantees granted to them were about 10# of the total for 
shipbuilding. The construction of ships under the Trades Facilities 
Acts, and similar measures which continued in Northern Ireland after 
1926, provided less than one year's work for British yards.
Between 1926 and 1935 the only involvement by the UK government 
was concerned with the completion of the Queen flarv. in the early 1930s 
British shipping and world shipping generally faced the problem of 
redundant and obsolete capacity, but to be effective any scheme of laying 
up, scrapping or allocation of tonnage had to be based on international 
cooperation. British shipowners had previously been hostile to state 
intervention, but at the end of 1933 they asked for a temporary subsidy 
to meet foreign competition. In July 1934 the government introduced 
proposals to provide a one-year grant of £2m to tramp shipping.
Payment of the subsidy was to be conditional on the shipping industry 
adopting a scheme acceptable to the government which would prevent the 
subsidy being wasted on domestic price cutting. Shipbuilding, which was
4 Qones, 1957, p.144.
very depressed at this time, was t o  b e assisted by a »scrap and build* 
programme outlined in a White Paper.5 British shipowners were to be 
helped by loans advanced or guaranteed by the Treasury to enable them 
to build new tonnage or to modernise existing tonnage on condition 
that they scrapped three times as much tonnage of the same general 
character.
The shipowners disliked the form of the proposed shipping subsidy, 
and were opposed to the 'scrap and build» scheme, which they claimed was 
meant to help shipbuilders and was not relevant to the future of British 
shipping. Following representations from the shipping industry, the 
government modified its proposals for the shipping subsidy, but it was 
not prepared to abandon the »scrap and build» proposals.6 The scheme 
was, however, modified so that owners were required to scrap only two 
tons for every ton of new shipping built, and one ton for every ton 
modernised. As well as scrapping British ships owners were to be allowed 
to buy ships for scrapping from foreign owners.
These proposals were embodied in the British Shipping (Assistance)
Act 1935. The Treasury was empowered to advance not more than £10m in 
loans, at an interest rate of Z %  or less and repayable within twelve 
years, to British owners to build and modernise ships. This assistance 
was to be available only until February 1937. It was estimated that the 
loans available would be sufficient to cover the cost of building
600.000 grt at existing prices. However, only thirty—seven applications 
for the construction of fifty ships, totalling in all approximately
1 8 6 .0 0 0  grt, were approved, and total advances to shipowners amounted to
5.
6.
Cmd 4647 
Cmd 4754
£3.5m - only a third of the amount available.7
In tha view of Donas, although the part of the Act dealing with the 
subsidy to tramp shipping and the part dealing with the scrap and build 
scheme were intended to be complementary, in practice they were 
incompatible: »On the one hand, the object of the subsidy was to secure 
an improvement in freight rates, while on the other, the success of the 
•scrap and build» provisions depended on the extent to which owners were 
prepared to scrap existing tonnage, which they were less likely to do in
g
a rising market». In the language of policy analysis, the basic 
programme design was faulty. In addition, the Act had come into effect 
at a time when international trade was improving and shipping was already 
recovering. Only six of the ninety-seven ships finally nominated for 
scrapping were the property of the applicant companies. The majority of 
shipowners had to buy the scrap tonnage they required and pay what amounted 
to a premium over the real scrap value of their purchases. When scrap 
tonnage had to be bought from abroad this premium was effectively a 
subsidy to foreign owners for scrapping s h i p s  which they would in any 
case have been compelled to scrap (though purchases of this kind were later 
disqualified). It had been the intention that ships scrapped under the 
scheme would be broken up in the United Kingdom, but because the price 
offered for scrap was higher abroad this restriction was eventually 
removed. (See Section 5.5 for an interesting parallel in the 1960s when 
British government funds again benefited foreign shipowners and foreign 
yards though on a much grander scale).
During 1938 the decline in shipbuilding activity in the UK became 
acute, and those urging government action emphasised the contribution of
7
8
Cmd 5459.
Dones, 1957, p.153.
shipping and shipbuilding to national defence. In March 1939 the 
government made a number of proposals to assist the two industries:
1. A subsidy of £2.75m a year for five years to tramp shipping, 
excluding coastal shipping.
2. A capital grant o f £0.5» a year for Civs years to ounara of tramp 
and cargo liners who ordered tonnage from British yards in the next feu
months. This would be mads available for the construction of ships most 
needed in wartime.
3. £10m was to be made available in loans to shipowners in favourable
terms for a period of two years. Instead of scrapping there was to be 
a laying-up programme by which ships would be retained on a »care and 
maintenance' basis and would not be brought out for trading except in an 
emergency.
4. £2m was to be made available for the purchase of British ships as a
9reserve for use in an emergency.
This statement produced an immediate response: 700,000 grt of orders 
were placed within six weeks. However, since the proposals were designed 
for defence purposes, rather than for the long-term future of the 
industries, it is a matter of speculation how shipping and shipbuilding 
would have fared if the war had not intervened.
One other scheme in the inter-war period should be mentioned, since, 
although not itself the result of government action, it involved the 
formation of a cartel which the government could, if it had wished, have 
intervened to prevent. Because of the considerable overcapacity in the 
industry after the First World War, the Shipbuilding Conference, the 
employers' organisation formed in 1928 to deal with the economic problems
9. HC Deb., 28 March 1939, cols. 1851-60.
of the industry, set up National Shipbuilders' Security Ltd. to buy up 
redundant and obsolete yards as they came on to the market.10 1 T h e Bank 
of England supported the venture, and security for an issue of debentures 
was given by the promise of a levy of 1 %  on the value of new tonnage to 
be constructed in the future by shipbuilders supporting National 
Shipbuilders' Security Ltd. This company was responsible for reducing 
UK shipbuilding capacity by about a third by 1939, though Parkinson 
remarks that »It is impossible to say how far the reduction in capacity 
effected by this means would have been brought about by natural processes 
... the effect of the intervention of the company in the affairs of the 
industry was of less importance than might at first appear».11 Some of 
the yards closed by the company were put on a care and maintenance basis 
and were reopened during the Second World War. However, they were closed 
after the end of the war and their equipment transferred to other yards.
In retrospect this forced reduction of U K capacity was short-sighted - 
quite apart from the l e g a c y  o f  bitterness it left in the minds of 
shipbuilding workers. T o a certain extent the concern with overcapacity 
In t h e  1 9 3 0 s  c o n c e a l e d  what was to b e  t h e  long-term danger* »It was not so 
m u c h  t h e  check to world output that spelled a warning for the U K industry, 
as t h e  gradual encroachment of its overseas competitors into what had been 
a United Kingdom preserve».12 This concern about overcapacity spilled 
over into the postwar period despite the evidence o f  r i s i n g  world demand.
2.3 A F T E R  THE SECOND WORLD WAR
A f t e r  t h e  end of the war the government c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  wartime statutory 
c o n t r o l  o f  licensing for building ships should not be retained for long,
10. PEP» 1957, p.25j Parkinson, 1960, pp.13-14.
11. Parkinson, 1960, pp.13-14.
12. Parkinson, 1960, p.12.
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but that there was a continuing need for close consultation and 
cooperation by which the government might 'hope to anticipate the 
difficulties which threaten the industry.13 Accordingly the government 
decided to set up a Shipbuilding Advisory Committee with the following 
terms of reference*
•1. To advise HM Government on all matters which affect or are
likely to affect the efficiency and stability of the Shipbuilding 
Industry.
2. To advise HM Government on any steps required to safeguard the 
War Potential of the Industry.
3. To promote the cooperation of the Shipbuilding employers both 
with the Shipowners and the representatives of Shipyard Labour.
4. To advise from time to time on organisation, practice and 
cognate matters, with a view to maintaining and improving the 
efficiency and stability of the industry? and to arrange for 
such consultation with the industry and for such enquiries into 
specific matters as may be necessary to this end.
Any matters of industrial relations normally dealt with by voluntary 
machinery within the industry will be referred to the appropriate 
bodies for consideration'.^4
Membership of the committee was to consist of a chairman, two 
representatives from each of the two main government departments then 
concerned - Admiralty and War Transport - plus representatives from other 
departments coopted as necessary, and representatives from the shipping 
industry, the shipbuilding industry and the Shipbuilding Unions. it was 
decided to have an independent chairman who should have both a thorough
13. Admiralty memorandum, 1946.
14. Document made available to the author by Sir Graham Cunningham.
understanding of industry, though not necessarily of shipbuilding, and 
familiarity with the machinery of government. The criteria were 
excellently filled by Sir Graham Cunningham, who s e r v e d  as chairman from 
1946 to I960. During the war he had been Chief Executive and Controller' 
General of Munitions Production at the Ministry of Supply, and while
chairman of the Shipbuilding Advisory Committaa ha w a s chairman and 
managing Director of Triplex Safety Glaaa Company Ltd.
The main issues discussed by the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee 
(SAC) mere steel allocation, shipbuilding costs, labour shortages (sic) 
and shortage of orders. These mare problems which affected firms 
individually, but the chairman saw the role of the SAC as coordinating 
the representations of Individual firms and asaaasing the implications 
of their problems.15 Because of hla wartime experience. Sir Graham had 
a largo number of personal contacts in the relevant ministries.
In the late 1940s the issue of shipbuilding costs was considered 
outside the formal framework of the SAC. At the end of 1946 the First 
Lord of the Admiralty and the Minister of Transport expressed concern to 
Sir Graham about the apparently v a r y i n g  c o s t s  o f  new shipbuilding in 
British yards and asked him if he could carry out some kind of 
investigation. Sir Graham agreed to do so if he could set up a committee 
which would be informal and divorced from the idea of a working party and 
which would produce a report which would not be published, because under 
the circumstances he did not think that the report should be available to 
shipowners. After some exchange of letters, in which the Admiralty 
showed that it was aware of the anomaly of setting up the SAC to deal 
with all matters affecting the industry and then setting up a committee
15 Interview with Sir Graham Cunningham. 13 November 1973
outside it, Sir Graham's proposed procedure was agreed to. The 
committee as finally appointed in D u n e 1947 consisted of a legal chairman, 
four shipbuilders, two trade unionists and two chartered accountants (one 
of whom was from a shipbuilding company). The report was not completed 
until March 1949. Of particular significance among the causes of cost 
variation identified were:
1. Unofficial embargoes on overtime working were a fairly common 
occurrence both in individual yards and in districts, and such embargoes 
caused a degree of interference with work which affected costs of 
production.
2. Shortage of skilled and unskilled labour. Houever, by the time the 
report uas prepared these shortages no longer seemed to be a problem or
to be e contributory factor to the variation of costs of shipbuilding in 
Britain.
3. Shortage of materials, especially, though not exclusively, steel.16
Despite claims to the contrary,17 uhil. steel shortages may have been 
important in the lata 1940s, they mere not an important contribution to 
the failure of the UK shipbuilding industry to expend. Although steel 
was formally subject to central allocation until the mid 1950s, Allen 
points out that 'Throughout the 1950s, however, British steel was 
relatively cheap by international standards and in that period British 
shipbuilders had few grounds for complaint'.18 m  the early 1960s the 
restrictive practices of the Iron and Steel Board in collusion with the 
government did prevent the extensive use of foreign steel when it was 
available at a low price. In 1963 the steelmakers made price concessions 
to the shipbuilders, and in Ouly 1964 the Restrictive Practices Court
16. Letter from Sir Graham Cunningham to the First Lorn nf 4-u
Admiralty, 14 March 1949. Lord of the
17. E.g. by Hardy and Tyrell, 1964, p.167.
18. Allen, 1970, p.136.
d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  producers- agreements for common steel prices should be 
abandoned. However, the undoubted disadvantages in steel prices In the 
early 1960s cannot be blamed for the drastic comparative decline of UK 
shipbuilding in the ,950s (see table 1 .9 ). rhla anal)(ala
by the view of a minister uho dealt with the Industry from 1 9 5 1 - 7  that 
while the main issue during his period of office was steel allocation 
this was not an adequate reason for failure to reconstruct yards.19
The Admiralty, which was rasponaible for shipbuilding after the war 
until 1959, did look at the question of the reconstruction of shipyards, 
but realised that the Treasury would not have been prepared to help - 
the industry was not considered to be in trouble end was even making 
profits.20 This attitude is understandable if you look only at the 
column headed -UK OOOgrt- in table 1.9, since output in the late ,950s was 
eteady. However, the really significant column was the -Per cent- 
column, which showed the UK share of world output and revealed the 
comperetive decline of UK shipbuilding, this diagnosis is developed 
further at the beginning of the next chapter. If us think in terms of 
the two aspects of a problem outlined in section 1.5 - -the state of 
affairs the government wishes to avert' and -what brought about (or 
would bring about) this state of affairs- - we can see that the British 
government reacted only when the undesired state of affairs actually 
occurred and failed to react to signals that this state of affairs would 
arise in time to deal with the causes leading to the undesired situation, 
in other words, the government adopted a problem-solving rather then a 
problem-averting approeoh. Given the competing demands on government 
time and resources governments are likely to concentrate on Issues with
19.
20. Interview with Simon Wingfield Digby. 11 December 1973. Interview with Simon Wingfield Digby. 11 December 1973.
current political penalties for not doing something now, to the 
detriment of issues where there are future costs for not doing something 
now.
2.4 CONCLUSION
Although there were no measures of government assistance specifically 
directed at shipbuilding in the late 1940s and the 1950s, it is clear that 
in previous periods shipbuilding did benefit from government policies.
The type of government assistance outlined in this chapter was, however, 
different from that considered in later chapters in that assistance 
measures were separated by many years and in that the government was not 
involved in the affairs of individual shipyards. Another notable feature 
was that many of the policies affecting shipbuilding, such as the mail 
subsidies, were directed at the shipping industry. Even where ship­
building was more obviously at the forefront of consideration, policies 
such as the 1930s scrap-and-build scheme operated on both UK shipowners 
and UK shipbuilders. This feature was to continue in some government 
policies in the 1950s. However, the symbiotic relationship between UK 
shipping and UK shipbuilding was to dissolve in the 1960s, with a growing 
proportion of orders from U K shipowners going abroad.
During the two world wars governments obviously became very directly 
involved in running the shipbuilding industry. The then strategic 
significance of shipbuilding was reflected in the setting up of the 
Shipbuilding Advisory Committee in 1946, through which the government 
hoped 'to anticipate the difficulties which threaten the industry'. How 
the government reacted to such a warning about difficulties threatening 
the industry is discussed at the beginning of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
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INITIAL RESPONSES TO DECLINE
3.1 RECOGNISING A PROBLEM
It is all too easy to point out in retrospect that tha government ought 
to have recognised a problem earlier and taken measures to deal uiith it.
If, however, we can point to a simple indicator of declining 
competitiveness which could have identified possible future employment 
problems before they became acute we will have a useful basis for 
assessing the government's response. As was suggested in section 1 .4 .1 , 
a declining national share of a rising world market for an internation­
ally traded product, even when this has not yet resulted in a fall in the 
absolute level of national output, is a good indicator for identifying 
future problems. Absolute level of output may be maintained for a while 
if world demand rises faster than new capacity, but if demand falters (or 
new capacity increases faster) then uncompetitive yards will be the first 
to suffer, and when demand picks up again they will be the last to benefit 
since they will not be given orders until the order books of more 
competitive yards are full. Even given a static level of output total 
employment will be likely to fall if the improvements in technology and 
productivity necessary to regain competitiveness are introduced; it is, 
of course, precisely in such circumstances that cooperation from the labour 
force in increasing productivity is least likely to be forthcoming. In 
order to avoid this vicious circle, action has to be taken as early as 
possible to improve competitiveness. It should be noted that even where 
the national average share and competitiveness are declining there are 
likely to be individual firms which are competing well; however, this
also carries the implication that future decline in employment will be 
even more highly location-specific than the national distribution of the 
industry.
The usefulness of declining national share as an indicator applies 
not dnly to shipbuilding but to most manufacturing industries producing 
an internationally competing product. In its report on the British car 
industry the CPRS suggested that 'The two best indicators of any 
industry's performance compared with its competitors are the share which 
it obtains of the market and its financial position. A poor or declining 
performance in either or both of these areas is a good indicator of 
fundamental weakness and the need for remedial action'.1 The report 
pointed out that the British car industry's share of total West European 
and ¡Japanese production had steadily declined from 26.9% in 1963 to 
17.4% in 1967, and 10.7% in 1973; the number of cars produced had, 
however, remained fairly constant. When demand slumped after the 
1973-4 oil price rise the British car i n d u s t r y  was particularly severely 
hit and the UK government had to rescue both British Leyland and Chrysler 
in 1974-5.
Returning to the shipbuilding industry, and in order to remove as 
much as possible of the benefit of hindsight, it is worth looking at the 
figures on output and employment which were available to government and 
the industry at the end of the 1950s. These are set out in tables 3.1 
and 3.2.
1 CPRS, 1975, p.59
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Table 3.1 UK and World completions of merchant ships. 1947-59
Year Completions (000 qrt) 
UK World
UK share of world 
tonnage { % )
1947 944 1,880 50.2
1948 1,213 2,482 48.9
1949 1,353 3,114 43.4
1950 1,389 3,254 42.7
1951 1,340 3,557 37.7
1952 1,264 4,211 30.0
1953 1,250 4,938 25.3
1954 1,496 5,450 27.4
1955 1,322 4,967 26.6
1956 1,457 6,291 23.2
1957 1,421 8,117 17.5
1958 1,464 9,059 16.2
1959 1,383 8,697 15.9
Source* Cmnd 2937, appendix K, p.185.
Table 3.2 Employment in shipbuilding, 1956-9.
Year Operatives (new 
Merchant
construction)
Naval
Other than operatives
(shipbuilding & 
shiprepairing)
1956 78,300 13,400 21,100
1957 80,700 13,900 21,500
1958 77,600 14,600 21,300
1959 80,100 13,600 21,100
Source* Cmnd 2937, appendix E, p.172.
If one looked only at the figures for UK completions in table 3.1 
and at table 3.2 on employment one would be impressed by the overall 
stability» If* however, one looks at the column for UK share of world 
output a different picture emerges} even if one assumes that for several 
years after the war the picture was distorted by increasing output from 
replacements to war-damaged yards abroad, there is a steady and fast
decline in the UK share from the mid-1950s. While world demand 
continued tc rise the UK felt no edverse effects. However, -Socm 
conditions up to 1957 postponed the penalties of conservatism, but in the 
years thst followed the weaknesses of British shipbuilding were fully 
revealed'.2 World output reached e peak in 1958 (with order books 
peaking e year earlier) which was not to be exceeded until 1964, end
British yards suffered disproportionately during the period of relative 
stagnation.
3.2 T H E RESIGNATION OF SIR GRAHAM CUNNINGHAM 
These symptoms of Britain's declining competitiveness did not go 
unnoticed by those involved in the industry. Two meetings u/ere held 
between unions and employers in early 1959 to discuss the continuing 
decline in Britain's relative position and the actual decline in the size 
of the order book, but nothing developed from them.3
Sir Graham Cunningham, chairman of the Shipbuilding Advisory 
Committee, considered that there were obvious signs in early 1959 which 
threatened the stability of the industry.4 On a number of occasions in 
1959 and 1960 he tried without success to persuade the committee to take 
special action to inquire into what should be done to help shipbuilding 
over the next few years. At his final attempt on 4 February I960 
Sir Graham once again raised the matter of a special inquiry and suggested 
setting up a subcommittee to inquire into the state of the industry and 
to make recommendations. The union representatives supported this 
proposal and the shipowning representatives offered full cooperation if 
such a subcommittee was set up. However,all the shipbuilding employer
2. Allen, 1970, p.134.
3. AEU Monthly Journal. March 1959 and December 1959.
4. Letter of resignation from Sir Graham Cunningham to Ernest16 March 1960. Ernest Marples,
I D
representatives vented the question to be postponed further. Sir Graham 
decided to resign, and follcuing a meeting uith Ernest harpies, the 
minister of Transport, he submitted his letter of resignation.
Referring in it to the employers' reasons for asking for deferment of the 
question of an inquiry he said, 'I consider these excuses so frustrating 
that to continue serving the industry as chairman mould be fruitless'.
The hinstry of Transport, uhlch had become responsible for 
shipbuilding only in November 1959 uhen it uas transferred from the 
Admiralty, uas clearly embarrassed by the resignation and mould have 
preferred that the letter of resignation had not been made public.
Sir Graham, houever, uas determined that the reasons for his resignation 
should be made knoun publicly. 5 In his reply hr. harpies referred to 
Sir Graham's previously expressed intention to retire from the 
chairmanship of the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee. 6 He also indicated 
his intention of appointing the Permanent Secretary of his Ministry,
Sir James Dunnett, to take over the chairmanship and that 'with the 
concurrence of the representatives of both sides of the industry' he uas 
arranging that a special subcommittee should be set up to consider the 
future of the industry.
hr. harplea uaa obviously conoarnad in his lattar to minimise possible 
embarrassment to the government, and certain points about his reply 8h«Ul,l 
be made. First, although Sir Graham had indeed indicated his desire to 
retire, he mould not have resigned at this time and in this uay if it had 
not been for the employers' refusal to agree to an inquiry. 7 Secondly, 
until Sir Graham's resignation on this issue his successor had not been
5 . intervieu uith Sir Graham Cunningham. 13 November 19?
6. Latter from Ernest harpies to sir Graham Cunningham, 1 6 h a i ^ g ’so. ^
7. Interview with Sir Graham Cunningham. 13 November 1973
chosen.
>  ^
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Because there uas not the time to go through the usual process 
of finding a suitable candidate the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry
g
uas a handy choice. It uas because of this, rather than a deliberate
decision to make a change, that a civil servant uas appointed, even though
the intention et thfi; time the Advisory Committee had been sat up uas that
the chairman should be independent, not only of the two sides of the
industry, but also of the government departments concerned (see section
2.3). Finally, although the 'concurrence1 of both sides of the Industry
uas obtained the decision to set up a subcommittee uas a unilateral one
on the part of the Minister and arose directly out of Sir Graham's
resignation. Naturally, the resignation provoked a number of questions
in the House of Commons. In dealing uith these Mr. Marples again tried
to play doun the issue on uhich Sir Graham had resigned by saying that
he had for some time wished to retire from the chairmanship.
Sir James Ounnett, as wall as becoming chairman of the main
committee, was appointed chairman of the special subcommittee. This
choice uas inevitable since he uas the only 'independent' member of the
committee. The subcommittee held its first meeting on 5 May 1960, with
the terms of reference 'to review the prospects of, and the problems
facing» the shipbuilding and shiprepairing industry and to make 
grecommendations'.
3 . 3  THE DSIR REPORT
t .3.1 The leak of the draft OSIR Report
1960 was a bad year for ministers responsible for the shipbuilding 
industry. While the SAC subcommittee uas sitting, political attention uas
6
9
Interview with Sir James Dunnett. 19 November 1973. 
HC Deb., 30 March 1960, cols. 1315-18.
focused on the activities of another government department as they
affected shipbuilding - the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research (OSIR). While the Ministry of Transport was the sponsoring
department for the industry, the DSIR was responsible for research and 
development.
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The day before the publication of Sir Graham Cunninghams letter of 
resignation. Lord Hailsham, the Minister for Science, made a speech to the 
Royal Institution of Naval Architects in which ha said that shipbuilding 
production in the United Kingdom might fall heavily ln the next five 
years. During his speech he asked ’Are British yards doing enough to 
apply new techniques of shipbuilding compared with soma of their rivals? 
Are me satiafied that our yards are making best use of their space - and 
ore there not perhaps too many of them? Parhapa the future lias with 
fewer and larger units. Are we spending enough on research? - 10 Lord 
Hailsham said that he knew of no research on production techniques and 
methods being undertaken in organisations representing the industry. He 
also asked whether satisfactory machinery had been developed for smoothing 
out conflicts over the allocation of Jobs. These comments provoked some 
concern among MPs of both parties. I„ reply to a question in the House 
of Commons, Mr. Butler said on behalf of the Prime Minister that Lord
Hailsham had made no statement of policy in his speech, but had drawn
attention to a number of questions of concern to the shipbuilding and
1 1shiprepairing industries.
During this time the economics staff at the DSIR, for w h i c h  Lord 
Hailsham was responsible, was working on a report on the research and 
.development requirements of the shipbuilding and marine engineering
1 0 . Times. 23 March 1960.
1 1 . HC Deb.. 17 May 1960, col. 1095.
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industries. A confidential draft of the report had been in the hands 
of the industry for some weeks before The Times published an outline 
of its contents at the beginning of October I960.12 According to 
— — ■m8-» thB report was rejected by many shipbuilders as misleading 
and inaccurate, though it specifically exonerated certain firms.
According to The Times summary, the report took the industry to task 
on a number of points, but particularly on productivity. The report 
calculated that productivity in British yards had perhaps improved by 
*  8inCB 1951’ C°mpared With in manufacturing industry and with great 
improvements in foreign shipyards. This failure to improve productivity 
was attributed to bad labour relations, demarcation problems, technical 
backwardness, quality of management, too many small firms, and lack of 
standardisation in ships and parts.
The report stated that production control in the industry was 
primitive, work-study non-existent, and personnel management old-fashioned, 
and there was too little contact with other industries whose techniques 
might benefit the yards. On labour relations there would be little hope 
of an end to demarcation troubles until workers were given security of 
employment and the unions some kind of financial inducement to cooperate. 
Not enough had been spent on modernisation. Subsidies to foreign 
competitors and taxation in Britain were not serious elements in the 
competitive positions Britain's competitors paid roughly the same level 
of taxation. The report also recommended changes in the organisation of 
the marine engine industry.
Not surprisingly, this leak of the contents of the draft report by 
The T i m e s provoked considerable adverse reaction. The Shipbuilding 
Conference declined to make a statement, since the report was still being
12 Times, 8 October 1960
discussed with the Ministry of Transport and the authors. The DSIR 
also declined to comment, since it still regarded the report as highly 
confidential! Shipbuilders had taken strong exception to some of the 
findings in the report and there had been hopes that the report would 
be withdrawn altogether or at least toned down. 13
3»3.2 Official version of the DSIR Report
P u a ^ JLt,l.°n.,of.th.e report. The leak of the draft report by The Times 
removed any doubts that there might have been about the publication of 
an official version of the report. The shipbuilders were anxious to see 
the publication of a version which went at least some way to countering 
the criticisms published in ThsTimes. A series of meetings was held 
between the DSIR and the Shipbuilding Conference and at the seventh 
meeting the decision to publish was taken. 14 The report was published
on 15 December 1960 under the title Research a„n n ,----and DBV/slopment Requirement o
of the Shipbuilding and Marine EnolneerJng Industrie 15
According to The Times, «hich had the opportunity of comparing m  
detail tha draft and published versions, the published version «as a 
severely curtailed version of tha draft, -The published version has been 
purged not only of some admitted inaccuraciea and questionable 
generalisations, but also of a grsat deal of serious and valid criticism 
of the industry contained in the original, especially in tha fields of 
management, productivity and labour relations' . 16
The report as published «as based on the assumption that existing 
«orld capacity «as far in excess of foreseeable demand for some years
13. Times, 10 October 1960.
14. HC Deb., 18 December 1960, col. 1421.
15. DSIR Report, 1960.
16. Times, 16 December 1960.
ahead; world production during the next five years could fall to as low 
as a quarter of the 1960 level before it began to recover. (This 
forecast turned out to be far too pessimistic; see table 1.9). As a 
result of this, the report suggested, British shipbuilding output might 
fall in th8 next few years. The UK share of world launchings had
declined during the 1950s and by 1959 the UK had become a net importer 
of ships.
in dealing .1 th coats and productivity, the report discussed in some 
detail prices, steel costa, components, labour, productivity and 
construction times, and compared British performance eith foreign yards. 
There ..a no evidence to suggest that over the British shipbuilding 
industry as a .hole labour productivity had increased significantly since 
1946, in spite of increased investment in production plant and machinery. 
The report concluded that there .as no indication that the UK shipbuilding 
industry had on balance any marked technical or economic advantage over its 
major foraign competitors apart from its large home market (though this 
advantage declined as an increasing proportion of British orders vent 
abroacj).
most of the report's conclusions, and all of its recommendations, 
dealt uith research and development. It concluded that the total effort 
then devoted to research and development in shipbuilding and marine 
propulsion uas insufficient in relation to the serious problems facing 
the industry. In particular, almost no organised research had bean 
applied to the industry's production and management problems uith the 
object of increasing the productivity of labour and capital and reducing 
costs.
The recommendations made in the report were:
»1. Further steps should be taken by the DSIR and the Shipbuilding
Industry in collaboration with the Ministry of Transport to examine 
the research and development needs of the industry as a whole and 
to review the arrangements for carrying out research.
2. In view of the current examination by the industry of the 
organisations and programmes of the British Shipbuilding Research 
Association and PAMETRADA Ca marine turbine research organisation}, 
arrangements should be made for a concurrent economic and 
technical study of research and development needs in the field of 
marine engineering to provide background for the Research Council's 
consideration of the reports they will receive from the two 
Associations.
3. The study recommended in 2. above should be carried out by 
DSIR with the assistance of the Ministry of Transport and in close 
association with the two Research Associations and the Industry.
4. In view of the great importance of research into production 
techniques and methods aimed at increasing productivity and 
reducing costs, DSIR and the Ministry of Transport should consider 
with the Industry what assistance could most appropriately be given 
to the industry's own efforts to promote research.
5. As an immediate stimulus to development DSIR should give 
priority consideration to proposals for development under contract 
in the shipbuilding and marine engineering industries.
6. The Ministry of Transport and DSIR should consider with the 
Shipping Industry what further steps should be taken to study the 
industry's future technical requirements'.
Rei*ctJ-°n to„ th.B-,.rePort,« The Shipbuilding Conference, in a statement 
issued at the same time as the publication of the Report, said that its 
release was with the knowledge and concurrence of the industries concerned
erroneousand that 'it is hoped that publication mill nou. put an end to 
and damaging speculation about its contents which have appeared in the 
Prese in recent seeks' . 17 However, the statement said that the industry 
»as 'by no means in agreement uith some of the comments and views 
expressed, especially as regards achievements in the field of marine 
engineering'« In particular, the statement rejected criticisms of 
PAMETRADA. The Shipbuilding Conference expressed willingness to 
cooperate as suggested with both DSIR and the Ministry of Transport to 
promote the interests of shipbuilding and marine engineering. it 
welcomed the proposal that the DSIR should give priority consideration 
to developments under contract in shipbuilding and marine engineering.
3» ---P-g-V-gÂqpments following publication of the DSIR Report.
For^li9.Q-9t-gresearch organisation (recommendations 4 ann K \
In November 1961 plans were announced for the formation of a new British 
Ship Research Association (BSRA) from the existing functions of the 
British Shipbuilding Research Association and PAMETRADA. The new BSRA 
was to take over PAMETRADA's work on turbines and gearing and BSRA's 
work on naval architecture, marine engineering, nuclear power, and 
production research. The formation of the new Association took place 
in May 1962. The DSIR undertook to provide 10 shillings (S0p) for every 
£ 1 raised for BSRA by the industry provided that the industry's 
contribution was at least £600,000 per annum, and subject to a maximum 
DSIR grant of £500,000. Between 1950/9 and 1964/5 expenditure at BSRA 
rose from £280,000 to £1,180,000.10 In addition expenditure at the 
National Physical Laboratory Ship Division, which was important for
1 7 , Shipbuilding Conference statement, 15 December 1960.
18. Cmnd 2937, p. 127.
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hydrodynamic work, rose during the same period from £230,000 to £700,000. 
R A D  needs in marine engineering (recommendations 2 and 3). An economic 
and technical study of research and development needs in marine
19engineering was well advanced by the end of 1961. The study was 
carried out by the DSIR and the Ministry of Transport with the cooperation 
of marine engine building firms and the research associations.
Production research (recommendation 4 ). Before the DSIR Report was 
published, the industry itself had already taken steps to inquire into 
means of improving productivity and developing production research. The 
eventual outcome of this inquiry was the Patton Report, issued in March
on
1962. The 86-page long report reviewed shipbuilding facilities and 
labour and welfare facilities in both UK and continental shipyards.
Taken together, the two chapters of detailed recommendations on improving 
productivity are themselves longer than any of the government-sponsored 
reports on the industry in the early 1960s. The report was intended to 
provide guidance for individual firms and no organisation was set up to 
supervise the implementation of its recommendations, though the 
Production Research Section of BSRA was available for inquiries about the 
detailed application of recommendations. In the opinion of the Geddes 
Report of 1966 'the influence of the Patten report on British ship­
building technology has been strong' . 21 The Patton Committee sent a 
copy of the report to the unions in the hope that they would take note 
of the lack of flexibility and interchangeability in British yards. 
However, just before this, talks between employers and unions on 
improving productivity had broken down (see section 3.4.2).
19. HC Deb., 14 December 1961, written answers, col.92.
20. Patton Report, 1962.
21. Cmnd 2937, p.125.
Development contracts (recommendation 5). The fifth recommendation of 
the DSIR Report was that as an 'immediate' stimulus to development DSIR 
should give 'priority consideration' to proposals for development under 
contract in the shipbuilding and marine engineering industries. By the 
end of 1961 consideration of this was postponed until the formation of
the neu/ BSRA and the results of the surveys being carried out by DSIR and
22the Ministry of Transport, and by the industry itself.
3.3.5 , The impact of the DSIR Report
For a report which had such an inauspicious start when it was leaked, the 
DSIR Report represents one of the most constructive developments of the 
early 1960s. Certainly when compared with the SAC Report considered in 
section 3.4 there was a fairly high success rate in carrying out the 
recommendations in the report. How can this be explained? The first, 
and most significant, reason is that the recommendations were in principle 
within the scope of the employers and the government acting together.
The recommendations related to increased research, and this was the 
unilateral prerogative of the employers; it is only when attempts are 
made to carry improved technology into practice that the danger of union 
opposition arises. To use the Implementation jargon of Pressman and 
Wildarsky, recommendations about research involve fewer 'clearances' than 
recommendations about introducing new processes into a yard. 23 Secondly
the report was produced within a government department,which implied a 
high probability that the government would be prepared to take the 
recommended action. Thirdly, the government provided financial 
inducements to non-governmental actors (i.e. the shipbuilders) to
22. H.C. Deb., 14 December 1961, written answers col.92.
23. Pressman and UlildaVsky, 1973. See also section 1.5,
participate, tha for» of inducement selected - matching grants subject 
tc both a threshold and a ceiling - seemed tha most likely way tc ensure 
an adequate flea of funds while containing tha government commitment.
The significance of these explanations can best be illustrated by 
considering their absence in the (non-) implementation of tha SAC Report.
3.4 THE SAC REPORT
3.4.1 Publication of the report.
four months after the publication of the official version of the OSIR 
Report came tha publication of the report of the special subcommittee of 
tha Shipbuilding Advisory Committee (SAC) which had been set up following 
Sir Graham Cunningham's resignation. 24 The subcommittee on prospects 
had never been intended to be an investigatory committee. In reply to 
a question in the House of Commons Hr. Plarples said, »Thera is 
absolutely no need for the Sub-Committee tc travel, because it consists 
of people belonging to the Shipbuilding Conference, the Shipbuilding 
Employers' rederation and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Unions. They are absolutely fully aware of the conditions in the 
shipyards* .25
That the Ministry was not relying on tha subcommittee to supply u  
with all tha advice it wanted is shown by tha appointment in January 
1961 (while the subcommittee was still sitting) of Hr. Gurney, an 
Accountant, to help the Ministry in its investigation of the current 
problems of the shipbuilding industry, particularly finance and credit. 26 
The Ministry had been discussing credit finance for orders with tha 
Shipbuilding Conference at the Conference's request, and Mr. Burney 
visited shipbuilders in connection with this.
24. SAC Report, 1961.
25» HC Deb.. 25 Play I960, col. 426.
26. Times. 7 January 1961.
The SAC subcommittee effectively consisted of the whole committee 
minus the shipping representatives. In any case, the two representatives 
of the General Council of British Shipping attended one of the 
subcommittee meetings to give their views on the future requirements 
for merchant ships and the competitive position of the UK shipbuilding 
industry. The main committee effectively ceased to function while the
subcommittee uas meetir9, end its approval of the subcommittee's report 
was a formality.^
The report of the subcommittee was published over a year after the 
initial announcement of the setting up of the committee. During the 
ten months from May 1960 to March 1961 the subcommittee held ten meetings 
in order to produce a report of fourteen pages. Given the composition 
of the committee, its terms of reference, and the history of relations 
between the two sides of the industry, it was inevitable that some of 
the time would be taken up in arguments between employer and union 
representatives. This also accounts for the 'lowest-common-denominator* 
nature of the report, with recommendations of the 'should bear in mind*
variety - a phrase which was used in the recommendation on amalgamations 
and tfbtionalisation.
An attempt »as made by the chairman ta parsuads the shipbuilders to 
consider reconstruction, but they »are not prepared to do so.
Amalgamations posed a threat to the autonomy of individual shipbuilders. 
Similarly, the trade unions mould have bean unuilling to agree to more 
substantial arrangements for avoiding and settling disputes uhether with 
management or uith other unions if these »ere seen as removing the right 
to unilateral action. The trade unions also suspacted, uith justification
27. Interview with Sir Dames Dunnett. 19 November 1973.
■') I
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that rationalisation and more vigorous introduction of new techniques 
would mean loss of jobs for many of their members, probably concentrated 
in certain yards and trades. Accordingly, it is not surprising that one 
of the few points on which all participants could agree was the need for 
government assistance - as long as this was given in a form which did 
not involve government intervention in individual yards.
The recommendations of the report wereî
‘(a) the government should give the industry's need for credits 
the most sympathetic and urgent consideration;
(b) managements and trade union leaders should make the most 
strenuous efforts to improve their labour relations;
(c) trade union leaders should continue to take the necessary 
steps to advise their members of the serious prospects facing 
the industry and the need for the maximum possible cooperation 
between management and workpeople to achieve the most efficient 
methods of production;
(d) employers and trade unions should together review their 
arrangements for avoiding and settling disputes;
(e) joint yard consultative committees should be set up for free 
consultation about ways and means of improving efficiency as well 
as welfare matters;
(f) employers and trade unions should constitute themselves as a 
national joint consultative committee to deal with matters of 
national interest relating to ways and means of improving 
efficiency. This committee should meet as ami when required and 
should be responsible for keeping alive at all levels the spirit 
of cooperation;
(g) managements should bear in mind the possible advantages of
amalgamations and should, wherever practicable. cooperate tp share 
effort and the rise of expensive equipment;
M  the government should oonsider in the o„urse of thelr 
examination of tha Survey Report of tha General Council of British 
Shipping the possibilities of subsidising the scrapping of ship, or 
a scrap and build scheme;
(i) the government should review its planned requirements for 
Government-owned ships with a view to placing as many orders a3 
possible in the two or three years*.
P-l-A- Pevel opments following oublf ctjon of »„a ----- f ,
Responsibility for implementatlnn. The Shipbuilding Advisory Committee 
took no responsibility for following up the report of its subcommittee. 
There was no meeting of the SAC between the publication of the Report 
end 13 February 1962, end a meeting was only held then after 
representations from the unions. 28 of course, the chairman of both the 
mein SAC committee end the subcommittee was also the Permanent Secretary 
o, the Ministry to which the recommendations were addressed. theory, 
there could be difficulties about the same individual advising the 
government as chairman of an official advisory committee and also being 
responsible for advising the minister on tha value of the committee., 
decisions. In practice, according to sir Gamas Dunnett, these 
difficulties did not arise for him. 29 Comparison of the report.s 
recommendations with the government's decisions would suggest that in his 
capacity as a civil servant he advised the Minister to reject the advice 
he had given him in the report to which he put his signature.
28‘ p?E2^ r±B-r^  ReP°rt °F thR^ r a U o u n c n t 1 1 January ^
29. Interview with Sir James Dunnett. 19 November 1973.
This provides a strong clue about how tho government saw the role
of the committee. It mould have preferred not to have been precipitated
into setting up the committee by the resignation of Sir Crehom Cunningham,
but once it had been set up the chairman did see the need for the
industry to adapt. However, he evidently saw his role as to attempt
to secure agreement among the industry representatives on the action they
needed to take rather than impose a preconceived government vieu. for
the reasons outlined in section 3.4.1, one of the feu things all industry
representatives could agree on uas the need for the government to
consider assisting the industry. The chairman could have attempted to
impose a veto on these recommendations about government action, but it
might have been politically embarrassing for a civil servant to be seen
to be attempting to prevent an advisory committee from making
recommendations to his minister. . Bearing in mind the bland form in
uhich the recommendations mere couched, the chairman's most sensible
course of action was to allow the commffcfeo m , ..committee to make the recommandations
even if in his departmental role he found them unacceptable.
Labour relations. The majority of the recommendations in the report ware, 
of course, for the industry itself to carry out. Xn March l961f befor0
the report was published, employers and unions had already held a couple 
of apparently amicable meetings about improving efficiency and the 
industry's competitive position. However, talks broke down in early 
1962. Although talks restarted under the guidance of the Minister of 
Labour, employers and unions were unable to agree about flexibility of 
labour. According to the Geddes Report, one of the reasons for the 
failure to reach any final conclusion on a package deal involving 
redeployment of labour, security of employment and procedures for settling 
disputes was the division of responsibility on the union side. 30
30. Cmnd. 2937, p.100.
unions in national negotiationsCSEU could act on behalf of its constituent
on matters of pay and renditions which „ere common to the industry as a 
whole, individual unions regarded questions affecting designation, 
differentials and demarcations as their prerogative.
Reconstruction, The recommendation on reconstruction, if indeed such 
a vaguely worded proposal could be celled a recommendation, was directed 
to individual firms and no organisation was responsible for ensuring its 
implementation. As figure 1.6 shows, little by way of amalgamation took 
place In the early 1960s, and the bulk of the ’reconstruction' which 
occured took the form of the closure of shipyards. Although the 
recommendation was aimed at the industry, the government also made its 
views known. The recently appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the 
flinistry of Transport with special responsibility for shipbuilding and 
shipping, Vice-Admiral 0. Hughes-Hallett, said during a visit to Scotland 
in Ouna 1961 that the Ministry of Transport had no policy for the 
rationalisation of the shipbuilding industry. However, by November 1961 
he had changed his emphasis, some degree of rationalisation, whether by 
mergers, closures or shared services, eeemed Inevitable. The alternative 
would be to rely on the survival of the fittest and that would be a very 
painful process (see also section 3 .5.1 ),
_Scrapr andrbuild Scheme^ Nothing came of the report's proposal for a 
scrap-and-build scheme because, as the subcommittee itself had expected,
It was not supported by British shipowners. The government discussed the 
possibility of scrapping or scrap-and-build schemes with the General 
Council of British Shipping, but the General Council did not support 
any such schemes. The government did not, however, finally reject the 
proposal until May 1963. The shipowners' rejection of a scrap-and-build 
scheme illustrates not so much the general phenomenon in British politics 
of the power of interest groups to veto proposed changes which conflict
D X
“lth thelr dSSlrB3> 33 thB bUilt- i" •' « h  schemes that Shipowners
are least likely to want to order new ships at tha time when they sre
most likely to want to accelerate scrapping, and „ice versa. This has
been illustrated by the failure of the scrap-apd-build scheme in the 
1930s (868 section 2.2),
.Government orders. The recommendation on government orders was also 
effectively shelved. According to fir. Marples, «The attention of all 
Departments which order ships has been drawn to the recommendation about 
reviewing their requirements, but it is rarely practicable to accelerate 
orders. Host government orders are for the Royal Navy and the value of 
these has been greater this year than in I960.'31 There are in fact 
considerable difficulties in placing enough government orders to have a 
significant short-term impact! although 90? of naval shipbuilding orders 
went to commercial yards, this employed only eg of the people in the 
shipbuilding industry. However, when employment in tha industry 
deteriorated further in 1963, two additional ships ware ordered. The 
general principle for the allocation of naval orders was that contracts 
for bullding/xepairing were placed with the shipyards beat able to give 
timely and economical completion? the employment position in the yard
»7*2
was among the factors considered.
Credit f a cilities and the Peat, Warwick, Mitchell Report. The provision 
concerning credit facilities proved to be the most controversial in the 
report. Mr. Marples, replying to a Parliamentary Question after he had 
received the SAC Report, but before it was published, said that he did 
not think that the question of credit terms was always a reason why orders
31. HC Deb., 14 December 1961, written answers col.94.
32. HC Deb.. 1 March 1961, cols. 1580-1.
33. HC Deb.. 2 March I960, col. 1190.
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were not placed in the UK, because UK shipowners had in the recent past 
placed orders abroad where there was no question of credit terms. 34 
Mr. Narples' view was that some British orders were going to continental 
yards because they had been quoting lower prices and early delivery dates.3
Improvements took place in export credit in October 1960 and April 
1961, but these did not meet the SAC Report’s assertion that credit was 
as important for orders from UK shipowners as from foreign owners.
fir. Marples returned to the question of credit facilities during a supply
3fidebate on shipping and shipbuilding in Duly 1961. Ha had askori ------
shipowners to give him details of tenders they hsd received from both 
foreign end British shipbuilders end for the reasons why they chose to 
build abroad. Ha quoted four cases, though obviously without naming the 
firms involved. The main factors leading to the placing of orders 
abroad were pries and d.livery dates, with the balance of the factors 
varying in each case. After these and other instances, Mr. Harpies 
thought that there should be an examination of practically all orders 
placed abroad during the previous twe or three years to find out why they 
went abroad. The government had decided to hold an independent inquiry, 
and had asked Peat, Harwich, Hitchell and Company, chartered accountants, 
to analyse and summarise the reasons and report to the government.
The company's report, which reached Hr. Harpies in October 1961, 
covered orders placed abroad by UK shipowners for UK registration between 
the beginning of 1959 and the end of duly 1961.37 The reasons for placing 
the orders abroad are summarised in table 3.3. 0n credit facilities
34. HC Deb«, 15 March 1961, col.1358.
3 5. HC Deb., 22 March 1961, col.368.
3 5. HC Deb., 13 Duly 1961, cols. 615-21.
3 7. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Report, 1961.
the report concluded that ’The availability of credit facilities to 
spread payment for a ship over a number of years does not appear in 
most cases to have been of primary importance, and in fact such 
facilities were neither required nor asked for by several owners*.
Table 3.3 Reasons for placing orders abroad
Reason Number of Ships
Price
Price and delivery date 
Price and credit facilities 
Guaranteed delivery date
UK builders unwilling to installs foreign-built engine 
Total
15
10
6
2
1
34
Source* Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Report, 1961.
The findings of the Report oertainly came as no surprise to anyone, 
indeed when the inquiry was set up Ihs Tines talked of -another rather 
futile inquiry, this time into why these orders are pleeed abroad (the 
reasons, better price end delivery ere known; but a formal listing will 
perhaps help to drive the lesson home) - . 38 ThB government regarded the 
report as -confirming- that prise had been a major factor in influencing 
British owners to place orders abroad. 39 Though the report wee prepared 
by a firm of eocountents rather then a committee of inquiry, it fits 
clearly into the category described by Rhodes as -Committees set up
where government is fairly clear whet course to adopt but needs independent 
backing before doing so*,^
• Times, 14 Duly 1961.
• HC Deb.. 22 November 1961, col.1348.
. Rhodes, 1975, p.192. See also section 8.3.
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39 
40,
Indeed, the whole point of holding the inquiry only three months 
after the publication of the SAC Report requires examination. In the 
first place, the Ministry of Transport did not regard the SAC subcommittee 
as a useful method of collecting the information necessary to make a
decision. The composition of the subcommittee mas such that it uas
naturally concerned aith the interests of both sides of the shipbuilding 
industry.
Secondly, once the SAC Report had been published the government had 
to try to formulate an adequate response to relevant recommendations to 
prevent any of them being used as political weapons against it. Ulth 
the recommendations about a scrap-and-build scheme and the placing of 
additional government orders, this could be done by pointing out that the 
first did not have the support of the shipowners and the second would have 
no significant effect. The question of credit facilities, particularly
to British shipowners, was more difficult. The government was clearly 
convinced from discussions with British shipowners that credit facilities 
were not an important factor in the placing of orders abroad. However, 
the government thought that rejection of a recommendation merely on the 
basis of its own investigation would not carry as much weight as the 
conclusions of an inquiry specially set up by the government itself. in 
other words, the government calculated that the best way to gain support 
for their rejection of a part of a report was to have another report 
published which showed that the assumptions on which the initial
recommendation had been based were incorrect.
In spits of this ths gusstion of credit facilities continued to be 
a matter of controversy up to the introduction of the Shipbuilding Credit 
Scheme in 1963. The reason for this is that, although ths Peat, Harmick, 
Mitchell Report had shoun that Biitiah shipounera mere not much influenced
by credit facilities, British credit facilities at the time were not so 
good as those offered in some other countries. This was bound to 
cause pressure for better credit facilities in Britain.
3.4.3 The impact of the SftC Report
In terms of the non-implementation of its recommendations the SAC RBport 
can be regarded as an almost complete failure. The first reason for 
this which can be identified is that some of the recommendations were 
badly designed. This was particularly true of the proposed scrap-and- 
build scheme when the experience of the 1930s ought to have suggested that 
this was unlikely to work (see section 2.2 ), and of the credit proposal 
where the assumptions about orders from British shipowners were shown to 
be false. Secondly, the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee itself had no 
authority to supervise the carrying out of the recommendations. It even 
recognised in advance that some of its recommendations, such as the 
scrap-and-build scheme, had very little chance of being accepted by those 
with whom they had to be cleared. Even where all the participants were 
within the shipbuilding industry, as with the recommendations on labour 
relations, the chances of success were slim because of conflicting 
objectives. The fragmented nature of trade union organisation also 
meant that there were a large number of groups with effective veto power 
over reaching an agreement. However, the successful implementation of 
the labour relations recommendations would have required more than the 
formal acceptance of an agreement. it would have required changes in 
the patterns of behaviour of those in the industry of a kind which is 
not adequately described by terminology such as 'decision points' and 
• clearances' as used by Pressman and li/ildafrsky. 41 This points to a need
to generalise their approach to implementation, and this will be taken up 
in the final chapter.
Pressman and UildaVsky, 1973. See also section 1.5.41.
3.5 DEVELOPMENTS UP TO THE SHIPBUILDING CREDIT SCHEME
3.5.1 The governments attitude to shipbuilding.
The government’s greater concern about shipbuilding had been reflected in 
the appointment in April 1961 of Vice-Admiral 3. Hughes-Hallett as an 
additional Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport with 
special responsibility for shipping and shipbuilding. In his dealings 
with the industry he largely took over the role of the Shipbuilding 
Advisory Committee. In addition, Elizabeth Ackroyd’s appointment as 
Under-Secretary in charge of the Shipbuilding and General section of the 
Ministry of Transport was largely to deal with shipbuilding problems.
The government's view about the size of the industry, as stated by
Vice-Admiral Hughes-Hallett in an adjournement debate in the House of
Commons in December 1962, was that in the long-term some reduction in the
existing capacity in Britain was inevitable; by how much was a matter of 
42
opinion. In the short-term the outlook was even more critical. 
Vice-Admiral Hughes-Hallett did not think that much benefit could be 
gained from proposals for an accelarated »»aval programme, tied aid, 
nuclear ships, or a scrap-and-build scheme.
Tta government therefore seemed to be regarding the problem as one 
of industrial decline rather than of industrial change. In doing so, «  
was undoubtedly Influenced by the decline in world output betueen 19S8 and 
1961 (see table 3.4). other things being equal, ue should expect the 
willingness of gouernmsnts to provide assistance to an industry (other 
than assistance to ease the rundown of an activity) to depend on the 
government's perception of the total market of the product. In other 
words, a government is more likely to assist an Industry which is
42. HC Dab., 18 December 1962, cols. 1225-36.
ncurrently uncompetitive if it thinks there is a large market in which the 
industry could share if its competitiveness was improved* Thus in the 
early 1960s one of the influences affecting the government's unwillingness 
to provide assistance was its view that decline was inevitable. By the 
mid 1960s this perception altered to the view that the market was an 
expanding one, and the government provided assistance in the hope of 
enabling the British industry to compete for its share. By the mid 1970s 
the market for ships was again seen as a declining one - at least in the 
medium term - and a government minister, this time a Labour one, could 
again be heard pronouncing on the inevitability of contraction (see 
section 7.7). In fact, by 1962 world output was already on the upturn, 
and Britain's output in that year represented an absolute as well as a 
relative decline at a time when the world market was expanding.
Table 3.4 UK and world completions of merchants ships. 1958-62.
Year Completions (OOOqrt.) UK share of world
UK World tonnage (%)
1958 1,464 9,059 16,2
1 959 1,383 8,697 15.9
i960 1,298 8,382 15.5
1961 1,382 8,058 17.2
1962 1,016 8,182 12.4
Source! Cmnd 2937, appendix K, p.185.
3 .5«2___Manufacture of building component« in shipyard«.
Further evidence of the government's concern about spare capacity in 
shipyards was provided in January 1963 with tha appointment by hr. M ppon, 
flinieter of Public Building and Works, of a team to inquire into whether ' 
spare c a p a c i t y  in shipyards could be used to make products for housing a d
othsr types of building. The report of the four-nan teen use
presented to Mr. Rippon at the end of February, but use not published
the end of April. Ths r0port indicated that many shipyardg ^
spare capacity which could be used for making building components and
listed the types of building exponents which seemed to be most suitable 
for production in shipyards.
f.r. flippon announced that he use setting up three inquiry centree, 
in Glasgow, Newcastle and Manchester, to provide points of contact with 
potential clients. 44 Inquiries could also be made through offices of 
the Ministry of Public Building and Works. 8y December 1963. thirty 
shipyards had made enquiries and were put in touch with builders and 
others who might be able to make use of their facilities. 45 One ship­
building firm bed established a subsidiary company in cooperation with^ 
builder to manufacture industrialised building components in the North-
East. By February 1964, seven shipyards inixpyaras m  Scotland and a number in
England had entered the building field to a -modest extent' . 46 At the 
end of 1965 it was revealed that no industrialised house-building was 
taking place in Scottish shipyards, though one firm was known to be 
considering future production. 47
Though a very interesting development in terms of the government 
encoureging diversification of industry, such a scheme could never have 
done more than provide small-scale relief to the problem of spare (i.B. 
non-competitive) capacity, and in practice appears to have achieved even 
less than expected. Given the government's view that contraction of 
capacity was inevitable it would have been logical for it to have offered 
incentives for diversification, since even the most fervent advocate of a
43.
44.
45. 
4 6. 
47.
PIPBW, 1963.
HQ Deb.. 30 April 1963, col,Q95#
HC Deb.. 3 December iQfiT *.j._------  written answers col. 149
HC_Deb., 18 February 1964, cols. 1006-8.
HC Deb.. 8 December 1965, written-■ * answers col. 1 2 7,
necessarily deliver newfree market will accept that the market will not
job opportunities in the right place, at the right time and for the right
skills, and shipbuilders themselves were highly unlikely to have spare
capital available for diversification. The MPBW report, however
than 9
represented a short-term expedient rather/a clear selection of diversifi­
cation as a strategy. When the unemployment actually manifests itself 
the government will almost always opt for doing something about it, as 
section 3.6 and indeed the rest of this study will indicate, but the 
option then chosen is likely to be to seek to maintain the jobs within
shipbuilding - because by then there is rarely time to explore any other 
option.
3.6 THE SHIPBUILDING CREDIT SCHEME
3.6.1 Initial proposals.
Continuing dissatisfaction uith the government's attitude, particularly
on credit, was evidenced by a censure debate in the House of Colons in
rebruary 1962, on the government.s sbippi„g e„d shipbuilding policy and
by an adjournement debate in December 1962 on shipbuilding.48 By nay
ig63 the government clearly felt that more sionificnf me significant measures needed to
be taken to help the Industry uith its problems. flpart from th# 
continuing decline in the UK share of uorld output (see table 3.4), th, 
government's change cf tact can be explained by a number of inter-related 
influences. First of all, the industry's problems mere nou being 
reflected In a sharp drop in the numbers employed in neu construction 
(see table 3.5). Secondly, the general level of unemployment had riaen 
considerably since 1961. Finally, the neu initiative in shipbuilding 
policy should be seen In the context of the government's changed attitude
48. HC. Deb., 15 February 1962, cols. 1526-655; HC.Oeb.. 
1962, cols. 1225-36. 18 December,
'100
to its role in the economy, as illustrated by the setting up of the 
49NEDC.
Table 3.5 Employment in shipbuilding, 1958-1963.
Year Operatives (new construction) Other than operatives
Herchant Naval (shipbuilding & ship- 
repairing)
1958 77,600 14,600 21,300
1959 80,100 13,600 21,100
1960 71,800 12,200 21,100
1961 58,600 9,600 20,400
1962 50,400 12,000 19,400
1963 47,900 10,800 18,100
Source: Cmnd 2937, appendix E, p.172.
Even given the government's belief that in the long-term contraction
was inevitable, the short-term problems were even worse - new orders in
1962 amounted to little more than 40j£ of recent output. The government
had taken a close interest in shipbuilding since the beginning of the
1960s, even if this had at times been confined to exhortation, and clearly
felt that it would be held responsible for any increase in unemployment
if it failed to take action at this time. The form of action chosen was
a shipbuilding credit scheme for loans to British shipowners.
At the end of flay 1963 hr. Harpies announced that the government had
decided to make funds available for a limited period at government lending
5Qrate to finance new orders from British shipowners for British shipyards. 
The loans would be made to the shipowners on terms to be decided on the
advice of an advisory committee to be set up under the chairmanship of
49
50
S8e LerVez, 1975, part 2.
HC Deb.« 29 Hay 1963, cols. 1326-32
Lord Piercy, the chairman of the Ship Mortgage Finance Company. Ths 
government was prepared to make available £30m in the first instance* 
they would consider raising the limit if experience show*! that it would 
be right to do so. The scheme would not, in any case, continue beyond 
31 May 1964. Loans in suitable cases could be for up to 80* of the 
cost of a ship; individual loans might be for up to 10 years.
3.6.2 Revisions of the scheme
It soon became cleer that the £30m originally allecated te the scheme 
ueuld be inadequate. By 24 July Hr. Harpies had already approved the 
making of firm offers of loans of £13im to build approximately 170,000dwt 
tons ef shipping and epplicatiens mere under consideration for another 
£27m te build about another 500,000 tons. The government therefore 
decided to increase the amount available te e total of £60m within the 
terms of the scheme as already announced. 51 Jn announcing the new 
total Hr. Herplesjbid that the relief it would bring to the shipbuilding 
industry would only be temporary end that he was, therefore, already 
discussing with the shipbuilders what action they proposed to take to 
secure the industry's long-term future.
The question ef the sire of the total to be made available under the 
scheme was complicated by the Cunard Steam-Ship Company's proposal to 
build a replacement for the flueen Hary. Cunerd's previous proposal had 
been for a 75,000 ten ship to be employed all the time on the North 
Atlantic express service. Under the North Atlantic Shipping Act 1961 
cunard would have provided £12m end the government £10m at 4fcS interest.
Cunard>e proposal in 1963 was that the Queen Wary should be 
replaced by a ship of 58,550 gross tons which in addition to operating on
51 HC Deb.. 24 Duly 1963, cols. 1461-5.
the North Atlantic express service would spend about three months of each 
year cruising. This ship would cost about £22m and the company proposed 
to put up £4m of this and asked the government to lend the remaining £l8m 
over twenty-five years at 4% interest. Mr. Marples announced the 
government’s rejection of this proposal in the same statement as the 
announcement of the new £60m limit to the credit scheme. He said that 
the new proposal was 'very different and, in general, a much less 
satisfactory one from a number of standpoints, including that of the
taxpayer'. However, Cunard was eligible to apply under the credit 
scheme. Cunard decided that it would apply for a loan under the credit 
scheme, and agreement was reached between the government and Cunard for 
a £17.6m loan on terms less favourable than those previously requested by 
Cunard and refused by the government.
Although the Cunard loan was made under the scheme, it was in a way 
additional to it, since on the same day as the announcement of the Cunard 
loan the Ministry of Transport announced that the total amount available 
would be raised to £75m including the Cunard loan. By the end of 
October 1963 the Ministry of Transport had received applications under the 
scheme for loans exceeding the new £75m limit, and had therefore decided 
that no further applications would be accepted for consideration. The 
total amount available had been applied for four months before the Act of
Pariiani,er|k authorising the scheme came into force.
3.6.3 Impact of the Scheme.
It might appear that the government, in introducing the Shipbuilding Credit 
Scheme, had changed its earlier opinion that credit facilities were not 
an important factor in British owners' decisions to place orders abroad. 
However, in 1963 the concern was with the low overall level of new 
orders placed by British shipowners. The way in which the scheme was
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introduced, and in particular the two revisions to the scheme, does 
suggest, though, that the Ministry mas not certain what was the best 
method of dealing with the short-term problem.
Although the government's view was that there would have to be 
some contraction in the long term, it did not wish large-scale closures, 
particularly just before a General Election. The scheme chosen had the 
advantage of acting quickly to provide a breathing space, as well as being 
acceptable to both shipowners and shipbuilders. A total of 848,000 grt 
was constructed under the schema, with work on all but the Queen Mary 
replacement (known as the Q4, and later the Q£2) being started by mid- 
1964.
The Conservative government had stated its opposition to subsidy and 
was technically right in arguing that the credit scheme involved no subsidy 
since the Exchequer was not paying more for the money it lent than it 
charged the shipowners. However, the whole point of the scheme was that 
it made funds available at a cheaper rate than would normally have been 
charged. The scheme also involved an opportunity cost in public 
expenditure terms, since the £75m could have been put to other uses.
Any assessment of the effect of the scheme is complicated by the 
usual historical problem of establishing what would have occurred in its 
absence. It is quite possible that some shipowners anticipated that the 
government was going to make money available, and therefore postponed 
their orders until after the scheme was announced. There is some 
evidence which suggests that there would in any case have been an upsurge 
in orders as a result of an improvement in general trading conditions 
throughout the world? Mr. Marples mentioned this in his speech in the 
debate on the Second Reading of the Bill. 52 it is difficult to assess
52 HC. Deb., 15 Qanuary 1964, cols. 236-7
whethar the scheme genurated any new orders st all rather than merely 
accelerating them, but it did have the effect of providing a breathing 
apace by concentrating orders in a period »hen they »ere much needed.
By October 1964 the effect of the scheme in terms of ne» »orh had 
passed. In the previous three months the volume of ne» orders had been 
about a quarter of »hat »as needed to keep the yards busy. Of a total 
order book of 2.5m tons, tuo-thirds »as already under construction.
3.7 TAKING STOCK
By 1964 the Conservative government's view that there ought to be a 
contraction in the industry had been fulfilled in practice to an extent 
which frightened the government. The number of operatives in merchant 
neu/ construction had fallen from 80,100 in 1959 to 47,600 in 1964; between 
1961 and 1964 six yards capable of building merchant ships of 5,000 gross 
tons and above (or naval vessels of equivalent value) had closed, though 
two were subsequently integrated with other yards. What really frightened 
the government was that there was no prospect of the downward slide being 
halted.
During the breathing space afforded by the credit scheme the ministry 
of Transport put pressure on the shipbuilders to deal with the longer-term 
situation. In Dune 1964 the Ministry confirmed that it had been put to 
the shipbuilders that they should examine the whole matter of costs, 
plant and machinery in the period of higher orders resulting from the 
government credit scheme; they had been told that thefe should be a 
radical reshaping and reconstruction of the yards themselves. 53 However, 
this new-found enthusiasm for government-guided reorganisation had 
probably come at a time when reorganisation would be more difficult than
53 Times, 17 Dune 1964
at the beginning of the 1960s (and to an even greater extent than in the 
mid 1950s). If the analysis of industrial decline in section 3 . 1 is 
correct, then by 1964 shipbuilding was well into the 'vicious circle* 
phase, with the prospects for recovery receding as the need for it 
increased. Recovery depended on the formal agreement and day-to-day 
behaviour of a large number of organisations and individuals not all of 
whom would regard it as being in their interest to cooperate in the 
measures necessary for recovery - unless sufficient financial inducements 
were offered to persuade them otherwise. It was a daunting prospect 
which faced the incoming Labour government in October 1964.
CHAPTER 4
FROM COMMITTEE TO LEGISLATION
4.1 THE SETTING UP OF THE GEODES COMMITTEE
The incoming Labour government in October 1964 faced a situation in 
which the UK share of world shipbuilding output was less than a third 
of what it had been ten years earlier, and despite clear signs of a
recovery in world output the absolute level of UK output continued to 
fall. (see table 4.1).
TablB 4,1 ~ - a-nd U,°rld comPletions of merchant shins,
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Completions (OOOqrt) 
UK World
1,322
1,457
1,421
1,464
1,383
1,298
1,382
1,016
1,096
808
4,967
6,291
8,117
9,059
8,697
8,382
8,058
8,182
9,028
9,724
UK share of world 
tonnage {%)
26.6
23.2
17.5
16.2 
15.9
15.5 
17.2 
12.4 
12 . 1
8.3
Source: Cmnd 2937, Appendix K, p,185.
The government's response use to deoide very early on in U s  term 
of office that there should be an independent committee of Inquiry into
the shipbuilding industry.1 The purpose of this inquiry uas to
establish hou the industry could best be equipped end organised to make
Times, 11 November 1964. The announcement was made from Downing 
Street, rather than the Board of Trade, the department newly 
responsible for shipbuilding.
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it fully competitive and what action should be taken by management, trade
unions and the government to this end. Thus from the start the
committee was given a more positive role than merely looking at the
•prospects' for the industry, which had been the brief of the S A C
subcommittee in 1960 (see section 3,4),
Why was this particular form of'Inquiry chosen? There was a
departmental view or 'folk-knowledge' at the Board of Trade, to which the
new government had transferred shipbuilding and shipping, that management
consultants should not be used for this type of problem but should only
be used for 'management problems' such as, for example, to decide on the
best structure if a prior decision had been taken to nationalise the 
2industry. The Shipbuilding Advisory Committee was not considered 
suitable because it met infrequently and its members had vested interests. 
Similarly, because of the need to be seen to be fair the inquiry could not 
be carried out by a special committee of those involved i n  the industry.
As for the Board of Trade, it could not carry out the inquiry itself 
because of its workload and because of the need for a management approach. 
By a process of elimination, therefore, the form chosen was considered
3
most suitable.
2.
3.
V#I* Chapman» secretary to the Geddes Committee,
The question was naturally raised about whether, in view of the 
various inquiries about the industry in the early 1960s, there was 
any need for a further inquiry. One ministerial reply revealed an 
alarming degree of ignorance about the recent history of the industry. 
In a Supplementary Question in the House of Commons fir, Edward Taylor 
asked whether there was a danger of ignoring the Shipbuilding Advisory 
Committee's Report. Mr. Roy Mason, Minister of State at the Board 
of Trade responsible for shipping and shipbuilding, replied 'The 
hon. Gentleman must know that this was the Patten (sic) Committee 
which was formed of a team of shipbuilders who were themselves * 
looking at shipbuilding and shipbuilders* (HC, Deb.. 4 March 1965 
col. 1509). In fact, the Report of the Shipbuilding Advisory ’ 
Committee, the Dunnett Report, was a completely different report from 
the Patton Report, published in 1963; see sections 3.3.3 and 3.4.
These points about the type of inquiry needed were reflected in the 
membership and terms of reference of the committee. The terms of 
reference, which were announced on 2 February 1965, over two months after 
the initial announcement about the setting up of the committee, were:
'(a) to establish what changes are necessary in organisation, in 
the methods of production, and any other factors affecting costs 
to make the shipbuilding industry competitive in world markets;
(b) to establish what changes in organisation and methods of
production would reduce costs of large main engines to the lowest 
level; and
(c) to recommend what action should bs taksn by employers, trada 
unions, and government, to bring about those changes'/
The committee was to be concerned with shipyards regularly building 
vessels of 5,000 gross tons and above (or na„al „essels
value), but mould also bs abls to consider tbs implications of their 
Investigations for shipyards building sea-going vessels Df w  tonnage. 
the committee was also to consider the manufacture of steam turbines and’ 
slow-running diesels normally installed in ships of 5,000 tons and above.
As is usual for such committees, the chairman was the first member of
t h e  c o m m i t t e e  t o  b e  s e l e c t e d , and his aDnnin+mo„+., dnu m s  appointment was announced at the
same time as the terms of reference. Nr. Reay Geddee, managing
director of the Ouniop Rubber Company, was the person chosen. At that
time nr. Geddes was e member ef the National Economic Development
Council, but he was raleaeed from the Council to take on the chairmanship
of the inquiry committee. hr. Geddee was regarded as being a dynamic
industrial ieader and, of particular reievanoe to shipbuilding, „as
4 HC. Deb., 2 February 1965, written answers cols. 272-3
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interested in achieving productivity through enlightened labour 
relatione.5 6 Hie firm had been the first to issue an individual 
•statement of intent' following the national Joint declaration on 
productivity, prices and incomes in December 1964.
The selection of the remaining members of the committee, whose 
names were announced on 12 February 1965, appears to have followed normal 
practice for such committees by which the Permanent or Deputy Secretary 
of the department invites potential members, in the first place over the 
phone, sometimes after consultation with the chairman. There was a 
deliberate attempt to balance the committee, with a trade unionist, an 
academic economist who was also a Scot, and experts in research and 
development, accountancy, management, and engineering. The very nature 
of the committee excluded anyone who was directly involved with ship­
building, though one member, Hr. Burney, had previously advised the 
Ministry of Transport on shipbuilding credit (see section 3.4.1). The 
secretary of the committee was Mr. V.I. Chapman, who had been made head 
of the shipbuilding branch at the Board of Trade, though he ended up 
spending virtually all his time as secretary to the committee.*’
Mr. A.3. Suicb, a principal in the shipbuilding branch, was assistant 
secretary to the committee.
4.2 POLICY BEFORE THE PUBLICATION OF THE GEDDES REPORT 
It must be remembered when focussing on the problems of a single industry 
that shipbuilding was only one of many problems facing the new Labour 
government in 1964, though some of these problems impinged on shipbuilding. 
A few days after taking office the Labour government introduced a number 
of measures designed to improve the balance of payments, Among these
5 . See Times, 3 February 1965.
6. Interview with Mr. V.I. Chapman. 7 November 1973.
u/era export rebates - a repayment to exporters of sums broadly 
equivalent to the amount of certain indirect taxes which entered into the 
cost of production of exported goods - and a temporary import surcharge 
of 15*, with re-exported goods being relieved of the charge. At first 
it appeared that ships would be liable to the import surcharge, which 
would have led UK shipowners to avoid ‘importing» ships for the 
duration of the surcharge, and would have been unlikely to have led to 
orders being diverted to UK yards. For its part, the Shipbuilding 
Conference was concerned about the adverse effect the surcharge might 
have when applied to imported equipment for ships being built on fixed- 
price contracts. However, in his Budget statement on 11 November 
fir. Callaghan announced a number of exemptions from the import surcharge, 
among which were ships of BO tons or more and components used by 
British shipbuilders in the manufacture, repair or refitting of large 
ships.7
Shipbuilders also benefited from new general arrangements for the 
provision of finance for export credits given to overseas buyers which 
were announced by the Bank of England at the end of Danuary 1965.
During the Budget debate in April Mr. Jay, President of the Board of 
Trade, claimed that the effect on shipbuilding orders of this extension 
had been even more encouraging than the government had expected.8 Since 
January overseas orders for ships to be built in Britain had increased 
sharply and new enquiries had doubled. At the same time Mr. 3ay 
announced further improvements in export facilities applying to industry 
generally. As on previous occasions these improvements in export credit 
facilities provoked calls for improvements in credit facilities for 
British shipowners ordering from British shipyards. A decision on the
7. HC Deb.. 11 November 1964, cols. 1027-8.
8. HC Deb.. 8 April 1965, cols. 684-7.
provision of home credit facilities did not, however, come until after
the publication of the Geddes Report.
Although the formulation of a definitive policy for the shipbuilding
industry had been postponed until after the Geddes Committee had
reported, fir. Nason, Minister of State at the Board of Trade responsible
for shipping and shipbuilding, outlined how government policy was
shaping up in speeches during tours of shipyards and elsewhere. In
doing so he attacked both shipbuilding employers and unions. During a
visit to yards in Lowestoft in October 1965 Nr. Nason said that British
shipbuilders spent too much time squealing about the shortage of labourj
this could be eased by better use of the available labour and the ending
g
of many of the restrictive practices. He also said that it was time
the unions did some fresh thinking about training schemes for workers.
At the Scottish TUC in November 1965 Nr. Nason tried, in his own words,
* to kill a lot of the old dogmatic slogans that have been in various
10resolutions for many years*. He told the trade unionists that 
nationalisation was not the answer and that subsidising the industry was 
no way to make it more competitive. A policy of scrap-and-build was 
•poppycock* because the average age of the British merchant fleet was 
about nine-and-a-half years.
By ruling out a number of options in this way, Nr. Nason effectively 
restricted the government, if it wanted to take part in improving British 
shipbuilding^ competitive position, to action roughly along the lines of 
the Geddes proposals which appeared a few months later. It is in this 
context that the Geddes Report and the government’s acceptance of it 
should be seen.
g. Times, 8 October 1965.
10. Times, 6 November 1965.
4.3 FAIRFIELDS
4.3.1 The collapse of the old Fairfield company
The precarious state of some parts of the shipbuilding industry while it 
was »waiting for Geddes» was illustrated by the rescue of the Fairfields 
yard from closure after a receiver had been appointed on 15 October 1955. 
The Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company owned a large shipyard 
on the upper Clyde, which together with its engineering subsidiary, 
Fairfield Rowan Ltd., employed about 5,000 workers. Efforts to save the 
company concentrated on the shipyard rather than the engineering 
subsidiary, which went into liquidation. This section will describe how 
the government became involved in what came to be known as the Fairfields
Project, and the incorporation of the Fairfields yard into UCS is 
considered in section 5.2.2.^
Tha central figure in the atter.pt to turn the difficulties of 
rairfields into an opportunity for an exportant in i„dUatrial management 
and industrial ralationa pas Iain Stepart. Iain stepart „as chairman of 
Hall-Thermotank Ltd., uhich had factories In Govan near the fsirfialds 
yard, end das also a director of a numdsr of other companies. Throughout 
th, 1960a ha had been advocating measures to improve industrial relations. 
Ha had argued that insecurity and Inadequate information ware the real 
causes of Industrial conflict in eritain and had proposed a national 
schema to remove Porkers' fears of unemployment and a louer standard of 
living.12 Before the collapse of Fairfields Iain Stepart had already 
been negotiating a scheme under Phlch porkers mho became redundant at 
Stephan's shipyard on the Clyde could be employed on special city 
building projects created by Glasgou Corporation. Ha therefore sap the
11.
12.
For accounts of various aspects of the Fairfields 
Alexander and denkins, 1970; Paulden and Hawkins,
PauHen and Hawkins, 1969, p.6.
Experiment see 
1969; Houston,1967.
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Fairfields yard as providing an opportunity to put his various ideas 
into practice.
As soon as they learned of the threatened closure, Fairfields shop 
stewards and local MPa made representations to the government to keep the 
yard going. Initially the Board of Trade was the department involved, 
but the major initiatives completely by—passed the Board of Trade.
For example, Dohn Rankin, the Labour WP for Govan, approached the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister directly.
On 4 November ,965 nr. Callaghan, the Chancellor of the exchequer, 
told the House of Colons that the Bank of England would advance up to 
£10, to keep the shipyard end its subsidiary open until th. early spring.13 
On the previous Friday, 29 October, the receiver, together kith the 
treasurer of the Bank of Scotland, had cone to see Hr. Callaghan and had 
told him that the company's sources of finance mere exhausted and that 
closure of the yard could be avoided only if immediate financial help 
was given. This would give time for an assessment to be made ef the 
prospects for long-term viability of the yard. The government had 
concluded that the future of the yard should be held open until they had 
received and considered the Geddes Report, which was axpectsd by the
following February. The money was to ba made available solely to keep 
the position open.
4.3.2 Developments during the breathinn
The way in which this £1m was made available to Fairfields without the 
Treasury making inquiries end without a government shareholding was 
thought stupid by Derek Palmar, a merchant banker who had been seconded
to the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) in 14 u
/ i»00. He also happened
13.
14.
HO Oeb., 4 November 1965, cols. 1234-9. 
Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, pp.18-23.
to have been Iain Stewart's financial adviser for some years and 
therefore provided an inside contact for Stewart's proposals. palmar 
was responsible for developing the formula of a fifty-fifty partnership 
between government and private investors and for persuading George Brown 
that Stewart should be chairman of a new Fairfields company. For his 
part, George Brown enthusiastically promoted the idea once he had 
accepted it and introduced the idea of union participation in the 
investment.
As a result of this initial inside contact through Derek Palmer 
Stewart sent a letter to George Brown outlining his view that the 
situation presented an opportunity to expose the problems of ship­
building and to 'grasp the nettle' of overmanning, demarcation and 
management problems. m  return George Brown telephoned Iain Stewart 
to discuss the project. A number of discussions were held with Stewart 
and Palmlr to develop ideas. Dames Callaghan became more favourable 
to the project following a chance meeting with Iain Stewart on 23 
Wovember. This support, and that of the Secretary of State for Scotland 
was particularly necessary because the Board of Trade, the sponsoring
department for shipbuilding, was one of a number of departments
15opposed to the project.
At the end of November the Cabinet agreed in principle to the fifty- 
fifty partnership formula, and on 1 December the OEA officially invited 
Iain Stewart to be chairman of the proposed company, Stewart accepted 
on condition that the unions agreed in advance to his new terms of 
work. Stewart and Palmar met members of the Scottish TUC on 3 December 
and obtained their support on condition that Stewart also obtained the 
approval of national union leaders. A meeting was therefore arranged
15. Brown, 1971, pp. 121-2. Private information confirm«?
of the Board of Trade ; interview with former civil servant^Vn^00November 1973. servant, 30
on 7 December with the unions' national e x e c u t i v e s , which g a v e  their 
approval after an enthusiastic exposition of the proposals by 
George Brown.
News of the moves leaked out and appeared in newspapers on 9 
December, though it was incorrectly assumed that Stewart was acting as 
chairman of Hall-Thermotank rather than as an individual. George Brown 
made a holding statement to the Commons on the same day.16 lain Stewart 
also issued a press statement that evening.17 He would become chairman 
of the new enterprise on the understanding that the unions would give 
their unreserved cooperation to the management in introducing flexibility 
and interchangeability between the trades at Fairfields. He explained 
that:
'Broadly speaking, this means that the management would have 
complete freedom to introduce a variety of new techniques. 
Fairfields would become a proving ground for new ideas, new methods 
and the elimination of unnecessary practices if the plan is 
acceptable. These measures, I believe, would not only re­
establish the company as a commercially viable unit, but would also 
enable the men to share in the prosperity which can be achieved by 
proved productivity performance'.
On the following day, 10 December, a mass meeting of Fairfields 
workers voted overwhelmingly to support the scheme promoted by Georgs 
Brown and Iain Stewart. However, a meeting to be addressed by Stewart 
himself on Monday 13 December, was postponed until after the problem of 
financing the new company had been settled.
16. HC. Deb., 9 December 1965, cols. 618-23,
1 7 , Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, pp,28-9.
4,3,3 Formation of Fairfields (Glasgow) Ltd.
The fortnight following Gsorgo Brown-s statement in tha House of Commons 
was takan up with .tt^pta to find financiai backars and »anagamant for 
tha new company. Sufficient progress had been made in negotiations to 
enabie George Broun to make a further statement to the House of Commons on 
22 December.18 He said that, although he uas not able to give details, 
arrangements had been made to safeguard the future of Fairfields 
shipyard. There uas nou the foundation for a financial partnership 
between the government, private enterprise and the trade unions. Two 
major unions had expressed the intention of participating and discussions 
were going on uith others. The government would hold half of tha equity 
of the new company, Fairfields (Glasgow) Ltd., and the other half would 
be shared between the other partners.
The postponed mass meeting to be addressed by Iain Steuart took 
place on 27 December and he outlined his proposals in detail to the 
19men. Employment conditions at Fairfislds were to be isolated from 
national, district or local agreements. The men would have to promise 
to eliminate strikes, go-slows and overtime bans, to allow free movement 
between jobs as demand fluctuated, and to cooperate with modern 
management techniques. In return there would be retraining to eliminate 
the fear of unemployment, union representation on the Fairfields board 
and regular reports from the chairman to the employees. The men 
supported these proposals by a show of hands. No written agreement was 
made; Stewart had said that he was prepared to accept their public 
endorsement of his conditions. The publicity surrounding Fairfields 
during its new life was a deliberate policy of the Fairfields management. •
• HC Deb.. 22 December 1965, cols. 2102-7.
, Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, pp. 49-51.
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The new company was formed on 7 Oanuary 1965. However, before 
then problems arose when the AEU, the TGWU and the NUGMW withdrew their 
offer of financial participation when they discovered that their 
constitutions did not allow them to invest finds in unduly risky 
enterprises. Lord Thomson and Isaac Wolfson also withdrew when they 
learned that the unions were no longer making a financial contribution. 
George Brown offered his resignation to the Prime Minister. However, 
Iain Stewart offered to guarantee Thomson’s and Wolfson’s cash 
personally if the unions were not able to take up shares, and George 
Brown cancelled his resignation. This secret agreement enabled the 
company to be launched even though it took a further six months for the 
unions to alter their constitutions to enable them to take up shares.
The final shareholdings are shown in table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Shareholdings in Falrfields (Glasgow) ltd.
Unions NUGiïlU £50,000
“ CAliiU £ 5,000
AEU £50,000
ASU £25,000
£130,000 (+ £50,000 loan from ETU) 
Private Stenhouse Investments £50,000
" ' Pennant Finance (Wolfson) £100,000
Thomson Scotland £150,000
H.K. Salveson £100,000
£400,000government £530,000
Total £1,050,000 *20
Source* Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, p.86.
Tha total capital of fairfialds (Glasgou) Ltd. at tha tiro of ita
formation mao 12m, consisting of ona million £1 ordinary shares and £1
20 m 
7% unsecured loan Stock. The Board of Trade acquired half the ordinary
20. HC Deb., B February, written answers cols. 46—7,
shares and subscribed the «hoi. of the loan stock. The government, 
by virtue of its shareholding, mas entitled to nominate one director, 
and the other shareholders three. The government nominated as its 
director Oerek Palmar, uho had been closely Involved In the initial
n&Qoti.i.{3fci.ons about ths neiu company#
4«3«4 T h e politics of ad hoc intervention
Government involvement in the setting up of the new Fairfields company 
was characterised by a number of features which are of more general 
interest in discussing ad hoc interventions as opposed to involvement in 
the industry as a whole. The first of these relates to the timing of 
the collapse of the old company. Because the Geddes Report was due to 
make recommendations on the whole industry within a few months, the 
government felt it necessary to keep the yard in operation until any 
part it could play in the committee's recommendations became clear.
Thus there was a greater chance of a government-backed rescue attempt 
to keep a yard open during the period from the setting up of the Geddes 
Committee to the implementation of its recommendations than there would 
have been at any other time.
The role of the various personalities involved in setting up the 
new Fairfields company was crucial. George Brown's enthusiastic 
advocacy of the scheme was vital in persuading the government to back it 
There seems to have been an element of chance in the responsibilities 
held by the various people involved at the very beginning - Derek Palmar 
who happened to be seconded to George Brown's department, happened to 
have been the financial adviser of Iain Stewart, who happened to iive 
and work close to the FairfiBlds yard.
George Brown's personal enthusiasm was all the more important in 
getting the scheme accepted because he had to override the opinion of
the department responsible for 
responsibility could only have
shipbuilding. This appropriation of 
arisen with an ad hoc intervention;
21
George Broun uould not have been able to launch a similar scheme to 
cover the whole industry. This clash of responsibility did not go 
unnoticed in the House of Commons and was one of the points raised by 
the Opposition when George Broun made his statement on 9 December 1965. 
This question of responsibility for Fairfields uas also raised by 
nr. Grimond in February 1966, and in reply fir. Wilson said that 
responsibility for the shipbuilding industry uas with the Board of Trade 
but that the question of the Fairfields decision arose out of thB very
serious regional problems uith the throat of the overnight closure of a 
major shipyard.22 This uas, indeed, the opening uhich enabled George 
Broun to promote the project, but the government's real vieu about uhere
the responsibility ought to U e  is shoun by the feet that the government's 
shareholding in Fairfields (Giasgou) Ltd. use held by the Board of Trade, 
not the DEA.
The government's relationship uith the neu Fairfi.lde company clearly 
ahous that there uas no thought out procedura for obtaining information 
about companies uhich had bash subject to ad hoc government intervention, 
fls ue have seen, although the D M  uas the department involved in setting" 
up Fairfields, the governmsnt sharsholding uas held by tha Board of Trade. 
Houeuer, Darak Palmar,.one of tha man most directly involved in promoting6' 
tha Fairfields project, ues appointed government director, and as uali 
as sending reports to the Board of Trade ha sent copies to Gaorga Broun,
2 1.
22,
See also section 9.2 on departmental responsibility for s h ip b u iid in o  
HC Deb*» 1 February 1966, cols. 878-9. )v)r Wilson 1« 9‘
recorded in Hansard is obscure. it says,’in parti .Thr8* 33 
Fairfields decision ... arose out of the very serious^ • 
problems - for uhich the Board of Trade is responsibleregional 
the threat of overnight closure of a major shipyard » r ^  
planning (but not distribution of industry function^ R09i°nal
course, the responsibility of the DEA, uhich is nresLin^hf6* °f Mr. Wilson meant to say, ^ esun>ably what
When George Brown became Foreign Secretary in August 1966 his ability 
to influence the government's attitude to Fairfields obviously 
d i m i n i s h e d  a n d  i t  v a n i s h e d  altogether w i t h  h i s  final departure from the 
government, A further change occurred with the transfer of ship­
building to the Ministry of Technology under Mr. Benn, who did not have 
the same personal commitment to the project as George 8rown.2^
For his part, Iain Stewart treated the government in the same way
as any large shareholder who did not have an absolute majority of shares,
and he did not concede any special influence to the government. This
obviously led to friction. W h en Sir Jack Scamp was appointed to the
Fairfields board, Benn complained to Stewart through Palmar that he had
24not been consulted before the appointment. In reply, Stewart made 
it clear that it was not the custom of a board to ask its shareholders' 
permission to appoint directors, but merely to inform them after the 
event, and that any shareholder was able to express his views about a 
director at the Annual General Meeting?
Iain Stewart later came to the conclusion that it had been a 
mistake to treat the government as an ordinary shareholder,25 His 
relations with the government during the time of the Fairfields experiment 
had been virtually nil because he did not want Fairfields to be seen as 
a government venture. However, eighteen months after the formation of
23« The account of changes in Ministers concerned with Fairfields which 
is given on p.5 of Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, is inaccurate. The 
authors state that the Fairfields shareholding was transferred to 
the Ministry of Technology while Frank Cousins was still Minister.
In fact, shipbuilding, including Fairfields matters, was not 
transferred to the Ministry of Technology until November 1966, by 
which time Mr. Benn was Minister. The announcement of the proposed 
change, had however, been made in June 1966 while Cousins was still 
Minister. (See section 9.2 on departmental responsibility for ship­
building). Thus, the statement in their book 'Derek Palmer sent 
his reports to Frank Cousins, with copies to George Brown, by now 
the Foreign Secretary, must be doubly inaccurate, since Cousins 
resigned shortly before George Brown became Foreign Secretary in 
August 1966.
24. Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, p.88.
25. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2271-7.
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Fairfields there was a completely different set of faces in the relevant 
ministries and instead of providing a sympathetic ear and the under­
standing which had existed in 1965 they were concentrating on the SIB as 
an instrument of government policy. Iain Stewart therefore found that 
any effort to contact people in Whitehall and make a point was hardly 
worthwhile, since there was a great deal of euphoria about the SIB and 
Upper Clyde. With hindsight, he thought that he 'should have been much
more in contact with the different ministers and have been in the thick
26of the changing scene much more'. Dust how important this point was 
will be seen in section 5.2.2 dealing with the absorption of Fairfields 
into UCS following the Geddas recommendation that there should be 
estuary-based groupings of shipyards.
4.4 THE GEODES REPORT
4.4.1 The committee at work
The committee carried cut It. Inquiry in a numbar of ways.27 E„idenoe 
uaa received from the central organisation, of the shipbuilding industry, 
all t h e  shipbuilding and marine engineering firms covered by the inquiry, 
the TUC, the CSEU and e number of individual unions, a large number of 
shipping firms, all the government departments in any uay connected ulth 
shipbuilding, and a number of other organisations, companies and 
individuals. in addition to written submissions, the committee held 
formal meetings with many of those who had presented evidence. Because 
the government submitted evidence to the committee, the secretary to the 
committee, who was also head of the shipbuilding branch at the Board of 
Trade, found himself drafting both letters during one exchange of
26.
27.
Similarly, Wr* Happer, chairman of UCS* fait aftpr* lire u „1 
liquidation that the situation would have developed more^ int0
satisfactorily if he had had better personal contacts with i.i m *- HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2145-7. With Uhitshalls
See Cmnd 2937 (Geddes Report), p.7.
t
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correspondencei However, much of the work was done less formally by 
discussion with groups and individuals; the chairman placed great stress 
on the informality of the committee. 28 9 * Members of the committee visited 
all the twenty-seven yards covered by the inquiry as well as a number of 
suppliers and other firms. Whenever possible, such visits included 
meetings with shop stewards and people interested in regional development. 
Committee members also visited shipyards and engine works in Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Germany, the USA and Dapan and had discussions with 
shipbuilders there. Not all the committee members went on each 
excursion. Accountants also visited each firm and reported to the 
committee, and the head of each firm was seen privately to discuss 
future plans. In addition, the committee commissioned a survey on the 
market for ships from a firm of management consultants. 39
The amount of time spent by members on committee work varied 
considerably but was generally large; Geddes himself spent nearly all 
of his time on committee work, as did the secretary of the committee, 
flora work was done by the committee than is recorded in the report. 
Representations were made to committee members in private. There were 
discussions on particular problems by the chairman, secretary and one of 
the other committee members. When it came to the drafting of the report, 
the preamble was written by Geddes himself, most was drafted by the 
secretary, and early drafts of some chapters by other individual committee 
members. 31 There were several drafts of some sections and some changes 
were made in policy recommendations in the meetings considering the 
draft of the report. However, due at least partly to the chairmanship
.28
28* Jn5SvemierW^fe?r# V*1* Chapman* secretary to the Geddes Committee.
29. Interview with Sir Reay Geddes. if April 1 9 7 4.
3 0. See section 1.4.2 on forecasting.
31. Interviews with Sir Reay Geddes and Mr, V.I. Chapman. This is 
normal practice for committees of this kind; see Chapman. 19 7 3 n n 1 m  ,
(Interviews on b April 1974 and 7 November 1973.) *PP.183~<!
of Geddes, there was no question of there being a minority report, 
though committee members were aware of their right to produce one.
Roy Mason was occasionally consulted about recommendations in final 
draft sometimes personally but more often through the secretary and tha 
department; this was done to enable government to raise points about
recommendations, but there were a number of points which the committee 
were determined to include.
The committee succeeded in meeting Mr. Mason's request that the
committee should try to report within twelve months, though one member
of the committee felt that the inquiry was conducted too fast, and that
they were only beginning to know the industry by the tims they had 
32
finished work. The length of the report, 156 pages plus 44 pages of 
appendices, reflected the thoroughness of the committee's work. A 
short version of the report was else drafted; special effort was made 
to produce . colourful, attractively laid out booklet. A copy of this 
was sent to every shipbuilding employee at hie home to errlvo on a 
Saturday morning — so that the wives would ask about it.
4.4.2 The Geddes approach
The preamble to the report suggested that shipbuilding might be a test
case for British industry, 'for the next generation the ship will remain
a very good example of a product constructed and fitted cut in ways which
give scope for a high quality of design, preduetion engineering, planning,
organisation and control, and accurate, steady individual work'. On th.'
other hand, the report mentioned the special nature of the industry - all
British-built merchant ships were sold in the epen unpretected market, so
all prices had to be at world levels and all deliveries had to he „ i* on time* 32
32. Interview with member of the Geddes Committee. 18 April ^
4. "ì 124
The Geddes Report explicitly rejected the more usual approach as found 
in, for example, the SAC Report of 1961, that British shipbuilding should 
rely largely on British shipowners for their orders. The committee’s
view uas that -the only satisfactory may to study futur. demand ls to 
examine the world market and British prospects of competing in it'.33
This approach had the consequence that the market for British shipbuilding 
was seen as a potentially expanding one.
The recommendation with the greatest significance in terms of 
government action, and the one which eventually came to dominate all the 
others, was that the industry should be restructured so that existing 
enterprises were merged into four or five regionally based groups and that 
a government financed Shipbuilding Industry Board should be set up to 
promote this reorganisation. The committee did not consider that 
continuing evolution along existing lines or the extension of voluntary 
co-operation between shipbuilders were likely to lead to the emergence of 
such shipbuilding groups. In discussing whether the safest course would 
be to support normal evolution by government assistance in the form of 
subsidies and of credits for home shipowners to build in UK yards, the 
report did not think that along period of government support would result 
in the formation of large groupings. Pointing to the experience of the 
United States, France and Italy the report considered that it was more
likely that the industry would come to rely increasingly on such support 
Although the report advanced highly plausible benefits to be gained 
from grouping - a group could better support the strengthened management 
structure advocated by Geddes and could secure better allocation of 
labour by transfers between yards - no attempt was made to quantify the 
benefits or the costs of different types of groupings. l/ickers
33. Geddes Report, 1966, p.36.
emphasises that ’All new organisations are bound to face extraordinary
difficulties of communication until they have had time to build up
common frames of r e f e r e n c e * T h e  Geddes Report recognised that extra
costs would arise during the period or reorganisation and proposed grants
u p  t o  a ceiling of £5m to meet transitional losses (see section 4.4,3);
however, in the absence of quantification of costs arising from
reorganisation it is difficult to be sure that this was an adequate sum.
One of the benefits expected from large groupings was that each yard
could specialise in building one kind of ship. However, Austin and
Pickersgill demonstrated that it was possible to specialise without large-
scale groupings (though it did merge with Bartram). Even given that
there were gains to be made from grouping (and the case was sound in
principle) different combinations of yards would obviously have different
costs and benefits. Some academics were approached to carry out a
study but none were free at short notice. The committee assumed that
SIB would carry out examinations of the best form of groupings and the
benefits to be obtained. However, as we shall see in chapter 5, this is
not how the SI8 approached the desirability of particular groupings.
In considering the emphasis placed on groupings in the Geddes Report it
is important to bear in mind that the recommendation was made at a time
when there were great hopes of making British Industry as a whole more
competitive through restructuring. This was reflected in the setting up
of the Industrial R e o r g a n i s a t i o n  Corporation (IRC) in the same year as
35the Geddes C o m m i t t e e  r e p o r t e d .
The report rejected a scrap-and-build scheme for similar reasons to 
those given by both Conservative and Labour ministers in the 1 9 6 0 s , The 345
34. Vickers, 1971, p.27.
35. On the IRC see Young and Lowe, 1974, part II.
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C0»„itte8.s desire to a v o i d  political controversy is explicitly revealed 
in its comment on the CSEU's proposals for nationalisation, -Any long 
term gains mould have to be very clear to justify mating the industry 
a centre of political controversy by taking action to nationalise i f . 36 
Neither nationalisation nor state participation mere recommended by the 
report since they mere not considered necessary to produce the desired 
improvement in competitiveness. It mas suggested in section 4.2 that 
the type of action mhich the Geddas Committee might recommend had already 
bean prejudged to e considerable extent by ministerial statements. This 
is not to imply any improper pressure by ministers on an independent 
committee. It is simply that any committee of this kind mill reflect 
attitudes common at the time and mill want to formulate its recommendations 
in such a may that they have a reasonable chance of acceptance by the 
government and others concerned. This does not mean that the Geddas 
recommendations mere determined before the report mas mritten, there mas 
a range of types of machinery and amounts of money mhich the committee 
might have recommended. As mill be argued in chapter 5, government 
policy folloming Geddes mas not, in any case, the complete implementation 
of the report which has sometimes been suggested.
The committee considered a number of the arguments mhich had been put 
formard far government assistance to shipbuilding before going on to give 
ite omn justification for the measures it recommended. The argument that 
there had to be a British shipbuilding industry to support the British 
fleet mas rejected. The festest-groming merchant fleets, Normay, Greece 
and the flags of convenience, were not backed by large national ship­
building industries, and British shipomners themselves made it clear that 
they did not regard their future as dependent on tha maintenance of the
36. Geddes Report, p.94.
British shipbuilding industry. Nor did ths committee, acoept tha 
argument that the decline of the British shipbuilding industry might 
lead to a monopoly in the supply of big ships. This situation could not 
come about suddenly, and there mas no reason to believe that Began wanted 
it. The report also argued that there uas no justification on defence 
grounds to maintain an uncompetitive merchant shipbuilding industry on 
a permanent basis, the ministry of Defence itself told the committee 
that it would not regard any government support for British merchant 
ship production as a proper charge on the defence vote.
Balance of payments arguments were difficult to disentangle from 
the more general question of the competitiveness of the industry. The 
committee accepted that the whole production of shipbuilding, as of many 
other industries, helped the balance of payments in that it either added 
to exports or reduced imports. Shipbuilding would make good use of the 
country's resources if it was successful in competing profitably both for 
orders and for resources on the home market. it could be argued that it 
would be wasteful to transfer the resources to other industries, but 
since 'this transfer would be a gradual process for the country as a 
whole* the committee did not recommend the permanent maintenance of the 
industry at an uneconomic size.37 The use of the phrase 'gradual 
process for the country as a whole* reveals the committee's political 
innocence. Shipbuilding has been a political problem to governments not 
because of its role in the country as a whole but because it is highly
concentrated in specific locations where the effects of a closure might 
be considerable (see section 1.3.2).
Similarly, the committee did not think it consistent with government 
regional policy to prop up an industry which was not competitive, though 
it recognised that Northern Ireland might face a special problem.
37 Geddes Report, p.133
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This rather remarkable conclusion was reached by accepting at face 
value the government's claim that 'the Government's regional policies 
are in fact based on preventing any avoidable hardship during transfer, 
on providing retraining and on encouraging the location of growth 
industries in areas prone to unemployment*. However, as the history 
of government involvement in the British industry in the 1960s and 1970s 
shows all too clearly, governments will intervene to prop up companies 
in areas of high unemployment. Earlier in the report the committee had 
remarked* 'The growth of competitiveness is the surest way for the 
industry to offer attractive regular employment to a substantial labour 
force, with the possibilities of a career for those who desire it.
The size of the labour force maintained will depend on the amount o f  
business which can be regularly competitively procured and it may not be 
geographically distributed as at present». However, it is precisely 
the geographical distribution which is of political significance. Even 
if the total industry labour force remained roughly constant (as it did 
between 1967 and 1971) there will still be repercussions from actual or 
potential redundancies in individual locations. It was not part of the 
committee's remit to consider the social and political consequences of 
such redundancies, but the absence of a specific and visible programme to 
deal with the c e r t a i n t y  o f  redundancies m a d e it very unlikely that unions 
would co-operate fully in measures to increase competitiveness if these 
had the effect of reducing the size of the labour force required. This 
would reduce the chance of the firm becoming competitive and increase the 
chance of redundancies through collapse of the firm; this in turn would 
increase the chance of government intervention to 'save* the jobs by 389
38. Geddes Report, p.134.
39. Geddes Report, p.115.
subsidising their continuation within shipbuilding.
Having r e n t e d  thesa justifications for government support to 
shipbuilding, the report advanced its own, it was the prospect of 
British shipbuilding becoming competitive, given the likely grouth of the 
uorld market for merchant ships and the Implementation of the 
recommendations outlined in the report which constituted the case for 
government action to assist it. Unfortunately -becoming competitive- 
is not a very precise phrase, one can ask -competitive whan and given hem 
much government aid!- The report set out a timetable and a programme of 
assistance far the industry as a -hole, but tha criterion of competitive, 
neaa (or the .van vaguer -potentially commercially viable-) was applied 
much more loosely in practice to individual firms (sea chapter 5).
One of the great merits of tha Gsddas Report mas the stress that It 
laid on the need for both sides of the industry to take action if 
government assistance was to contribute to oompetitivenesa. The committee 
therefore recommended that the government should not commit itself to 
special temporary financial assiatanoe unless tha Industry Indicated its 
oun willingness to make the necessary changes, and that steady progress by 
the industry should be e condition of the extent of the assistance given 
within the proposed ceiling figures. This proposal contains an element 
of -Catch 22- paradox, If progress depsnded on the availability of 
government assistance how could progress be a prior condition of 
government assistance? To be fair to the committee the paradox was not 
completes the payment of tranches of government assistance for capital 
investment or working capital could be made dependent on better 
performance on the basis of existing resources. (The parallel with 
government assistance to British Leyland in 1975-6 is obvious). However 
this approach depended on two assumptions which turned out to be fals i 
practices that firms could survive without immediate government ’
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assistance, and that if performance by a firm failed to improve
sufficiently the government would in fact be prepared to cut off further 
assistance and allow the company to collapse.
4,4,3 Recommendations for government action
The government as customer. In addition to suggesting government 
financial assistance, the report made a number of other recommendations 
for government action to improve the competitiveness of the industry.
For example, the report argued that the competitiveness of the industry 
was impaired because naval work was so widely distributed among the twelve 
yards of thB Warship Group, This meant that no yard could concentrate 
o n  sophisticated work and such work had to be mixed with the production 
of tankers, bulk carriers and other cargo vessels. The committee 
therefore recommended that orders for large naval ships should be
concentrated in three yards as part of the programme for nationalisation 
of the industry.
InterosMonal relations and credit for hnmn The
considered that shipbuilding industries in some pthar 00untrtM anJoyGd 
advantages which distorted international trade i„ shlps. ln 
production was directly subsidised in some advanced cpuntriGs ^  ^  J  
USA, Franca and Italy, while in Dapan, not only was an export finance 
scheme operated by the government, but credits were alee given to home 
owners at a subsidised rate. There was also the risk that other ship, 
building countries in the EEC might start subsidising production.
The report recommended that Britain should urge through the DECO 
the establishment of a suitable forum for discussion bstwaen governments 
and shipbuilding industries with the following objects?
1 , improving statistics of capacity and output;
2, assessment of the future market for various types of ships;
3. evaluation of various measures of government assistance,
4. influencing governments to reduce end eliminate assistance which
withdrew sectors of the world market from international competition or
gave a particular shipbuilding industry a dominating position in the 
world market.
The British shipping industry, supported by the British shipbuilding 
industry, had been pressing for home credit facilities to be made available 
on the same terms as those available for export credit. The evidence 
presented to the Geddes Committee, however, was that many British 
shipowners preferred to use their own financial resources for purchases 
and that orders placed in Bapan by British owners had gone abroad because 
the ¡Japanese offered a lower price for these particular ships rather than 
because of credit terms. The committee recognised that there must be 
a point at which individual orders from British shipowners might go abroad 
because they did not want to finance their orders and could not obtain 
credit as cheaply in Britain as abroad, but put forward a number of 
arguments against taking action in anticipation of such a situation*
1 . It was the level of profitability in the industry which jeopardised
its survival and not a shortage of orders. While costs were rising fast 
an overlong order book might even be a disadvantage.
2. Dapan was the only major shipbuilding country to operate such a scheme 
of credits f o r  h o m e owners, a n d  it might be undesirable for Britain to 
encourage a race in such credit arrangements. It would be better if a 
reduction could be negotiated in all artifical aids to shipbuilding, 
leading to their eventual elimination.
3 . A credit scheme for home owners which was not tied to a scheme of 
reorganisation and rationalisation in shipbuilding would tend to maintain 
the less competitive units in production. Some closures might have been 
averted by the Shipbuilding Credit Scheme of 1963.
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The committee therefore thought that a general scheme for home 
owners should be reserved as a counter-measure if the government was not 
successful in securing more liberal arrangements for trade in ships. 
However, the committee did support a modest temporary provision for 
financing home owners on a selective basis (see section 4,4.3). As 
we shall see in chapter 5 the credit scheme introduced by the government 
turned out to be massive, permanent, and relatively unselective. 
rittr.al arrangements. Shipbuilders, along with other manufacturers, had 
been given an export rebate on indirect taxes since 1964. The proportion 
of rebate fixed for shipbuilding was 2% and shipbuilders received a refund
of this amount on their sales to overseas customers. The committee felt 
that the demand met by British shipbuilders was a world demand, 
irrespective of whether the order was placed by a home or an overseas 
owners. The usual distinction between home and export trade was that 
the home market was protected by the casts of transport, by tariffs, or 
by various other special circumstances such as the perishable nature of 
the product or the use of special standards. Shipbuilding did not enjoy 
such protection. It was therefore unfair to apply to the shipbuilding 
industry, on the basis of a false analogy with other industries, a 
distinction in the tax treatment of home and overseas sales which the 
market conditions did not justify. Other shipbuilding countries 
relieved shipbuilding of indirect taxes on all orders. This recommendation 
was incorporated by the government in the Finance Act 1966, and the rebate 
was continued after the general export rebate was withdrawn from other 
industries. This rebate to shipbuilders was aptly called 'Shipbuilders* 
Relief*
-tiding Industry Board. The Geddes Committee believed that if the 
shipbuilding industry was to become and remain competitive it must quickly 
reorganise its structure, change its outlook, and improve its reputation.
Ths proposed povernoent financial. assistance would ba condition,! on the 
efforts „.da by both sides of the industry towards foil competitiveness. 
The administration of these proposals would, therefore, need an 
independent body in close contact with the industry and its problems.
The report recommended the setting up of a Shipbuilding Industry 
Board (SIB) which would:
1. initiate, assist and stimulate necessary action within the industry;
2. administer and control government financial assistance;
3. give the government informed advice on the current prospects of 
British firms and the effect of assistance given to foreign shipbuilders.
The Board would be composed of independent members, since 
representatives of the industry should not take part in decisions 
affecting assistance to individual firms. Initially the government 
should appoint three people to the SIB: an independent chairman with 
experience of the problems of large industrial organisations, a trade 
unionist from another industry, and a technologist or engineer not closely 
connected with shipbuilding. There should be provision for two more 
members if that seemed desirable. The chairman's appointment should be 
full-time, or nearly full-time, so that he could take an active part in 
advising and guiding the industry. The Board would need advice from 
independent consultants on the financial, organisational, management and 
production aspects of schemes of reorganisation and on industrial 
relations. The SIB would control government assistance to the industry 
for a five-year period. It should report annually to the government on 
its activities and on progress towards increased competitiveness. The 
report also recommended the setting up of a Shipbuilding and Ship- 
repairing Council to replace the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee.
It is not surprising that a committee set up specifically to 
recommend action to help shipbuilding should recommend a special 
to deal with the industry. Ii/hat is disturbing is that the committ
did not consider the possibility that restructuring might best be 
carried out by some more general body for industry such as the IRC.40 
This is not necessarily to say that the IRC uould have been a better 
agency, but given the desperate state of some shipbuilding firms there 
would have been the advantage that the IRC could have intervened in the 
industry before the SIB was able to do so. further advantages in 
shipbuilding coming under a more general body would have been greater 
flexibility in allocation of funds, presumably greater expertise among 
staff and the possibility of cross-fertilisation of ideas from other 
industries. A disadvantage would have been the possibility that the 
special problems of shipbuilding might be neglected. m  the event, 
as will become clear in the next chapter (section 5.3.3), problems 
could cut across sectoral boundaries in a way the SIB was unable to cope 
with. The IRC had to be called in after all to help with the 
difficulties of Cammell Laird.
Government financial assistance,. The report recommended that varioue 
types of government financial assistance should bs given to assist end 
accelerate the reorganisation of the industry*
!•— Cp.nsul.la.nt_services. Grants, up to a ceiling of £150,000, to 
encourage firms in the industry to examine possible grouping s c h e m e s and 
the reorganisation, including yard specialisation, which might be expected 
to follow.
2* Grouping .loans. Loans to facilitate desirable groupings and 
accelerate the rationalisation of resources. Three types were,proposed*
(a) To assist groups to buy at valuation am interest in a participating 
company which uould otherwise hold up the integration of that company 
within the group. Ceiling of £5m.
40. Interview with a member of the Geddes Committee. 18 April 1 9^
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(b) To provide additional working capital (i) through a Realisation 
Company to be sot up by the SIB, which would purchase assets surplus to 
requirements as a result of grouping and dispose of them in due course; 
(il) where a group was short of working capital and the shortage could 
not be satisfactorily remedied in any other way. Ceiling of £,2im.
(c) To help finance the rearrangement of facilities and new and 
economically sound capital projects. Ceiling of £15m.
The SIS should be empowered not to charge interest on loans in the first 
three years, the decisions on remissions of interest to be made annually. 
The Realisation Company's capital would be provided by the SIB free of 
interest.
h .--- Gra-n-ts-for ,transitional losses._ Grants, up to a ceiling of £5m,
to meet part of the extra costs arising during the period of 
reorganisation when resources would not be f u l l y  utilised, plant and 
overheads temporarily duplicated and costs would be incurred in running 
down existing facilities and setting up new ones. Within the ceiling 
the SIB would be empowered to meet*
(a) 7556 of such transitional losses incurred before mid 1968.
(b) 50$ of such losses incurred between 1968 and mid 1969.
(c) 25$ of such losses incurred between mid 1969 and the end of 1970.
4j-- Shipbuilding  credits^ The SIB should be empowered to grant to
shipbuilders credit facilities for orders by UK owners on the same terms 
as those available for export orders. The facilities would only be 
available for the period from mid 1967 to the end of 1970 and would be 
subject to a ceiling of £30m with a limit of dOm in any period of twelve 
months. The aim was to assure as far as possible that the groups should 
have a steady order book during the transitional period.
5. Loans to companies outside groups. Loans similar to those in 2(c)
above, and subject to a ceiling of £2m out of the £15m for loans in 2(c)
to apply where grouping was impracticable but where firms should be
able to make a substantial contribution to the competitiveness of the 
industry.
6. Main engines. Loans and grants to assist the rationalisation of 
engine building where this necessitated additional working capital and
the acquisition of plant for works in which engine building was to be 
concentrated. Loans up to a ceiling of £1^m out of the £12£m for 
purposes as in 2(b) above; loans up to a ceiling of £2m out of the
£l5m for purposes as in 2(c) above; grants up to a ceiling of £1m out 
of the £5m in 3 above.
The Geddes Committee considered that these incentives covered all 
the assistance that the industry needed to encourage it to form groups 
on a competitive basis as quickly as practicable. The report pointed 
out that the figures were proposed ceilings, not expenditure. Actual 
amounts could not be determined until groups and their consultants had 
prepared their projects and these had been assessed by the SIB. The
proposed figures assumed four large groupings if these groupings did
net c o m e  a b o u t ,  t h e  expenditure should bs proportionately less. ln 
addition to nesting the industry's real financial nasds tha morstoria 
on interest payments, mhich could only bs paid yearly, and the 
transitional grants mould enable the S!B to ensure that the loans mere 
used far the agreed purposes and that all other necessary steps mere 
being taken to make the group competitive. The section of the report 
o n  government financial assistance concluded with the word! 'to quote 
the figures mithout noting either that they are maxima or tha timetable 
proposed and the stringent conditions to be met, mould be a 
misinterpretation of what we propose»,^
41. Geddes Report, p.150.
The report’s recommendation about grants for transitional losses 
reflected the committee's concern about the speed with which the 
industry should be reorganised. However, its proposal did pose some 
practical difficulties. It would be almost impossible to disentangle 
costs arising from reorganisation from, say, l o s s e s  due to continuing 
inefficiency. If, on the other hand, grants were made on the basis of 
overall losses this would benefit an inefficient firm which incurred few 
transitional costs at the expense of a profit-making firm with high 
transitional costs. The report's laudable intention that such grants 
should only be available to firms making good progress at reorganising 
themselves also depended on the assumption that the government would
accept a situation where the firms most likely to collapse are those 
least likely to be assisted.
4.4.4 Timetable for action
Ths report ouUinod what the state of the British shipbuilding lnduatcy 
might be by 1972/5 based on three different hypotheses;42
~ --- Decline^ Gradual evolution on recent trend, with no real gain in
competitiveness, a decline to 7 «  of the world market or less and an 
output of little more than gross tons per annum on average.
.Sp.radic appeals for Government aid to aasa the decline., Employment 
on new building falling to about 30,000.
H°ldln3 °n‘ S°m8 Cha"9e 10 attltud“ . Practices and deployment of
resources sc as to held about 10* cf the market and output about 1jm
gross tons a year. .Neither a healthy nor a secure industry. 
Employment possibly held at 50,000 but productivity throwing up 
surpluses in some trades.
42 Geddas Report, p.152
3 Growth. After two to three years of major reorganisation of firms*
facilities and practices along the lines of the report's recommendations 
market share recovering to W % %  or more with output around 2£m gross tons 
a year. Employment slightly increased above 50,000, providing more 
security.
The committee itself believed that, 'providing the rate of British 
inflation which affects costs so quickly and acutely, does not exceed 
that in competing countries1, the shipbuilding industry could grow on the 
scale described in 3 above. In the event, by 1972/5 the British 
industry was in the state described as 'Decline', though government 
subsidy kept the size of the workforce above the 30,000 envisaged.
The timing of the reorganisation of the industry was considered 
important, because the need was urgent, because action by all those who 
were involved in the industry had to be fitted together, and because 
government assistance to the industry should, at each stage, follow 
commitments and evidence of real progress by the industry itself. The 
report therefore included a recommended timetable for implementing its 
proposals; this is shown here as table ^.3 to provide a checklist for 
comparison with subsequent developments.
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Table 4.3 Geddes Timetable
March-Tune 1966
Both management and workers should discuss our proposals at local 
levels and advise their own central organisations.
These organisations should give the Government their views with any 
reservations. y
Meanwhile the Government should take any action open to it on the 
rebate of certain indirect taxation.
Duly 1966
The Government should announce its conclusions in the light of the 
response by both sides of the shipbuilding industry and by the steel­
makers.
If our proposals are accepted, the Government should take steps to 
set up the Shipbuilding Industry Board (SIB) on a non-statutory basis.
August-December 1966
Any necessary legislative processes should be set in train.
Firms should consider their future in relation to groupings and 
obtain SIB approval for any necessary consultant work.
Unions should make their plans for strengthening their staff, 
organisation, and shop steward training.
The Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Council should be established.
Tanuary-Tune 1967
Concultants* studies should proceed and their reports be 
considered by firms and the SIB.
The S I B  should familiarise itself with the industry's problems and 
hold any necessary discussions with both sides.
The SIB should set up a Realisation Company.
March-December 1967
Firms' detailed proposals for grouping and rationalisation should be 
considered by the SIB and, where they measure up to the standards we 
recommend, the necessary loans should be made.
The / • • •
Table 4.3 (Continued)
The SIB should keep in touch with developments in industrial 
relations and take them into account in assessing the prospects of 
grouping and reorganisation schemes«
mid-1967-end 1970
The SIB should consider annually whether moratoria should be qiuen 
on any loans already advanced and whether credits should be extended 
for particular orders.
The SIB should make recommendations as to the arrangements for 
winding up its own business and as to the development of the Ship­
building and Shiprepairing Council.
Source: Geddes Report, pp. 154-5
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4,4,5 Reactions to thB report
The Geddes Report was published towards the end of the General Election 
cdmpaign in 1966, This timing appears to have been entirely 
fortuitous, When the committee had started work in February 1965 
fir. Mas-on had asked the committee to report in twleve months at the 
latest. The committee submitted this report to the President of the 
Board of Trade on 24 February 1966, and it was published exactly a month 
later, within a week of the General Election. This was a fairly short 
time for a minister to sit on a report, but the report itself had urged 
speedy publication. The government had to lay a dummy White Paper before
the House of Commons on 4 March to enable publication of the report as 
a White Paper after the dissolution of Parliament the following Thursday.
On the day before the Geddes Report was published Mr. Cay, the 
President of the Board of Trade, announced the government., acceptance 
of the report as a basis for considering the future of the industry.43 
The government would be prepared to play its part, broadly along the 
lines indicated in the report, if those in the industry were prepared to 
play theirs. Since the report came cut during the election campaign it 
wee naturally raised et campaign press ccnferences. At the labour Party 
news conference on 24 March Mr. Callaghan, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, declined to put a figure on the sum likely to be needed.
When it wee put te M m  that direct aid might amount to £30m 
Mr. Callaghan replied, *1 am not assuming it will all be Government 
money. Sometimes I feel like hanging a sign outside my office saying: 
»This is the British Treasury and net a national soup kitchan for 
indigent industrialists»..44 When Parliament met again following tha
43
44
.HC-,.P.eb«» 9 August 1966, col. 1400. 
Times, 25 March 1966.
election Mr. Plason announced that the government accepted the 
recommendation in the report that those concerned in the industry should 
be alloyed until the end of Dune to consider the report as a „hole and 
to give the government their views before final decisions mere taken 
about the form of any government assistance.46
The report was welcomed by the Shipbuilding Conference;
Nr. Michael Scott, president of the Conference, said that it was a 
«great report« and that shipbuilders would «work like blazes« to try to 
keep to the proposed timetable.46 The executive board of the 
Shipbuilding Conference accepted the report in principle on 29 March.
The unions were more ambivalent in their attitude to the Report.
The Scottish TUC agreed unanimously on 20th April that the report was 
only a preliminary to public ownership.47 However, In „ay g mMtinQ 
of national and district representatives of shipbuilding employers and
unions at Vork welcomed the report and agreed to work together towards
48
its implementation. They agreed to form immediately a joint 
consultative committee in anticipation of the sotting up of tha SIB 
and the Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Council. This committee mould 
investigate the oausea of delays resulting in missed delivery dates and 
take action to prevent similar daiays in futura. Less than a week after 
this mooting at York, tha Boilermakers Society conference at florae,mbs 
passed unanimously an executive council resolution asking tha conference 
to reaffirm rts determination to do everything possible to have the 
shipbuilding industry brought under public ownership.49 Yet at the 
CSEU conference the following month fir. Dan flcGarvie, president of the
45. HC Dsb., 28 April 1966, written answers, col, 46.
46. Times. 25 March 1966,
47. Times. 21 April 1966,
48. Times, 13 May 1966.
49. Times, 19 May 1966.
Boilermakers Society, warned the delegates against damaging the prospects 
of fulfilling the report by constantly calling for public ownership.50 
The key to this apparent contradiction lay in Mr. McGarvie's remark that 
if the proposed reorganisation of main shipyards into five groupings 
failed after financial assistance had been given by the government, it 
would be much simpler then to nationalise the five groupings!
4.5 THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY ACT
4.5.1 Statement of government policy
Following the publication of the report Mr. Chapman, who had been ' 
secretary to the Geddes Committee and who now reverted full-time to his 
post as head of the Shipbuilding Branch at the Board of Trade, was 
involved m  receiving representations on the report from the same people 
as he had met when they were giving evidence to the Geddes Committee.51 
This personal contact obviously helped, though with the publication of 
the report it became a matter not just for his branch but for the 
department as a whole.
By the end of Dune 1966 the Board of Trade had received memoranda 
setting out the positions of the Shipbuilding Conference, the Shipbuilding 
Employers« Federation and the National Association of Marine Engine 
Builders, and of the CSEU. In a statement to the House of Commons on 
9 August 1966 Mr. Day announced that as a result of these memoranda and 
knowledge of what had already been achieved, such as a recent demarcation 
agreement, he was satisfied that the industry had accepted the basic 
recommendations in the report and that both sides were prepared to 
cooperate in giving the industry a fresh start.52 He could therefore 
confirm the government's decision to play its part also in the
50. Times, 24 Dune 1966.
51. Interview with Mr. V.I. Chapman» 7 November 1973.
52. HC Deb., 9 August 1966, cols. 1400-6.
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reorganisation of the industry
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The government had already taken steps in the Finance Bill to 
provide by order for shipbuilders to be relieved of certain indirect 
taxes for home orders and would make this order come into force on 12 
September. Legislation would be introduced in the current session to 
establish a Shipbuilding Industry Board. The government had in mind 
ceiling commitments for government financial assistance of the kind 
proposed by the Geddes Committee, but the precise financial arrangements 
to be included in the legislation needed further study. The actual 
expenditure would depend mainly on the industry itself, and before 
giving financial support to new groupings the government would want to 
be satisfied that all possible steps would be taken to ensure competitive 
efficiency and viability.
Mr. 3ay announced that Mr. William Swallow, until recently the 
chairman and managing director of Vauxhall Motors, had agreed to accept 
the chairmanship of the Shipbuilding Industry Board when it was set up.
The names of two other members would be announced in the near future.
They would be able to hold discussions with firms and unions in advance 
of legislation, as recommended in the Geddes Report. The government 
agreed with the report's recommendation on the desirability of concentrat­
ing orders for frigates and destroyers in a few yards specialising in 
sophisticated vessels. The detailed arrangements for making this 
change would be worked out with the SIB in the light of the reorganisation 
of the industry as a whole.
4.5.2 Differences between the Bill and the Geddes Report 
The Geddes Committee had recommended that any legislation following its 
report should be set in train by November 1966, but the Shipbuilding 
Industry Bill was not published until February 1967. The delay was due
to difficulties in demising a system of credit for home owners. The 
Geddes Report had recommended that the SIB should be empowered to grant 
to shipbuilders credit facilities for orders by UK owners on the same 
terms as those available for export credit, up to a maximum of £30m. 
However, the government was concerned about the rapidly increasing 
percentage of orders from British shipowners going abroad! in 1966 
this was 70%, compared with S7% in 1965 and 38* in 1964, the year of 
the Shipbuilding Credit Act.53 Accordingly, the government decided that 
there was a strong case for a credit scheme for orders by British 
shipowners going beyond that recommended by the Geddes Committee, but 
closely associated with measures for the reorganisation of the ship­
building industry. The Bill therefore included a provision for the 
Minister of Technology, on the advice of the SIB, to guarantee in 
appropriate cases loans to shipowners for the construction of ships up 
to a total of £200m at any one time. The Chancellor of the Exchequer 
arranged for discussions with the London clearing and Scottish banks with 
a view to their agreeing to apply in such cases the same fixed lending 
rate, then 5$%, which they applied to medium-term export credits under 
ECGD guarantee.
There were a number of other differences between the Geddes Report 
and the Bill of varying degrees of significance. Clause 3 of the Bill 
enabled the SIB, with the approval of the minister, to make grants not 
exceeding £5m in total to shipbuilding firms taking part in grouping 
schemes (and to main engine manufacturing firms) for expenses incurred 
by them in reorganising their resources and for their inability to make 
the best use of these resources during the process of reorganisation.
53. The reasons given in this section for the differences between the 
Bill and the Geddes Report are based largely on Mr. Bonn’s Second 
Reading speech (HC Oeb.. 9 March 1967, cols. 1773-88).
The Geddes Report had recommended the same figure, but for 
•transitional losses', and had suggested a declining percentage to be 
granted each year up to 1970. However, as was suggested above, there 
would have been a number of difficulties in carrying out the Geddes 
proposal in practice (see section 4.4.3).
Under clause 4, the bill provided for the same total to be made 
available in loans (£32.5m) as had been recommended by the Geddes Report 
but gave greater flexibility to the SIB by leaving it to determine the 
amount it wished to devote to various purposes, rather than specifying
the amounts to be allocated to each purpose in detail, as had been done 
in the Geddes Report.
The most politically controversial change from the Geddes 
recommendations was contained in clause 6, which enabled the SIB, with 
the approval of the minister, to acquire shares in a company instead of, 
or in addition to, making a loan, and it also enabled loans to be 
discharged by the issue of shares. . In either case, the shareholding 
would count against the limit on loans of £32.5m. This equity 
provision was included because the government felt that where substantial 
sums of public money were put into an industry it ought to be open to the 
agency that put them there to take a share in the ensuing profitability 
of the enterprise which reodved it. The SIB might also have in mind the 
desirability of an equity to give itself a continuing say in the 
management of an enterprise at a time when questions of management 
reorganisation were of crucial importance. In the event, this clause 
was only used once, to buy shares in Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, where the 
question of sharing in profitability never arose and where the existence 
of a shareholding did not even guarantee effective monitoring.54
54. See section 5,3.2 and Hogwood, 1976b.
The arrangements for remission of interest were affected by a 
technical change. Instead of providing for a remission of interest 
due on loans for the first three years, the Sill provided for the
payment of interest to be financed by grants, so that the exact cost 
could be known and identified.
The timing of the Geddes proposals was affected by a change 
concerning consultancy fees. The same amount as recommended by Geddes 
(£150,000) was to be made available in grants for consultancy fees, but 
where Geddes recommended that the last date of application should be 
30 November 1966 and that reports should be completed by 30 June 1967, 
the Bill provided that no grant should be made after 31 March 1968.
This exemplified the si ippage which was already developing compared to 
the Geddes timetable (see table 4.3). The Bill also provided for the 
dissolution of the SIB at the end of 1970, unless its life was extended 
by an order made by the minister for a period of not more than a year.
The final difference concerned the Bill*s coverage in terms of 
the number of yards affected. The Bill was concerned with all yards 
building vessels of 100 gross tons or more, of which there were about 
sixty, rather than the twenty-six yards building vessels of 5,000 gross 
tons or more on which the Geddes Committee had reported. According to 
Mr. Benn, the Geddes Committee had concentrated on the larger yards (as 
it was required to do so by its terms of reference) ‘as a matter of 
convenience*. The effect of this difference in coverage was that the 
SIB became responsible for a large number of smaller yards whose problems 
were, for the most part, different from those of the large yards, though 
their exclusion would have led to claims of unfair treatment from the 
smaller yards.
4,_5.3 The passage of the Bill through Parliament
Apart from Clausa 6 on SIB sharsholdings, tha Opposition mars in agreement 
with the general principles of the Bill, so its passage through 
Parliament uas not even marked by those sat-piaoa confrontations uhich 
tha government uins as a result of its automatic majority. (Always 
assuming that the government does have a working majority, of course.
Tha Labour government had considerable problems in 1976 with its bill 
to nationalise shipbuilding? see section 7.6). Nor was the 
introduction of the Bill preceded by active Parliamentary discussion of 
the principles of the Geddes Report. The second reading of the Bill on 
9 March 1967 was the first time that the House of Commons had debated the 
shipbuilding industry since the Geddes Report a year earlier. A large 
part of the second reading debate was concerned with the Geddes Report 
and developments since its publication, rather than just with the 
contents of the Bill itself.55
The government's case was put by Hr. Benn, who as Minister of 
Technology had taken over responsibility for shipbuilding in November 
1966 at a crucial stage in the preparation of the legislation,55 
Opposition spokesmen generally welcomed the Bill, though they were 
unhappy about the minister's power to give the SIB directions of a 
general character and the provision to allow the SIB to take up equity 
holdings. This bipartisan approach was reflected in the fact that the 
Bill was read a second time without a division.
The Bill was little altered in its passage through its committee 
and report stages, as table 4.4 illustrates.57 it is entirely
55. HC Deb., 9 March 1967, cols. 1773-888,
56. For a discussion of changes in departmental responsibility
see section 9.2. y*
57. HC Deb., Standing Committee D (Shipbuilding Industry a i m  
1st to 5th Sittings, 6, 11, 1 3 , 18 and 20 April 1967 Cd  '
1-250; HC Deb., 11 May 1967, cols. 1785-1815. *
Table b. b Shipbuilding Industry Bill: summary of amendments in committee and report stages
Type of amendment : 
Moved by:
Substantive Probing Technical Clarificatory Totals
Govt Govt back­
bencher
Opp. Opp. Govt Opp. Govt Govt Govt back­
bencher
Opp.
Moved C 1 1 1 16 2 3 b 3 7 1 22R1 1 0 2 0 3 0 3 7 0 2
Withdrawn C 0 0 8 2 0 b 0 c 0 1*f
R 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 c 2
Negatived C 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Responsive^ C 1 - - - 0 - 0 1 - -
R 0 - - - 0 - 3 3 - -
Agreed to C 1 0 0o
0
Q 3 0 3 7 0 0
R 1 0 3 0 3 7 0 0
Notes: 1. C = committee stage; R = report stage.
2. 'Responsive* refers to amendments moved and agreed to as a result of undertakings given in committee 
or to clarify points of concern to the Opposition.
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appropriate to consider the committee and report stages together, since 
for this Bill they clearly went over the same ground. indeed, the 
most significant difference was that there were fewer ,PS present during 
the report stage than there had been during the committee stage'58 Glv, 
that most of the committee members were from towns with large shipyards 
anyway, this implies a distinct lack of concern over government 
expenditure of this sort. Needless to say, when things started to go 
wrong with the policy set out in the Bill, concern was manifested by the 
Public Accounts Committee - - after the event.
The Opposition cooperated with the government in grouping amendments
to speed the Bill's passage through the committee, but received little
in return by way of government acceptance of Opposition amendments. The
government did introduce some amendments at report stage to clear up
points raised by the Opposition, but did not yield on any of the
substantive amendments suggested by Opposition PIPs. As table 4.4 shows,
the sole effect which non-ministerial MPs had on the Bill was that the
government put down a number of clarificatory amendments which did not
affect the substance of the Bill, together with one minor substantive
amendment. This conforms with the general pattern for government
legislation found by Griffith in his study of legislation in three
sessions - virtually all amendments agreed to were moved by the 
59
government. Few of the amendments moved by non-ministerial W a  were 
agreed to, and the most significant impact of non-ministerial piPs was 
an indirect one through the government responding to points made in 
committee.
After a trouble-free third reading and passage through the House of
Lords, the Bill received the Royal Assent on 28 June 1967 Tn• no sense
58.
59.
HC Deb., 11 Way 1967, col. 1815. 
Griffith, 1974, especially chapter 6
could Parliament be said to have had a significant impact on the 
legislation.
4.6 A GOOD WAY TO MAKE POLICY?
In section 4.4.2 a number of criticisms were made of the approach 
adopted by the Geddes Report. These should not imply criticism of 
the calibre of the membership of the committee or the quality of its 
report. Indeed, as Edmund Dell has argued, 'On the contrary it was 
in many ways a sensible report'.50 Criticisms about the committee's 
lack of political realism and the narrowness of its focus are more 
properly directed at the process by which an ad hoc committee is set up 
to look at a specific problem, almost inevitably recommends special 
government assistance to deal with that problem, and is then disbanded.61 
The narrowness of focus helps to rule out the possibility that the 
problems of any given industry will be identified as more general 
problems, or of recommendations which would have had an impact more 
widespread than on the specific industry. For example, the committee's 
terms of reference effectively precluded the recommendation of the 
devaluation of sterling to improve UK shipbuilding's competitiveness, 
since this was not a measure specific to shipbuilding. Similarly, the 
committee was not asked to examine the social consequences of its 
proposals.
However, the last thing the Geddes Committee should be blamed for 
is for suggesting that government support alone could solve the problems 
of the industry. Indeed, if some of its prior conditions had been 
followed, the government would not have paid out any assistance at all.
60. Dell, 1973, p.170.
61. A more general critique of the role of inquiries in shipbuilding 
policy is undertaken in section 8.3. Heclo and Wildafsky, 1974, 
p,90 comment on the role of inquiries in recommending more money 
for favoured causes.
For example, the report wanted the government to make its acceptance of 
the report's recommendations conditional on steelmakers providing a 
discount to shipbuilders. This the steelmakers declined to do, and it 
would have been politically naive to have expected the government to 
refuse to give assistance to yards which would otherwise close simply 
because a concessionary price for steel was not introduced. This 
illustrates a more general criticism that can be made of the report.
The implementation of those of its recommendations addressed to groups 
other than the government was highly contingent, yet the report 
presented the proposals as an all-or-nothing package, its reasons for 
doing so were understandable - it wanted to confront the industry with 
the need for action — but by failing to list the options open to the 
government in the all-too-likely event of only partial implementation of 
the report by unions and management, the committee effectively provided 
the government with as little guidance about what to do in such a 
situation as if it had never been set up.
Setting up an ad hoc committee is arguably a wasteful way to obtain 
information about an industry. Given the need for an independent 
committee, the majority of members are likely to know little about the 
industry when they start work. As the chairman of one such committee 
remarked ’the paradox is that, just as we were reaching some understanding 
of the problems of the industry, we finished our Report and the Committee 
disbanded. The expertise, so painstakingly and expensively acquired, 
is unlikely ever to be used again». There are two main .¿angers here.
The first is that since the Inquiry committee will not itself be 
responsible for carrying out its own recommendations it may not be fully 61
61. Lord Plowden, chairman of the committee of inquiry into the aircraft 
industry 1964-5, in HL Deb.. 1 March 1966, cols. 618-19.
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aware of the practical difficulties of implementing them; thus me can 
echo Pressman and UildaVsky's view, formulated in another context, that 
'implementation should not be divorced from policy. There is no point 
in having good policies if they cannot be carried out'.62 The second 
danger, indeed certainty, is that such reports 'can only too easily 
become outdated without anyone noticing because it would require a new
report to establish the fact that the emperor no longer had any
, .63clothes'.
Perhaps the most disturbing feature about how policy developed 
from inquiry committee to legislation is that setting up a committee 
seems to have been regarded as a way of avoiding the awkward problem of 
deciding just how much it was worth to save a particular industry. sir 
Richard Clarke, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Technology, 
volunteered the shipbuilding industry as an example of this problem to 
the Commons Select Committee on procedure:
•Take as an example the Shipbuilding Industry Board programme for 
the reconstruction of the shipbuilding industry. Thirty-two 
million pounds has been voted by Parliament for that purpose.
How one measures the benefit ensuing from that I do not know,
I would not know how to start that calculation. My answer would 
be that without it the industry might have died'.^
Sir Richard rightly pointed out that even retrospective calculation of 
the benefit would be difficult because the situation which existed would 
have to be compared with what the situation would have been if one had not 
done the thing in question. Even given the difficulty of assessing the
62. Pressman and Wildatfsky, 1973, p.143. See also section 1.5.
63. Dell, 1973, p.166.
64. HC 410, Session 1968-9, Q.236; see also Garrett, 1972, p.27.
The figure of £32m (actually £32.5m) was that for loans. There 
was an additional sum, intially £5m, available in grants.
benefits to be obtained, it might nevertheless have been expected that 
the department would have analysed what the cost of preventing the 
industry from dying would be. However, in reply to a question asking 
how one decided on the figure of £32m, Sir Richard said:
'Parliament decides on £32 million! In that case, there was 
the Geddes Report on shipbuilding. The Geddes Committee 
considered what might be needed for this purpose. They must 
have thought in terms that something was needed on the Tyne, 
something on the Wear and something on the Clyde. They then 
put figures of somB kind to that, thinking, "This is about what 
the bill will be". It was then put to Government. Government
65submitted it to Parliament and Parliament approved it1.
Given the evidence in section 4.5.3 about hoe little Parliament 
contributed to the Shipbuilding Industry Bill, the remark that Parliament 
decided on the sum to be spent can be regarded as a joke in bad teste, 
wore seriousiy, the above „dotation reveals hou much the department 
changed uith regenerating British industry „as operating in the dark.
Lest it be thought that shipbuilding uas in this respect a special case 
it is north quoting further from Sir Richard's evidence, 'What ne are 
trying to do is to develop and improve the economic and technological 
position of private industry by various means of assistance of one kind 
or another. It is very difficult to put a cost tag on that'.65
Clearly, the formulation of shipbuilding policy in 1964-7 did not 
take the synoptic approach embodied 1„ the 'rationality model discussed 
in section 1.5. In its neglect of important alternative policies and 
of important possible consequences, decision making during this period
65
66
HC 410, Session 1968-9, Q.238. 
HC 410, Session 1968-9, Q.239.
conformed much more clearly urith the Lindblom incremental model. The 
amount of money committed to helping shipbuilding was not chosen by 
assessing its opportunity cost compared to alternative policies or 
uses, but it did meet the Lindblom criterion of a »good» policy in that 
various analysts agreed on the policy. However, this method of decision 
making was not arrived at as a result of a conscious choice by the 
government that this was the best decision-making approach to adopt. 
Rather, an anti-synoptic approach was built in from the start b y defining 
the problem as a shipbuilding one and referring the problem to an 
independent committee dealing only with shipbuilding.
It very quickly became clear that the sums in the Shipbuilding 
Industry Act determined in the way described by Sir Richard Clarke were 
not adequate to ensure the survival of some shipbuilding firms. The 
Industrial Expansion Act 1968 raised the £5m available in grants to 
£20m, while at the same time removing the requirement that the recipient 
should be taking part in a grouping scheme. Similarly, the £200m ceiling 
on guarantees for credits to shipowners, itself a considerable increase 
on the Geddes recommendation of £30m, was raised by legislation to £400m, 
and later to £700m. However, the success or otherwise of a scheme 
cannot be measured simply by whether or not the original global limits 
proved to be adequate. What is required is a detailed assessment of how 
the money was spent and the impact that it had, and this assessment is 
undertaken in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5
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FROM LE6ISLATI0N TO REALITY
5.1 THE SITUATION FACING THE SIB
The situation facing the SIB as it started work in 1967 was markedly 
different from that when the Geddes Committee had been set up, as 
table 5.1 shows. In 1965 UK shipbuilding had recovered substantially 
from its poor 1964 showing, though as we would expect from the diagnosis 
outlined in section 3.1 this recovery took place two years after the 
recovery in world output. However, despite the continuing growth in 
world output, UK production in 1966 and 1967 failed to maintain its 
absolute level of 1965. This was reflected in the co^nuing long-run 
decline in the UK share of world output. The problem facing the SIB 
in 1967 is therefore best described not as helping the industry out of a 
trough but as trying to avert a continuing decline.
Table 5.1 UK and world completions of merchant ships. 1959—67.
Year Completions (QOOqrt)_______ UK share of world
UK World tonnage {%)
1959 1,383 8,697 15.9
1960 1,298 8,382 15.5
1961 1,382 8,058 17.2
1962 1,016 8,182 12.4
1963 1,096 9,028 12.1
1064 808 9,724 8.3
1965 1,282 11,763 10.9
1966 1,074 14,105 7.6
1967 1,188 15,157 7.8
Source* Booz-Allen Report (1973), exhibit 30, p.91
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Tha appointment of the chairman of the SIB, Mr. (later Sir) William 
Swallow, had been announced on 9 August 1966, immediately before the 
summer recess, thus enabling the President of the Board of Trade to 
make a statement to the House about progress on the Geddes Report,
Nothing further was done for some weeks, with there being no other Board 
members, no staff and no office accommodation. However, Mr, Swallow 
himself was soon involved in consultations about individual shipyards. 
Further members of the Board were appointed in the Autumn,
Mr, A.E.Hepper, who had been an executive director of Thomas Tilling 
since 1963 and who six months previously had been seconded to the 
Department of Economic Affairs for two years as an industrial adviser, 
was appointed as a part-time member of the Board on 4 November 1966,
Mr. 3. Gormley, then General Secretary of the North Western Area of the 
National Union of Mineworkers, was appointed on 4 November 1966.^ The 
Director of the SIB, Mr, Barry Barker, who had been secretary of the 
Metal Box Co. of India, was not appointed until November 1967, One 
problem posed by the limited life of the SIB was the difficulty in 
recruiting staff of sufficient calibre. The allocation of 
responsibilities within the staff Is shown in fig. 5.1, which also gives 
an idea of the range of activities carried out by the SIB. The SIB staff 
were also responsible for servicing the Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing 
Council (SBSRC).
Before the passage of the Shipbuilding Industry Act in Dune 1967,
1. Interview with Sir Williars Swallow. 10 April 197^*
2 . Mr. Hepper resigned from the SIB in September 1967 to become 
chairman designate of UCS and on 12 October 1967 Mr.A,S.Ashton, 
finance director of Esso Petroleum, and Mr. H.W.Morris, deputy 
chairman of ICI Fibres, were appointed to the SIB. Mr. Morris 
resigned from the SIB at the end of May 1971 because of the pressure 
of other business commitments, but otherwise the membership of the 
SIB remained the same until its dissolution at the end of 1971.
3 . interview with Sir William Swallow. 10 April 197*f.
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and for the first nine months of its statutory life, the SIB was mainly
involved in establishing contacts and the discussion of fundamental
problems with representatives of management, unions and employées? visits
to shipyards at home and abroad; the commissioning of studies of
particular problems facing the industry; the formulation of policies
designed to correct imbalances in the industry and the beginning of their 
4implementation. fir. Swallow did not regard this as simply duplicating 
the work of the Geddes Report, since he already had the report to guide 
him.^
For the first year of its existence, the SIB was closely guided by 
the Geddes Report. After that, the SIB realised that Geddes had 
underestimated the demand for very large ships and, therefore, the need 
for facilities to build them. This underestimate still existed at the 
time the Shipbuilding Industry Bill 1967 was passing through the Commons. 
The SIB made representations to the government about the need for more 
finance not necessarily tied to grouping. The ceiling on the amount 
which could be given by the SIB in grants for reorganisation of resources 
was increased by the Industrial Expansion Act 1968 from £5m to £20m, and 
the restrictions concerning grouping were relaxed. The SIB did not see 
itself as simply implementing Geddes and was not asked by the government 
about progress in carrying out the recommendations of the report.
T h e delay in making the SIB a statutory body hindered its work, 
because it was unable to make any commitments. When the stage of 
applications for aid was reached, Mr. Swallow had expected that he would 
be sent fully documented project proposals rather as he had been when he
4 . HC 361, Session 1968-9.
5 . Interview with Sir William Swallow. 10 April 197^.
160
was with Vauxhall Motors; instead, he and Mr. Barker often had to play
an active part themselves in drawing up the proposals. 6 7 The SIB
sought outside advice when it felt that its members own experience was
not exactly of the type required in a particular case; for example, in
the assessment of asset values or financial figures which needed to be
7worked out by an expert accountant.
The SIB was by no means completely autonomous in the way it 
dispensed grants and loans. Because government funds were used the 
Treasury required the SIB to draw up proposed annual budgets. This was 
obviously very difficult, considering that expenditure depended largely 
on the timing of applications, over which the SIB had no direct control. 
The SIB therefore had to take an active role in encouraging the 
submission of projects for its consideration. The Treasury did 
sometimes send back recommendations with queries, which sometimes meant 
that the SIB in turn had to go back to the firm concerned; this caused 
delays in the making of payments. The SIB staff, especially the 
Director, worked closely with civil servants at the Ministry of 
Technology before recommendations were f o r m a l l y  submitted so that the 
civil servants would be able to tell the minister what was involved 
when he received the SIB's recommendation. The various stages involved 
in the processing of applications are shown in fig. 5.2, and the way this 
procedure operated in practice can be seen particularly in the next 
section on groupings.
5.2 POST-GEDDES GROUPINGS
5.2.1 Introduction
As we saw in section 4.4.2, the Geddes Committee did not carry out an
6. Interview with Sir William Swallow. 10 April 1 9 7 .^
7 . HC 362, Session 1968-9, Q.2224.
Fig 5.2 Processing of applications for SIB aid
Note: Bashed lines indicate stages which did not occur with every application.
v
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economic analysis of the benefits to be gained from the grouping of
shipyards, and whether particular groupings would produce greater
benefits than others. Although it was not spelt out in the report, the
Geddas Committee appeared to have assumed that the proposed SIB would
carry out an examination of what the best groupings would be.®
However, grants for consultancy fees under the Shipbuilding Industry Act
1967 were for the study of any proposed grouping scheme, rather than
whether a grouping scheme was desirable at all. No retrospective
analysis was carried out by the government of the economic effects of
any of the groupings compared with leaving the yards to continue
separately, or alternative groupings, or other uses to which the aid given
could have been put, either within the shipbuilding industry or 
9elsewhere. In the absence of economic analysis the SIB and the 
government e n c o u r a g e d  groupings to i n c l u d e  a l l  shipyards in each estuary, 
even where the cost of obtaining the inclusion of some yards was arguably 
avp.re than the contribution those yards could make to the group. The 
reason was quite obvious: outside the groupings some yards would have 
been unable to survive. Anyone who approaches the following accounts 
of each grouping on the assumption that government aid in the late 
1960s was concerned with lubricating the transition to the optimum 
structure of the shipbuilding industry to meet foreign competition is 
likely to be very bewildered.
5.2.2. Upper Clyde
In 1966 merger talks took place amongst two different sets of yards on 
the Upper Clyde - Stephen, Connell, Yarrow and Barclay Curie on the one 
hand, and Fairfields and John Brown on the other. However, the merger 89
8. Interview with a member of the Geddes Committee. 18 April 197^.
9. Though the Department of Industry has now undertaken a cost- 
effectiveness study of aid given to the UCS liquidator in 1971-3; 
see section 8.6.
which did take place resulted not from these talks but from a SIB
working party. Before the SIB working party was set up it was announced
early in 1967 that the Barclay Curie yard on the upper Clyde, a subsidiary
of Swan Hunter, could no longer be maintained, and was available for sale.
Fairfields, which had itself been formed with government, private and
10trade union support the previous year, became interested in the yard
at the end of February 1967; they felt that they could make profitable
use of the berths at Barclay Curie. However, the uncertainty about
Fairfields' own future following the Geddas Report made it impossible
for Fairfields to raise the necessary finance privately. Iain Stewart,
the chairman of Fairfields, asked the SIB to provide a loan, until
Fairfields' own position in a new grouping was cleared up. Then, if
Fairfields was to continue as a separate yard, it would raise the cash
privately to purchase the yard. If an upper Clyde group was formed it
could officially borrow money from SIB to absorb the yard. However,
Mr. Swallow made it clear that this type of loan was outside the terms of
11reference of the SIB.
Before the SIB working party on the upper Clyde was set up 
William Swallow had informal talks with the chairmen of the five upper 
Clyde yards - Stephen, Connell, Yarrow, Dohn Brown and Fairfields. 
Following this he wrote to each chairman on 8 March 1967 suggesting 
discussions on who might be asked to serve as full-time chairman of the 
proposed new group; it had already been agreed that the chairman should 
be found outside the shipbuilding companies on the Clyde. The Fairfields 
board was convinced that a merger of equals would be ineffective, and that 
the experience of continental yards showed that the only way to achieve 10
10. See section 4.3.
1 1 , Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, p.162.
succsss in mergers was for one yard to take in the others. So strongly 
did Iain Stewart believe this that in his reply to William Swallow on.
28 March he offered to resign as chairman of Fairfields (since he 
himself was a controversial figure) so that Fairfields could be used as 
a basis for taking over the upper ClydeJ However, the 5IB*s view
was that the best chance of forming a group lay in approaching the 
problem from the outside and setting up a new company entirely separate 
from the existing ones. This was in marked contrast to the approach 
adopted in the formation of a Tyne-Tees group (see section 5.2,4).
At the end of March it was o f f i c i a l l y  announced that a working 
party had been set up to make proposals for the merger of the Stephen, 
Connell, Yarrow, Fairfield and Brown yards. The working party was 
formed with the cooperation of the SIB, the first occasion on which the 
SIB had been involved in this way. The chairman of the working party 
was Mr. Anthony Hepper, a member of the SIB, and the other members were 
a merchant banker and a management consultant. Although the working 
party's terms of reference related primarily to the upper Clyde, it was 
asked to bear in mind the possibility of a grouping being extended to 
cover the whole of the river.
While the working party carried out its investigations, a number of 
those involved in Fairfields tried to appeal over its head directly to 
the Minister of Technology, Mr. Benn, who refused to become involved. 
Oliver Blanford, the managing director of Fairfields tried unsuccessfully 
to get a hearing with him; 3ohn Rankin, the Labour MP for Govan failed 
to persuade him to take action; and Andrew Cunningham, one of the 
directors of Fairfields and a trade union official complained to 123
12. Extracts from the exchange of correspondence are included in
Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, pp.166-9.
13. Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, p.154.
Mr. Benn in writing 'that Labour Ministers are extremely difficult to
talk to'• Iain Stewart himself later came to regret that he had tried 
to keep the government at arm's length since it led to a lack of 
interest in the continuation of the Fairfields approach to running a 
s h i p y a r d  ( s e e  section 4.3.4).
Towards the end of July 1967, Mr. Hepper asked the SIB to consider 
his position on the Board following the news that he had been invited to 
be head of a possible upper Clyde grouping. However, Mr. Hepper agreed 
to turn down the invitation at the request of the SIB. Leaks about the 
working party's report in August caused concern among the workers of the 
yards. It was believed that though the proposals would not involve 
the immediate closure of any of the yards, they saw the running down over 
about two years of the shipbuilding activities a t  the Stephen yard and 
recommended that from then on this yard should be concentrated on 
building and repair and engineering work. The number of hourly paid 
workers at the five yards would be reduced by about 3,000, though the 
reduction would be gradual.
In August 1967 four of the yards - Fairfields, Brown, Stephen and 
Connell - announced that they would be forming a new upper Clyde group, 
yarrow was to decide within a week whether to enter the group. A 
steering committee was set up to supervise the merger. The grouping 
arrangement was designed to allow for other shipbuilders on the Clyde, 
such as Scott and Lithgow, to join the group. Yarrow did decide to be 
included, and agreed with Connell that there should be only one group 
for tha whole of the Clyde. It soon emerged that the price of Yarrow's 
inclusion in the merger was that it was to retain its name, its own 
board of directors and all main departmental functions; the company
14 Times. 11 August 1967
u/as to operate as a subsidiary of the new group. By maintaining its
separate identity in this way Yarrow was able to withdraw from UCS in
early 1971, which would have been impossible for any of the other yards 
(see section 6.2 .2 ).
The first members of the board of the new group, Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders (UCS) were named at the end of August. Mr. Hepper was to 
be chairman and was to resign from the SIB. Until the new company was 
formed he was to continue as chairman of the steering committee 
supervising the merger. The change of attitude by the SIB towards 
Mr. Hepper's appointment was due to the failure of the component 
companies to agree on an alternative chairman.
Tha five yards announced at th. and of October that they had decided 
not to buy the Clydeholme yard of Barclay Curie, contrary to the 
recommendations of the working party. if the Clydeholme yard had been 
included, it would have meant that the new group would have had to 
assimilate six, rather than five, different sets of working practices.15
Although by the beginning of December 1967 the final details of the 
Upper Clyde merger had not been completed, the SIB had agreed to the 
broad outlines of the proposed group and was prepared in principle to 
give loans and grants when it was established. The boards of the five 
yards had reached agreement on terms for merging their shipbuilding 
interests, subject to agreement with the SIB of terms for financial 
assistance, the signing of an employment charter, and obtaining the 
approval of the shareholders. It is worth noting that agreement with 
the SIB on terms for financial assistance was a condition of the merger 
taking place at all. The employment charter had been approved after 
discussion with the fifteen trade unions involved, who recommended it
15. Barclay Curie ceased building ships and concentrated nn ron i
„ork; in «ay 1974 it „as bought by Yarro„, „hich by theÌSaÌ'again an independent company. was
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to their shop stewards and members. The charter was described as being 
based on existing agreements covering methods of working} the difficult 
questions of wage differentials and mobility within constituted shipyards 
were left to be settled with the individual trade unions. This was in 
marked contrast to Fairfields (Glasgow) Ltd., which only got under way 
after hundreds of men were made redundant and the workers had given 
undertakings to cooperate in improving productivity (see section 4.3 .3 ).
The financial details of the merger were announced in January 1968. 
The company was to have an issued capital of £4m, but there was also to 
be a one-for-four rights issue raising £lm working capital, which would 
take the issued equity up to £5m. The equity was to be divided as 
follows* John Brown 30*, Connell 5* and up to £400,000 in cash, 
Fairfields 35* and £350,000 in cash, Stephen 10* and Yarrow 20* and £1m 
cash. (Fairfields* shareholding was reduced to 32.5* when rights issues 
were not taken up by some Fairfields shareholders and were bought by 
John Brown). The merger did not include the non-shipbuilding interests 
of John Brown, Stephen and Yarrow. UCS would have only a 51* share of 
Yarrow Shipbuilders, which explains the relatively low share of the 
equity held by Yarrow. As a result of its 50* shareholding in 
Fairfields, the government acquired 17** of the equity of UCS.
The cash payments in addition to shareholdings for three of the 
companies were partly in consideration for the outcome of future 
contracts. The upper Clyde working party had recommended that the 
companies should be put together on the basis of the outcome of current 
contracts being the responsibility of the predecessor shareholders.16 
However, when the deal had to be put together by Barings, advised by 
Deloittes and Attwood Wallace, Deloittes said that it would not be
16. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2163.
possible to do this because}
1. there were different accounting procedures in the various yards;
2. when the group was formed it would set up integrated accounting 
procedures;
3. the outcome of the contracts was likely to take as much as two years
and it would be very difficult to allocate financial responsibility at 
that time;
4. even if it had been possible to carry out the working party's 
recommendation, in one case there were no shareholders who could be 
asked to pay for any money owing if contracts lost money.
The merchant banking advice on the formation of UCS turned out to 
have grossly underestimated the amount of working capital required and 
the amount needed to cover losses on inherited contracts. Mr. Hepper's 
later view was that if UCS had not had to carry these initial financial 
burdens it would have stood a much better chance.^
Tha SIB vie« «as that tha trading prospect, of most of tha CoBpanies 
at the time of tha merger « t  very dismal in the long run.18 Cash 
payments had bean mads to thraa of thaaa companies In addition to UCS 
shares to satisfy reluctant shareholders «ho did not «ant to exchange an 
immediate earning prospect, houeyer small, for something that might not 
give a cash return until the longer term. The chairman of the SIB later 
agreed «1th an HP on the Public Accounts Commitee , that in the case 
of one company -its assets «ere nearly nil'.19 if the company had been 
left to go into liquidation it could have been picked up more cheaply,
•But if you proceed like that you eould probably be left eith one or L  
yards on the upper Clyde'. Baiting to pick up the assets more cheaply
17
18,
19,
HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2164, 2166. 
HC 362, Session 1968-9, Q.2227-9, 2234. 
HC 362, Session 1968-9, Q.2280-9.
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from the liquidator would have caused a delay in forming the Qroup _
•Unless we could get a group formed reasonably quickly, the advantages 
of such a group were declining all the time.. Clearly the distribution 
of shareholdings and additional cash to the component yards of UCS is 
better understood in terms of what was neecfcf to secure voluntary 
compliance in the immediate formation of a group containing all the yards
rather than in terms of what the relative assets and liabilities of each 
yard were worth.
UCS applied to the SIB for loans under section 4 of the Shipbuilding 
Industry Act 1967 and said that it proposed to make application for 
grants under section 3. The SIB was informed of the plans UCS had 
for the future management of the group, including the closure of the 
Stephen yard, and was supplied with a forecast of expected future profits 
and losses. The SIB also consulted its own financial advisors on the 
future prospects of the group. A s a result of this information and 
advice the SIB decided that the scheme should be supported and sought 
the approval of the Ministry of Technology in general terms to make 
loans and grants to UCS. In its submission to the Ministry the SIB 
commented that »if the five companies were left to themselves it was 
clear that, except for the one company which had been operating
profitably tYarrouD and possibly Fairfields (Glasgow) Ltd., tbsy would 
sooner or later cease to exist*.
Following discussions between the SIB, the Ministry and the 
Treasury, it was decided, with the approval of the Minister, that loans 
would be made to UCS, subject to a limit of £7m. A loan agreement 
giving effect to these proposals was signed in February 1968, the month 
UCS started operating. It provided for loans of £i.5m for the
20 HC 361, Session 1967-8, p.21.
acquisition of shares by UCS and £2m for the purposes of the undertaking
generally; both of these sums were made available w h e n  t h e  merger took
place. Given the sums which had to be paid to predecessor companies
(£1,75m in cash) it can be seen that much of the SIB aid at the time of
the formation of UCS was simply to enable the group to be formed and in
some cases effectively constituted a free gift to previous shareholders.
Relatively little went towards providing better facilities, more working
capital or the costs inherent in merging five organisations into one.
Under the loan agreement UCS could also obtain further loans of up to
£2m if it submitted details of its future plans and budgets to the
satisfaction of the SIB (only about £1.2m of this was ever drawn) Thoconsider '• ,ne
SIB also undertook to/applications for further loans oI* grants in the 
light of future circumstances.
In view of the subsequent government involvement in UCS it is 
obviously important to set out the government's role at this formative 
stage of UCS's brief life. Sir Richard Clarke, Permanent Secretary at 
the Ministry of Technology told the Public Accounts Committee in 
February 1969 that the government played no part in the negotiations 
at alls
•The Government Director of Fairfields played a very active part 
in the interests of Fairfields shareholders as a whole, but it 
was not a government matter at all. It was a matter between 
these five companies to work out the terms for the merger. Then 
when they came to an agreement to set up UCS the question arose 
whether the Government, as 50 per cent shareholder in Fairfields
would agree like the other Fairfields shareholders and did, in
* 4. . 21 fact, agree'.
21. HC 362, Session 1968-9, Q.2157-9.
Of course, as Sir Richard himself remarked, the government 'had interest 
in the merger going through because it believed, on S I B  a d v i c e , that it 
was desirable for the rationalisation of the shipbuilding industry that 
the group should be created. Although the SIB had had some misgivings 
about the commercial viability of UCS and had mentioned these in 
submitting the merger scheme to the Minister for approval, the Ministry 
did not make any further investigation of the merger proposals or the
22potential viability of UCS. The Ministry considered that the SIB 
had had very expert advice, both from a firm of merchant bankers and 
from a firm of accountants; the SIB quoted this advice to the Ministry 
in submitting UCS's application for assistance.
I
The government clsarly tried to stand back from the merger and le*ve it to 
the oompanies and the SIB. However, as we ehall see in section 5.3.2, 
only a year after the formation of UCS the government began to be 
Increasingly involved in the affaire of the company. „r. „epper-s 
vlea following the collapae of UCS was that tha governmant ahould hava 
taken a much oloeer interest in the finanoial structure of the company 
if it had bean known that the government was going to have the 
involvement which it ultimately did.23
Thera is also the question of whether this was an appropriate 
stance to take whan tha government was itself a 50* shareholder in 
Fairfields, which it had helped to set up. m  standing aside from the 
negotiations leading up to the formation of UCS, the government refused 
to become involved even when asked to do so by those connected with the 
company which it half-owned, flore than this, the government failed to 
establish whether or not the Fairfields 'experiment' had been successful.
22. HC 447, Session 1971-2, Q.1279-80.
23. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2165.
An’experiment’ is ’something done to test a theory, or to discover
something unknown’. One of the difficulties in assessing the
achievements of Fairfields (Glasgow) Ltd. is to determine how far it was
intended to be an experiment in those terms, and if so what were the
theories it was testing. The government’s reason for supporting
Fairfields was, at least in part, to keep the yard open until it was seen
how it would fit into any post-Geddes grouping, but Iain Stewart clearly
did regard the enterprise asJ an experiment or ’proving ground’ and set
out what he saw as its objectives on a number of occasions.
The task of establishing what did happen is complicated by the
undoubted antagonism between Fairfields and the other upper Clyde yards.
Fir. Anthony Hepper, chairman of UCS throughout its existence, was in no
doubt that Fairfields had been a commercial failure. He claimed that
existing and promised Fairfields wage rates had pushed up rates for the
group as a whole and that promised increases were not tied to
improvements in productivity.25 He also claimed that Fairfields was
»littered with almost an impossible mixture of different types of ships
which there were not the facilities either technically or physically to 
. 26complete1•
Iain Stewart, on the other hand, thought that the Fairfields
27experiment had been justified by results. He pointed out that 
independent consultants had forecast a profit of £300,000 for Fairfields 
for 1968. Fairfields were paying higher wages because the men were 
giving a performance which justified it, he claimed; other yards had no 
eeans of measuring performance. Replying to the allegation that Fairfields 
had taken on ships atunsconomic prices,Iain Stewart argued that the Contracts
24. chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary,.
25. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2125.
26. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2124-30.
27. HC 347-H, Session 1971-2, Q.2256-7.
Sir Iainhad turned out to be more expensive under the UCS management
was himself very critical of the way UCS was run. When UCS was formed, 
Sir Iain was appointed as deputy chairman. However, it became clear to 
him after two months of UCS board meetings that the report of the SIB 
working party, particularly its recommendation to cut the size of the 
workforce, was not going to be implemented, so he resigned.28 He also 
felt that the UCS board were not going to pursue any of the Fairfields» 
management practices and policies.2^
As we saw above, the SIB in its submission to the Ministry of 
Technology considered that Fairfields 'possibly* could have survived on 
its own. The government view was that much of the difference between 
the profits forecast by Fairfields and the loss shown in accounts 
prepared under UCS was due to different methods of accounting.30 A 
large proportion of the difference was due to differences in treatment of 
losses for work in hand. The Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of 
Technology also drew attention to the cost Fairfields had to incur for 
production engineering and people concerned with job evaluation and 
other aspects of the productivity plan.
Any statement about whether Fairfields would have been profitable 
on its own therefore has to be heavily qualified by the assumptions 
involved. However, perhaps more important than whether Fairfields would 
have made an accounting profit in 1968, was whether Fairfields succeeded 
in its attempt to improve performance by introducing management 
techniques which had proved successful elsewhere and by changing the 
behaviour of the workforce - a workforce which from the start had been cut
28.
29.
30.
HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2240-2.
For Mr. Hepper’s rejoinder to Iain Stewart's views see HC 347-II 
appendix 18, p.726. *
HC 362, session 1968-9, Q.2124. The figures were given by Sir 
Richard Clarke,Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Technology, 
to the Public Accounts Committee? he had to be corrected twice by 
Mr. V.I. Chapman, an Assistant Secretary dealing with shipbuilding 
who, in*turn, later had to submit a note correcting a figure he ha 
given.
down to the size management thought desirable. These changes in 
behaviour were to be brought about by, amongst other things, consultation 
of the workers’ representatives and designing a better payments scheme. 
Although Fairfields was not completely strike-free, there was a clear 
change from the atmosphere of mutual suspicion which characterised 
industrial relations in the shipbuilding industry. This change of 
attitudes would not itself have bBen sufficient to secure competitiveness, 
but experience elsewhere in the industry suggests that it is a pre­
requisite. The evidence suggests that the benefit from some of the
techniques introduced at Fairfields was just beginning to be felt when
31Fairfields was merged into UCS. However, the experimental aspects 
of Fairfields management were effectively abandoned by UCS.
Almost by accident, it seemed, the government had stumbled on an 
opportunity to test whether new management techniques could be applied 
to shipbuilding and whether attitudes in industry could be changed. 
However, not only did the government fail to establish any evaluation 
procedure to scrutinise the experiment as it went along, but it actually 
squashed a request from Fairfields to carry out a retrospective analysis.
In order to establish the record within government quarters, Iain Stewart 
approached Aubrey Jones, chairman of the National Board for Prices and 
Incomes, before Fairfields was merged into UCS and asked him:
»If the Government have made an investment in Fairfields as a 
national proving ground and have been party to this merger, 
which we agree with if the plan is implemented, do you not 
think that it is up to you to wade into the situation and make
a thorough unbiased examination of what achievements have been
32made within this national proving ground?' 31
31. See Alexander and Denkins, 1970.
32 HC 347-11» Session 1971-2, Q.2256 (Sir Iain Stewart).
Aubrey Bones agreed, and said that he would write to the Department of 
Economic Affairs (DEA) where Peter Shore was in charge at the time, 
and ask for a team to go in and make such an examination. Iain Stewart 
thought that this would put Fairfields' achievements and failures on 
record in a way that nothing else could do - the independent consultant's 
report commissioned by Fairfields had been criticised by many. However, 
the OEA turned down the suggestion - according to Iain Stewart because 
it thought that an investigation would be an embarrassment toUCS.33
The UCS merger also, illustrated how elastic are the concepts 
•commercial considerations' and 'potentially viable'. The SIB clearly 
regarded the formation of a five-yard group from companies as going 
concerns as of over-riding importance* »If we left out just one or two 
yards on probably just cold-blooded commercial consideration«, we uould 
not then have got some of the productivity improvement we will get by 
having them all within one working unit'.34 When asked whether »cold­
blooded commercial considerations would have suggested leaving one or 
two of them out', Sir William Swallow replied, 'Yes, but against that 
we had the tangible benefit of the entire group working as one group and 
getting some benefits from the production point of view'.35 These 
replies reflect some confusion over what are 'commercial* considerations - 
apparently such 'cold-blooded commercial considerations' were to be 
contrasted with the SIB's objective, which was 'to see eventually an 
industry which is a profitable and practical commercial industry'.36
When asked whether social considerations also influenced the SIB's 
attitude to LICS's application for a loan, Sir William told the Public 
Accounts Committee in 1969*
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33.
34.
35.
36.
Peter Shore's letter to Aubrey Bones is published in full in 
Paulden and Hawkins, 1969, pp.178-9.
HC 362, Session 1968-9, Q.2297 (Sir William Swallow). Emphasis 
HC 362, Session 1968-9, Q.2298.
HC 362, Session 1968-9, Q.222Q (Sir William Swallow). Emphasis
added.
added.
•We were primarily influenced by commercial considerations, but
I suppose that we were slightly influenced by the fact that the
Upper Clyde is one of the major shipbuilding areas of the country
and we felt that we should probably lean over backwards in order
to give it a chance to get on its feet and make it a very strong 
37group *•
If anything, fir. Hepper took an even gloomier view of UCS's commercial 
visibility at its formation:
•When I reported as Chairman of the working party to the Vice- 
Chairman and to the Government and SIB at the time I made it very 
clear that in my view the formation of the Upper Clyde Group 
could not possibly be considered as a financial venture, that is
to say one in which you put your money with a hope of getting it 
out within a reasonable period of time'.
However, Mr. Hepper felt able to confirm that there was no difference of
opinion between UCS and the SIB on the role played by social 
39
considerations. To compound the confusion of terminology, both 
Sir William Swallow and Sir Richard Clarke were clear in their evidence
to the Public Accounts Committee that in considering applications for 
assistance the SIB was guided by strictly commercial principles.40
The apparent contradictions can be resolved if we bear in mind that 
any firm is 'Potentially competitive- - provided it is given anough monay. 
What the SIB was trying ta do was not to subsidise production costs but 
to give assistance which wouid enable the firm tc make changea, after 
which it would be able to compete without further aid. Howauer, as 
we saw above, little of the money given to UCS at its inception was to
37. HC 362, Session 1968-9, Q.2240, Emphasis added.
38. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2132.
39. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2175-7.
40. HC 362, Session 1968-9, para. 185.
enable it to make these necessary changes the money was used to enable
the group to be formed in the first place. As ua shall see later in the 
chapter UCS repeatedly came back to the SIB for further assistance.
5.2.3 Lower Clyde
Although the SIB uas pleased at tha progress that had baen made towards 
tha formation of an uppar Clyde group by the autumn of 1967, it really 
favoured a single group for the whole of the river.41 However, In 
September 1967, Scott and Llthgou on the lower-Clyde presented to the 
SIB proposals for a merger of their shipbuilding and engineering 
interests. The upper Clyde yards would have preferred a single Clyde 
group, but the lower Clyde yards were opposed. This opposition was 
due to their fears that they would be dragged down by the upper Clyde 
yards, which they felt should prove their viability before the lower 
Clyde yards were asked to join a larger group. Those who wanted a 
single group for the whole river argued that it would be possible to 
rationalise capital expenditure between the upper and lower reaches of 
the ciydet that the lower Clyde yards could be developed to build the 
largest tankers - this would enable the Clyde to build a complete range 
of merchant ships! and that there would be savings through the sharing 
of common marketing and other services. These potential benefits do not 
appear to have been quantified - aa for the argument for grouping in 
general. Tha working party on tha upper Clyde grouping thought that the 
groupings on the upper and lower Clyde were complementary and recommended 
that the lower Clyde grouping should become an independent subsidiary, 
with the upper Clyde having a majority shareholding.
Had the SIB insisted on its wishes it could have brought considerable
41. Times. 11 September 1967.
pressure to bear by refusing to give the lower Clyde group grants or 
loans or to recommend credit guarantees for ships to be built in its 
yards. The government could also have brought pressure by taking 
Scott off the list of yards asked to tender for national orders, and 
did appear to be considering this in August 1968.42 m  doing so, the 
government could have argued that it was carrying out the Geddes Report* 
recommendation that the number of yards asked to tender for naval orders 
should be reduced, fir. Benn, on his visits to the Clyde in 1969, made 
it clear that he strongly favoured a single group for the Clyde.43 
Neither the SIB nor the government did take the actions open to them, 
although they allowed them to regain as a threat while they sought to 
persuade. In the last resort, however, they did not see their roles 
as involving coercion. Undoubtedly, had such coercion been brought to 
bear, the Opposition would have mounted a vigorous compaign against it.
Following the presentation of merger proposals by Scott and Lithgow 
to the SIB a study was carried out for a lower Clyde grouping.
Although it was a considerable time before legal formalities were 
completed, 'in the meantime the two companies have stated that they are 
acting in all respects as if the merger were legally complete».44 The 
grouping finally took place on 31 December 1969. Scott Lithgow also 
includes the Greenock Dockyard, which was included in the Geddes Report. 
The new group had extensive plans for new facilities for which they 
needed financial assistance.45 The SIB supported the group's 
application and after Ministry approval an agreement provided for loans 
up to £2.3m and grants up to £1.4m. It is important to note that this 
financial assistance was for the provision of new facilities and not
42.
43.
44.
45.
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as »as the case with mUch of the help given to UCS, for buying shares or 
providing »orking capital. A further feature cf this merger »as the 
long time it took to be finalised. This meant that the group »as abZe 
to present a plan for reorganisation of facilities at the time of the 
formal merger, but after the t»o yards had already settled doun to
working together. In other words, what took place was a genuine merger 
rather than simply a grouping.
5.2.4 Tyne-Tees
A month after the publication of the Geddes Report, it was announced that 
merger talks were going on between Swan Hunter on the Tyne and Smith's 
Dock on the Tees. The idea of a merger was pre-Geddas and born of 
commercial requirements, but the Geddes recommendations helped in 
obtaining union approval. Completion of the talks was delayed by the 
difficulty of drawing up terms for the two companies, which had both had 
losses in 1965; however, a return to profitability was expected in 1966. 
Once this merger had been completed, the next step was to a Geddes 
regional group. Discussions had already been held with other Tyne and 
Tees firms, including Hawthorn Leslie, Vickers (who had a yard on the 
Tyne as well as at Barrow-in-Furness) and John Redhead.
On Dune 1967, fur firms on the River Tyne announced their intention 
of merging into a new joint company. Sir John Hunter, who was to be 
chairman of the new group, pointed out that it would be the largest 
shipbuilding organisation in Britain. Although a considerable amount 
of detail had still to be worked out, it was hoped that the new 
company would come into operation the following January. The companies 
involved were those who had been involved in discussions the previous 
year - Swan Hunter, Vickers, Hawthorn Leslie and John Redhead. The 
merger would take in only the companies' shipbuilding interests and would
exclude l/ickers shipbuilding interests outside the Tyne. The group would 
have a theoretical capacity of over 400,000 tons a year and a labour 
force of 12,000 compared with the Geddes recommendation that a ship­
building group should aim to achieve an output of 400,000 to 500,000 gross 
tons per year and should employ a total work force of 8,000 to 10,000 
workers. Swan Hunter would have the majority interest in the new 
company, though the amount of the holdings of the participant companies 
still had to be decided.
The Times, in a Business News leader in Dune 1967, stated that in 
Nay the SIB had suggested that a working party should be set up to 
examine the prospects of a grouping of Tyne yards with Furness Shipbuilding 
on the Tees - a loss-making company, which was part of Sears Holdings.46 
The Times suggested that this had spurred the Tyne yards into an early 
decision on amalgamation, which would avoid the need for a working party.
The coordinating committee set up by the four Tyne yards envisaged 
the possibility of a new shipyard on the Tyne since there was no purpose- 
built yard for modern ships. A new yard would not necessarily mean more 
jobs.
In September 1967, Swan Hunter offered to acquire Bohn Redhead, 
whose status as a private company raised difficulties over its participat­
ion in a consortiumj this bid from Swan Hunter was considered to be the 
logical way to solve these difficulties. In October 1967 it was 
announced that Swan Hunter (Shipbuilders) would be used as the joint 
company for Tyne group. The company's name was to be changed to Swan 
Hunter and Tyne Shipbuilders. The authorised capital of the company 
would be increased from 5 million to 15 million ordinary £1 shares and 
the Tyne shipbuilding interests of Vickers, Hawthorn Leslie and
46 Times, 18 Dune 1967
Redheads would be acquired by the company for shareholdings in it.
The acquisition of Redheads would include their ship repairing and 
marine engineering interests (contrary to the original merger proposals) 
The issued capital of the joint company (expected to be £9m to £lQm ) 
would be held in the following proportions* Swan Hunter (including 
Redheads) 64$,Vickers 18& Hawthorn Leslie 18%. The board would 
include representatives from the companies whose yards made up the 
group. The company was due to start operations on 1 January 1968, but, 
in the meantime, progress had been made in setting up a centralised 
design and estimating organisation, and the first tender to be submitted 
on behalf of the joint company resulted in an order from the Cunard 
Line.
The final form of the Swan Hunter and Tyne group was complicated by
the predicament of Furness Shipbuilding's Haverton Hill yard on the Tees,
which, it was announced early in 1968, would close down, putting 3,000
men out of work. The SIB was keen to save the yard, and the obvious
candidate to do this was Swan Hunter. In September 1968 Swan Hunter
and Furness Shipbuilding issued a joint statement confirming that talks
were taking place about the future of the yard. The firms were 'in
constant touch with the ministry of Technology and the Shipbuilding 
47
Industry Board'. Agreement was reached that Swan Hunter would take 
over the yard and that it would be incorporated in the group at the end 
of 1968. The SIB, with the approval of the Ministry of Technology, 
agreed to make available a grant of £lm to Swan Hunter to make the 
takeover possible.
Sir 3ohn Hunter later told the Houee of Commons Expenditure Committee 
that 'carrying through this merging and amalgamating is an expensive
47. Times, 10 September 1968.
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process.» When f i v e  or six yards had to b e merged and all of them 
had different accounting systems this was not a v e r y  e a s y  thing to do. 
On the Tyne they had to get five yards to work together and then a year 
later bring in a yard on the Tees and fit them all into one management 
structure. At least two of the yards on the Tyne were on the point of 
closing down when the merger took place. 'With some assistance and 
urging from Sir William Swallow* the group was forced to take orders at 
existing world prices which subsequently proved to be far too low, in 
order to keep these yards in being and to carry on the new organisation.
Two points of comparison can be made with UCS. First the 
structure of the Swan Hunter group was brought about by agreed takeovers 
rather than a merger of 'equals'? this would help to make it easier to 
introduce a uniform management structure. Secondly, it is clear that 
the troubles that UCS had in devising a uniform accounting system and 
in absorbing loss-making yards were not unique. Swan Hunter proved 
better able to cope with these problems, but not without transitional 
losses:
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1968 1969 197° 19?1
£217,000 profit. £3,449,000 loss £5,604,000 loss £549,000 profit
Source: Booz-Allen Report, p.176.
5.2.5 Wear
On the Wear there already existed a grouping of a number of yards: Sir 
Dames Laing and Company, Dohn L. Thompson and Sons, and William Doxford 
and Sons, were all part of the Doxford and Sunderland Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Company. In April 1967 it
48. HC 347-1, Session 1971-2, Q.918.
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was announced that a working party was to ba set up with the cooperation
of the SIB to make proposals for the merger of three shipbuilding 
companies on the Wear - Austin and Pickersgill, Bartram and Sons and 
Doxford and Sunderland. The chairman of the working party was Derek 
Palmar, the Government director on the Fairfields board.
The report of the working party was in the hands of company
chairmen by the beginning of September ,967. N„ „stalls of tha rsport 
were reieaeed, but The Timss reported that it included financial 
propoeals for a merger, in contreet to the Upper Clyde, „here, though
a merger had by that time been agreed in principle, financial proposale 
were still being worked out.^
However, no action was taken on the report, apparently because it 
did not envisage any expansion of production and proposed the closure 
of Bartram and the Doxford yard of the Doxford and Sunderland company.
In Duly 1968, the SIB told the three companies that because of the lack 
of progress in reorganising their production facilities the SIB would no 
longer recommend the granting of credit guarantees under Section 7 of the 
Shipbuilding industry Act 1967 for ships to be built in their yards. The 
embargo affected five ships immediately, and if it had been continued in 
the long run would have made it virtually impossible for these yards to 
win orders from British owners. The companies made joint representat­
ions to the Ministry of Technology about the SIB's action.
Following talks, between the companies and the SIB, the SIB 
recommended that credit facilities be restored and the three companies 
were able to announce orders totalling £l5m. The SIB's action does 
seem to have had an effect, since in August Bertram and Austin and 
Pickersgill announced that they were to merge. Although the SIB had
49. Times, 2 September 1967.
been pressing for a three-company merger, Doxford and Sunderland 
was not to be included in the proposed group. Earlier in the year 
Doxford and Sunderland, easily the largest of the three companies, 
had proposed merger terms which amounted to a takeover of the other 
two companies, and these had been rejected. In the terms for the 
two-company merger, Austin and Pickersgill was to acquire the whole
of the share capital of Bartram. This merger was carried out without 
any financial assistance from the SIB.
As with the Clyde, the SIB had a definite view about the size of 
the grouping it wanted on the Wear, and in this case it went 
considerably further in exercising pressure by carrying out the threat 
to withhold recommendations for credit guarantees. By using this 
pressure, the SIB secured a grouping smaller than they wished, and did 
not press further for a single group when it became clear that some of 
the companies concerned opposed this. This episode is not without a 
certain irony: Austin and Pickersgill became one of the most 
consistently profitable shipbuilders in the late 1960s and 1970s and 
they did so by specialising in a standard ship, the SD14. This was 
one of the benefits which large groups were supposed to make possible!
In fact, before the Geddes Report, Austin and Pickersgill had 
rebuilt their yard. Because there was a derelict shipyard adjacent, 
they had been able to raâre the shipyard to the ground, and build a 
completely new yard, rather than'bits stuck on here and there' as had 
happened in other yards without a similar opportunity.^ According 
to Ken Douglas, who was with Austin and Pickersgill before going on to 
UCS, 'the only thing Austin and Pickersgills did wrong was to do the 
modernisation too early because they could have got the £3^ millions
50. HC 347-1, Session 1971-2, Q.917.
from Geddes instead of earning it themselves'.
¿¿aJS---Other changes to the structure of the shipbuilding ind.««»^
No further large groupings took place under SIB sponsorship. The idea 
of an 'Irish Sea Grouping» consisting of Harland and Wolff in Belfast, 
Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness and Cammell Laird at Birkenhead was 
considered but came to nothing. The Industrial Expansion Act 1968 
as well as providing an extra £15m in grants for shipbuilding also 
removed the requirement that applicant shipbuilders must have been 
involved in a grouping scheme; thus Harland and Wolff was able to 
obtain finance for its 'building dock» without grouping.
However, there were a number of smaller-scale groupings, many of 
them involving yards which, because they could only build ships of less 
than 5,000 tons, had been too small to fall within the terms of 
reference of the Geddes Committee. For example, Thornycroft of 
Southampton, which was covered by the Geddes Report, merged with 
Vosper of Portsmouth, which was not. On the East Coast of Scotland, 
Caledon of Dundee merged with Robb of Leith to form the Robb Caledon 
Group. The SIB agreed to make a loan for capital expenditure. The 
Robb Caledon Group later took over the Burntisland yard following its 
closure, and used it for préfabrication. The SIB made a loan of 
£150,000 to the Drypool Engineering and Dry Dock Company of Hull to 
assist it with the acquisition in 1969 of Cochrane and Sons of Selby 
and to provde working capital for the two companies. In its report 
for the year ending 31 March 1969, the SIB said that it would welcome 
other yards following this example.51 Drypool went into receivership 
in 1975, and the receiver, Mr. Robert Smith (who was also the UCS
51. HC 326, Session 1968-9.
liquidator) described the group as then structured as having «no 
commercial logic behind it and the only hope of survival for the 
separata companies is to be unshackled from the group'.52
Apart from the Barclay Curie yard mentioned in section 5.2.2 on 
the upper Clyde, and the Burntisland yard mentioned above, one other 
yard included in the Geddes Report was closed without being included 
in a grouping - the Blyth shipyard in Northumberland, which closed in 
August 1966, only five months after the publication of the Geddes 
Report.
The various changes which took place in the structure of the UK 
shipbuilding industry through groupings and closures are illustrated 
in figure 1.6.
5.2.7 The nature of the groupings
The closure of the Blyth, Burntisland and Barclay Curie yards, 
together with the poor state of other yards which survived only by 
being incorporated into groups, indicates that the Geddes Report and 
the subsequent government assistance were too late by several years.
The Geddes Report had envisaged the groupings as an opportunity for 
new management structures and new attitudes as well as new physical 
investment. In practice, some of the groupings became massive rescue 
operations with the SIB desperately trying to include yards whose 
survival on their own was at least doubtful. On the upper Clyde the 
SIB sponsored a grouping compered of yards, the majority of which it 
recognised as being incapable of surviving on their own. The upper 
Clyde case showed more clearly than most that the idea of promoting 
competitiveness was sufficiently elastic to include what were
52. Times. 11 October 1975.
effectively social and political considerations. The attitude of 
the SIB is understandable enough* it was regarded as being the 
saviour of the shipbuilding industry, and if it had allowed the 
majority of shipyards in one of the main shipbuilding areas of the 
country to go into liquidation its credibility would have been 
reduced.
The SIB had no general view on the type of structure for 
groupings - merger of equals into a new company, takeovers etc, ©'i&erB did 
think it mattered, for example Fairfields on the form of the upper 
Clyde grouping. There was no economic analysis (as opposed to 
financial analysis of share divisions etc.) of alternative courses of 
action, and in any case the money for examination of groupings was 
not for the SI0»s direct use but for payment to shipyards to employ 
consultants. The SIB*« approach was to seek to secure the compliance 
of the participants in the formation of the groups. Apart from the 
brief withdrawal of guarantee recommendations from the Wear yards and 
the implied, but unexercised, threat to the lower Clyde, the SIB 
sought compliance by persuasion and the provision of incentives.
Thus the SIB paid Swan Hunter to take over Furness and gave funds to 
UCS to pay off owners of yards reluctant to part with control, even 
though it was doubtful whether the net assets of one yard had any 
value at all. On the labour side the SIB accepted an employment 
charter described as being based on existing practices and which 
retained the existing size of the workforce although the working party 
on the group had proposed large-scale redundancies. This reluctance 
to use coercion, although this merely involved the withholding of 
benefits, to achieve the SIB*s responsibility for making the industry 
competitive reflects a much move general reluctance to impose 
solutions without full consent from those affected which characterised
government 'intervention' in economic and industrial policy throughout
the 1960s. This approach has been described by Back Hayward:
'In Britain, the myth rather than the reality of gradualist
political development, in which piecemeal change is almost
frictionlessly brought about under the aegis rather than
through agency of a passive government, has been a potent
cultural constraint inhibiting any unprecedented response
crisis. The capacity to use a domaftic, peacetime crisis for
the purpose of shedding the shackles of incrementalism and
imparting a new impetus to an old industrial society is
53consequently absent'.
Both the Geddes Report and the SIB appear to have underestimated 
the problems associated with grouping. The Geddas Report realised 
that there might be problems arising from the use of physical resources 
when a number of yards came together, and had proposed grants to cope 
with these 'transitional losses'. However, the administrative 
problems, such as the integration of five different accounting systems, 
do not seem to have been realised in advance. This had the 
consequence that just when new demands were being placed on management, 
their management systems were least able to cope.
Some of the groupings envisaged by Geddes were delayed (or never 
took place in the form envisaged by the report) because 1967 was a bad 
year for orders (and profits) and firms were reluctant to accept 
merger terms which they did not consider reflected the full value of 
their shares. These delays shortened the time for remission of 
interest on SIB loans, which was available only until the end of 1970, 
Although the Geddes Report had been quite clear that grouping was only
53. Hayward, 1975, p.9.
a means towards a more competitive industry, as soon as legislation 
defined grouping as a condition for the receipt of help, grouping 
tended to become an end in itself.54 Firms looked into grouping 
prospects in order to get grants for which they would otherwise have 
been ineligible, and some of the smaller groupings which took place 
bore little resemblance to those envisaged by Geddes. This situation 
was altered by the Industrial Expansion Act 1968, which allowed 
grants to be given when there was no grouping.
The government, although it had clear views on the size of 
groups, deliberately stood back from the details of the grouping 
schemes - mergers were regarded as 'private' matters even when the 
government half-owned one of the yards involved. This would have 
seemed an appropriate stance if the government had set up an agency 
to 'deal with the problems of the industry', but in fact the SIB was 
not allowed by its terms of reference to continue rescuing a yard 
which had little prospect of success without continuing injections of 
aid. When this situation arose the government was inevitably less well 
informed aboii: the industry and the yards concerned than if it had 
been directly responsible itself for dispensing aid for groupings and 
other purposes.
5.3 THE RETURN TO RESCUE OPERATIONS
5.3.1 The economic background
Although 1967 had been a poor year for orders and profits, British 
shipbuilding started 1968 with a number of advantages. First, the 
1967 devaluation of sterling gave British shipbuilders a competitive 
edge over its rivals; second, when the boom in ship orders following
54. Confirmed in interview with Sir William Swallow. 10 April
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the closure of the Suez Canal came along, British order books were so 
low that early delivery dates could be offered; finally, the cheap 
credit scheme for British owners ordering ships in British yards 
resulted in more orders. In the twelve months from October 1966 to 
September 1967 British shipbuilding obtained orders for only 422,000 
gross tons of merchant ships, but in the fifteen months from October 
1967 to the end of 1968 3,200,000 tons of new orders were obtained.
However, this spate of orders owed almost everything to these 
external factors and almost nothing to the effect of the groupings, 
which would not show any advantages of scale for at least two years. 
Some of the advantages were eroded by increased costs. A number of 
new productivity agreements were negotiated following the groupings, 
but some of these, such as that on the Tyne, produced the expected 
rise in earnings, but not the rise in productivity which should have 
accompanied them. Dan PlcGarvey of the Boilermakers told the CSEU 
conference in 3une 1969 that the new productivity systems were only 
producing results at Harland and Wolff. The SIB set up a special 
committee to find out why the industry's productivity agreements were 
not producing the expected results. Increases in steel prices also 
contributed to increased costs; the Geddes Report had recommended a 
special price reduction for steel, but instead the shipbuilders had to 
absorb a number of substantial increases in the price of steel during 
the next few years. Other material costs also rose considerably.55 
In 1965-6 British shipbuilders had suffered enormous losses as a 
result of large increases in cost when they had long fixed-priced 
order books. Following these losses there had been some caution in 
taking on too long an order book, but this caution faded when the
55 For details of cost increases from 1968 to 1971 see HC 347-1 
Session 1971-2, pp.191-3. *
order boom started in 1968. By the beginning of 1969 many British 
yards were heavily committed until well into 1971. Losses on 
contracts taken on at this time account for much of the difficulties 
faced by UK shipbuilders in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
5.3.2 UCS
We saw in section 5.2.2 that UCS hardly had an auspicious start.
Indeed, the whole of its short life - it has existed longer as a company 
in liquidation than it did as a going concern - can best be described 
as a succession of crises. The deputy chairman resigned within two 
months of tha formation of UCS because of disagreement with the 
direction the new group was taking. The chairman's personal part in 
travelling round the world in search of orders when others thought he 
should have concentrated on organising the group also caused 
controversy early in the group's life. This marketing effort by 
ite. Happer produced £14m of orders by flay 1968, but even then many of 
the contracts offered little or no prospect of profit at existing 
levels of productivity, and the aim was to provide a volume of work to 
see the group through while efforts were made to improve efficiency.
UCS»s difficulties were increased by the delay in handing over the QE2, 
which had been inherited from the 3ohn Brown yard. Apart from thB 
direct financial effect of the delay and the damage to the group's 
reputation, the amount of management effort diverted to the QE2 in 
the first few months of 1969 resulted in a slippage in the construction 
programme for other ships, which meant that progress payments were 
delayed.
It had been hoped that the group's corporate plan would be 
submitted by the middle of 1968, but it was considerably delayed, and 
UCS was in no condition to wait for further financial assistance until
it was ready. Early in December 1968 UCS applied to the SIB for 
grants of £6m. At the end of February 1969 the SIB paid to UCS an 
immediate grant of £0.5m and made a conditional offer of a further 
£2.5m, which depended on UCS improving productivity and absenteeism 
rates. The £2.5m was paid in March and April 1969 and a further 
£0.5m was provided in May and Dune.
When the corporate plan was finally submitted to the SIB at the 
end of April 1969 improvements in the accounting system showed that 
UCS needed much more financial support than had originally been 
envisaged. The corporate plan not only depended on the immediate 
availability of large grants, and later loans for capital equipment - 
up to £12m in total - but also asked for long-term guarantees of
financial support from the SIB. The SIB refused to give financial 
assistance on the scale sought.
The corporate plan was publicly released at the beginning of May. 
It showed that UCS expected a loss of £8m in the two years up to the 
end of August - in fact the loss turned out to be more. The company 
was in real danger of going into liquidation less than eighteen months 
after it had started operating. After negotiations which included 
trips by Mr. Benn to Glasgow, the SIB offered UCS at the beginning of 
Dune £5m in grants and loans for working capital and a promise to 
discuss UCS's request for £4.3m for capital investment and re-equipment. 
The offer was subject to assurances about board and management changes, 
and an increased public shareholding and full cooperation by the trade 
unions. The SIB also made it clear that no further funds would be 
provided to the company under the Shipbuilding Industry Act for working 
capital.
A surprise development occurred on 9 Dune when Lord Aberconway, 
chairman of Dohn Brown, offered his company's one-third share of UCS to
the government for the nominal price of £1 if the government mould do
its best for the workforce, would pay the creditors and would complete
the contracts in hand. If the government had taken up this offer
it would have held 50-£# of the equity. The government did not take
up the offer, being reluctant to accept open-ended responsibility
56for UCS’s liabilities. However, of the £5m aid from the SIB, £3m 
was to be in loans convertible to ordinary shares; this would take 
the combined SIB-government shareholding up to 48.4%. Had this gone 
above 50# Yarrow (Shipbuilders) could have exercised its option, built 
into the original merger agreement, to leave the group. (yarrow did 
in any case leave shortly before UCS went into liquidation). The 
decision about the size of the shareholding was taken by the SIB, which 
did not discuss in detail with the Ministry of Technology the reasons 
for choosing that particular figure.57 in practice, the government 
may well intervene to protect the workforce, but, as the UCS 
liquidator has found, it is reluctant to take on responsibility for 
creditors as well.
Throughout Dune, Mr. Hepper attempted to raise the £3m difference 
between the £12m UCS thought it needed and the £9m the SIB was 
prepared to make available. Among the possibilities explored were 
selling the land occupied by the UCS yards and leasing it back, or 
raising the funds abroad. However, UCS was unable to raise the £3m, 
though at the time it accepted the SIB offer of grants and loans in 
the middle of Dune the UCS board was still hoping to raise the money.
UCS accepted the SIB’s offer following an assurance that the SIB ’would
56. There is an obvious parallel with the government’s preference in 
1975 to give up to £162.5m to Chrysler UK rather than accept 
the company as a gift together with £35m from Chrysler Corporation.
. HC 397, Session 1968-9, Q.1447.57
be ready to discuss the developing financial situation with the 
reconstructed (UCS] Board and management in the light of the performance
of the group following the implementation of the plan approved by
58 *
SIB'. In accepting the offer, UCS had to agree to a number of
conditions including:
1. a restructuring of the board and the appointment of a separate
managing director (Hr. Hepper had acted as both chairman and managing 
director);
2. the renegotiation of the productivity agreement with the 
Boilermakers Society and the implementation of other productivity 
agreements;
3. reduction of the workforce by about 1,300 by August 1969 and by
a further 1,300 by August 1970 and a reduction of 270 in the number of 
staff;
4. the closure of the headquarters office at Fitzpatrick House in 
Glasgow;
5. the rationalisation of some production facilities and a closer 
integration of the yards.
The position revealed by the corporate plan shows clearly the 
dangers of embarking on a large-scale merger of the UCS type without 
a clear idea of the best structure or of the financial requirements.59 
Plany of the measures necessary for success (or rather for minimising 
failure) were not taken until a year and a half after the group was 
formed. Even then they were not taken all at once - as we shall see 
below, the question of redundancies remained a festering sore. The 
problem was not merely one of delay but of having to undergo two
1947
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HC 397, Session 1968-9, p.250.
The lesson does not seem to have been learnt. At the timn f 
preparations for the nationalisation of shipbuildino in in?«
British Shipbuilders' first corporate plan was not exDecteri ln begin until the 1978 fiscal year. xpected to
major reorganisations within two years. The mid 1969 measures could 
not have been expected to have an immediate effect. There is 
considerable truth in the arguments that the benefits were only 
beginning to show by the time UCS went into liquidation in Oune 1 9 7 1* 
that is not necessarily to accept, however, that the structure of UCS 
was optimal or that it would then at last have been able to compete 
without continuing government subsidy.
There was some delay in carrying out the full reconstruction of 
the UCS board, partly because of disagreement between the UCS board 
and the SIB over the future of Mr. Hepper. When the full reconstruct­
ion was carried out, Mr. Kenneth Douglas, joint managing director of 
the successful Wear shipbuilders Austin and Pickersgill, was appointed 
as managing director of UCS. Mr. Hepper remained as chairman but 
ceased to be managing director. The marketing, production and finance 
directors and two non-executive directors resigned. Under the new 
managing director the group made considerable progress in standard­
ising production, concentrating on the group's designs for the 'Clyde' 
cargo ship and bulkcarriers.
In spite of this, UCS continued to be in financial difficulties.
In August 1969 it was announced that the UCS loss since its inception, 
forecast in May to be £8m, was in fact £10.3m. Of this £3.6m was 
losses on contracts inherited from the component yards and £4.8m losses 
on contracts taken on since the formation of UCS. In the autumn of 
1969 UCS asked for further financial assistance from the SIB. The 
SIB decided that it would not be justified on commercial grounds in 
providing such assistance and informed UCS and the Minister of 
Technology of this.
At this stage the issue of further aid was returned to the 
government to deal with directly and again became an explicitly
political problem. According to Harold Wilson, when UCS continued to 
be in difficulties following the Dune 1969 aid,
•Tony Benn, Back Diamond and, at a later stage, Harold Lever 
were in constant consultation, and occupied in meetings with 
the UCS board. From one moment to another it was impossible 
to get reliable figures of the group‘s financial position and 
there was a series of crises over the next six months, when 
frantic telephone calls made it clear that there was no money 
for the wages due to be paid the following Friday'.60 
By December 1969 UCS again faced imminent closure. The ministers 
concerned brought the matter 'yet again' to the Economic Policy 
Committee and to the Cabinet*
On 11 December Mr. Benn told the House of Commons that 'to allow 
it a further period in which to show results' the government had decided 
to provide UCS with loans not exceeding £7m and, if necessary, 
guarantees of completion for new orders of particular and immediate 
value to the company because they were for early completion.61 
Mr. Benn admitted that the SIB's view was that ;on strict shipbuilding 
industry grounds, taking into account the total sum given to it by 
Parliament, it would not have been right itself to have put more into 
this group», but he argued that 'In view of the wider economic, regional 
and Scottish considerations ... we thought it necessary to go in and 
contribute towards giving this company the opportunity of proving its 
capability in the future'.
However, the justification on regional economic grounds for 
further aid to shipbuilding on the upper Clyde was fairly weak.62
60. Wilson, 1971, p.676.
61. HC Deb., 11 December 1969, cols. 662-7.
62. See section 1.3.2and Hogwood, 1976a.
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In terms of Scottish political considerations a good case could be 
made out for this rescue operation; there would have to be a general 
election in just over a year at the most, and the victory of the SNP 
at the Hamilton by-election the previous year suggested that the 
nationalists posed a threat. More generally, the UCS rescue in 
December 1969 showed that while governments would prefer to secure 
employment by making a firm 'competitive', where this approach failed 
they were nevertheless prepared to put in more money. Ideally the 
government would have liked to combine the maximisation of economic 
resources with the avoidance of large-scale localised redundancies, but 
where the two were shown to be incompatible the government plumped for 
the latter.
The government's commitment to avoiding redundancies was not 
absolute. There was clearly a trade-off between the amount it was 
prepared to spend and the number of redundancies it was prepared to 
allow. Thus it provided a further £7m to prevent complete closure, 
but it did allow a substantial reduction in the size of the workforce.
UCS announced in March 1970 that it proposed to reduce its labour force 
by 3,500 men in all trades by August - more than twice the number 
originally planned. Mr. Ken Douglas, the managing director, took the 
view that if these men did not go the group would fold, putting the 
entire labour force out of work; the excess of 3,500 men was 
equivalent to £5m a year. However, labour disputes connected with the 
redundancy plans hindered the group's attempts to improve productivity.
This was entirely predictable, since it was obvious that many of the 
men would have great difficulty in finding jobs if they had to go 
through the labour market. Although the government was willing to
63. In the event, just over 2,000 men were made redundant hat-woor.
August 1969 and December 1970. For a study of the attempts of 
these workers to find new jobs see Herron, 1972. H
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rescue the company, it was unwilling to assume direct responsibility 
for the social consequences of the reduction in the workforce necessary 
if there was not to be yet another rescue operation. By declining 
to take on this responsibility, the government ensured that the 
funds which it had given would not be put to best use.
In April 1970 it was announced that UCS had agreed to sell its 
51* shareholding of Yarrow (Shipbuilders). At the time of the UCS 
merger Yarrow had been the only clearly profitable yard on the upper 
Clyde but in 1969, as part of UCS, the yard lost £1.1m. Yarrow had 
originally joined with UCS in joint guarantees for ship contracts, 
but later withdrew. By early 1970 the position was that Yarrow 
(Shipbuilders) could not muster the financial backing to obtain new 
orders. It was quite clear by this stage (just over two years since 
the formation of UCS) that Yarrow was dissatisfied with the UCS link. 
Yarrow was negotiating with Scott Lithgow and Vosper Thornycroft about 
the possibility of merging with one of them. These negotiations had 
come to nothing by Dune, but it was announced that Yarrow and Co. 
which owned the other 49* of Yarrow (Shipbuilders) shares, would buy 
back UCS's 51* holding. In fact, Yarrow did not leave UCS until 
February 1971, with the help of a special Ministry of Defence loan 
(see section 6.2.2).
Although the government had set up the SIB as an agency to 
promote competitiveness in the shipbuilding industry and to make 
recommendations about aid to individual companies, government 
ministers spent a considerable amount of time in discussions about UCS. 
Between February 1968 and March 1970, Sir William Swallow visited UCS 
four times, and one of the part-time SIB members visited UCS twice* 
in addition, frequent visits were made by SIB officials and many 
meetings were held with UCS representatives in London, On the
government side, between 12 February and 9 Dune 1969 alone, Mr. Benn
had thirteen meetings with local M.P., fifteen with UCS management,
seven with the STUC, and many other meetings. Thus, even before
the SIB was no longer prepared to help UCS, the Minister of Technology
spent a considerable amount of time dealing with the company. in
spite of this, Mr. Benn told the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs
in Dune 1969 that the work of the SIB took responsibilities out of the 
64department. For all Mr. Benn’s flying visits, it is clear from 
his other answers to the Committee that he was not involved in the 
details of the negotiations. Whatever the formal allocation of 
responsibilities, it would have bsen politically inept for the 
relevant minister not to have been seen to be actively concerned about 
a crisis.
In contrast to this veritable orgy of ministerial involvement, 
there was a falling off of contacts once the SIB had washed its hands 
of UCS and the government was involved directly.65 This shows once 
again the reactive and crisis-centred nature of much government 
involvement in the industry. The pattern of government activity 
shows that agencies cannot in practice shield politicians from 
becoming involved in the affairs of individual firms. Political 
pressures make it impracticable for a minister to decline to receive 
representations when a firm is in trouble on the grounds that the aid 
is dispensed by an agency rather than by his government department.
5.3.3 Cammell Laird
Although Cammell Laird did not take part in a grouping, it was 
affected by another Geddes proposal - that fewer yards be invited to
64. HC 397, Session 1968-9, Q.1411.
65. HC 347, Session 1971-2, para. 115.
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tender for naval orders.
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The government decided to concentrate 
nuclear submarine building at Vickers' Barrow-in-Furness yard, thus 
leaving Cammell Laird with a large amount of specially trained manpower 
which was no longer required. The government had also stipulated 
that Cammell Laird should order certain engines from Vickers, who had 
recently acquired a license to build them in the UK.66 Delays in 
the delivery of these engines disrupted Cammell Laird's building 
schedules. Stock market rumours at the beginning of 1970 forced 
Cammell Laird to announce that shipbuilding losses had been heavier 
than forecast. When the figures were released in April 1970 it was 
revealed that the shipbuilding division of Cammell Laird had made a 
loss of £2.27m during 1969 compared with a profit of £1.35m the previous 
year. Altogether, losses at Cammell Laird on fourteen ships from 
1969 to 1971 amounted to £12m. These losses threatened the existence 
of the whole Cammell Laird group, which included engineering interests 
as well as shipbuilding,* about 7,500 out of 20,000 Cammell Laird 
employees worked in shipbuilding. Lengthy negotiations took place 
between representatives of Cammell Laird management, the SIB, the 
Ministry of Technology, shipowners and the shipbuilding and engineering 
unions to try to ensure the company's future.
Because these difficulties extended beyond the yard to the 
group as a whole, the SIB considered that its powers were not 
appropriate, so the government had to be involved directly. The 
government asked the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (i r c) to 
undertake an investigation of the Cammell Laird group. However, the 
IRC was explicitly excluded from intervening in the shipbuilding 
industry by the Industrial Expansion Act 1968, and the Corporation
66. S &SR. vol. 115, 8 May 1970, p.6.
insisted as a precondition of its^involvement that the shipbuilding 
division should become independent from the rest of the group, leaving 
the IRC free to promote the reorganisation of the group’s other 
activities* On 4 Dune a scheme of financial assistance which 
provided for the Laird Group (as the Cammell Laird group was now to 
be called) to make good to Cammell Laird (Shipbuilding and Engineering) 
Ltd* the actual amount of the losses on the current order book up to 
£7.2m. To help the Laird Group meet this obligation, the IRC 
subscribed at par for 4,900,830 ordinary shares of 5 shillings (25p) 
each in the Laird Group. In addition, the IRC entered into 
arrangements for the provision of refund guarantees to shipowners for 
funds made available to the shipyard for ships being built there; 
government ’back-to-back' guarantees were given to the IRC which 
removed its financial liability. One of Cammell Laird’s customers 
agreed to cancel orders for four chemical tankers which would have 
resulted in a loss of at least £2m for Cammell Laird.
As part of these arrangements, the government agreed to provide 
the finance for a 5C$ shareholding in the shipbuilding company at a 
price to be agreed by independent valuation. fir. Lever, the Paymaster- 
General, said in announcing this that he was considering whether there 
were ways in which the shares in the shipyard might be dealt with, 
such as placing them in a trust on behalf of the employees, to give 
an incentive to those most concerned. This was done by arranging for 
the shares to be held by the Public Trustee. The management structure 
of the company was reorganised, and a policy of having a short order 
book and aiming for series orders was instituted. The announcement 
of the assistance to Cammell Laird was made in the run up to the 
General Election of Dune 1970, but the incoming Conservative government 
allowed the arrangements made by the IRC and the 50$g government share-
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holding to stand* However, the shares were described as being held 
on behalf of the DTI rather than the Cammell Laird workers.
Why was the IRC rather than the SIB involved? The SIB had no
power to give loans for general purposes to Cammell Laird because the
yard was not in a shipbuilding group. The SIB could provide loans
for physical investment in such a yard, but the need here was for the
general purposes of the undertaking (i.e. a write-off of losses).
However, the IRC was excluded by the provisions of the Industrial
Expansion Act 1968 from intervening in shipbuilding while the SIB was
in existence. For that reason, the IRC 'came in a little unwillingly
when the Government found themselves obliged to approach the IRC because
they had no other way of getting at this particular problem'.67 The
government did, of course, have to subscribe directly for the 50%
shareholding in Cammell Laird (Shipbuilding and Engineering) Ltd.
Cammell Laird did apply to the SIB for financial assistance towards its
plans for reorganisation, but the Board did not support this
application 'principally because the Board was not convinced that the
Company’s proposals offered sufficiently clear prospects of commercial 
68viability'. The yard did eventually manage to obtain further 
assistance directly from the government (see section 6.4.2).
The way in which the SIB, the IRC and the government all became 
involved in Cammell Laird in 1970 illustrates that problems are not 
always considerate enough to fall into the tidy categories outlined 
in legislation setting up government agencies to deal with an industry. 
Regardless of the merits or otherwise of a single-sector agency (an 
issue to which we will return in chapter 9) it seems unwise to
67. Sir Anthony Pttrt, Permanent Secretary at the DTI, HC 447 
Session 1971-2, Q.1191. *
. HC 554, Session 1970-1, pp.6-7.68
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exclude from an agency set up to deal with industry generally the 
power to intervene in that sector; firms in difficulties are 
frequently involved in more than one sector.69 Problems of conflict 
or overlap would be better dealt with in working agreements between 
the two agencies and the industry department rather than in legislative 
form which might prove inappropriate and restrictive in individual 
cases. The problems will be made worse when, as with Cammell Laird, 
the general agency is excluded from an Individual sector, but the 
sectoral agency does not itself have full powers to deal with all 
types of problem arising in the industry.
5.3.4 Harland and Wolff
The history of assistance to the Harland and Wolff yard in Belfast is 
of a different nature to that of other UK yards, reflecting the special 
social problems of an area with unemployment higher than that of any 
of the development areas in Great Britain and with special political 
problems, particularly after 1969. Harland and Uolff had been 
receiving subsidies from the Northern Ireland government since the war 
and in 1966 the company was saved from liquidation by a loan of £3.5m 
from the Northern Ireland government. Following this, it was decided 
to concentrate on giant tankers and bulk carriers and to construct a 
new building dock. The SIB provided an £8m loan towards this, 
together with grants of £0.9m for entry into a market for new types of 
ships and £1.4m for reorganisation and disruption costs. Harland and 
Uolff would not have been eligible for these grants under the Geddes 
recommendations or the Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967 before it was 
amended by the Industrial Expansion Act 1968, since it had not taken 
part in a grouping scheme.
69. A good example of this was the Court Line collapse discussed in 
section 7.2.
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The new building dock came into operation in 1969, but the 
company's financial problems continued, partly because of delays in 
bringing new supporting facilities into operation, but also because 
of low productivity and the effect of inflation on costs. In April 
1970 the chairman of Harland and Wolff, Sir Oohn Mallabar, resigned 
following the preliminary announcement of a £3.77m loss for the 
previous year. The loss in the audited accounts turned out to be' 
considerably higher - £8.3m - mainly as a result of anticipated losses 
on contracts. The SIB gave £3.5m in grants to Harland and Wolff.
This was considerably less than the £8.5m the company thought it would 
need during 1970-3, but 'The problem was that the SIB only had about
£3.5 million (in grants) left in the kitty, and it made that grant on
7f1the understanding that the government would take up the rest'.
The SIB and the government did not have audited accounts for 1969 when 
the £3.5m grant was approved in Duly 1970 but they had informal 
indication that a substantial increase would have to be made in the 
future provision for losses. Both the SIB and the government knew that 
before 1970 Harland and Wolff had been quoting low prices to obtain 
work to keep the yard open.
In 1971 the Northern Ireland government took a shareholding in 
Harland and Wolff and undertook to provde funds for anticipated losses 
(see section 6.2.3). The SIB's grant of £3.5m was not even a full- 
scale rescue operation - more a dampening down of the problem while 
the two governments (UK and Nl) sorted out the full 'fire brigade' 
rescue. The fact that the SIB grant to Harland and Wolff 'cleaned 
out the kitty' shows that an agency set up with a ceiling on grants 
over a period of some years may not be sufficiently flexible to deal
70. Sir Anthony Part, HC 447, Session 1971-2, Q.1645.
with problems which arise near the end of its life. It is also 
worth noting the extent to which a single yard can pre-empt a large 
proportion of the funds set aside for the whole industry: Harland 
and Wolff, an ungrouped yard, received more in grants from the SIB 
alone than the Geddes Report had recommended for all grouped yards 
in the industry.
5.3.5 SIB aid to other shipyards
Although UCS, Cammell Laird and Harland and Wolff received the bulk 
of the money dispensed by the SIB, other shipyards also received funds, 
which in some cases went largely towards the construction of capital 
facilities. For example, following the merger at the end of 1969, 
the Scott Lithgow group planned to construct new facilities for the 
construction of big ships, including a sloping building mat which would 
be much cheaper than a building dock. The SIB agreed to give loans 
of up to £2.3m and grants of £1.4m. The new facilities were almost 
complete by the end of 1971, but inflation increased the cost of the 
new facilities and seriously affected the cost of existing fixed price 
contracts. As an insurance against financial difficulty in the 
future the SIB provided an additional £0.5m on the existing loan, and 
a further loan of £1m, and the parent companies also agreed to make 
additional finance available. The Appledope shipyard in Devon 
received SIB grants of over £1m towards the cost of a new building dock 
and covered berth.
A number of other yards ranging in size from Swan Hunter and 
Vickers to small Humberside yards also received loans and grants from 
the SIB for purposes which included entry into a market for new ships, 
the improvement of production facilities, and the improvement of 
workers’ amenities; this aid is summarised in table 5.3.
Applications from yards too small to have been considered by the Geddes
Committee took up a disproportionate amount of the SI8»s time in 
terms of the sums involved and the importance of the yards to the 
industry as a whole,
5,3,6 The reactive nature of involvement
In carrying out these rescue operations, the government was reacting 
to rather than initiating events. There are a number of reasons 
why the government ended up adopting this responsive approach. The 
first was that despite the rhetoric of reconstruction the government 
did not see its role as an active one. Both the Geddes Report and 
the subsequent legislation were largely non-controversial in the 
sense that they conformed to the consensus between the two main parties 
that th8 government could provide assistance but should not attempt 
to direct the reorganisation of the shipbuilding industry.
To have adopted anything other than a reactive approach would 
have required the government or the SIB to have anticipated possible 
problems rather than wait for calls for assistance. In part, this 
would have required better monitoring of firms in which the SIB or 
the government was already involved (see section 8.5). However, in 
terms of available time and funds the SIB had at each stage of its life 
a number of existing problems and would have had to di¥eft its 
attention from them to seek out possible future ones.
The Geddes recommendations for government action and the 
legislation which embodied many of them provided a package deal which 
offered little flexibility in response to changing circumstances.
When some of the assumptions underlying this package turned out to be 
incorrect there was no guidance as to the alternative courses of 
action which the SIB or the government ought to pursue. The result 
was that the SIB and the government were left to respond to events 
rather than to try to shape them in a different direction.
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relative inflexibility of the initial proposals contributed to the 
policy failures which are analysed further at the end of the chapter.
5.4 SHIPBUILDING CREDIT GUARANTEES
The Geddes Report had recommended a very modest £30m credit scheme 
for ships being built for UK owners, but the government, concerned 
about the rapidly increasing proportion of orders from British ship­
owners going abroad, had increased this figure to £200m in the Ship­
building Industry Act 1967. Section 7 enabled the Minister of 
Technology to guarantee a loan towards the cost of a ship ordered by 
a British owner from a British shipyard. The clearing banks agreed 
to provide money under such a guarantee on similar terms to those 
which applied under ECGD financial guarantees. The shipowner paid 
fees to cover the legal and administrative costs of the scheme. No 
call arose on public funds unless there was a default by the shipowner 
and the security proved (insufficient to cover the loan? no such default 
arose during the operation of the 1967 Act.
The Minister could issue guarantees only on the recommendation of 
the SIB and, although the loans were to the shipowner and not to the 
shipbuilder, the 1967 Act stipulated that the SIB should not make a 
recommendation unless the shipbuilder was making satisfactory progress 
in reorganising his resources and unless the order in question would 
contribute to the use of resources which were otherwise not likely to 
be used. When a shipbuilder sought the SIB's recommendation for a 
guarantee, he had to complete a questionnaire covering changes in 
organisation, investment plans, expected profitability, industrial 
relations and consultation. The SIB suspended recommendations for 
guarantees on only one occasion, when it was dissatisfied with progress 
towards reorganisation on the Wear (see section 5.2.5). On another 
occasion, although the SIB had made a recommendation, the government
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delayed giving guarantees for several months for ships to be built 
by UCS because it was not satisfied that UCS would survive to complete
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the orders (see section 6,2.2). In general, however, the stipulation
that the shipbuilder should be making 'satisfactory progress' was 
interpreted fairly loosely.
Although the amount of loans which could be guaranteed under the
1967 Act was several times the amount recommended by Geddes, it soon
became clear that even this was inadequate. By October 1968 the
shipbuilding industry was urging the government to increase the amount
available under the scheme. In response to the unexpected demand for
loans, the government published a Shipbuilding Industry Bill in
December 1968 which doubled the amount available from £200m to £400m.
In opening the Second Reading debate on the Bill, Mr. Benn said that
there were two main reasons why the demand for guaranteed loans had not
been foreseen: the increase from an already high level of world
demand for merchant tonnage and, even more important^ the increase in
71British orders, particularly since devaluation. By 1969 the 
clearing banks* obligations under the export and shipbuilding credit 
schemes had risen to such levels that the Bank of England undertook a 
measure of refinancing to relieve the burden on the banks.
By the end of 1969 it had already become apparent that the new 
limit on guarantees would be reached by early 1970. In January 1970 
the government announced that it would be introducing legislation to 
increase the statutory limit on guarantees by a further £200m to £600m. 
Because of the June 1970 General Election, this legislation never 
reached the statute book. The incoming Conservative government 
undertook to reintroduce the Bill, but a new Bill was not introduced
71 HC Beb., 23 January 1969, cols. 676-7
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until early 1971, By then the requirement for guarantees had 
increased even further, and the Shipbuilding Industry Act 1971 
raised the guarantee limit to £700m (see section 6,2,4), The 
Industry Act 1972 extended the limit on guarantees, which no longer 
required SIB recommendations, to £1,000m with provision for further 
extension to £1,40Om. The annual Bills which had to be introduced
to increase the guarantee limit illustrate the inflexibility of 
ceilings imposed by statute when rapidly changing circumstances 
require updating of the provisions of legislation. Fortunately for 
British shipbuilding (though reflecting the poor status of Parliament), 
the government took it upon itself to offer guarantees 'subject to' the 
passage of the appropriate legislation.
It is important to emphasise that, although the government would
only have to pay out if a shipowner defaulted on his repayments, the
provision of these credits was not costless in resource allocation
terms. In the words of a Treasury official, »this is £700million
earmarked of the nation's savings at a relatively low rate of interest
and if you have earmarking fsic} those millions,for ship-building they
are coming out of something else. It has been a very big act of
72hypothecation to make'. Had the eventual size of the ceiling on 
the guarantees been known in advance both the government and the 
clearing banks might have balked at the scheme. However, once it had 
been established on a relatively modest scale it had a much greater 
chance as an established programme of improving its share of resources,73 
The provision of credits on this scale clearly went well beyond 
the modest Geddes scheme to ensure a steady order book during the 
transitional period while the new groups were reorganising their
72. HC 347-1, Session 1971-2, Q.267.
73. On the more general issue of bargaining for increased 
see Heclo and UildaJfsky, 1974, especially pp,88-103, expenditure
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resources. In the opinion of the Treasury, the credit scheme was
the largest single factor in maintaining demand in British yards in
74the years up to 1971. When asked to distinguish between the 
effectiveness of loans, grants and credit guarantees, Sir William 
Swallow of the SIB replied that he thought that the greatest benefit 
had ensued from the credit guarantees because in 1966-7 the order 
situation had been declining rapidly and if it had not been enabled 
to recover as a result of credit guarantees it would have been 
difficult to have had confidence in investing in shipyards. What 
had been intended by the Geddes Report as a temporary measure became 
a central plank of government policy to ensure the survival of many 
shipbuilding firms.
5.5 SHIPPING INVESTMENT GRANTS
While the government was giving these guarantees on loans being made to 
British shipowners building in British yards, it was actually paying 
out similarly vast sums in grants to British registered shipowners, 
whether or not they built in British yards. The previous 40% tax 
allowance for investment in ships (compared to a general rate for 
industry of 30%) was replaced by investment grants under the Industrial 
Development Act 1966, which also enacted a general switch from 
allowances to grants for investment in industry. The rate of 
investment grant for ships was 20%, except for a temporarily increased 
rate of 25% between 1 January 1967 and 31 December 1968.
Grants were payable to companies incorporated in Britain even if 
they were foreign-controlled, and this enabled foreign shipowners to 
use ’brass plate’ companies incorporated in Britain to place orders
74.
75.
HC 347-1, Session 1971-2, Q.266.
HC 347-1, Session 1971-2, Q.495.
abuse, the Board of Trade announced in January 1968 that certain types
of cases would be subject to special scrutiny with the aim of ensuring
that the transaction as a whole would not be detrimental to the balance
of payments in the short term. This change did not remove concern
about the amount of investment grants being paid on ships being built
abroad, particularly for foreign-controlled companies. During the
following year the matter was raised a number of times in the House of
Commons, both in questions and in an adjournement debate.^6
By November 1969 it had become obvious that the extra scrutiny
announced at the beginning of 1968 had not been sufficient to prevent
large-scale payment of investment grant to foreign-controlled firms
having ships built abroad (see table 5.2). The government published
the Industrial Development (Ships) Bill, under which an applicant for
grant would have to satisfy the Treasury that payment of the grant
would result in a net benefit to the UK balance of payments. Because
of treaty obligations, ships to be built in EFTA yards were exempted
from the balance of payments scrutiny, and this provision provoked
criticism on the grounds that it could cost the UK taxpayer millions
of pounds. The Ministry of Technology admitted the existence of the
EFTA loophole, but claimed that 'Means are available through exchange
control which can and will be used to prevent these transactions.
Secondly, as part of the scrutiny applied by Min.Tech, there is a
series of checks in relation to investment grants which would also 
77apply'. However, if these methods had been fully successful in
preventing abuses in similar cases of ships being built in other 
foreign yards it would not have been necessary to introduce new 
legislation.
76. HC Qafa., 24 January 1968, written answers col.120; 13 March iqkr 
cols. 1368-71; 2 April 1968, cols.326-36; 10 July 1968, written ’ 
answers col.81; 19 November 1969, cols. 329-30. 7
77. Times. 15 January 1970.
which would attract investment grants. In an attempt to reduce
Table 5.2 Investment grants for foreign-built ships
Period Ownership of shipping 
companies
Investment grants 
paid during 
each period (£m)
Estimated 
grants 
outstand­
ing on ships 
ordered 
before end 
of each 
period (£m)
1 April 1967 ) UK controlled 7.5 31.0
to 17 April 1968) Foreign controlled 2.6 34.0
18 April 1968 ) UK controlled 10.1 52.8
to 31 March 1969) Foreign controlled 10.7 37.0
1 April 1969 ) UK controlled 8.4 80.0
to 30 Sept. 1969) Foreign controlled 7.9 40.0
Totals at ) UK controlled 26.0 80.0
30 Sept. 1969) F oreign controlled 21.2 40.0
Source: HC Deb, 19 November 1969, written answers cols. 329-30 •
Note: In the last year of operation of investment grants (i.e. up to
October 1970) Q2% of orders went to foreign yards (HC Deb..
4 December 1972, col.895). It is not possible to give a final 
analysis because payments continue to be made on contracts 
signed before October 1970. Between 1 April 1967 and 31 
March 1973 a total of £378m was paid in investment grants on 
new ships (HC 429, Session 1972-3). Estimates in April 
1973 suggested that payments might continue until 1982 and 
total £220m, with many of the ships concerned being built 
overseas (HC 67, 5ession 1973-4, p.xxxi).
During the period between the Committee and Report stages of the
Bill the Estimates Committee published its report on the Winter
Supplementary Estimates. This showed that the Ministry of Technology
had wildly underestimated the amount which would be spent on
investment grants for ships - the supplementary estimate of £30m
78represented a rise of 57% over the original estimate. In evidence 
to the committee Mr. Ward, Under-Secretary in the Investment Grants 
Division of the Ministry of Technology, estimated that the grant
78, HC 71, Session 1969-70, para.27.
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saving in a full yaar as a result of the Industrial Development
(Ships) Bill could be about £5m, although he pointed out that there
was nothing to stop a shipowner transferring his order somewhere else,
79or to an EFTA yard.
Further criticism emerged in the Rochdale Report on Shipping,
published in flay 1970, which recommended that the government should
withdraw investment grants for ships as soon as practicable and
replace them with investment allowances of the same nature as applied 
80before 1966. Three main reasons were given for this recommendation I
1. Unlike most other assets attracting grants, a ship is geographically 
mobile and it need employ few UK resources in its operation and none in 
its construction.
2. The need for special arrangements for the shipping industry and 
the obvious difficulty in formulating them underlined the difference 
between shipping and other industries qualifying for investment grants.
3. With credit readily available for 80# of a ship's cost and an 
investment grant of 20#, a UK company need put up little of its own 
money to invest in new ships. This was not healthy in the long term.
In July 1970 a report from the Public Accounts Committee revealed 
further evidence of exploitation of investment grants for ships.79 801 
The committee examined the cases of four ships which were sold during 
construction abroad with the effect that a foreign purchaser ineligible 
for investment grant was replaced by a British purchaser who was 
eligible. Investment grant paid on these four ships was £2.9m, and 
altogether £30m in investment grants had been paid towards the cost 
of ships similarly transferred during construction abroad. These
79. Session 1969-70,0.211. Denton, 0'Cleireachin and Ash, 1975
p.165 are incorrect in stating that the new Act meant'that only 
ships ordered from British shipbuilders would be eligible for * 
grants. u
80. Cmnd 4337, pp.366-70.
81. HC 297, Session 1969-70,pp.xix-xxi.
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transactions had obviously taken place to exploit the availability 
of UK grants, since in each of these four cases the ship was to be used 
after completion for the purpose intended by the original shipowners. 
Control over the grants was so inadequate that investment grant was 
even paid on a £143,000 premium over the original contract price paid 
by the British company to the original shipowner. In three out of the 
four cases examined grant would probably not have been payable under 
the Industrial Development (Ships) Act 1970, but grant would have been 
payable on the fourth ship as it was built in a EFTA country.
After the Oune 1970 General Election the new Conservative
government announced the ending of investment grants for ships as well
as for all other assets, though grants continued to be payable where
contracts had been signed before October 1970. When some investment
grants were reintroduced by the Industry Act 1972 the government
resisted calls to include shipping so that grants could again be paid
to shipowners. The Public Accounts Committee continued to review the
issue of grants being paid where there was no benefit to the UK well
82after it was too late to do anything about it.
The payment of grants to shipowners to build abroad illustrates 
that to a large extent incentives for shipping and shipbuilding are 
necessarily conflicting in their purposes. Incentives to promote a 
modern, efficient British fleet must allow British shipping companies 
to build abroad if foreign yards offer the best terms. To do 
otherwise would be to promote British shipbuilding at the expense of 
British shipping. However, a large proportion of the total paid in 
investment grants for ships did nothing to assist either shipbuilding 
or UK-controlled shipowners. The government clearly failed to
HC 303, Session 1974, pp.xxi-xxv.82.
recognise early enough that ships were different in kind from other 
investment goods» When abuses arose the government responded by 
successive restrictions rather than by a complete change in the method 
of assisting shipowners» While the process may have been incremental, 
the sums of money lost as a consequence were certainly not trivial.
The saga of investment grants for ships also tells us something 
about the way British governments allocate resources. The lack of 
control over expenditure which produced no benefit to the UK has 
already emerged clearly in this section, but of at least equal 
importance is the fragmented nature of decision-making about related 
topics. Investment grants for ships and the package of aid for 
shipbuilding embodied in the Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967 both 
affected shipbuilders and shipowners, but decisions about each package 
were taken separately and at different times (and sometimes by different 
government departments; see chapter 9). There was clearly no 
attempt to measure the opportunity cost of aid to shipping compared to 
aid to shipbuilding. While one might despair of measuring the 
balance of benefit of giving an extra £1m to nursery schools with an 
extra £1m to shipbuilding, one might reasonably hope for some co­
ordination between two very closely related expenditure proposals. If 
one judged the government’s resource allocation priorities by their 
expenditure outcomes one would be forced to the conclusion that the 
government accorded a very much higher priority to shipowners building 
abroad than it did to the British shipbuilding industry, since in the 
period 1966-70 it gave away in grants to foreign-controlled shipowners 
building ships in foreign yards substantially more than the SIB spent 
in both grants and loans on British shipbuilding. This bizarre 
outcome was not, of course, the result of prior intention, but was a 
consequence of fragmented decision-making, faulty initial programme
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design, and a palliative approach to dealing with the problem once 
it became apparent*
5.6 SHIPBUILDING AND REGIONAL POLICY
All of the shipyards which received substantial aid from the SIB were
in development areas, and in addition to special shipbuilding
assistance were eligible for various kinds of regional assistance,
including investment grants and regional employment premium (REP).
Not all shipyards were in development areas, however, and those
outside felt themselves disadvantaged in securing orders at profitable
prices, particularly after the introduction of REP in September 1967.
Firms outside the development areas were generally much smaller than
those inside (with the exception of Vosper Thornycroft), and altogether
accounted for only '\Q% of manual labour employed in shipbuilding.
The government's own estimate of the advantage in shipbuilding costs
resulting from REP and selective employment tax premium was about 2%
83on average of the total cost of a ship. The SRNA asked the 
government to pay REP to all shipbuilding, shiprepairing and marine 
engineering firms regardless of geographical situation, but the 
government refused. In December 1967 a deputation of Labour MPs 
lobbied fir. Benn on behalf of the shipyards outside the development 
areas and ten of the companies joined in a campaign for equality of 
treatment with development area yards. The government's response was 
to advise the shipbuilders to submit evidence to the Hunt Committee, 
which was considering the problems of the intermediate or 'gray' areas.
When the Hunt Committee reported in April 1969, it recognised that 
the problems of the shipbuilding and shiprepairing industries as 
presented to it 'constituted a striking example of the discriminatory
83. HC Deb., 1 December 1967, written answers cols. 192-3.
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effects of the present development area package1. However, the
committee pointed out that there were other industries similarly
affected and did not consider that a case had been made for treating
shipbuilding and shiprepairing differently from other industries, or
for special measures of assistance for the areas outside the
development areas. Many of the small shipyards did happen to fall in
the new intermediate areas designated following the Hunt Report, but
the assistance given to these areas did not include the all-important
REP. Both the SRNA and individual shipbuilders reacted bitterly to
85the report's recommendations.
The government'8 refusal to extend REP to non-development-area 
shipbuilders provides further evidence about the relative importance 
of sectoral and locational considerations in determining government 
policy. Had sectoral considerations been the only consideration the 
government might well have been inclined to assist all shipbuilders 
equally. However, government assistance to shipbuilding has clearly 
been influenced by two locational characteristics which most of the 
non-development-area yards did not fulfil; (1) aid was concentrated 
on large shipyards where shipbuilding employment constituted a large 
proportion of the local community and constituency; (2) these large 
yards were in areas of high unemployment.
5.7 ASSESSING GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT 1967-70
5.7.1 Analysing the financial assistance
Although the SIB continued to exist until the end of 1971, its useful 
life was already coming to an end by mid-1970, since, as we saw in 
section 5.3.4, it had almost run out of funds to allocate for grants.
84. Cmnd 3998, paras. 123-8.
85. Times. 26 April 1969.
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The change of government in Dune 1970 therefore provides a useful 
end date for analysing at aggregate level the government assistance 
to individual yards considered in this chapter. Table 5.3 shows SIB 
payments to firms by category and year. These sums exclude the 
finance provided by the government, the IRC and the Northern Ireland 
government to DCS, Cammell Laird and Harland and Wolff, which during 
the lifetime of the SIB amounted to more than the total SIB assistance 
(assistance to these firms after mid 1970 is considered in chapter 6).
The industry also received assistance in the form of a rebate of 
indirect taxes (shipbuilders’ relief) and the exemption of supplies 
from import duty; from the time of its introduction in the autumn of
p c
1966 to May 1971, about £16m was paid out in shipbuilders’ relief.
Shipyards in development areas were also eligible for various general
regional grants (though these probably did not amount to more than
about £3m in the period 1967-71) and for REP and refunds of Selective
Employment Tax (SET) which together amounted to about £28m in the 
87period 1967—71.
The most obvious point illustrated by table 5.3 is that while 
nearly all the £20m available in grants was distributed, only two- 
thirds of the amount available in loans was taken up. Further, as we
have seen above, the SIB had almost run out of funds to allocate for
grants eighteen months before it was wound up. It should be recalled 
that the £20m available in grants compared with the Geddes recommendation 
of £5m for transitional losses only, but that the £32.5m in loans was 
the same as the total recommended by Geddes. The main reasons for
86. Denton et al.. 1975, p.174.
87. Denton et al.. 1975, p.178-9. However, in attempting to
calculate the subsidy rate for each shipbuilding firm, Denton 
et al. make serious errors in allocating REP/SET to individual 
firms. These and other.errors in their calculations of 
subsidies are analysed in the appendix to this chapter.
Table 5-3 SIB payments to shipbuilders 1968-71 (£OCCs)
S e c t io n  3 g ra n ts S e c tio n  5  in te re s t r e l ie f  g ra n ts S ec tio n  4  ( lo a n s) S ec tio n  2
C o m p a n y
3 i S 1969 1970 1971 1971 T o ta l 1968 1969 1970 1971 1971 T o ta l 1968 1969 1970 1971 1971 T o ta l
fees
1968
cq u it v 
1970
T o ta l
A p p lc d o rc — — — — 34.9 34 .9  - — — — — — — — — 250.0 SI 4 .0 1064.0 — — 1098.9
A u s tin  & P ic k e rsg iil — — — — —  . —  — — — — — —  ' — — — — — — — —
C a m in c ll L a ird — . — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — - - — —
D o  x fo rd — — — — — —  ' — — — — — —r — — — — — - 12.6 — 12.6
G o v a n /U C S — 2200.0 3300 .0 — — 5500 .0  — 219.5 265 .9 265.3 — 750.7 3250.0 270 .0 — — — 3520.0 20.8 3000 .0 12791.5
I l a i l a n j  & W o lf f - IL L S 1150.3 4239 .0 275 .4 5778.5  — 71.6 511 .7 676.3 — 1259.6 — 5000.0 3000.0 — — 8000.0 — 15038.1
R o b b  C a le d o n — — — — 104.0 104.0 — — — — *■----- ' — — — 200.0 200.0 — 400.0 10.0 — 514.0
S co n  L ith g o w — — — 752.8 647 .2 1400.0 — — 5.5 31.3 36.8 — — — 2128.6 1671.4 3800.0 8.9 — 5 245 .7
S w an  H u n te r — 2S 65.5 1222.5 552.0 1176.0 5816.0  — — — — — — — — — — — — 22 2 — 5N3K.2
V ickers — — — — 10.3 10.3 - — ' — - — — — — — — — — — .. . 10.3
V o sp cr — — — S9.0 S9.0 — ' — — — — — — — — — •— 9.8 98 .8
Y a rro w - — — - - 153.2 153.2 — 2 0 .6 S0.8 96.3 — 197.7 250.0 665 .0 270.0 — — 1185.0 37.4 1573.3
D ry  p o o l — — - — 15.8 15.8 - — — — — — ■ — — 150.0 — 334.0 484.0 — — 4 9 9 .8
D u n s to n —  " — — 7.6 7.6  - — — — — — — — ~ — - - * 7 6
l la l l  R . — — — — 11.0 11.0 —  • — — — — -- • — — — - 11.0
Holmes — — — — — —  — — — —  *' — — — — — — S5.2 s s : 85.2
R y to n — — — — — _ — — — — — — -- 100.0 100.0 iM .O
T o ta l — 5179 .3 5672.X 5632.X 2435 .4 18920.3 311.7 858 .4 1043.4 31.3 2244.8 3500.0 -5935 .0 3620.0 257S.6 .*004 18**38.2 ¡21 .7 3000.0 4 2 9 2 5 .0
Source: Booz-Allen Report, 1973, exhibit 73, p.l80.
Notes: Excludes payments to marine engine builders.
Years denote financial years. ro
220
the failure to take up all the loans were the reluctance of the 
shipbuilding companies to pay the high rates of interest (by the 
end of the SIB’s life considerably higher than at the time of the 
Geddes Report), and their anxiety about their future cash position 
when the loans had to be repaid. The Geddes Report had partly 
forseen these worries, and had recommended that the SIB should be 
empowered not to charge interest in the first three years. The 
Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967 had included a provision in section 5 
for grants for the remission of interest, but only to the end of 
1970. Because 1967 was a bad year for orders and because of delays 
in coming forward with suitable projects, the industry did not benefit 
much from the remission of interest. This is reflected in the 
pattern of section 5 payments over time shown in table 5.3.
We can also compare the details of the uses to which SIB money 
was put (table 5.4) with the Geddes recommendations (table 5.5). On 
the grants side, we can see that, apart from the total sum involved 
being four times larger than that recommended by Geddes, the range of 
purposes for which grants were given was considerably wider than the 
contribution to transitional losses proposed by Geddes.
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Table 5.4 The purposes for which the SIB money bias spent
Purpose of grants £000 Purpose of loans £000
Entry into new markets for Acquisition of shares
new types of ships 4,875 for grouping 1,550
Reorganisation, modernisation Working capital 3,100
and disruption costs 3,995 Capital equipment
Welfare amenities 406 and reorganisation
Special assistance to Swan of resources 13,988
Hunter towards buying Furness 1,000 Total loans 18,638
General purposes: UCS 5,425 £3m shares in UCS 3,000
Harland 4 W. 3,500
Total £19,2011 Total loar» 4 equity £21,638
Source: HC 316, Session 1971-2.
Note 1: Includes grants to marine engine builders of £281,000.
Table 5.5 Purposes of assistance recommended by the Geddes Report1
Purpose of grants £000 Purpose of loans £000
Contribution to transitional
losses 5,000 Towards buying an 
interest in a 
participant in a 
grouping scheme 5,000
Working capital 
(including realisation 
scheme) 12,000
Rearrangement of 
facilities and 
capital projects 15,000
Total grants £5,000 Total loans £32,500
Source: Geddes Report (Cmnd 2937),pp.147-8. For details see section
4.4.3.
Note 1: All figures are maxima.
2 2 2
On the loans side, the total amount lent for working capital,
£3.1m compared to the Geddes maximum of £12.5m, seems surprisingly low 
at first sight since many shipbuilding firms were chronically short of 
working capital throughout the lifetime of the SIB. However, the SIB 
was constrained by commercial considerations in making these loans, 
however widely these may sometimes have been interpreted. The figure 
of £3.1m is in any case misleading. Because the distinction between 
working capital and compensation for losses turned out in practice to 
be a fine one, the £3.1m should be considered together with the £3m 
taken in shares in UCS and the nearly £9m given in grants for 'general 
purposes' to UCS and Harland and Wolff. To this should be added the 
aid to Harland and Wolff from the Northern Ireland government in 1966 
and 1971, the £7m given directly to UCS by the government in 1970, and 
the aid given by the IRC and the government to Cammell Laird in 1970-1, 
which together add up to substantially more than the amount allowed for 
working capital by Geddes.
The £14m lent for capital equipment and reorganisation is very 
close to the £15m maximum recommended by Geddes, but this is misleading, 
since most of the money (£8m) was lent to Harland and Wolff (an ungrouped 
yard) for the construction of a new building dock. Of the remainder 
of the £14m lent by the SIB under this heading, over £1m each went to 
Appledofe (then an ungrouped yard) and Yarrow (originally in UCS, but 
left the group early in 1971) towards the cost of covered building 
yards. The Geddes Report had not envisaged 'new yards or the 
complete reconstruction of existing yards', and limited the amount 
available for capital investment in ungrouped yards to £2m out of the
QQtotal. Comparisons of the Geddes proposals with the figures for the 
money actually spent therefore have two implications* the Geddas
88 Cmnd 2937, paras. 551, 558
Committee underestimated the need for extensive rebuilding of yards, 
and the amount spent by grouped yards on capital projects was well 
below that estimated as desirable by Geddes.
More significant than whether various categories of assistance 
conformed closely to the Geddes recommendations is whether the 
assistance achieved the desired results* The verdict of the Public 
Accounts Committee was that 'many millions of pounds of public funds 
provided for distribution to the shipbuilding industry through the 
SIB have been spent for purposes which had little to do directly with 
improving the industry's ability to compete in world markets'. As 
we saw in sections 5,2 and 5.3, much of the money spent by the SIB and 
all of the money put in by the government directly is best described 
as contributing to rescue operations rather than the industry's ability 
to compete without continuing subsidy. The consequence of this, as 
will be shown in chapter 6, was that the government continued to pour 
sizeable sums of money into the shipbuilding industry in order to 
prevent large-scale closures.
Clearly, this analysis of financial assistance to shipbuilding is 
concerned both with non-implementation and with implementation failing 
to have the desired results (see section 1.5). A number of the Geddes 
proposals relating to financial assistance were never fully implemented 
the total available in loans was not taken up. This illustrates the 
point that the implementation even of proposals directed at the 
government (leaving aside for the moment the implementation of 
proposals directed at others or whether implementation had the desired 
effects) may require actions on the part of non-governmental actors 
where the probability of all the necessary actions being performed is
89 HC 447, Session 1971-2, para.13
significantly less than unity - even if these actions involve the 
acceptance of government money. (in fairness to Geddes, it should 
be noted that the figures he proposed were maxima rather than targets, 
though these maxima were based on what was thought necessary for full 
reorganisation). Parallel with this failure to implement all the 
original proposals was the expenditure of additional sums in other 
ways - both the extra SIB grants and the money put in by the 
government directly. This points to both an initial failure to 
analyse the conditions necessary for the acceptance of assistance and 
the changing circumstances since the proposals had been drawn up.
In addition to implementation being only partial, even this 
partial implementation failed to have the effects desired. Neither 
groupings nor much of what capital expenditure did take place produced 
the full amount of extra competitiveness hoped for. This was due in 
part to overoptimism about the differences which mergers or new 
facilities could make, but it was also because to a considerable extent 
the desired effects of government-assisted changes were contingent on 
actions by management and workers in the shipyards and to the right 
economic conditions prevailing. Thus, to point to the way in which 
public funds were spent without placing them in the context of the 
circumstances in which the SIB had to operate would be to imply a 
degree of incompetence on the part of the SIB which would not be 
correct. Analysis of the failure of government policy requires other 
considerations to be taken into account, and this will be undertaken 
in the remainder of this chapter.
5.7.2 SIB*s other activities
Public attention was focussed on SIB*s role in promoting mergers in 
the shipbuilding industry and providing large-scale financial
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assistance, but the SIB also carried on a number of other activities to 
promote the competitiveness of the industry. Some of these were 
really prerequisites of the regeneration of the industry which the 
SIB was trying to achieve, such as the work of a group of shipbuilding 
finance directors formed in 1968 to consider ways to improve the 
standard of cost accounting and managerial reporting in the ship­
building industry in the UK. The eventual outcome of the review was 
a manual, Accounting and Reporting for Managers in Shipbuilding, 
published by the SIB in 1971. This could be regarded as a 'horse 
after the cart' activity, because only if the standardised procedures 
outlined in the manual had been put into practice could full benefit 
have been obtained from the grouping schemes and the SIB assistance 
(see also section 8.5.2).
The Geddes Report had recommended more market research by the 
shipbuilding industry and the building up of strong sales departments 
in all companies. The SIB gave support to the Marine Transport 
Research Section formed by the SRNA in April 1968 to carry out market 
research and commissioned Professor Roland Smith of the University of 
Manchester Institute of Science and Technology to advise it on the 
theory, method and organisation of marketing as applied to the 
shipbuilding industry. After visits to the main shipyards and 
discussions with their senior executives, Professor Smith submitted 
to the SIB a report which examined marketing procedures and suggested 
improvements. The SIB subsequently circulated the report to 
representative organisations in the industry in the belief that the 
adoption of the recommendations in the report would be of general 
benefit to the industry.
In some of its promotional activities the SIB worked through the 
Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Council (SB&SRC), which replaced the
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Shipbuilding Advisory Committee. The SBSRC consisted of the members 
of the SIB, six representatives each from management and unions in 
shipbuilding, and a representative each from shiprepairing,flflarine 
engineering, marine equipment, BSRA and the Ministry of Technology.
The chairman of the SIB took the chair of the SBSRC. Although the 
SBSRC's formal function was as a forum for consultation between the 
SIB and the shipbuilding industry, the SIB also used the SBSRC as an 
indirect channel to the government when it shared with both sides of 
the industry concern over an issue such as the increases in *teel 
prices in 1971. A number of the SIB's publications, such as Safety. 
Health and Welfare in the Shipbuilding Industry, were commissioned by 
the SBSRC.
More difficult to assess is the SIB's general effect as an 
external stimulus to a traditionally inward-looking industry. The 
role of the chairman, with his personal experience in other engineering 
industries, was particularly important. Sir William Swallow was not 
afraid to tell those in the industry what improvements he thought were 
necessary. The SIB's promotional activities were not, of course, 
sharply divided from its role as a provider of financial assistance.
Sir William's own assessment six months before the end of the SIB's life 
was that 'The SIB can claim to have strongly influenced improvements 
in cost accounting, budgeting, cash forecasting and marketing, partly 
by consultation and partly by pertinent questioning when seeking
90supporting information for loan applications and credit guarantees'.
Although they may not have produced spectacular effects, the 
money and effort put into the SIB's promotional activities certainly 
produced better returns th»n the far more expensive assistance provided
90 S&SR, 9 Duly 1971
in grants and loans. Although the role of paragovernmental agencies 
is criticised elsewhere in this study (section 9.3), there does seem 
to be a case for a body dealing with this type of involvement.
However, in a situation of continuous change there seems to be no 
logical reason why such an agency should have a limited lifetime.
This need could be fulfilled by an expanded independent staff for the 
shipbuilding NEDC (which replaced the SBSRC after a delay) under a 
head who has made a reputation of his own in an industry other than 
shipbuilding,
5,7,3 Industrial relations and performance
Despite the differences between recommendation and outcome described 
in section 5,7.1, it is relatively easy to spend money in specific 
ways compared to the difficulty of improving industrial relations and 
day-to-day performance in the yards. Further, it is easier to secure 
formal agreements about the improvement of industrial relations than 
it is to alter the behaviour of those on whom the improvement depends. 
Some progress was made towards the implementation of the Geddes 
recommendations on industrial relations with the formation of a Doint 
Industry Consultative Committee in 1966, an agreement between the 
SRNA and the CSEU in 1967 on a National Procedure for the Avoidance of 
Disputes, and an agreement between the SRNA and the trade unions 
affiliated to CSEU in 1969 on a National Demarcation Procedure. Less 
progress was made on other recommendations: productivity bargaining 
failed to live up to expectations (see section 5.3.1); no progress 
was made towards reducing the number of unions in the industry; the 
number of industrial disputes increased, though this was a trend not 
confined to shipbuilding.
In September 1969 the government told unions and employers that 
it proposed to refer shipbuilding and shiprepairing to the new Commission
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on Industrial Relations (CIR) as its first industry-wide reference.
The SIB, through the SBSRC, joined with the employers and trade
unions in objecting initially to the necessity for the reference,
sharing the view that industrial relations had improved in recent
years. However, the government went ahead with the formal reference
in Oanuary 1970. The CIR was asked to examins industrial relations
since the Geddes Report, particularly the 1967 disputes procedure
agreement and the 1969 demarcation procedure agreement and to assist
in promoting any further improvements that appeared necessary. In
March 1970 the CSEU decided to give the enquiry its full backing.
This reversal of attitude was made for explicitly partisan political
reasons; Mr. Dan McGarvey, the boilermakers' leader and chairman of
the CSEU shipbuilding committee, said:
•One of the things which swayed the executive in its decision is
that, whether we like it or not, we are in the 12-months
election period ... hJe want to see the Labour Party returned
to power and we think that a favourable report from the CIR will
91help. I see nothing wrong with that.'
However, the CIR Report did not appear before the 1970 General
Election. A preliminary report was ready by Oanuary 1971 and was
circulated to unions and employers, but the final report was not
92published until August 1971. The report drew attention to two 
features of industrial relations in the industry*
1. The comparative narrowness of the area subject to joint 
determination by negotiation and consultation and the wide areas of 
common concern that were subject to independent control by one side or 
the other.
. Times, 13 March 1970.91
92 Cmnd 4756
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2. Interwoven with the prevalence of independent action was
sectionalism - the extent to which action on the workers' side was
frequently confined to the individual union or work group*
The general finding of the report was that, while progress had been
achieved since Geddes, the practices of independent action and
sectional behaviour had combined to prevent measures of reform that
had taken place from achieving full success. Since most of the
report's recommendations were for action by unions and employers, and
neither accepted the report, it was effectively shelved.
Thus poor industrial practices had the effect of minimising the
impact of government assistance in promoting the ability of the
industry to compete without continuing subsidies. However, government
assistance can itself have an adverse effect on industrial
performance in some circumstances. The CIR Report accepted that
government support had improved the prospects for stability and
security of employment but argued:
'At the same time there are grounds for believing that financial
assistance has in some cases had an adverse effect on industrial
relations by encouraging the belief that Government support
would always be forthcoming whatever difficulties the companies
got into and thus diminishing the incentive for reform and for
realistic settlements. So that whilst the fact of financial
assistance has been beneficial to the companies concerned and
those employed in them, the manner of its provision, and the
assumptions engendered in those receiving it, may have militated
against the achievement of necessary changes. In no such cases
was the provision of aid made conditional upon any changes in
93the conduct of industrial relations'.
93 Cmnd 4756, paras. 404
f }
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The shipbuilding workers were generally correct in their assumption 
that the government would continue to bail them out despite earlier 
protestations to the contrary. The belief in open-ended government 
support also explains much of the bitter reaction when the Conservative 
government allowed UCS to go into liquidation in June 1971 (see 
section 6.3). The government approach to shipbuilding assistance 
contained a basic flew in its failure to take account of the relations 
between performance in the yards and the type of assistance given.
While shipbuilding companies were provided with the finance which 
might have enabled them to improve performance, workers frequently had 
little incentive to cooperate in operating new equipment or removing 
restrictive practices. Because of sectionalism the winning of the 
right to operate a new piece of equipment by one trade might be seen 
as the loss of potential employment by another. Where redundancies 
were called for the workers were unloaded onto the normal labour 
market, which was frequently unable to cope. At the same time, the 
government itself removed the main sanction against non-cooperation - 
mass unemployment following collapse of the company. This is not to 
argue that there was no cooperation and no improvement in performance; 
the point is that the improvements required were very substantial and 
could only have been achieved by an appropriate mixture of incentives 
and sanctions in which the government would have had to be directly 
involved - for example, by providing specific alternative employment 
in step with proposed redundancies. These generalisations do not, 
of course, apply equally to all UK shipbuilders, but mainly to those 
which have continuously received government assistance. The motto 
of the government appears to have been ’To them that have received 
shall be given'.
5«7.4 The reasons for failure
Failure was simply inevitable. The successful achievement 
within a period of five years of a shipbuilding industry able to 
compete without further assistance would have required the existence 
of a set of circumstances many of which would have been unlikely 
individually and which in combination were virtually impossible.
Failure resulted partly from design faults in the government's approach, 
which have been touched on at various points in this chapter, and 
partly because of unforeseen economic developments affecting ship­
building.
The economic conditions under which the SIB had to operate were 
much more difficult than those expected when Parliament passed the 
Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967. The main cause of the shipbuilders' 
losses was the effect of inflation on costs on contracts taken at 
fixed prices. Inflation hits particularly hard those industries such 
as shipbuilding (or Rolls Royce and the RB211) where there is a long 
lag between signing of contract and delivery^ but the causes of 
inflation do not lie within the individual industry - though measures 
such as improving turnover can mitigate its effects. On the other 
hand, many of the loss-making orders were obtained during the order 
boom following the closing of the Suez Canal and the 1967 sterling 
devaluation - the latter a decision taken on general economic grounds. 
Thus the results of government policy to deal with the problems of a 
particular industry can depend to a very large extent on the general 
economic environment in which the industry operates, which is in turn 
affected by decisions which the national government takes.
This environment in which the industry operates is not, of course, 
purely a national one. The surge of orders in the late 1960s was a 
worldwide phenomenon in which the UK shared less than most. On the
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supply side Britain's competitors are naturally trying to improve their
own sales. The Booz-Allen Report found that sales revenue per employee
in some European companies increased at a much higher rate than for
94UK merchant shipbuilders in the period 1967-71. Major European 
companies undertook a higher level of capital expenditure compared to 
UK merchant shipbuilders though the advantage of this was largely 
offset by higher labour costs. Thus in seeking to promote the 
competitive ability of the UK industry the British government was not 
aiming at a fixed target but at a continuously receding threshold over 
which its control was effectively nil.
Higher hopes might be held of the government's ability to promote 
improvements in the performance of the UK industry to meet this 
challenge. However, as the Geddes Report recognised, many of these 
improvements could only come about as a result of decisions by 
management and unions which the government could seek to influence but 
did not have, or was not willing to use, sanctions to impose.
Section 5.7.3 showed just how difficult it is to obtain desired levels 
of performance in this way. Differences in the government's approach 
might have led to improvements in performance greater than those that 
actually took place, but it would have been remarkable if the 
improvements were sufficient to ensure that all parts of the UK 
industry were in future able to compete . without further subsidy.
From the point of view of the agency set up to promote 
competitiveness, it had to operate in a changing environment over 
which it had virtually no control, but had a fixed sum of money to 
distribute on fixed conditions within a relatively short time period. 
What looked like a commendably strategic approach at the policy
94 Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.220
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formulation stage had become by the implementation stage a recipe 
for impotence. The government did, after all, have to adopt a 
'tactical' ad hoc approach which fell outside the capabilities of the 
strategic approach. In terms of flexibility of funds and the range 
of problems it could tackle the IRC might well have proved a more 
suitable vehicle for government assistance than a single-sector fixed­
lifetime agency.
However, this would not have avoided an even more significant 
issue — implementation is not merely a matter of optimum administrat­
ive arrangements, it is a fundamentally political process. Ship­
building was not removed from the political agenda simply because 
legislation had been passed and an agency set up to dispense funds. 
Politicians could not be seen to be unconcerned either about the way 
public funds were spent or about the fate of the jobs of thousands of 
workers. During the second reading debate on the Shipbuilding 
Industry Bill 1967 fir. Benn asked for a 'self-denying doctrine of 
non-intervention' and said that he was 'anxious that in the months 
ahead I shall not be drawn by hon. members or others into too much
comment on the detailed arrangements and negotiations in which the
95Board will be involved with the individual yards'. Yet, as we have 
seen (section 5.3.2), Mr. Benn himself became closely involved in 
receiving representations over UCS even before the SIB had refused 
to put in any more money.
The experience of shipbuilding policy in the late 1960s shows 
the impossibility of keeping politics 'at arms length' in implementing 
industrial policy, because the choices which have to be made are 
political ones. At the end of chapter 4 it was suggested that the
95 HC Deb.. 9 March 1967, col. 1786.
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Geddes approach suffered as a consequence of the separation of policy 
formulation from implementation. This chapter has confirmed that 
problems arose in practice as a result of this separation and has 
also shown the difficulties which governments are likely to meet in 
attempting to separate implementation from political responsibility.
APPENDIX
ERRORS IN CALCULATING SUBSIDIES BY DENTON ET AL.. 1975.
While the final version of the present work was being completed a
book on the trade effects of public subsidies to private enterprise
96by Denton, 0'Cleireachin and Ash became available. This study
analyses public assistance to British shipbuilding in the period
1967-71 as one of two case studies (the other is of the development
of the British aluminium industry). Although the authors' concern
as economists is with the trade effects, their attempt to calculate
subsidies is of obvious relevance to the present chapter. In
particular, they attempt to calculate a subsidy rate for each major
merchant shipbuilding firm as a percentage of total revenue from
sales, based on SIB assistance, shipbuilders' relief, ad hoc state
97assistance and benefit from SET and REP.
However, their calculations contain a number of errors which in 
the opinion of the present writer render the final figures meaning­
less, if not misleading. The most serious error relates to the 
calculation of the benefit derived from REP and SET by individual 
firms. The authors' state that 'Total employment in the industry has 
remained very stable since the mid-1960s and, in the absence of further
96. Denton et al.t 1975.
97. Denton et al.. 1975, pp.184-5, table 21.
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information it is assumed that fluctuations in the number of employees 
r  t 98in industrial LsicJ firms were also minimal*. In fact there is
evidence of substantial fluctuations in two of the basic reports on
the industry, the Geddes Report and the Booz-Allen Report, which
99Denton et al. refer to elsewhere in their book. Since Denton 
at al. use 1972 employment figures for each firm to calculate REP/SET 
for the period 1967-71 the effect is to exaggerate the subsidy paid 
to a firm like Scott Lithgow, which expanded its workforce during the 
period, and to underestimate the subsidy to firms like UCS, whose 
workforce contracted. Since the benefit from REP/SET constitutes the 
bulk of the subsidy for a number of yards, the effect of this error 
on the final figures is very serious.
Other points of relevance to the figures calculated by Denton 
et al. are:
1. They state that Appledofe received SET refund only, and not REP, 
since it is not in a Development Area. In fact the yard was in a 
development area throughout the period (and still is), so the effect 
is to underestimate the subsidy paid to Appledoje.
2. Although this is not mentioned, Yarrow is not included under UCS 
or listed separately. Admittedly, Yarrow is a naval shipbuilder, 
but since it operated as a subsidiary of UCS for nearly all of the 
relevant period, the implications of this for calculating the subsidy 
rate should have been noted.
98. Denton et al.t 1975, p.183. The word 'industrial* must be a 
misprint for 'individual* if the sentence is to make sense.
99. Cmnd 2937, p.98, table 5; Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.160, 
exhibit 61. Hogwood, 1976a, pp.11-12 provides evidence of 
fluctuations on the Clyde. See also section 1.3.2.
In conclusion, apart from the misleading impression created 
by their figures, Denton et al. have assumed away what is arguably 
one of the most politically significant features of change in the 
shipbuilding industry — that it is not the national aggregate 
employment figures that matter but changes in location-specific 
employment. The lesson to be drawn from their mistakes is to beware 
of assuming that what is true at the aggregate level is also true at 
the individual level.
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CHAPTER 6
2 3 7
SHIPBUILDING UNDER THE CONSERVATIVES 1970-3
6.1 THE COMMITMENT TO NON-INTERVENTION
It is now part of political folk-lore that the Conservatives came 
into office in Dune 1970 with a general commitment to not intervening 
in industry, yet within two years had introduced a comprehensive system 
of government assistance. It is, however, worth exploring the 
precision of this commitment and the extent to which exceptions were 
built in from the start. This section examines how the party's 
commitment to non-intervention was expressed, in particular how it was 
seen as applying to shipbuilding, and analyses the extent to which the 
initial formulation of the approach contained the seeds of the political 
difficulties of implementing the approach in practice.
Although the Conservative Party in Opposition had supported the 
Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967 (though not the section enabling the SIB 
to take shareholdings), it took a more hostile attitude to the direct 
government assistance to UCS in December 1969. In the same month,
Mr. Nicholas Ridley, then an Opposition spokesman on technology, met 
Sir Eric Yarrow, and following this recommended to Sir Keith Joseph, 
the main Opposition spokesman on industry, that the best long-term 
solution to the problem of UCS was:
(a) to detach Yarrow from UCS and allow it to be independent prior to 
merging with Scott Lithgow or Vosper Thornycroftj
(b) for the government (Labour or Conservative) to bail out the rest 
of UCS - to write off its debts, sell off government shareholdings, 
close one or even two of its three yards, appoint a new chairman, and 
let it stand or fall on its own;
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(c) to work toward an eventual merger of Scott Lithgow, Yarrow and 
UCS. Mr. Ridley estimated that the employment effects of this would 
be about 1,000 net fewer jobs and saw the alternative as the 
continuation of huge losses, or the collapse of UCS and 13,000 
unemployed.
Following a subsequent meeting with Mr. Hepper and Mr. Douglas of 
UCS, Mr. Ridley changed his recommendations to:
(a) give no more public money to UCS;
(b) let Yarrow leave UCS if it still wanted to and facilitate its 
joining Scott Lithgow if it still wanted to;
(c) this would lead to the bankruptcy of UCS} a Conservative 
government could accept this, in which case Scott Lithgow could take 
over one or two of the yards - there would be a net loss of 1,500 jobs - 
or the government 'could put in a Government "Butcher" to cut up UCS 
and to sell (cheaply) to Lower Clyde, and others, the assets of UCS
to minimise upheaval and dislocation';
(d) after liquidation or reconstruction the government shareholding 
should be sold, even for a pittance.
These feats of instant policy formulation were not public policy
statements but private recommendations. The Guardian 'obtained'
1copies of the documents and published them on 6 May 1970. Mr. Davies
claimed at the beginning of August 1971, after the liquidation of UCS,
that he had heard of the 'Ridley Report' for the first time the previous
2month, and then through The Guardian. This indicates that 
recommendations formulated in Opposition were not transmitted to 
senior ministers who subsequently became responsible for the subject,
1, Guardian, 6 May 1970.
2 HC Deb,, 2 August 1971, cols. 1096-7
( * . Z
239
which must detract from the value of carrying out such exercises in 
Opposition in the first place. Mr. Ridley was himself a junior 
minister at the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), but he became 
less involved in shipbuilding matters following the collapse of UCS, 
and was dismissed in 1972.
In the same month as Mr. Ridley was making his first set of 
recommendations about UCS, Mr. David Price, Opposition front bench 
spokesman on science and technology, listed shipbuilding as one of six 
sectors for continuing government intervention under any future 
Conservative administration (the other five were civil aircraft, 
microelectronics, heavy electrical plant, cotton textiles and 
hovercraft). However, according to Peter Walker, Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry after 1972, industrial policy as such was not 
discussed at the famou* Selsdon Park conference of shadow ministers in
3
1970. The proposal to abolish the IRC was confirmed, but nothing was 
said about what should take its place.
The Conservative Party's 1970 election manifesto, A Better 
Tomorrow, took a generally negative attitude to government involvement 
in industry, though it did say that 'Special assistance for particular
4
industries like shipping will be continued'. In his speech to the 
Conservative Party's October 1970 Conference, Mr. Dohn Davies, the new 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, proclaimed that 'To abandon 
great sectors of our productive community at their moment of maximum 
weakness would be folly, but I will not bolster up or bale out companies 
where I can see no end to the process of propping them up*. He 
recognised that some industries, such as aircraft production were 
'going through a period of world-wide disarray and need a helping hand',
3. Peter Walker, interviewed in Open University programme: Decision­
making in Britain Course: Government and Industry Block: 'Events 
of 1972-Industrial Policy'. BBC Radio, 31 Duly 1976.
4, Conservative Central Office, 1970. For a general account of ths 
development of Conservative policy on disengagement, see Young with 
Lowe, 1974, chapter 11.
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but be would not accept involvement in an open-ended liability.5
The commitment to non—intervention was therefore qualified in its 
general application and ambiguous in the extent to which it was to be 
applied to the shipbuilding industry. Once it is conceded, as it was 
by the new Conservative government, that there are circumstances, such 
as 'unfair* international competition or strategic considerations, which 
can result in exceptions to the policy of non-intervention then the 
assumption is that each case will have to be considered on its merits. 
Thus a policy of non-intervention, even if precisely formulated, which 
the Conservative policy was not, requires a continuous set of choices 
not to intervene rather than simply a proclamation of general intent.
The fact that a general policy of non-intervention does not shelter the 
government from having to make detailed decisions does not appear to 
have been fully grasped by some of the minister* involved, even after 
the event. Thus Nicholas Ridley has said of the attitude of the 
Conservatives in 1970: 'So that was, I think, how we entered the 
election, with a conviction that the Labour government were wrong to 
bale out lame ducks, but without any sort of carefully worked out 
strategy. Indeed, one doesn't need a detailed policy if one holds 
those views'.6 In the absence of established criteria for exceptional 
treatment it was inevitable that the government would be affected by 
political pressures in individual cases. A general policy of non­
intervention cannot depoliticise the choices about individual firms 
which the government still has to make.
6.2 IMPLEMENTING NGN-INTERl/ENTION 
6.2.1 Introduction
Policy towards shipbuilding in the first year of the Conservative
5. Times, 9 October 1970.
6. Nicholas Ridley, interviewed in Open University programme: Decision­
making in Britain Course: Government and Industry Block: 'Uonpr* 
Clyde Shipbuilders'* BBC Television, 11 3uly 1976.
government seemed, in terms of declared policy, to be, if anything, 
a move towards the more general approach of non-intervention, and away 
from the special treatment for shipbuilding implied in some statements. 
However, in each of the two cases about which the government had to 
take decisions in its first few months of office it did in practice 
intervene by giving financial assistance. On assuming office, the 
Conservative government undertook a 'review* of the shipbuilding 
industry. No statement was made for some months, though the government 
did exercise its power under the Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967 to 
extend the life of the SIB for a year to the end of 1971. Before it 
did make its statement of policy on the shipbuilding as a whole, the 
government had already become involved in two yards.
6.2.2 UCS
The direct government loan to UCS of £7m announced in December 1969
merely postponed the time when the survival of the company was again in
doubt. According to Mr. Hepper, during the summer of 1970 the
company suffered labour disruptions, go-slows and general troubles
which resulted in a loss of budget*;«! income of about £5m, and in the
7autumn of 1970 the company became very worried about its viability.
8Indeed, in Duly 1970 the company was insolvent. On 14 October 1970,
nr. Mackenzie, the SIB director on the UCS board, told the then newly
formed Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) that he doubted whether
the company could be profitable in the long-term and therefore whether
git should continue trading. Following legal advice, the DTI decided 
not to authorise Section 7 guarantees on a number of ships to be built 
by UCS which had already received SIB recommendations. The reasons
7. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2110.
8. HC 447, Session 1971-2, p.418.
9. HC Deb., 15 Duly 1971, written answers cols. 157-8.
10. The relevant departmental minutes and correspondence are included 
in HC 447, Session 1971-2, pp.415-19,
for this decision were*
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(a) that there was no real prospect of the ship being completed and 
that to give a guarantee would not implement the policy of the 
Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967;
(b) the change in circumstances was so great that the existing SIB 
recommendation could not be regarded as still being in effect;
(c) to give a guarantee might be regarded as infringing Section 332 
of the Companies Act 1948 (this makes it a criminal offence to be 
knowingly a party to fraudulent trading - which includes continuing 
to trade and to incur debts when there is no reasonable prospect of 
the creditors ever receiving payment of those debts).
Subsequent discussion by civil servants made it seem doubtful whether 
the giving of a guarantee under a statutory scheme would infringe 
Section 332, which does not in any case apply to the Crown, but the DTI 
considered that point (a) alone would make the giving of guarantees 
illegal.
According to Mr. Hepper, the company discovered through its
11customers that the guarantees were not being signed up. On 27
November the UCS board met Mr. Nicholas Ridley, who had by then become
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Industry. Mr. Ridley told
Mr. Hepper that, until the government was satisfied about the future
viability of the company, new credit guarantees could not be issued to 
12shipowners. Three weeks later, Mr. Hepper gave Mr. Ridley a 
financial report which stated that in the opinion of the UCS board the 
company had a reasonable prospect of success and was justified in 
continuing to trade; the report included the assumption that there
11. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2111.
12. HC Deb., 15 Duly 1971, written answers cols. 157-9.
could be a capital reconstruction involving the writing down of 
loans. However, on 17 December Hr. John Davies told UCS board 
members that the financial statement had not sufficiently reassured 
the government about the company»s financial viability to enable it to 
resume issuing guarantees? there would have to be another £3m in the 
balance sheet. By 23 December members of the UCS board were able to 
report that some shipowner customers were prepared in principle to pay 
increased prices provided UCS indebtedness to the government was
substantially reduced. Mr. Davies agreed to consider some modification 
of the capital structure.
Over Christmas and New Year UCS managed to raise £2.75m from its 
customers. However, on 14 January Mr. Hepper told Mr. Davies that it 
would be wrong to accept contributions from shipowners until the 
separation of Yarrow (Shipbuilders) from UCS had been accomplished.
Yarrow had by this time announced that, in contrast to the profits 
earlier forecast, a loss of £4m was now envisaged. UCS therefore tried 
to negotiate with Yarrow to complete the agreement signed in the summer 
of 1970 to conclude the break between the two companies (see section 
5.3.2). UCS took legal advice and were told that the agreement was 
valid and would be upheld in the courts, but since time was short UCS 
was obliged to tell Mr. Davies that it could not make the break with 
Yarrow and therefore could not receive the money from its customers.
However, Mr. Davies met the chairman of Yarrow on 2 February and 
reached agreement about hiving-off arrangements. The following day 
Mr. Davies told Mr. Hepper of the agreement over Yarrow and also that 
credit guarantees would be resumed in two to three weeks. (The 
circumstances surrounding the break between UCS and Yarrow were the 
subject of a special report prepared by Professor Flint for the UCS 
creditors; at the time of writing in November 1976 this
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report was
still not published, but it is believed to be critical of the 
arrangements).
Mr. Davies was able to make a statement to the House of Commons
13about Yarrow (Shipbuilders) on 11 February. 'In view of the 
importance of Yarrow (Shipbuilders) for the present orders and future 
programme of the Royal Navy', the Ministry of Defence was to make a 
loan to Yarrow towards meeting the company's requirements for working 
capital (i.e. its anticipated losses). These requirements were 
estimated at the time to be a maximum of about £4^m over the next 
three years, an estimate which for once has turned out to be accurate. 
There was also to be a capital reconstruction of UCS, though details 
still had to be worked out. The government would agree to a
substantial writing down of equity and a writing down and conversion 
of fixed-interest state loans into a smaller equity holding. The aim 
would be to maintain a total public holding of 48% of the UCS voting 
equity, but with an increased dividend entitlement after the capital 
reconstruction. No new funds were to be provided to UCS.
The issuing of credit guarantees for UCS orders was resumed on 19 
February on completion of the arrangements for increased contributions 
from shipowners. The Commons statement by Mr. Davies on 11 February
had not mentioned the suspension of guarantees at all. The specialist
14press had got wind of the delays by January 1971, but MPs had no 
knowledge of the suspension, as was shown by the large number of 
parliamentary Questions on the subject put down following the liquidation 
of UCS. The suspension of guarantees itself made UCS’s cash flow more 
difficult, and had the suspension been general knowledge the difficulty 
would have been increased, since suppliers would have been unwilling to 
extend credit.
The finalising of arrangements to hive off Yarrow and resume 
credit guarantees occured at the same time as the decision to nationalise
13. HC Deb., 11 February 1971, cols. 808-12.
14. See Shipbuilding and Shipping, Record. 22 January 1971, p.4.
the aerospace parts of Rolls Royce. Had the government allowed UCS 
to go into liquidation at the same time it would have had two very 
contentious industrial issues to cope with at the same time, and its 
policy would have lost even more credibility. In providing aid to 
Yarrow, however, the government tried to play down the issues of industrial 
policy and emphasised the strategic value of Yarrow; this was 
underlined by channelling the aid through the Ministry of Defence 
rather than the DTI. The detailed account of this episode has amply 
illustrated the assertion made at the beginning of the chapter that 
a general commitment to non-intervention does not remove the need to 
examine the problems of each firm as they arise, nor insulate ministers 
from the need to take part in detailed negotiations about the future of 
individual companies.
6.2.3 Harland and Wolff
In December 1970 the Northern Ireland government announced an interim
rescue plan for the Harland and Wolff shipyard after it became clear
that even the losses expected the previous April, when the SIB allocated
a grant of £3.5m, would be greatly exceeded (see section 5.3.4). The
o f*
NI government was to take control for a maximum period^three months, 
during which it would guarantee overdraft facilities for the yard, and 
it appointed a director to the Harland and Wolff board and a financial 
controller. The interim period was to provide time for the 
consideration of four possible rescue plans. The NI government 
formulated proposals based on retention of control by the existing 
company, and at the end of April 1971 Sir 3ohn Eden, the UK Minister 
for Industry, announced that the UK government had accepted these 
proposals. Both governments warned Harland and Wolff that there would 
be no question of further financial aid being forthcoming from either of
them should the yard once again find itself in difficulties.
The offer of assistance as formulated and notified to Harland 
and Wolff in Dune 1971 included £4m for a 47.6$ NI government 
shareholding, the waiving of unpaid interest of £1.255m on the £3.5m 
loan made in 1966, and a grant to be determined by the NI ministry of 
Commerce in accordance with an assessment of actual and prospective 
losses by an accountant appointed by the Ministry. This grant was to 
be related to the expected increase in losses over the estimate of £10m 
made in October 1970 (itself an increase over the estimate made in 
April 1970), and estimates in Duly 1971 put this sum in the region of 
£2-3m. However, the final estimate given to the Ministry of Commerce 
in Danuary 1972 was about £14m; this sum was paid over to Harland and 
Wolff by October 1972. The Ministry of Commerce was later criticised 
by the UK Public Accounts Committee which felt that the Ministry 
should have ’informed themselves with greater certainty on the relevant
15matters’ before entering into the Dune 1971 commitment. The Committee 
also criticised the lack of any clawback provision in case losses were 
less than forecast, a criticism which became rather academic, as 
Harland and Wolff's losses continued to accumulate.
6.2o4 Statements of policy and policy in practice
Delay in announcing a definitive policy provoked criticism, since the
aid to Harland and Wolff and Yarrow caused confusion about the govern-
16ment’s intentions for the industry as a whole. The long-awaited 
policy statement was made during the second reading debate on the
15. HC 308, Session 1972-3, paras. 7-12.
16. See, for example, the Business News leader in The Times of
15 April 1971 on 'Politics and the Shipyards', which contained 
the prophetic remark that: 'If the Government believe that 
Britain should have a shipbuilding industry, it seems almost 
inevitable that before very long Whitehall will have to mount 
a financial rescue operation in another part of the industry'.
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Shipbuilding Industry Bill 1971, which raised the ceiling on credit 
guarantees for loans to shipowners from £400m to £700m.17 The previous 
government had introduced a Bill to raise the limit to £600m but this 
had been lost with the general election of 3une 1970, By the time 
the Conservative Bill could be introduced the sum required had increased 
further.
In introducing the Bill, Sir 3ohn Eden said that the government 
did not see a case for 'singling out the shipbuilding industry as the 
continued recipient of a special payout from the taxpayer which can only 
weaken morale and lessen the incentives on management and employees 
alike to learn to operate competitively in the world market'. However, 
since shipbuilding lacked the tariff protection enjoyed by other 
industries 'shipbuilders' relief', which was equivalent to 2% of the 
contract price of a ship, would be continued, as would the clawback of 
import duty on components. In addition, it had already been announced 
that there would be a relaxation of the rule about the import content of 
ships qualifying for credit guarantees so that shipbuilders could use 
imported steel where supplies could not be obtained on competitive terms 
from the domestic market - that is from British Steel, a nationalised 
industry. Apart from the home credit scheme with which the bill itself 
dealt, the government did not consider that there was any justification 
on economic grounds for further special assistance to the shipbuilding 
industry as such, apart from assistance available to all industries in 
development areas. The approval by the UK government of the 
proposals of the NI government for the future of Harland and UJolff were 
stated to be 'in line with the policy of giving the industry an 
opportunity to readjust', and the assistance to Yarrow was 6aid to be 
to safeguard the present orders and future programme of the Royal Navy,
17 HÇOeb,, 22 April 1971, cols, 1381-468
Sir John's statement about there being no further special 
assistance for shipbuilding was reiterated by Mr. John Davies in 
May 1971 on a visit to the Clyde for the opening of Yarrow's new 
covered yard - built with assistance from public fundsj He said that 
the time had almost come for shipbuilding to assume total responsibility 
for its own futures »Perhaps it may be felt that the recovery process 
is as yet too insecure to contemplate drawing away the props, but I do 
not believe that to be the case'.18 This was less than a month before 
the liquidation of UCSi
Thus if we take 'policy' to be the government's declared attitude 
we would conclude that the Conservative government was still committed 
to non-intervention. If, however, we take policy as what governments 
actually do, we find that in both the yards where the government had to 
take decisions it intervened on a fairly substantial scale. On both 
occasions the government declared that it would not be prepared to put 
any further funds into the companies concerned, but as we shall see 
below, in both cases the government did later go back on this stance.
The reconciliation between declared policy and policy in practice only 
came about by altering declared policy to fit in with what the 
government was doing in practice.
6.3 THE COLLAPSE OF UCS 
6.3.1 The final weeks
This section does not attempt to give a blow—by—blow account of the 
collapse of UCS and the subsequent events, culminating in massive 
government assistance to keep all four yards open. However, in the 
continued absence of a definitive account - indeed, because of the 
existence of general misconceptions about what did take place - it will
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18. Shipbuilding and Shipping Record. 21 flay 1971, p .3
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be necessary to outline the main developments. The history of UCS
up to Dune 1970 mas discussed in sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.2, and
developments in the first few months of the new Conservative
administration were outlined above in section 6.2.2.
Despite the government's concern about UCS over the winter months,
there was no further meeting between ministers and representatives of
the company after Mr. Hepper's meeting with Mr. Davies on 3 February
1971 until fir. Davies saw Hr. Hepper immediately prior to the company's
liquidation. However, the company continued to provide information to
the DTI, though there were delays in this information becoming
available. One of the main reasons why the government allowed UCS to
go into liquidation was its lack of confidence in the company's ability
to produce accurate and up-to-date information. On 5 flay 1971,
the accountants considering the capital reconstruction of UCS which had
been announced in February reported to fir. Davies that they were awaiting
essential information from the company to enable them to report 
20further. Two days later the UCS board commissioned new cash and 
profit forecasts and fir. Davies was notified that the reconstruction 
proposals were held up awaiting this new forecast. On 8 Dune UCS 
provided information on the position disclosed by this review; this 
showed that by August 1971 the company would have a net asset 
deficiency of £5-£m and that cash was available to pay wages only up 
to 18 Dune.
19. The fullest and most balanced account of UCS currently available 
is flcGill, 1972, by a Scottish journalist. For an account by 
another journalist, who was sympathetic to the 'work in', see 
Buchan, 1972, and for a Communist view see Thompson and Hart,
1972. The UCS 'work in' is also referred to in a number of 
other books and pamphlets too numerous to mention here. 20
20. HCDeb., 15 Duly 1971, written answers col. 159.
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On Wednesday, 9 Dune, Mr. Hepper met Mr. Davies and gave him
further details of the company's finances; Mr. Hepper indicated that
the company could be saved only by an immediate injection of £5m to
£6m, and this would have to be substantially in the form of equity or 
21
grant. Otherwise the unions would be told of the situation on the 
following day, and on the day after that, Friday, the company would 
petition for the appointment of a provisional liquidator. Mr. Davies 
asked Mr. Hepper to seek the UCS board's agreement to delay taking 
this action, even for a few days, so that the government could have more 
time to examine the position fully, and gave him an assurance that the 
government would guarantee the payment of wages for at least a further 
week. However, when Mr. Hepper saw Mr. Davies again on Sunday, 13 
Dune, he told him that it now seemed unlikely that funds were available 
even to pay the current week's wages and unless the required injection 
of funds could be guaranteed on the following day the UCS board felt 
it had no alternative but to petition for a provisional liquidator.
6.3.2 The liquidation announcement
On the following day, 14 Dune, Mr. Davies announced in the Commons the 
government's decision to allow UCS to go into liquidation.21 2 23 ThB UCS 
board had told him that they still had hopes of attaining viability in 
the future, but they were unable to forecast when the existing excess 
of liabilities over assets would be reversed. (The UCS liquidator 
estimated soon afterwards that there was an excess of total liabilities 
over estimated realisable assets of over £28m). The government had 
decided 'that nobody's interest will be served by making the injection
07of funds into the company as it now stands*.
21. HC Deb.. 14 Dune 1971, cols. 31-4.
22. HC Deb., 14 Dune 1971, cols. 31-4.
23. Emphasis added.
r'On the other hand', Mr. Davies went on, 'it is clearly right 
that without prejudice to the creditors' interests, the 
Government should seek to ensure the minimum dislocation of 
current production and the preservation of as much employment 
as possible and as many of those assets as can be expected to 
have a viable and prosperous future'.
He proposed to seek the liquidator's cooperation in bringing about a 
reconstruction and would consult him to determine what funds would be 
necessary to enable him in carrying out his role as liquidator to 
assist the government in its objectives. fir. Davies also proposed to 
appoint a small group of experts to assist him in considering the best 
action to achieve a reconstruction.
The government's decision met with an immediate outcry from Labour
MPs, who demanded a debate; the government agreed to an adjournment
. 24debate on the following day. Mr. Davies emerged from the debate very 
badly, since Mr. Benn pointed out that Mr. Davies had misquoted him on 
the previous day, implying that a statement Mr. Benn had made in 
December 1969 had been about UCS when it had in fact been about Beagle 
Aircraft.
In response to the liquidation announcement a campaign to save the 
yards quickly developed. Two days after Mr. Davies' statement in the 
Commons a trainload of shop stewards, councillors and trade unionists 
lobbied Parliament, and a delegation met Mr. Heath at Downing Street.
On Monday, 21 June, a delegation from the Scottish TUC met Mr. Heath 
and Mr. Daviesjon 23 June there was a strike of a large number of workers 
in Clydeside, and a march was held in Glasgow.
The SIB was still in existence at the time of the UCS liquidation,
24. HC Deb., 15 June 1971, cols. 233-362.
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but it uas by theft clearly a 'lame duck’ itself, u/ith only another six
months of formal existence left. The SIB had washed its hands of
UCS nearly two years earlier and in any case, had no money left to
give in grants. The UCS liquidation came as a surprise to the SIB
as much as to the government. In a draft of an article by
Sir William Swallow which appeared in the Shipbuilding and Shipping
Record on 9 July 1971 the underlined words in the following sentence
were scored out: 'Accordingly, some of the early loans were in the
nature of first aid rather than for long-term development, for
example, Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, which is now showing signs of
25recovering from a very difficult situation. Far from being in a 
position to provide advance warning to the government of problems in 
the shipbuilding industry, the SIB itself had an unrealistic picture 
of the state of one of the main companies in the industry.
To hold the position while it considered the possibilities of 
reconstructing shipbuilding on the upper Clyde, the government agreed 
at the end of June to provide funds to enable the liquidator to keep all 
the employees on the payroll until 6 August, at an estimated cost of 
£3m.
6.3.3 The report of the 'four wise men'
Initially three people were appointed to the 'small group of expert 
people' referred to by fir. Davies when he announced the government's 
decision to allow UCS to go into liquidation. They were 
Mr. Alexander McDonald, chairman of Distillers, Sir Alexander Glen 
from the shipping industry, and Mr. David McDonald, a director of 
Hill Samuel. To these was later added Lord Robens, and the group 
became generally known as the 'four wise men'.
25. Draft supplied by Sir William Swallow. The published version 
appeared in Shipbuilding and Shipping Record. 9 Duly 1971.
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The Report of the Advisory Group was published on 29 July 1971,26 27
The report was very short - only three pages - and it did not contain 
any detailed analysis. After listing causes and circumstances of the 
failure of UCS the report concluded that ‘any continuation of Upper 
Clyde shipbuilders in its present form would be wholly unjustified 
and, indeed, could cause serious and more widespread damage'. In 
their recommendations the members of the group said that they had 'tried 
to make judgements primarily on grounds of likely commercial viability 
both in the short and longer term, but in view of the Government's «hare 
of responsibility, we have also given weight to social considerations 
which we believe Government in this case must observe'. The group 
recommended:
( D  that an end should be made to UCS, while retaining legal and 
financial flexibility to help achieve other objectives;
(2) that a successor company should be established at Govan/Linthouse, 
and that Clydebank and Scotstoun should be disposed of as soon as 
possible by the liquidator;
(3 ) that the existing shipbuilding programme should be concentrated 
so far as practicable, and as urgently as possible, on the Govan yard;
(4 ) that every assistance should be given by the government and the 
local authorities in assisting redeployment of redundant workers.
An essential contribution to improved productivity at Govan would be a
commitment to accepting changes in working practices, including in due
course a change to two-shift daily working.
The government announced its acceptance of the conclusions of the
27advisory group on the same day as they were published.
26. HC 544, Session 1970-1, For a detailed rejection of the report 
by Mr. Hepper, see HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2122-4.
27. HC Deb., 29 Duly 1971, cols. 791-800.
' l 
2 5 4
If the conditions of first class management and of satisfactory 
undertakings by the unions about working conditions were met, the 
government believed that private capital should be forthcoming, 
particularly from Scottish sources, (in the end the government had 
to put in all the capital). The government would itself be ready to 
provide some of the initial capital. fir. Davies estimated that the 
new company would employ about 2,500; about another 1,000 should be 
able to find work with other shipbuilders on the Clyde and some might 
be retained in work by other interests acquiring UCS facilities from 
the liquidator. According to fir. Davies' estimate, only about 400 men 
would become redundant immediately, although others would do so at 
intervals as ships were completed. To ensure that meanwhile the 
liquidator had the necessary working capital, the government would allow 
him to retain the money already advanced. If further funds were needed 
then, provided that there had been satisfactory progress in fulfilling 
the conditions, further funds would be made available from the Consolidated 
Fund. A debate was held on this statement in the Commons on the 
following Monday, but this was overshadowed by events on the Clyde 
itself.
6.3.4 The myth of the 'work in'
In response to the government statement accepting the report of the 
advisory group, shipbuilding workers took effective control of the 
entrance gates at the Clydebank yard and held a mass meeting. News 
reporters were let in to the meeting. The joint shop stewards 
coordinating committee said that the management (i.e. the liquidator) 
had refused to allow a press conference, so they had 'taken over' the 
yard and let the press in as the first sign that they were the masters 
now. This action in admitting the press was more than merely symbolic:
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media coverage of the ’takeover' and ?work in' was extensive, vital
to the campaign to keep the yards open, and, in retrospect, rather
misleading. The Times headline on 31 duly was 'Workers seize control
28of shipyard on the Clyde'.
Dames Reid, the main spokesman of the coordinating committee, told
the mass meetings 'We are not going on strike, we are not even having
a sit in. We do not recognise that there should be any redundancies
29and we are going to "work-in".' The atmosphere of the 'work in',
the hagiography of its leaders, and the meetings, demonstrations and
30other support for it are described extensively elsewhere. The 
concern here is to assess the extent of the 'work in', what it 
'controlled' in practice, and how it influenced government decisions 
about the future of the yards.
Contrary to the general impression created at the time, the number 
of men actually 'working in' was relatively small, and at no time did 
the workers actually take on the responsibility for running the yards. 
In his report to creditors on the first year since UCS went into 
liquidation, the liquidator remarked:
'There has been widespread misconception of the nature and extent 
of the "UCS work in", often misquoted as a precedent for quite 
different industrial action of a totally obstructive or "sit in" 
nature. A number of creditors and others appear to have been 
given the impression that the whole operation of the shipyards 
has depended on the "work in", and that the complex legal, 
financial, technical and practical problems of building ships, 
the employment of a large number of employees, and the provision 28930
28. Times. 31 Duly 1971.
29. Buchan, 1972, p.14.
30. See Buchan, 1972; Thompson and Hart, 1972; McGill, 1973; and, 
with appropriate caution, the newspapers for the period.
of and payment for goods and services, has in some way been
31organised by committee'.
In fact, all such matters remained the responsibility of the liquidator.
Table 6.1 Estimate by UCS liquidator of approximate numbers involved 
in 'work in'.
Oate Total 'Uork in' no. expressed as %  of
No. retained in 
employment
No. made . 
redundant1
23 August 1971 121 1.5 69
6 September 1971 377 5.0 52
5 October 1971 390 5.2 48
2 November 1971 343 4.7 37
7 December 1971 263 3.7 27
6 Danuary 1972 265 3.7 26
1 February 1972 246 3.5 24
7 March 1972 237 3.4 21
4 April 1972 220 3.2 19
2 May 1972 191 2.8 16
6 Dune 1972 177 2.6 14
Sourest UCS (in Liquidation), 1972, appendix IV, p.18. The figures 
were taken from a weekly assessment of numbers prepared by 
management in connection with insurance cover, similar to 
employers' liability insurance cover, designed to protect 
the liquidator in the event of a claim arising from an accident 
caused by or to someone involved in the 'work in'.
Note;1. Number made redundant excludes normal retirements, those
leaving of their own accord, dismissals for misconduct, and 
deaths.
The liquidator's estimate of the numbers involved in the 'work in'
is shown in table 6.1. Dames Reid has accepted that there were never
32more than 400 workers actually »working in' at any time. The main
reason why the 'work in' numbers were fairly small was that the number 312
31. UCS (In Liquidation), 1972, p.11.
32. Dames Reid, interviewed in Open University programme: Systems 
Behaviour Course: 'Shipbuilding II'. BBC Television, 5 October 
1975.
made redundant turned out to be lower than seemed certain after the 
government statement based on the report of the ‘four wise men'.
This was largely a consequence of the government's willingness to 
provide funds to the liquidator while it explored ways of keeping the 
yards open. However, as can be seen from table 6.1, the proportion of 
those made redundant who stayed on at the yards steadily declined.
The amount of work actually done by those 'working in' has also been 
exaggerated. The liquidator has claimed that the original intention 
that those involved in the 'work in' should continue to work was 
observed for only a short time in most departments.33 An account 
sympathetic to the 'work in' states that 'when a work-in man and an 
employee of the Liquidator shared a job, the total amount would not 
exceed the amount expected from the employee'.34 This illustrated a 
basic weakness of the 'work in' concept! if the men who had been made 
redundant had oontinued to work they would have been working for the 
liquidator without being paid by him.
The control which the workforce as a whole exercised over the yards 
was in effect (l) a potential veto on the operation of the yards by 
the refusal to carry out specific tasks or by withdrawing labour - as 
any workforce can do in any company! (2) a potential (and on occasion 
actually exercised) veto on who could enter the yards; (3) a potential 
veto on the removal of any material from the yards. In practice, after 
initial mutual suspicions had been dissolved, the workforce and the 
liquidator found that they had a common interest in maintaining the 
yards in operation! the workforce because this maximised the numbers 
kept in employment, and the liquidator because he could maximise the
33. UCS (In Liquidation), 1972, p . 1 1 .
34. Thompson and Hart, 1972, p.60.
funds available for distribution to creditors if he could sell the 
yards as going concerns rather than at their break-up value. The 
objectives of both could be met if the government continued to give 
funds to the liquidator to keep men surplus to the liquidator's 
requirements employed while possible ways of keeping the yards open 
were explored. (The ordinary creditors of UCS have never been repaid 
the £7.6m they were owed. The government has refused to accept a 
moral or legal obligation to repay UCS's debts. Despite an earlier 
rebuff, it was proposed in October 1976 to refer the matter again to 
the Ombudsman).
Mistaken impressions about the nature of the 'work in' persist,
even in reputable academic circles; for example, an Open University
programme on UCS stated without qualification that 'on Duly 30th the
35workers took control of the yards'. This persistence of mis­
conceptions about what happened at UCS justifies Sykes' description of
the UCS 'work in' as*the most successful experiment in myth-building of
36recent years.' To reject the mythological aspects of the 'work in'
as representing a truthful description of what occurred is not to deny
its political effectiveness. The government, although expecting a
militant reaction, particularly from Clydebank, had not foreseen the
37form it would take. The campaign associated with the 'work in' had 
an important influence on the government's willingness to make interim 3567
35. Open University programme: Decision-making in Britain Course: 
Government and Industry Block: 'Upper Clyde Shipbuilders'.
BBC Television, 11 Duly 1976. This statement is in contrast to 
the well-balanced presentation of the UCS 'work in' in another 
Open University programme: Systems Behaviour Course: 'Shiobuildinn 
II'. BBC Television, 5 October 1975. y
36. Sykes, 1973, p.7.
37. John Oavies, interviewed in Open University programme: Decision­
making in Britain Course: Government and Industry Block:
'Upper Clyde Shipbuilders'. BBC Television, 1 1 3uly 1976.
payments to the liquidator and ultimately to include an extra yard 
in the government-owned successor to UCS. Indirectly, the campaign 
contributed to the general reappraisal of industrial policy which
followed the UCS debacle.
6.3.5 The government retreats
On 23 September 1971 it was announced that the vehicle for government
support for the UCS yards would be Govan Shipbuilders, with Hugh
Stenhouse as chairman and Archibald Gilchrist as managing director.
fir. Davies maintained that the company was formed by private interests,
with private resources, but the truth of the matter is that fir. Stenhouse
38was 'persuaded’ to take on the job and that apart from the initial two 
£1 shares all the company's resources came from the government.
At first, the UCS shop stewards refused to enter discussions with 
Mr. Stenhouse and fir. Gilchrist except on the basis that all four 
divisions of UCS were to be acquired by Govan Shipbuilders. However, 
they eventually agreed to do so as the result of negotiations in which 
fir. Dan flcGarvey, the boilermakers' leader, played a prominsnt role.
This reflected the increasing role played by the national union 
leadership in negotiations about the future of the yards after the first 
few weeks of the 'work in'. The nature of the 'work in' organisation 
was not suited to taking an active role in discussions involving new 
arrangements, since it sought essentially to preserve the status quo.
At the end of talks on 29 September involving UCS shop stewards,
CSEU officials and fir. Stenhouse and Mr. Gilchrist it was stated that 
Scotstoun would be included in the feasibility study being made of 
Govan and Linthouse. The unions officially recommended a policy of 
cooperation to the shop stewards. Following this, a meeting was held 
on 12 October between John Davies and Sir Dohn Eden of the DTI and
38 UCS (in Liquidation), 1972
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Dan NcGarvey and Oack Service of the CSEU. At this meeting the 
CSEU representatives gave assurances about the timely and efficient 
delivery of orders needed to enable Govan Shipbuilders to be 
established, providing the government was prepared to give the 
necessary guarantees to the shipowners concerned and the liquidator 
was prepared to set in hand work on those orders. As soon as these 
arrangements had been made, the CSEU was prepared to enter immediately 
into discussions with Govan Shipbuilders about working practices, wage 
rates and other matters. These negotiations would cover the operation 
of the Govan and Linthouse yards and would be extended to cover Scotstoun 
as well, providing the feasibility study commissioned by the government 
showed the inclusion of the Scotstoun yard to be in the economic 
interest of the whole project. In return, Nr. Davies would seek to 
reach agreement with the shipowners about the guarantees required to 
secure the confirmation of these orders. It was also agreed that the 
government and the CSEU would make every effort to encourage a 
purchaser for the Clydebank yard and that such a purchaser would be 
eligible for substantial financial assistance under the Local Employment 
Acts.
This agreement can be said to mark the time of the government's 
retreat from any attempt to withdraw from involvement in shipbuilding 
on the upper Clyde. While the government had all along been prepared 
to put in some money to enable a new two-yard company to get started, 
this agreement effectively constituted an undertaking by the government 
to commit very sizeable sums of money to keeping most of the UCS work­
force employed at their existing workplaces. In return for a commit­
ment by the government to be actively involved in seeking to secure 39
39. A record of this meeting is contained in HC Deb.. 20 October 
1971, cols. 734-5.
39
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employment at all four yards, the original demand that the four yards 
should be kept under a single shipbuilding management was dropped by 
the unions.
The government continued to give interim assistance to the yards.
At the end of November the government agreed to meet the extra cost 
over and above the contract price for four ships for Irish Shipping Ltd. 
to enable work on these to be started; it was estimated that about 
£10m would be required for this purpose by the liquidator. The 
government also agreed to refund all progress payments made by Irish 
Shipping after the date of the liquidation if delivery of the ships was 
delayed beyond certain dates. Up to £1^m was also to be made available 
to the liquidator for working capital. Similarly, £0,5m was set aside 
in January 1972 to compensate for the extra cost of building a dredger 
for the Brazilian government. In all, £10m was paid to the liquidator 
by the government.
6.3.6 The Hill Samuel Report
Following the death of Hugh Stenhouse in November 1971, Lord 
Strathalmond was appointed chairman of Govan Shipbuilders. There were 
delays in Govan Shipbuilders' arrangements because of the unwillingness 
of trade union representatives to conclude agreements until a separate 
future for the Clydebank yard had been determined (see section 6.3.7), 
but with the completion of the feasibility study of the future of Govan 
Shipbuilders came a commitment by the government to provide the 
necessary finance for the new company. This feasibility study was 
carried out by Hill Samuel 4 Co. and was published in March 1972.^
The report showed that both Govan plus Linthouse plus Scotstoun and 
Govan plus Linthouse would expect to make considerable losses in the
40 Cmnd 4918.
first three years and would require substantial investment. The 
report's findings assumed that the market for ships was bouyant in the 
fourth year of the company's operation and that there would be huge 
increases in productivity (to reach 220% of the 1971 figure by the fifth 
year of the company's operation). The assumptions about the future 
market for ships turned out to be wrong as a result of the post 1973 
slump. That the report's assumptions about future levels of performance 
were feasible was shown by the experience of foreign competitors} that 
they were unlikely to be achieved was suggested by past performance 
in upper Clyde yards. In conformity with previous escalations Govan 
Shipbuilders' need for government funds turned out greatly to exceed 
the Hill Samuel estimates (see section 7.3.3).
Any lingering hopes that the scale of government involvement could 
be accompanied by private participation were dashed by the report's 
strong recommendation that the company should be wholly owned by the 
government. - Funds would have to be provided by the government for 
fixed and working capital and to cover losses in the early years. The
report made clear the political nature of the operation by its 
conclusion*
'In our view there can be no question of the establishment of 
Govan Shipbuilders, in accordance with this Report, being a 
proposition which could attract commercial support. The 
decision whether or not to establish it must therefore, be 
judged on other considerations'.
In an employment debate in the Commons shortly before the 
publication of the report, Dohn Davies announced that, subject to some 
further examination of the plans, discussion of the exact sums of money 
required and the reaching of satisfactory agreements with the unions, 
he was prepared to propose the legislation necessary to carry forward
(n
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the project, u/hich would include Scotstoun.41 £17m would be needed 
for losses in the first three years and £18m for investment and working 
capital. fir. Davies praised the helpful role of Mr. McGarvey, who as 
good as returned the compliment by saying that after studying the reports 
on UCS he felt that the government had done the best they could with 
the situation. fir. Jimmy Reid was also very pleased with the 
government's statement, though he made it clear that the 'work in' 
would end only when the future of all four yards and the entire work­
force was settled.
In order to keep the Scotstoun yard open until Govan Shipbuilders 
took over, the government provided finance to enable work to start on 
two ships. Govan Shipbuilders finally took over the yards on 18 
September 1972, having paid the liquidator £2.5m, though not until 
last-minute negotiations finally secured acceptance of the labour 
agreement by the boilermakers.
6.3.7 The Clydebank yard
The government's announcement of its willingness to put £35m into Govan 
Shipbuilders secured the future of three of the yards, but the fate of 
the Clydebank yard remained to be resolved. Following enquiries from 
Mr. A.D. Kelly and Breakssa Tankships Inc., which came to nothing, the 
Marathon Manufacturing Company of Houston, Texas, expressed interest in 
acquiring the Clydebank yard. Mr. McGarvey and Mr. Service of the CSEU 
visited Houston in January 1972 and discussed the company's interest in 
acquiring the yard for building oil rigs. Later in January Mr. Harbin, 
president of Marathon Manufacturing, and other Marathon representatives 
visited Clydebank and met DTI officials and representatives of the
41 HC Deb., 28 February 1972, cols. 51-3.
staff, shop stewards and trade union officials. It was made clear 
that Marathon’s interest depended on a satisfactory agreement on wage 
rates and working practices and on the extent of government financial 
assistance under the Local Employment Acts. Negotiations between 
Marathon and the DTI continued in March and April in both London and 
Houston. In early May representatives of Marathon came to Clydebank 
to start work on the drafting of an agreement with the liquidator, 
which provided for the sale of the Clydebank yard for £1.5m. Marathon 
officially took over the yard on 8 August, though there was a subsequent 
dispute over the level of redundancies which was only resolved when 
Marathon agreed to accelerate its programme of building oil rigs and 
the reconstruction of the yard. Mr. Harbin revealed that Marathon 
envisaged an expenditure of about £12m; a £6m loan repayable over 
seven years had been provided by the DTI, in addition to other financial 
aid granted under the new 1972 Industry Act.
6.3.8 The reasons for the reversal of policy
While the massive funds allocated to the upper Clyde yards following
the collapse of UCS clearly marked a change of direction for the
government, it would be inappropriate to analyse this change in terms
of a clear change in stated objectives leading to a change in the amount
of funds which it was appropriate to allocate. Rather, the change in
objectives was wrapped up in the particular issue facing the 
42government. The further rescue of the upper Clyde yards and 
assistance given to other yards in the first two years of the 
Conservative government suggests that government policy in practice can 
more appropriately be analysed in terms of a series of individual 
decisions which may have an underlying pattern, rather than individual 
decisions being the detailed implementation of a stated general policy.
42. Cf. Lindblom, 1959.
It is therefore worth examining the reasons for the decisions 
taken by the government about upper Clyde - as well as criticising 
the adequacy of some of the justifications which have been offered. 
John Davies told the Trade and Industry Sub-6ommittee of the 
Expenditure Committee in March 1972 that there were two reasons why 
it was not desirable that shipbuilding on the upper Clyde should 
disappear: the employment it gave and the future growth potential of 
the industry in terms of worldwide demand.43 He felt that it was 
quite impossible to quantify the proportionate weight of these two 
reasons. However, the continued employment of the workers in the 
Clyde yards alone is hardly sufficient to justify the commitment of 
the huge sums involved (around £57m committed in 1971-2 without 
allowing for subsequent increases). On the assumption that many of 
the workers would have managed to get other jobs, it would arguably 
have been cheaper to have provided new alternative jobs outside 
shipbuilding, or possibly even to'.: pay them not to build ships!
The Conservatives' non-intervention approach did not seem to have 
taken into account the regional, social and economic impact of the 
closure of large firms. This issue achieved added salience on 
Clydeside, when unemployment in the Glasgow are^in June 1971 was 4.6$ 
(unadjusted) well above the UK average of 2.5$, and rose to 5.7$ 
compared to 2.8$ for the UK by December 1971. However, despite some 
impressions to the contrary at the time, the case for rescuing all the 
yards because of any catastrophic effect their closure would have had 
on the regional economy is also fairly weak. There are two issues 
involved here: (1) the regional economic impact of shipbuilding is 
probably less than was assumed in some statements; (2) other ship-
43. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.3000, 3055-60.
yards on the Clyde were expanding. No firm figures are available for
the regional decline in employment by suppliers arising from a decline
in shipbuilding. Alexander suggests a figure of about 5,500 jobs
lost in West Central Scotland manufacturing industry between 1959 and
1968 through the loss of direct and indirect purchases by shipbuilding,
shiprepairing and marine engineering arising from a fall in jobs in
those industries in West Central Scotland in the same period of 
4418,991. He also quotes a simple employment multiplier for ship­
building within West Central Scotland of 1.202 based on 1968 data 
collected by the Netherlands Economics Institute.
These figures relate to the region as a whole and provide only 
a rough guide to the impact of the closure of particular yards. In 
the absence of any official figures, the temptation is for politicians 
to use the figures which suit their case. For example, when UCS went 
into liquidation in 1971, Hr. Wedgwood Benn quoted figures of ’7,000
men directly involved and 20,000 others whose employment depends on 
45UCS'. Academics also have to work in the darks Professor D.
flacKay in a submission to the Scottish TUC after the liquidation of
UCS suggested that 5,000 redundancies at UCS might result in total
job losses (i.e. including UCS) of 11,000 in South-West Scotland and
4616,000 in Great Britain. However, the analyses quoted in the 
paragraph above suggest that both these estimates are far too high. 
Professor Alexander, who as well as being an academic studying the 
industry has served on the boards of Fairfields and UCS and has been 
chairman of Govan Shipbuilders, suggests that ’the economic case for 
special support for shipbuilding in a regional policy for WCS (West 
Central Scotland) is not a strong one. This view contrasts with the
44. Alexander, 1973, using figures collected for the West Central 
Scotland Plan, 1974.
• HC Deb., 14 Bune 1971, col. 33.
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46 STUC, 1972, p.41
impression gained when UCS was under threat, that a majority of
economists favoured its survival, at least on wider cost-benefit 
47grounds*. However, Professor Alexander does point out that a major
factor affecting that view was the absence of alternative employment, or
of any contingency plans to produce alternative employment.
If we are to consider the regional impact of the closure of the
UCS yards, we must also consider what was happening elsewhere on the
Clyde. If the Marathon yard is included, there was no overall decline
in shipbuilding employment on the Clyde between 1965 and 1972, despite
the considerable redundancies which did occur at UCS. This was because
of job increases at Scott Lithgow and Yarrow. Since its formation in
1969 Scott Lithgow has been growing, and the group has frequently
suffered labour shortages; attempts to recruit shipbuilding workers
from the upper Clyde met with little success, and the bulk of the
increased employment has gone to local newly trained workers. Of a
sample of about 2,000 men made redundant from UCS in 1969-70, only 6%
48had their first jobs on the lower Clyde. One of the ironies of the 
UCS affair was that a few days before UCS went into liquidation Scott 
Lithgow announced that it would need to take on an additional 1,700 men, 
including 1,000 steelworkers, if its new facilities were to be fully 
utilised. We can see, therefore, that the issue is less one of 
regional aggregates than of the avoidance of large-scale, highly 
location-specific redundancies.
This suggests that it is not plausible to see the aid to the 
upper Clyde yards as government action to secure a socio-economic 
optimum which would not come about through market forces.
47. Alexander, 1973, p.6.
48. Herron, 1972.
Rather, explicitly political explanations seem to be the most important; 
of these three related points can be identified.
(1) The militant reaction to the government's initial decision did
raise fears about civil disorder. As Peter Walker later put it, 'I
think there was a genuine feeling that unless some action mas taken then
social disorder of a type we hadn't seen in this country could have taken
49place in that city'.
(2) The issue of unemployment from the UCS yards was important, not 
because of its direct or indirect economic impact, but because of the 
symbolic value it acquired as an indication of the government's attitude 
to the region as a whole. This was later described by 3ohn Davies 
himself:
'I think that the thing that really developed alongside the 
problem of militancy ... was the fact that we had unemployment 
rising rather rapidly at the time ... and, of course, that 
added fuel to the flames of militancy very much, and under­
standably in some ways. And one had to face the problem that 
this was not an issue which could be considered on its own 
industrial merits, that it, in fact, affected more and more
the whole of the attitude of mind of West Central Scotland with
. 50its growing problem of unemployment'.
(3) When UCS went into liquidation the Northern Ireland civil
disorders were very serious and because of the number of people with
Irish backgrounds in the Glasgow area there was some fear that there was
a risk of the spread of terrorism and civil violence to Glasgow under
51conditions of very heavy unemployment.
49. Peter Walker, interviewed in Open University programme: Decision­
making in Britain Course: Government and Industry Block: 'Events 
of 1972 - Industrial Policy'. BBC Radio, 31 Duly 1975.
50. Dohn Davies, interviewed in Open University programme: Decision­
making in Britain Course: Government and Industry Block: 'Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders'. BBC Television, 11 Duly 1976.
51. Nicholas Ridley, interviewed in Open University programme: Decision­
making in Britain Course: Government and Industry Block: 'Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders'. BBC Television, 11 Duly 1976.
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Apart from showing the powefulness of myths, this account of the 
government's policy following the UCS liquidation has shown not only 
that a general policy of non-intervention does not shelter the 
government from the need to make decisions about individual problems, 
but that even after an initial decision has been made the government 
continues to be subject to political pressures which, if powerful 
enough, may result in the government taking action which both goes back 
on the original decision and which effectively marks a reversal of the 
general approach to which the government had declared itself committed.
6.4 OTHER AO HOC INTERVENTIONS 
6.4.1 Harland and Wolff
Although public attention was almost entirely focussed on UCS during 
this period, the government also became involved in the affairs of two 
other yards during the aftermath of the UCS collapse. We have already 
seen that even before the liquidation of UCS the government had 
approved a rescue plan for Harland and Uolff. In flay 1973 it was 
announced that government grants and loans totalling £23.5m would be 
given towards Harland and Wolff's expansion plans. The remaining £12m 
was to be found from the company's present and future resources (sic). 
Later the same year it was announced that about £10m of the debt owed 
to the government would be replaced by about £8m of non-voting 
convertible preference shares. At the same time the government said 
that it would provide guarantee facilities up to a further £10m - despite 
its 'no further aid« statement in 1971. Harland and Wolff's finances 
continued to deteriorate in 1974, and in 1975 the Labour government 
took complete control of the yard in an operation separate from the 
proposed nationalisation of the industry as a whole, and injected 
further funds (see section 7.3.2).
/,
There has been a considerable degree of continuity of policy 
of governments of both political parties in providing aid to Harland 
and L/olff. The yard's location in Belfast gives it a special 
political significance over and above the normal reluctance of 
governments to seem responsible for allowing large-scale redundancies 
in an area of high unemployment. No government, would be keen to have 
unoccupied thousands of workers in the situation of civil strife which 
has existed in Northern Ireland since 1969. In addition, particularly 
since 1972, when direct rule was instituted, continuing government 
support for Harland and Wolff has been necessary to allay fears of an 
economic withdrawal from the province which many in Northern Ireland 
fear would be the prelude to a political withdrawal. British govern­
ments have therefore been faced with a dilemmas to close the yard 
could precipitate a political crisis but to continue to support a yard 
which appears incapable of telling from one six-month period to the 
next by how much its estimated losses will escalate prolongs a source 
of economic and political insecurity.
6.4.2 Cammell Laird
Following the taking of a 50$ government shareholding in June 1970 
(see section 5,3.3), a management reshuffle was carried out in August 
1971, with a Canadian, Graham Day, being appointed managing director.
In November 1971 the government announced that it was to provide £3m 
to Cammell Laird as a stand-by facility over the next year or so. A 
further £3m was made available the following April to enable modern­
isation to proceed. £14m aid towards the company's £25m modernisation 
scheme was announced in .September 1972. A year later the company 
revised its estimate for capital works from £14m to £16.36m, in April 
1974 to £22.5m, and in Dune 1974 to £23m. It estimated that it
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would need £27m in government aid: £23m for capital works and £4m for
working capital and contingencies. The Department of Industry agreed
that the company should proceed with the capital work as planned,
subject to a possible reappraisal of the project, though the department
recognised that reappraisal might not be a valid option. In January
1975, after there had been considerable delays in the reconstruction,
Cammell Laird ordered the contractors off the site and started legal
proceedings against them. The Public Accounts Committee was severely
critical of the Industry Department and deplored the lack of control
53over the public funds involved. Despite its problems, Cammell Laird 
registered a profit of £1.lm in 1973, half its 1973 figure. The 
company’s operating forecasts in June 1974 had indicated net profits 
for the four years 1974-7, but examination by the Department of 
Industry suggested a possible deterioration in performance.
6.5 INSTITUTIONALISING INTERVENTION
The government's experiences with a number of firms, particularly UCS, 
led it to come to the conclusion that it needed a general framework of 
assistance and advice which would enable it to intervene without 
having to set up special arrangements in each case. This marked a 
change from the acceptance of possible exceptions to a policy of non­
intervention to a general presumption that the government would be 
intervening frequently on a selective basis. At the same time, the 
problems of a number of shipbuilders showed that immediate steps would 
have to be taken in addition to longer-term selective assistance if 
many of the firms were not to collapse. The number of orders received 
by UK yards was falling dramatically (see figure 6.1). 523
52. HC 85, Session 1974-5, pp.xxxv-xxxvi.
53. HC 374, Session 1974-5, p.xxvii.
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Fig• 6.1
Source:
Merchant shipbuilding orders placed in UK yards by quarter
Figures taken from Briticl. $1 inn in; • Statistics 1976, table 
updated frcm Tro' dimes'.
The formal announcements of the changes in Conservative 
industrial policy were made by Mr. Barber in his Budget statement and
by Mr. Davies in the Budget Debate in March 1972, and in a White Paper
54on Industrial and Regional Development. There was to be a new 
range of regional and industrial aid (including the re-introduction of 
grants^ which the Conservative government had abolished less than two 
years earlier), a Minister of Industrial Development was to be 
appointed, and an Industrial Development Executive was to be set up 
within the DTI. This executive would take an immediate interest in 
two industries: machine tools and shipbuilding. In the context of 
the current state of shipbuilding it was vital, Mr. Oavies said, to 
develop the right policies for the longer term. However, the 
government recognised an immediate need to safeguard employment and 
to provide a period of stability, and therefore proposed to introduce 
a system of tapering grants to shipbuilders for all ships over 100 gross 
tons except those being built for the Royal Navy or government 
departments. The rates would be at the level of <\0% of the contract 
value of the work in 1972, and at 4% in 1973 and Z% in 1974; the total 
cost was expected to bd about £50m. The initial high rate of grant 
was designed to give an immediate much-needed injection of aid, while 
the later reductions in rate would oonform with the new policy on 
shipbuilding aid being considered by the EEC. As far as Govan 
Shipbuilders was concerned, the tapering grants were to be deducted from 
the £35m aid announced a few weeks earlier.
All these measures were embodied in the Industry Act 1972, which 
allowed for the imposition of conditions on firms wishing to avail 
themselves of the tapering construction grants. Two such conditions
54. HC Deb., 21 March 1972, cols. 1357-69; 22 March 1972, cols.
1534-55. Cmnd 4942.
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mere imposed by the DTI; (1) cooperation with the Department of
Employment over work practices and (2) the provision of adequate 
55information.
As part of the shipbuilding package in the Industry Act, the
statutory ceiling on credit guarantees was raised to the £1,000m
promised the previous August; provision was made for a further
extension to £1,400m by order. New arrangements had already been
announced in March for export and shipbuilding credits before the
publication of the White Paper, following representations from the
clearing banks during 1971 that the fixed medium-term rate of interest
had got badly out of line with current market rates and that it was
inequitable that an uneconomic rate should be held at the expense of
55the banks’ shareholders. The effect of these new credit arrangements 
was that in future any element of subsidy would be made explicit, 
whereas under the old arrangements the banks had absorbed the extra 
cost of providing the credits in return for other 'favours’ from the 
government. The cost of the new arrangements turned out to be well
above expectations, and the system set up to administer them broke
. 57down.
Within two years the government had moved on general industrial 
policy from an approach of non-intervention with some possible 
exceptions to setting up a framework for selective intervention. On 
shipbuilding, the Conservatives had moved from ambiguity about ship­
building as an exception to the general approach, through a declaration 
that shipbuilding would not be treated as a special case, followed soon
55. Private information. Interview conducted on 1*f August 1973*
56. HC Deb., 15 March 1972, cols. 535-41. See also HC 303, Session 
1974, para. 1.
. For details see HC 67, Session 1973-4, pp.xvii-xx; HC 303,
Session 1974; Cmnd 5786, p.3.
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after by massive assistance to a number of individual yards, to a 
policy of temporary general subsidy to all firms in the industry.
The statement that the new Industrial Development Executive would be 
taking a special interest in shipbuilding implied that the government 
accepted a continuing responsibility for the fate of the industry.
These fairly dramatic changes in policy towards the industry point to 
special difficulties in maintaining a stance of non-intervention, and 
these will be analysed at the end of the chapter,
6.6 THE BOOZ-ALLEN REPORT 
6,6,1 The nature of the inquiry
The form which the 'immediate interest' in shipbuilding by the new
Industrial Development Executive took was the commissioning of a report
by Booz-Allen and Hamilton International BV, a firm of management
consultants, whose 'terms of reference excluded them from making
, . .58recommendations on policy'. Despite the initial impression of 
urgency, the announcement that Booz-Allen and Hamilton would be carrying 
out the study was not made until Dune 1972, The report reached the 
minister's desk at the beginning of February 1973, and was published in 
flay after editing by the DTI to remove material provided in confidence,59 
The report itself contained nothing that the DTI did not already 
know, or could not have found out itself. Indeed, under the Industry 
Act the DTI could threaten the withholding of the tapering construction 
grants from firms which did not provide the necessary information to 
Booz-Allen, The purpose of the exercise was to secure a report 
produced by an outside body, to which the DTI could refer when stating 
its views.
, HC Deb., 16 flay 1973, written answers col. 347.58
59 Booz-Allen Report, 1973
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6 , 6 , 2  The reports findings
The Booz-Allen Report echoed many of the findings of the Geddes Report 
seven years earlier. UK yards generally mere undercapitalised and 
poorly managed. The industry had a poor reputation amongst its 
customers, particularly for delivery and labour relations. Overseas 
shipbuilders had moved more rapidly to modernise and re-equip their 
facilities and were better placed to face the forecast overcapacity, 
which was expected to become more severe during the remainder of the 
1970s. However, management had strengthened in several companies, 
which were already showing signs of improving their reputation for 
efficiency and delivery.
Government support alone could not ensure a long-term market for 
the industry, nor was technology likely to offer any particular 
advantage to the UK, the report considered. The direct price support 
available from the government in the UK would have been sufficient to 
enable the UK shipbuilding industry to offer competitive prices in the 
world market if it had been operating as efficiently as shipbuilding in 
other countries. In practice, the industry had not performed as 
efficiently as the main competition in Dapan and Europe, and revenue 
support had been used largely to meet operational losses and to replace 
working capital. Long-term development of the UK shipbuilding industry 
could only be achieved if government support was combined with lasting 
improvements in the industry’s performance. Government capital 
support was considered essential if the necessary degree of cost 
reduction was to be achieved.
The report examined a number of hypothetical future ’situations’ 
for the merchant shipbuilders given various combinations of government 
support and improvement in cost-effectiveness; these are summarised in 
table 6.2. A particularly important point to note is that in all
Table 6.2 Summary of situations examined by the Booz-Allen Report.
1
| LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
4 t,pw„lcve.l
- Shipbuilders Relief (equivalent to 2Z of contract price)
- OECD Credit arrangements
- Commitments already made to supported yards
Medium Level
(Equivalent to Existing Level)
Capital support and revenue support up to 5Z of sales.
. Revenue support? same aids as for low level, but could 
also include
- Direct cost subsidy to shipbuilders
- Capital investment grants and loans to shipowners
Capital support in the form of
- Specific grants or loans for the reconstruction of 
i facilities
- General grants or loans e.g.regional development grants 
. - Ad hoc loans and grants for special purposes
Hiffh Level. Capital support and revenue support up to 10Z of 
sales - but not flag discrimination.
Aa for medium level,but could also include
- Direct subsidy
- Price support
• Inflation insurance
COST-FFFrCTTVF.NFSS OF THE INDUSTRY
Existing (1972) Level of Costs nnd productivity including 
benefits anticipated from supported yards
A 1971 1977 1982
Output (million grt) 1.2 1.2 0.6
(0.4) (0.8)
UK X of world output 5.1 4.4 2.0
Employment 49 27 25(000) (16) (12)
Government support (£m) 1972-7 1977-82
Total capital in period 60-5 0.0
Maximum revenue per annum . 3.0 0.5
Comment. Decline primarily at expense of unsupported*
companies: 1*3 would have to close by 1977. After
1977 survival of individual yards following bankruptcy
of groups.
» 1971 1977 1982
Output 1.2 1.5 1.2
(Million grt) (0.4) (0.8) (0.8)
U.K.Z of world output 5.1 5.6 4.0
Employment 49 37 30
(000) (16) (12) (12)
Government Support (£tn) 1972-7 1977-82
Total capital in period 110-20
Revenue per annum 9.0 7.0
Comment. Similar to existing (1972) situation. One
major closure of 'unsupported' company by 1977,and another
by 1982.
G
Omitted from detailed evaluation because it 
implied committing government support solely 
to making up losses in the industry and encouraging 
the placement of orders mainly through revenue 
support.
Note* 1* Figures in brackets refer to 'supported1 yards. The supported yards are Cammell Laird, Govan
Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff; the 'unsupported' yards are Austin and Pickersgill, Doxford 
and Sunderland, Robb Caledon, Scote Lithgow and Swan Hunter. Appledore was not included in 
the detailed analysis of the situations because it was assumed that the company would continue 
to operate under all conditions.
Table 6«2 (cont.)
cost-effectiveness of tue i n d u s t r y.
Coats reduced by 10X, Costs reduced by 152.
Improvement of over 40Z required in output per employee. Improvement of over 1102 required in output per employee.
‘ Capital invested in new facilities £3,000 per employee. Capital invested in new facilities of 16,000 per employee,t ■—■■■—— - 1 . .....- ■■ — -■ ■■"*— —1 ■ ■ 1 ■ — ■
C
A Omitted from detailed consideration because
improvements in cost effectiveness of the order 
needed would require government capital support 
for new facilities; this would not be available 
with a low level of government support.
E 1971 1977 .1982
Output 1.2 1.4 1.6
(million grt) (0.4) (0.8) (0.8)
B.K.X of world output 5.1 5.2 5.5
Employment 49 29 32
(000) <U) (12) (12)
Government support (£m) 1972-7 1977-82
Tot.l capital in period 100-20 10
Maximum revenue per annum 8.5 10
Comment. Probable closure of one major 'unsupported1
shipbuilder by 1977. increase in employment after 1977
almoet all in 'unsupported shipbuilders.
H 1971 1977 1982
Output 1.2 1.6 - 2.0
(million grt) (0.4) (0.8) (1.0)
B.K.X of world output 5.1 5.9 6.8
Employment 49 35 40
(000) (16) (12) (15)
Government support (£m) 1972-7 1977-82
Total capital in period 125-35 6.7
Maxmimum revenue per annum -- 20 25
Comment. No major closures.
r
Omitted from detailed evaluation because 
improvements in cost effectiveness of 
the order needed would require a level 
of government capital support higher than 
the existing level of government support.
i 1971 1977 1982
Output 1.2 1.8 2.5(million grt) (0.4) (1.0) (1.25)
G.K.Z of world output 5.1 6.7 8.6
Employment 49 35 39(000) (16) (15) (18)
Government support (£m) 1972-7 1977-82
Total capital in period 210-50 2-3Mexmiffium revenue per annum 22 27
Comment? No major closures.
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the situations examined employment would drop substantially, even where 
there was a high level of government support. As the report remarked, 
'In fact, significant capital investment will often be counter­
productive in terms of maintaining employment at a particular yard'.60 
A particularly tricky manpower planning problem, the implications of 
which were not discussed in the report, was posed by situations E, H and 
I, in which employment was forecast to drop sharply from 1971 to 1977, 
and rise again sharply from 1977 to 1982, though not to the original 
1971 level.
These forecasts were based on a model of the shipbuilding industry 
which was developed to provide an 'overview' of the industry as a whole 
and was unsuitable for the evaluation of individual yards (for comments 
on demand forecasting in the report see section 1.4.2). An essential 
condition of achieving the shares of the world market indicated was the 
achievement of the levels of improved productivity and delivery 
performance assumed in the model. These market shares would not be 
obtained if (1 ) there was a significant increase in the price support 
or restrictive practices adopted by other governments; (2) shipbuilding 
in Europe or elsewhere achieved substantial cost reductions through 
improved performance over existing levels; (3) market demand 
increased substantially less quickly than forecast. These conditions 
illustrate the limitations of the model used in the report. If the 
levels of UK government support specified in situations H and I were 
given then (1) would be quite likely to occur; improved performance 
over existing levels by foreign shipbuilders as in (2) seemed quite 
likely; as for (3), after a surge in the demand for tankers while the 
report was being put together, this part of the market collapsed a few
60. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, p.9.
Booz-Allen also considered the future of the uiarshipbuilders and 
produced a confidential annex to the main report on the alternatives 
open to the government. The Geddes Report had recommended reduction 
of the number of yards competing for naval orders from the existing 
twelve to two specialising in submarines and three other yards. By 
1972 naval work was concentrated in three specialist builders (Yarrow, 
Vickers and Vosper Thornycroft) and three non-specialist builders 
(Swan Hunter, Scott Lithgow and Cammell Laird). A large excess of naval 
shipbuilding capacity over home demand was forecast by Booz-Allen, and 
it was unlikely that export sales would be sufficient to fill the 
excess capacity after 1976. The Ministry of Defence could 
concentrate its orders on the three specialist yards and exclude from 
its building programme the three non-specialist yards. Even so, the 
specialist firms could not rely wholly on the Royal Navy programme for 
their continued viability — a source of potential dilemma for Labour 
governments faced with demands from supporters both to maintain 
employment and restrict the supply of war materials to certain regimes. 
Since some of the naval capacity of the non-specialist builders was 
not suitable for merchant work it was likely that unemployment would 
result if they were excluded from warshipbuilding. The government's 
dilemma in dealing with this recommendation was increased by the fact 
that all three non-specialist yards were in assisted areas, two of them 
in special development areas. In practice, whatever their stated 
policy or the long-term logic of specialisation, governments may 
succumb to the temptation to divert a naval order to a non-specialist 
builder to fill a gap in an order book as the Labour government did 
with Swan Hunter in 1976.
months after the publication of the report»
6.6,3 Reactions to the report
When the report was published, Mr. Chris Chataway, the new Minister for 
Industrial Development, invited written comments within a month. The 
CSEU asked for and was granted an extension of time to submit its views. 
However, the effectiveness of these representations was prejudiced by 
hints which Mr. Chataway dropped at the International Marine and 
Shipping conference in London at the beginning of Dune. He reaffirmed 
that the government was in no way committed to the financial or 
employment implications of the report, and that it was hoped that all 
the interested bodies and the government could start objective (sic) 
discussions on the industry's future, but he pointed out that ship­
building was already receiving substantial assistance from public funds. 
Referring to the considerable surge in orders in the first quarter of 
1973, Mr. Chataway said that the report had to some extent been over­
taken by events. This remark illustrates the danger of government's 
focussing on short-term trends, since the boom soon turned into a 
worldwide slump.
The SRNA, in its submission on the report, suggested that 
investment loans should be made available on favourable terms to support 
further modernisation and that this assistance should not be 
discriminatory. The SRIMA also urged the maintenance of existing credit 
facilities and the introduction of an inflation guarantee scheme similar 
to the Coface scheme operated in France and referred to in the report. 
Also advocated was the extension of the tapering construction grants 
beyond 1974 as a form of revenue support. Although the ship builders 
welcomed the report's emphasis on the need for capital investment, 
there was some disagreement with its conclusion that the number of men 
employed in the industry would fall.
The CSEU was severely critical of the terms of reference of the 
report, arguing that the consultants had been asked to consider the 
long-term prospects of British shipbuilding unrelated to the overall 
structure of marine engineering and shiprepairing and without any 
guide to the minister's likely policy criteria. The CSEU wanted a 
figure of £250m aid to be regarded as a minimum. As for the 
reductions in employment projected by the report, the CSEU was quite 
uncompromising: 'We emphatically state that our unions will make
quite certain that such a plan will never be applied to our members ... 
liie will agree to no plan which involves raising productivity faster 
than production'. The unions' submission was altogether a rather 
remarkable document, referring as it did to 'the hurriedly written 
and leisuredly (sic) doctored Booz-Allen report'. The CSEU document 
concluded by reaffirming the unions' commitment to nationalisation.
Unlike both shipbuilders and unions, the UK Chamber of Shipping 
took the view that if employment in shipbuilding were to continue at 
its existing level it would require an unrealistically large share of 
the market to maintain it and a level of government subsidy which would 
almost certainly encourage other governments to follow suit0 However, 
the shipowners, while attaching importance to the maintenance of a 
competitive, profitable and efficient UK shipbuilding industry, also 
emphasised the importance of being able to order from the yards which 
offered the most competitive terms, whether in Europe or Dapan.
6.7 THE DULY 1973 POLICY STATEMENT
The speed with which the government's policy statement, made to the 
House of Commons on 23 Duly 1973, followed the submission of views by 
the inter«Sted bodies suggests that the government had not waited to
Report
61. CSEU document, 'Reply to the Booz-Allen/to be presented by the
CSEU to Mr. C. Chataway of the Department of Trade and Industry*
receive those views before formulating its own policy. In his statement,
Mr. Chataway said that the upsurge in orders meant that the industry was 
in a better position than Booz-Allen envisaged to finance modernisation 
schemes (though this surge in orders was to be reversed within months 
of Mr. Chataway's statement). The core of Mr. Chataway's statement 
was that shipbuilding would no longer be a special case and that the 
next step would be to consider under the 1972 Industry Act investment 
proposals for individual projects. These would be considered on the 
same basis as investment projects from other industries with the 
exception that the government would be prepared to give the same 
favourable loan terms to shipbuilding modernisation schemes which did 
not increase employment as were normally given only to schemæ which did 
provide more jobs.
The Ministry of Defence accepted the Booz-Allen view that warship 
orders should be concentrated on specialist builders; the non­
specialist builders would continue to be able to tender for auxiliary 
vessels. Applications for the modernisation of both the specialist 
and the non-specialist yards would be considered by the DTI in the same 
way as those from other shipbuilders.
That shipbuilding was no longer to be considered a special case 
might seem to be a simple reversion to the declared policy of the 
Conservative government prior to the UCS liquidation (see section 
6.2.4), but the rest of British industry had to a certain extent ‘caught 
up’ with shipbuilding as a result of the Industry Act 1972. One feature 
both statements had in common* they ignored the government's 
vulnerability to the political pressures arising from the employment 
consequences of problems facing individual yards. Although no longer 
a non-interventionist approach, the government's new policy was still 
a fragmented one, since it did not incorporate a stated view about the
2 S3'
62. HC Deb.. 23 Duly 1973, cols. 1157-64.
total level of support which the government was prepared to give, nor 
did it make clear the size of redundancies which the government 
expected. fir. Chataway's statement made it clear that assistance to 
shipbuilding would be considered on an individual yard basis, so no 
direct comparison could be made with the Booz-Allen scenarios, nor 
could any forecast be made for the prospects of the industry as a 
whole. Indeed, in reply to a direct question from fir. Benn 
flro Chataway replied:
'As for the final cost and the final employment figure involved 
in reshaping the British Industry, clearly one cannot at this 
moment make estimates, because they depend upon the vigour 
(Hon. Members: "Why not?") They depend upon the vigour with 
which the industry responds to the Booz-Allen Report and the
proposals that are put to us for the modernisation of individual
. , 63 yards'.
Although it is not possible to make a direct comparison with the 
Booz-Allen scenarios, the type of assistance announced by Mr. Chataway 
seems closest to 0 or E, probably nearer 0 than E (see table 6.2).
If the Booz-Allen forecasts were anywhere near the mark, then the 
industry faced a sharp drop in employment. However, apart from the 
exception in giving assistance where no new jobs were created,
Mr. Chataway made no reference in his statement to employment prospects 
in the industry. While this may have prevented an attack from the 
shipbuilding unions, which refused to recognise the inevitability of 
any redundancies, this was a very short-sighted approach to take. In 
the absence of any specific proposals to give new jobs to redundant 
shipyard workers it was inevitable that the unions in the yards would
63 HC Deb., 23 3uly 1973, col.1164.
285?
not cooperate fully in modernisation schemes which reduced employment.
The chances were that such firms would end up coming to the government 
for help in meeting losses and that political pressures would result 
in the government giving aid which did little to improve the firm's 
competitive ability.
6.8 THE POLITICS OF NON-INTERVENTION
The fate of the Conservative government's approach to shipbuilding 
policy shares one very important feature with the Labour government's 
involvement in the industry in the late 1960s. When the Labour 
attempt to 'promote the competitiveness' of the industry by providing 
certain kinds of assistance came up against individual cases where the 
policy might have suggested allowing a firm to go under, the government 
decided nevertheless to rescue the company; similarly when the 
Conservatives with their policy of non-intervention were faced with the 
political repercussions of firms in danger of collapse they intervened 
on a massive scale. Within the first two years of office the 
Conservatives not only committed more funds in selective support for 
shipbuilding than the Labour government had done in six years, they 
also did something which the Labour government had never done by 
introducing indiscriminate subsidies. For both parties the political 
pressures over individual firms turned out to be more powerful than the 
assumptions underlying general statements of policy. Implementation 
was not simply a matter of 'following through' a declared approach; 
implementation was where policy in practice was decided.
The experience of the Conservative government suggests that a policy 
of non-intervention is not immune from political reactions to attempt to 
apply it in individual circumstances. Indeed, there may be special 
political difficulties in implementing such a policy. This arises in
two different ways First of all, such a policy is not promulgated
in a historical vacuum; current expectations will be that governments 
will intervene no matter what their initial statements of policy; 
only after a long run of choices not to intervene would such 
expectations alter. Secondly, there are always likely to be some 
exceptions built into a policy of non-intervention from the start, 
such as strategic or regional economic considerations, and this will 
require that each case will have to be considered on its merits. Not 
to intervene therefore requires a continuous set of choices not to 
intervene as each problem occurs, rather than a general policy 
statement followed by the withdrawal of the issue from the political 
arena. It is misleading for advocates of markets as means of making 
choices currently taken by the government to imply that this in some 
way depoliticises these choices. Thus Participation without Politics 
is an inappropriate title for Samuel Brittan's book on the role of 
markets, since decisions not to intervene are as much political acts 
as decisions about what form intervention should take.^
Dnce it is accepted that governments cannot shelter behind a 
general declaration of policy but have to make a choice about whether 
or not to intervene each time a problem occurs, the political dice are 
weighted against non-intervention. The reason for this can be summed 
up ass the adverse effects of non-intervention are immediate, 
concentrated and visible, whereas the beneficial effects are long-term, 
hypothetical, controversial and dispersed. Thus the adverse effects 
of failing to bail out a large firm may be immediate large-scale 
redundancies in a town with high unemployment, where those affected can 
be identified and will be likely to organise themselves to protest about
64. Brittan, 1975.
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their situation. The benefits of such a policy, however, are only 
likely to emerge in the long term, possibly after the government had 
lost office, and only as part of a long series of decisions not to 
intervene; such benefits are hypothetical in that they may emerge 
through better resource allocation, lower taxation or lower inflation, 
and controversial in that not everyone will agree whether a general 
policy of non-intervention or a particular act of non-intervention will 
produce such effects. Above all, any beneficial effects of non­
intervention will be dispersed among a large number of people who will 
not be able to identify the extent to which they may have benefited 
from a particular ‘non-intervention'; no such group of beneficiaries 
will lobby MPs or send delegations to ministers, nor will the media 
be able to interview individuals who will tell of the benefits they 
have received.
A government with an initial commitment to non-intervention which 
decides to intervene on a massive scale in a particular firm, such as 
UCS, may face grumbling from some backbenchers and party supporters, but 
on the other hand, not to intervene may provoke fierce and possibly 
illegal reaction. (Once in Opposition again, of course, the party may 
exact its retribution, as Edward Heath found to his cost). The easiest 
way to remove a controversial issue from the political agenda in the 
short term is therefore to intervene by providing public funds. In 
the longer term, as the history of UCS and Harland and Wolff suggests, 
the firm may be back for more, which is, of course, one of the things 
which a policy of non-intervention seeks to avert. The choice which 
the Conservative government made when faced with apparent present 
political costs outweighing present political advantages was to set up 
a framework in the Industry Act 1972 which would make it easier for it 
(or any other government) to intervene when it chose to do so.
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To carry through a policy of non-intervention therefore requires 
considerable political determination to make a continuous set of 
choices not to intervene in the face of possibly rising opposition.
We do, in fact, have virtually no information about the electoral 
impact of industrial policy, but as with UCS issues of civil order 
may also arise. Less dramatically, the government may be concerned 
about the 'trade-off effects of industrial policy; it may intervene 
in the hope that this would help to secure compliance with, say, 
industrial relations legislation or incomes policy. An alternative 
course of action, at least in theory, would be for the government to 
seek to d&fuse some of the political reaction which arises from the 
social consequences of industrial change. This would imply giving 
an undertaking to provide specific new jobs to meet specific large- 
scale redundancies. There would be considerable practical difficulties 
in implementing such a policy, and it would reduce the hypothetical 
benefits to be gained from a policy of non-intervention in the sense 
of not propping up non-viable firms. However, the experience of the 
Conservative government suggests that a government has to be prepared 
one way or another to meet the political reaction which arises as a 
result of decisions about individual firms. To disregard the 
political nature of decisions about implementing a policy seems to be 
a guaranteed way of ensuring that the policy will be overturned.
7 POSTSCRIPT* DEVELOPMENTS UP TO NATIONALISATION
7.1 - INTRODUCTION
In February 1974 the Labour Party was returned to office (initially 
as a minority government) with a declared policy of nationalising the 
shipbuilding industry. However, this change of government coincided 
with a dramatic change in world demand for ships (see fig. 6.1) which 
altered the prospects of the UK industry from those expected when 
the Labour Opposition drew up its proposals in conjunction with the 
unions. It seemed inevitable that the new nationalised body would 
have to preside over the contraction of the UK industry. Before the 
nationalisation proposals could finally be embodied in legislation, 
the government became involved on an ad hoc basis with the affairs of 
a number of shipbuilding firms.
7.2 THE COURT LINE AFFAIR
The government's first ad hoc involvement on taking office was in the 
Court Line shipbuilding interests, which consisted of Sunderland 
Shipbuilders on the Wear and the Appledore yard in Devon.
Sunderland Shipbuilders had already become the first major shipbuilding 
company to be awarded selective financial assistance under the 
Industry Act 1972 by being allocated a loan of £9m, though thi3 
depended on Court Line itself putting in £3m. Plr. Benn, the new 
Secretary of State for Industry, was first told of Court Line's 
difficulties soon after the February 1974 election. Dealings in 
Court Line shares were suspended in June, and talks took place between 
Court Line, its bankers and the government about finding finance for 
the shipbuilding Division's capital investment programme and the
29D
groups package tour operations, which had bean hit by a drop in 
bookings and rising costs. The main problem for the shipbuilding 
interests did not at the time seem to be loss-making orders (though 
it was later revealed that Sunderland Shipbuilders made a loss of 
nearly £6.5m in the year to September 1974) but shortage of finance 
to enable modernisation to proceed.
The surprise form which intervention by the government took was 
to take into public ownership the entire shipbuilding and shiprepair­
ing interests of Court Shipbuilders. This was to be done under the 
Conservative's Industry Act, a fact which Hr. Benn exploited to the 
full in the House of Commons. Hr. Benn claimed that this move would 
safeguard £133m of shipbuilding orders and the jobs of 9,000 workers 
in development areas, making possible the completion of £48m worth of
further orders and, in a phrase which was later to assume great
1
significance, 'safeguarding the holidaymakers'. The following week,
Hr. Benn announced that a payment of £8m was to be made for Court
Shipbuilders (£16m for the capital minus £8m owed by Court Line to
the shipbuilding company, though £4m of this was to be allowed to
2remain outstanding for a short period).
The haste of the government's move is indicated by the fact that 
Hr. Benn did not put the purchase before the Industrial Development 
Advisory Board for their consideration. The appointment of a firm of 
accountants to examine the future viability of the residual Court Line 
company wgs not made until after Hr. Benn's 26 Dune statement.
Although the government had had some warning that Court Line was in 
difficulties some months before, the final warning of impending
1. HC Deb., 26 Dune 1974, col. 1558.
2. HC Deb., 1 Duly 1974, written answers cols. 6-7.
collapse gave the government only a feu days to undertake important 
decisions. The hectic nature of such crisis is illustrated by a 
quotation from the Ombudsman's report on the affair*
•On 19 Dune Court Line directors had approached the Department 
of Industry asking the Government for urgent financial 
assistance to avoid a complete and imminent collapse. Within 
96 hours the Department had discussed uith the directors a 
scheme to acquire all of the capital of the shipbuilding and 
ship-repairing subsidiaries; had put the scheme to the Treasury 
and Ministers; and had finalised intensive negotiations uith 
the directors and their advisors on the amount of the purchase 
price'.3
The government's purchase of Court Shipbuilders failed to save the 
rest of Court Line, uhich collapsed uithin tuo months, leaving over 
40,000 holidaymakers stranded abroad and many more uith their holiday 
plans ruined. Not surprisingly, the government came under fierce 
attack for alledgedly giving false reassurances to holidaymakers about 
Court Line's ability to continue to operate. Mr. Shore agreed to set 
up an inquiry into Court Line and its subsidiaries under the Companies 
Act. In October 1974 it uas announced that the Ombudsman had 
decided to investigate the part played by Mr. Benn in the Court Line 
affair. In September, a feu ueeks before the October election,
Mr. Shore, the Secretary of State for Trade, announced a neu scheme to 
protect holidaymakers. The government uas prepared to make an 
interest-free loan to the scheme; the implication uas that Court Line 
holidaymakers uho had lost their holidays uould get their money back.
The Ombudsman and the inspectors appointed by Mr. Shore, uhose
3 HC 498, Session 1974-5, p.17
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reports were published at the end of Duly 1975, were both critical of 
the statements made to Parliament by fir. Benn on 16 Dune and 1 Duly 
1974, arguing that the statements went further than was justified in 
reassuring the public about the continuation of the company's
4
operations for the rest of summer. The government, however 
rejected these criticisms, and in a debate on the reports in the 
House of Commons the government had a majority of 24.
The Court Line affair illustrates in an acute form the speed 
with which the government has to act in carrying out rescue operations. 
Partly as a consequence, the government based its decisions on what 
turned out to be totally unreliable information - a feature which this 
rescue shares with many of the others considered in this study. One 
unusual feature of the affair was that, in contrast with some other 
interventions where the political repercussions of a rescue fall on 
the head of a subsequent government (e.g. UCS), on this occasion there 
were short-term indentifiable political costs attributable to the 
minister and government which had made the decision. Normally it is 
only the political costs of not intervening which are visible and 
short term. As far as the government was concerned, these political 
costs took the form of embarrassment rather than actual defeat in the 
House of Commons. At a personal level, Mr. Benn's chances of 
remaining in his Industry Secretary post cannot have been improved by 
the findings of the two reports on the affair. What has not been 
resolved are the questions of how far the government is entitled to 
utter expressions of reassurance on the basis of possibly inaccurate 
information (or obliged to in order to prevent a collapse of 
confidence), and what are its responsibilities towards those who
4 . HC 498, Session 1974-5; Department of Trade, 1975.
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suffer as a consequence of the collapse of a firm in which the 
government has been involved. The attitude of governments of both 
parties over compensation to UCS creditors, and the Labour 
government's stand over the Court Line affair, suggest that 
governments are seeking to minimise their liability to creditors for 
the financial consequences of collapses of such firms, while at the 
same time taking on responsibility for providing continuing employment.
7.3 FURTHER INVOLVEMENT IN HARLAND AND WOLFF AND GOVAN 
7.3.1 Introduction
As well as taking over Court Shipbuilders, the government continued to 
be involved in a number of yards with a long history of receiving 
public funds. The government's commitment to Cammell Laird steadily 
escalated as the cost of reconstruction increased (see section 6.4.2). 
Further funds were also allocated to Govan Shipbuilders, which had 
been established with a commitment of £35m in 1972 following the 
collapse of UCS, and Harland and Wolff, which continued to receive 
more funds despite assertions by the government that no more would be 
forthcoming.
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7.3.2 Harland and Wolff
Discussions with Harland and Wolff carried out by the incoming Labour 
government revealed the company's continuing inability to meat 
production targets and the inadequacy of previous proposals for 
provifagfinancial assistance. Consideration of a request for 
government aid was postponed in May because of the Ulster workers 
strike. Revised figures received by the government on 5 duly 1974 
showed that if the company was to continue trading further government 
assistance was urgently required. The amount was expected to be well 
in excess of the Conservative government's proposal only the previous
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December that £10m of debt should be replaced by the issuing to the 
government of shares and that the government should provide guarantee 
facilities for up to £10m as needed up to the end of 1976 (see 
section 6.4*1).
In a statement to the House of Commons on 22 Duly 1974 
fir. Stanley Orme, Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, 
announced that the government had decided to extend its equity from
5
47.6^ to a substantial majority. This would be done by expanding 
the equity rather than by acquiring shares from existing shareholders, 
though the possibility of moving to full public ownership at some 
future date was not ruled out. Accompanying the increased government 
equity would be a comprehensive review of Harland and Wolff's 
management structure and resources, a full review of the order book, 
a temporary moratorium on all new shipbuilding orders, and measures 
to reduce overheads and improve productivity and training. The 
government also proposed to consider full participation in management 
by representatives of all employed in the firm. The cost of the 
rescue operation was to be met in part by compensating savings in 
public expenditure in Northern Ireland, though expenditure on social 
services and areas of high unemployment would not be cut. The ritual 
declaration was made that 'this must not be regarded by those working 
for the company as an open-ended Government subvention'.
Following Mr. Orme's statement, Mr. Ivor Hoppe, the Danish 
managing director appointed by the Conservative government in 1971, 
resigned at the request of the Northern Ireland Department of Commerce, 
There were considerable criticisms in Parliament when it was later 
revealed that Mr. Hoppe had been paid an annual fee of over £78,000
5. HC Deb.. 22 Duly 1974, cols. 1060-71.
which was paid to a Swiss consultancy company for which he worked.
Mr. Hoppe's replacement, Mr. Ronald Punt, deputy managing director 
at Harland and Wolff, was appointed a year later.
Harland and Wolff's long-term prospects were bound to be 
adversely affected by the collapse in the large tanker market 
following the oil price rise, since its facilities were designed to 
construct such vessels. However, prospective losses on existing 
contracts and slippage in the shipbuilding programme as a result of a 
prolonged industrial dispute meant that it was almost a relief when 
Maritime Fruit cancelled orders for three ships of 333,000 tons 
deadweight at the end of 1974. This was expected to improve the 
delivery position of the remaining three vessels ordered at the same 
time.
The review carried out following Mr. Orme's Duly 1974 statement 
revealed that the £38m provision for losses in the company's accounts 
for 1973 as published in November 1974 would have to be increased by 
over £22m. In a further statement to the Commons in March 1975,
Mr. Orme announced that the government had concluded that the only 
satisfactory way in which the company could be financially reconstructed 
was for the government to be the sole shareholder.^ New contracts 
would require the approval of the Secretary of State. By this stage 
the promised discussion paper on worker participation had been sent 
to unions and management, and the government hoped that this would 
influence the attitudes of those in the yard. One of the forms which 
this participation eventually took was a restructured board with a 
chairman and fifteen members comprising equal numbers of executive 
directors, worker directors and government-nominated directors.
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6 HC Deb., 26 March 1975, cols. 496-507
Harland and Wolff was taken into full public ownership under the
n 'I 
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Shipbuilding Industry (No.2) (Northern Ireland) Order - the normal 
procedure for Northern Ireland legislation under direct rule - which 
was debated in the House of Commons at the beginning of August 1975.^ 
The order limited the amount of new public money to be provided to 
£60m but the financial reconstruction of the company also involved in 
part the writing off and in part the capitalisation of existing loans 
from the government. Between 1966 and March 1975 about £59m had 
been given in special assistance to Harland and Wolff, together with 
about £22m in standard assistance, including REP. If all the money 
was taken up under the new order, the company would have received a 
total of £119m in special assistance (excluding standard assistance) 
between January 1966 to March 1979. However, by June 1976 only about 
£20m of the new assistance remained unspent.
The government's attitude to providing assistance to Harland and 
Wolff continued to be complicated by the yard's role as a major 
employer in an area of civil strife and the symbolic value which the 
yard took on in the context of fears in Ulster about intentions by the 
government and British industry to begin an economic withdrawal from 
the province as a prelude to political withdrawal. These fears of 
economic withdrawal were increased by the government's refusal to 
include Harland and Wolff in British Shipbuilders under its nationalis­
ation proposals} although the company was wholly owned by the 
government, the shares were held by the Northern Ireland Department of 
Commerce. The view expressed by Mr. Day, chief executive designate 
of British Shipbuilders, was that Harland and Wolff was a political 
question in the Northern Ireland context and they did not intend to
7. HC Deb., 1 August 1975, cols. 274-529.
n  C'1
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try to mix politics with a commercial organisation - as if shipbuilding
8policy had ever done anything elsel The prospects are that the 
government will again have to decide in 1977 whether to provide yet 
more funds to Harland and liiolff, and the special political consider­
ations involved make it likely that it will agree to do so*
7*3*3 Govan Shipbuilders
When Govan Shipbuilders had been formed in 1972 the government under­
took to support the company until it attained commercial viability or 
for five years, and agreed to commit up to £35m in aid, including 
assistance for the modernisation of facilities (see section 6*3.6). 
However, a report from the Public Accounts Committee in 1975 revealed 
that delays in starting and carrying out work on the facilities meant 
that substantial parts would not be in operation until late 1976 at
the earliest, up to two years longer than Hill Samuel had originally 
gestimated. Productivity had been projected to double by the end 
of 1977, but so far there had been no discernible improvement at all; 
losses on fixed-price contracts accepted by the company up to the end 
of 1973 were now expected to be £22m, an increase of £8.5m.
Critical assumptions about productivity and the level of losses had 
therefore been falsified.
Figures subsequently issued by the Department of Industry quoted
a figure of £29.2m at 1972 prices as the originally proposed direct
assistance (the remainder of the £35m was to come from regional
development grants and shipbuilding construction grants); this figure
represented £42.2m at 1975 survey prices, of which £37.5m had been
10spent by the end of Dune 1975. The corporate plan which Govan
8. Times, 10 Dune 1976.
g. HC 374, Session 1974-5, para. 64.
10. HC Oeb., 7 August 1975, written answers cols. 506-7.
Shipbuilders submitted to the Department of Industry in 1975 forecast 
that the company would not be making profits until 1978, and that 
further funds would be necessary to allow the company to complete 
the redevelopment programme and to support it until it achieved 
viability.
Accompanied by the usual ritual incantation - ’The company clearly 
cannot expect to continue to receive Government subsidies to cover 
its losses indefinitely' - the government announced that it would 
provide further funds 'in view of the 5,320 jobs which the company 
provide in an area of exceptionally high unemployment, and of the 
company's forecast that it will be making profits in 1978'.11 This 
assistance was to take the form of a further £6.9m in loans at 1975 
survey prices in addition to the £4.7m still outstanding, an extension 
of the support period to the end of 1979, and the provision of funds 
of up to £10.3m at 1975 survey prices to cover the losses which the 
company expected to incur on existing contracts in 1975, 1976 and 1977. 
It should be noted that these new funds were in addition to the 
conversion of the original aid into larger nominal sums at 1975 prices, 
so this new aid cannot be attributed to the effects of inflation in 
the way that some of the escalation of assistance in the late 1960s 
could be explained.
The company continued to have difficulty in securing orders at 
prices which could conceivably produce a profit. Govan lost an order 
for six cargo ships for Kuwait to a South Korean yard in April 1976 
despite government approval to quote a potentially loss-making price.
The winning of an order from another Kuwait customer for six similar 
ships the following month provided a breathing space. However, the
1 1 . Mr. Eric Varley, Secretary of State for Industry, HC Deb..
7 August 1975, written answers col. 507.
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firm * s continuing difficulties make it almost certain that the 
government either directly or through British Shipbuilders will have 
to decide whether to provide assistance in addition to that announced 
by Mr. Varley in August 1975. Like Harland and Wolff, special 
political considerations, though of a different nature, apply to the 
Govan yard. In the Strathclyde Region the Labour Party took 26 of 
the 33 seats at the October 1974 election (though two of the MPs have 
since defected to the new Scottish Labour Party). The Scottish 
National Party came second in 23 of these 26. These figures suggest 
that at least a Labour government is likely to agree to a request for 
further aid.
7.3.4 Coming back for more
The important point to bear in mind when reading through these 
detailed figures is that both Harland and Wolff and Govan Shipbuilders 
(as the successor to UCS) had once again been given 'once and for all* 
assistance, and continued to absorb a large proportion of the total 
special assistance to shipbuilding firms. This further aid cannot be 
explained simply in terms of increased costs due to inflation. That 
the idea of firms coming back for more is not merely journalistic 
impressionism or confined to the shipbuilding industry is confirmed 
by a glance at the list of firms to which the IRC gave aid in the late 
1960s, which reveals a number of firms, headed by British Leyland, 
which received further special assistance in the 1970s,1^ This 
implies that attempting to make such firms viable by providing pump­
priming aid is rather difficult to achieve in practice. The 
willingness of governments to inject further aid despite earlier
12. See Young elth Loee, 1974, pp.231-6, for a H s t  of flrnls uhich 
received IRC aid. •LLM
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declarations to the contrary has, not surprisingly, reduced the 
credibility of such declarations and the extent to which those in 
the firms concerned feel compelled to make the necessary adjustments 
to eliminate dependence on future public support.
7.4 DRYPOOL* AN INTERESTING CASE OF NON—INTERVENTION 
The Drypool shipbuilding and engineering company, which operated three 
shipyards on Humberside and employed about 1,200 workers, ran into 
financial difficulties in the summer of 1975. It had originally 
been formed with SIB assistance in 1969 (see section 5.2.6), and was 
included in the list of companies to be nationalised in the abandoned 
Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill of the 1974-5 Session.
However, the government refused to provide assistance to rescue the 
company, both £2m requested in CJune and a later request for £10 a head 
subsidy for twenty-six weeks and some small orders to be placed within 
that period. A receiver and manager was therefore appointed at the 
beginning of September; the irony of this act of non-intervention 
by a Labour government was underlined when the receiver was named as 
none other than Mr. Robert C. Smith, the UCS liquidator! The 
government did provide £325,000 to allow the receiver to make a complete 
assessment of the situation, A report prepared by Mr. Smith and 
submitted to the Department of Industry in October 1975 concluded that 
the only hope of preserving most of the job's was to split the group up 
and that the group ’as presently structured has no commercial logic 
behind it' - a rather devastating criticism of a group formed with 
assistance from the SIB under the merger philosophy and held by the SIB 
as a model for other small yards to follow. 1 3 Far from coming to the 
rescue of the Drypool yards, the government excluded the group from the
13 Times, 11 October 1975
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new version of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill for the 
1975-6 Session. The government defeated by 248 votes to 42 an attempt 
by Hull Labour MPs to include Drypool in the Bill at report stage.
At first sight this refusal by a Labour government to intervene 
does not seem to conform to the general pattern of intervention under 
both Labour and Conservative governments in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. On reflection, however, it will be noted that assistance has 
overwhelmingly been focussed on large yards in areas of well above 
average unemployment. Although the Drypool yards were in an 
intermediate area, unemployment in Yorkshire and Humberside at 4.1$ 
(seasonally adjusted) in the third quarter of 1975 was slightly less 
than average of 4.2$ for Great Britain. The total workforce of 1,200 
was relatively small, and the three yards at Hull, Selby and Beverley 
were fairly dispersed, with no single yard employing much more than 
450 workers. Although there was a campaign to save the company, backed 
by Humberside Labour MPs, the government evidently felt that the 
political costs were worth bearing even though the sums of money 
which would have been needed to rescue the company would have been small 
relative to those given to other yards. The refusal to rescue 
Drypool therefore provides a useful counter-example which will assist 
the delimitation of the circumstances in which a government is likely 
to intervene.
7.5 OTHER DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE GOVERNMENT 
7.5.1 Maritime Fruit Carriers
Many of the orders placed in the UK during the order boom in 1973 had 
come from a single company - Maritime Fruit Carriers. Orders for six 
333,000 ton tankers were placed with Harland and Uolff and orders for 
thirteen ships with options for thirteen more were placed with Swan 
Hunter. Scott Lithgow received orders for two 260,000 tons deadweight
Lf '
tankers. At the end of 1975 2 5 %  of the UK shipbuilding industry's
order book was accounted for by Maritime Fruit contracts. Maritime
Fruit aimed to finance its shipbuilding programme by borrowing on the
basis of the prospects of future income from the ships it was having
built; this was an approach which could work well if the demand for
ships continued to increase, but could spell disaster if demand
contracted, as it did abruptly following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and
the subsequent oil price rise. Swan Hunter's exposure to this risk
was increased by its 2 5 %  stake in Swan Maritime, which was established
with Maritime Fruit to own and charter ships built by Swan Hunter and
to sell ships to independent owners. Reservations about the company
and its policy and the extent to which British shipyards had come to
depend on it do not rely solely on the benefit of hindsight - in March
1973 The Observer published a special article on Maritime Fruit which
argued: 'But a close look at Maritime suggests that it is far from wisB
that the future of British yards should be so dependent on orders 
14from one group*. The article pointed to Maritime Fruit's previous
cash shortage, lack of xnformation about who was chartering some of 
the tankers which were to be built, and the extent to which profits 
in 1972 had depended on a British tax postponement device. The 
government was involved in the new orders to the extent that it had to 
give guarantees for loans to finance the orders; to have refused to 
have given these guarantees would have been to deny the shipbuilding 
industry what seemed to be an opportunity for expansion.
After the oil price rise it was inevitable that Maritime Fruit 
would get into difficulties, and from autumn 1974 onwards the company 
tried to stave off bankruptcy. Three of the tankers ordered from
14. Observer. 18 March 1973.
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Harland and Wolff were cancelled at the end of 1974* Nine of the 
thirteen options held by Swan Maritime to build ships at Swan Hunter 
were cancelled* Talks involving the company, shipowners, the
government and banks were initially aimed at renegotiating loans and 
trying to avert the seizure of ships because of default on payments. 
However, seizure of some ships did take place in 1976, including six 
seized by the British government. Talks continued through the summer 
of 1976 about transferring the ownership of some of Maritime Fruit's 
refrigerated ships as a way of reducing the company's debt* One 
interested company, American-owned Sea Containers, sought government 
support for its rescue plans, claiming that the government's financial 
exposure through loans and guarantees would otherwise be £104m.
Later negotiations centred on the attempt by Cunard to gain control of 
the remaining British—registered ships of the Maritime Fruit fleet.
Apart from its involvement through credit guarantees, the government was 
a l s o  concerned in talks about the future of Maritime Fruit to avert 
the employment consequences of further cancellations of orders from 
British yards.
7.5.2 Other developments
The dramatic fall in shipbuilding orders after 1973 (illustrated in 
fig. 6.1 ) meant that despite orders accumulated in the boom a number of 
shipyards were beginning to run short of work by 1976. Despite signs 
of a slight rise in orders in 1976, the inflow of new orders was less 
than the rate of c o m p l e t i o n  o f  o l d  orders. The shining exception 
was Austin and Pickersgill, which continued to attract orders for its 
SD14 design; however, the company did receive its first injection of 
public funds in the form of a £9m loan. The government stepped in
to plug some of the gaps in order books: Swan Hunter's difficulties 
resulting from the cancellation of orders by Maritime Fruit were
ameliorated by the placing of contracts for a destroyer and an anti­
submarine cruiser. Perhaps the most bizarre rescue of a shipbuilding 
company mas that of Robb Caledon, which got into difficulties in 1975 
because of a loss resulting from labour problems and cost overruns.
The company was saved by an injection of £2.5m guaranteed by none 
other than the Post Office, whose involvement arose from an order for 
two cable repair ships from the company.
The shipbuilders' opposition to nationalisation did not prevent 
them from seeking government involvement in the form of increased 
general assistance for the industry. General assistance did come in 
1975 as part of a scheme designed to cushion the effects of rising 
costs on export contracts for capital goods. Exporters or buyers were 
expected to bear cost increases of up to 1 0$ but the government would 
cover 85$ of cost increases within a 10$ band above that level.
However, because the scheme applied only to new contracts and few new 
orders for ships were being placed, it had little immediate impact.
The scheme was extended in 1976 to cover orders from British shipowners 
placed in British yards.
The specialist warshipbuilders did not suffer from the collapse in 
merchant ship orders and were normally better sheltered from the effects 
of inflation in their contracts with the Ministry of Defence. However, 
problems of a different sort did occur. Both the Expenditure Committee 
and the Public Accounts Committee drew attention to a number of severe 
delays in warship construction, arising in part from modifications 
requested by the Ministry of Defence, and the associated increases in 
costs. In particular, the Public Accounts Committee criticised the 
Ministry of Defence over a provision for additional payments for
15. HC 155, Session 1975-6, paras. 23-7; HC 556, Session 1975-6,
paras. 1-14.
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exceptional dislocation and delay; Britain's principal warship- 
builders had successfully claimed nearly £23m in additional payments 
from the Ministry of Defence,
7.6 NATIONALISATION PROPOSALS
The Labour Party's proposals to nationalise the shipbuilding industry 
were developed in Opposition between 1970 and 1974 in conjunction with 
the TUC and the CSEU, Discussion documents were exchanged between the 
Labour Party and the trade unions on such issues as compensation terms, 
initial capital, worker participation and the future structure of the 
industry. The proposals as agreed between the Labour Party, the TUC 
and the CSEU were set out in 1973 in a pamphlet entitled Nationalisation 
of Shipbuilding Ship-repair and Marine Engineering. This listed five 
grounds for nationalisation; (l) no other industry had failed to 
increase its absolute output for twenty-five years in a period when 
world output had grown fourfold; (2 ) no other industry, with the 
exception of the aircraft industry, had received so much public finance 
and support; shipbuilding would continue to require that support;
(3 ) few other industries had fqiled to modernise and re-equip to the 
disastrous degree of shipbuilding and shiprepairing; (4) the history 
of labour relations in the industry, despite recent improvement, had 
been poor; (5) the coming few years would continue to be difficult 
for shipbuilding internationally; the industry needed a clear and firm 
national strategy, which could only come from a nationalised shipbuilding
organisation.
The SRNA launched a publicity campaign designed to improve the 
industry's image and to counter the threat of nationalisation.
16. Labour Party, 1973.
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However, the tinning was far too late to have any effect; the February
1974 election campaign was already under way before the first
advertisement appeared. The SRNA's campaign therefore had some of
the characteristics of »fire brigade* campaigns, which are generally
less likely to be effective than preventative or long-term campaigns
17to promote a favourable image.
In August 1974 the Labour government reaffirmed its commitment to 
nationalising shipbuilding, shiprepairing and marine engineering and 
published a 'discussion paper' which was to form the basis of 
consultations with interested parties. All major shipbuilding companies 
were to come under the new nationalised corporation except Harland and 
Wolff, which was to remain under the Northern Ireland Office.
Marathon, the oil rig company which had taken over the Clydebank yard, 
was not included, an exclusion which later proved of great 
parliamentary significance. The SRNA's response was to offer what was 
essentially a corporatist approach: a Shipbuilding Council would be 
established through which government, trade unions and shipbuilders 
would develop and administer a national shipbuilding policy, including 
the allocation of state aid. With the return of a Labour government 
in October 1974 with an effective majority (which showsd signs of 
disappearing by 1976) the SRNA, though still opposed in principle to 
nationalisation, began to accept it as inevitable and concentrated on 
trying to improve the terms.
In March 1975 the government announced its intention of bringing 
in a Bill to nationalise the aircraft and shipbuilding industries 
(including shiprepairing and marine engineering). Compensation was to 
be based on the average value of quoted securities during the six months
17 Finer, 1966, pp.93-101
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ended 28 February 1974 (the date of the general election); where this 
did not apply, valuation would be determined as though there had been 
quoted securities. These terms were later attacked by shipbuilders 
as relating to a depressed period in the stock market; the effect of 
the compensation terms was not very clear since few of the shipyards 
were quoted as 'pure* shipbuilding companies. The Bill was 
introduced in the Commons in flay 1975, but because of the pressure of 
other legislation it was postponed to the following session. The Bill 
was reintroduced at the beginning of the 1975-6 Session, minus Drypool, 
but with the same compensation terms, despite the delay.
The government’s proposals set a limit of £300m for capital 
and loans from the National Loans Fund for British Shipbuilders. The 
amount which would be required for compensation had still not been 
worked out, however. The Bill required British Shipbuilders to have 
full regard to the need to promote industrial democracy so that the 
workers would be entitled by law to be involved in decisions affecting 
their jobs; the new nationalised body was seen as being different from 
the traditional nationalised industries. During the committee stage 
of the bill the government also made it clear that it expected the 
industry to have a decentralised structure with individual yards 
retaining a considerable degree of autonomy. British Shipbuilders, 
as such, would have a staff of only about 100. One still unresolved 
issue is the location of the headquarters of the new body. The 
government had originally committed itself to putting the headquarters 
in an assisted area with a shipbuilding background, but the organising 
committee of British Shipbuilders, displaying a certain degree of 
awareness of the location of political power in Great Britain, wanted 
the headquarters to be in London. All the financial and political 
institutions with which British Shipbuilders would have to deal are in
London, as are the head offices of many shipowners.
As usual for such bodies, the names of those who would serve on 
the board of British Shipbuilders were announced in advance of final 
parliamentary approval of the relevant legislation, though on this 
occasion this was itot a formality. The chairman, Admiral Sir 
Anthony Griffin, until then Controller of the Navy, and the chief 
executive and deputy chairman, Mr. Graham Day, chief executive of 
Cammell Laird, were named as early as December 1975. Subsequent 
appointments were announced during 1976.
The passage of the government's Aircraft and Shipbuilding 
Industries Bill did not conform to the usual by which a Bill moves 
smoothly through second reading, committee and report stages in which 
only minor or clarificatory amendments are made, and a set-piece debate 
during the third reading. In the first place, the Bill set up a 
Commons record by being fifty-eight days in committee. Wore 
importantly, on 26 flay 1976 between the committee and report stages the 
Speaker accepted the contention by a Conservative backbencher, 
fir. Robin flaxwell-Hyslop, that an oil platform constructed by flarathon 
was a 'ship', and that since flarathon was not included in the Bill the 
Bill was hybrid. (When it took over the Clydebank yard flarathon had 
been given an undertaking by the Conservative government, backed by 
the Labour Opposition, that the yard would not be nationalised).
Under the procedure for hybrid Bills the Bill would have gone to a 
Select Committee where companies affected by the legislation could have 
petitioned for equal treatment with flarathon. However, the government 
decided to put a motion the following day which would avoid having to 
put the Bill through hybrid procedure. On a Conservative amendment 
to the motion there was a tie and the Speaker, in conformity to custom, 
cast his vote against the amendment; however, according to the same
custom the Speaker would have voted against the government motion if 
there had been a tie on the next division. This did not arise, as 
a government whip who had a pairing arrangement was instructed to vote 
and the government scraped through with a single vote. This provoked 
uproar in the House and the suspension of communication between the 
whips' offices.
In a conciliatory gesture, the government first of all postponed 
further consideration of the Sill and then, following discussions 
between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, agreed to 
hold a rerun of the controversial vote on 30 June (after the return of 
a Labour MP as a result of a by election). However, on this occasion 
the Scottish and Welsh Nationalists abstained as a result of a deal by 
which the government agreed to consider introducing an amendment to 
ensure the creation of 'a recognised Scottish entity* within British 
Shipbuilders and assurances about Welsh shiprepairing (later denied by 
the government). The government wouldNprobably just have scraped 
through even with nationalist opposition, but this could not have been 
known in advance. The government's amendment when it was published 
provided for British Shipbuilders to seek the largest possible degree 
of decentralisation of management and decision taking to separate 
profit centres in shipbuilding and shiprepairing areas, including 
Scotland and Wales. This failed to satisfy the nationalists, who 
announced their intention of voting against the third reading. The 
government, reinforced by another MP returned by a by-selection, won 
a vote on 20 Duly to guillotine the Bill; motions to guillotine four 
other Bills were passed on the same day - an indication of the extent 
to which the government's legislative timetable had been disrupted as 
a result of the dispute. The Bill finally passed its third reading
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on 29 Duly by a majority of three.
However, the Bill ran into further difficulties in the House of 
Lords. Amongst other things, Lords amendments curtailed the Secretary 
of State's powers to intervene, made owners' compensation subject to 
arbitration and exempted from nationalisation the twelve shiprepairing 
companies and the three specialist naval builders. All these amend­
ments were overturned in the Commons, some by the narrowest of margins.
f
When the Bill again returned to the Lords, the only amendments they 
insisted on reinstating were those dealing with shiprepairing.
However, the government refused to allow the Bill to go forward without 
the inclusion of shiprepairing, and after shuttling backwards and 
forwards between the Lords and the Commons in the dying days of the 
1975-6 Session, the Bill lapsed when Parliament was prorogued on 22 
November 1976.
The government's intention was to reintroduce the Bill in December 
1976, a year after the second reading of the 1975-6 Bill. Under the 
Parliament Act 1949 the Lords would not be able to exercise a veto on 
the Bill or any part of it. However, it is by no means certain that 
the government will be able to ensure the passage of the Bill early in 
the 1976-7 Session. First of all, the government may lose its 
effective majority in the Commons as a result of deaths or by-election 
defeats and be defeated on the Bill or parts of it. Secondly, because 
of the legislative chaos likely to result from the domination of the 
session by the Devolution Bill, the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries 
Bill (mark three) may be delayed if the Lords sit on it by delaying 
their consideration of it. Whatever the arguments for and against 
nationalisation itself, the effect of the prolonged argument on the 
issue (over three years at a minimum) can have done nothing to increase 
the confidence of the shipbuilding industry or its willingness to take
.
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long-term decisions»
The curtailed passage of the Bill to nationalise shipbuilding 
(and the aircraft industry) was characterised by a number of novel 
features: the action of a backbencher in throwing the government's 
timetable into confusion, the breaking of a pairing agreement, the 
temporary suspension of relations between Opposition and government, 
behind the scenes legislative bargaining between government and minority 
parties, mass guillotining of bills, the insistence of the House of 
Lords on an amendment unacceptable to the government, and the 
subsequent lapsing of the Bill. However, apart from the original 
technical point which sparked this off, these f e a t u r e s  were not the 
result of some intrinsic characteristic of the shipbuilding industry 
or the Bill, but of the government's lack of a reliable majority.
If this lack of a steady majority continues for long we can expect
some of these elements to become more common features in the legislative
process.
7,7 A SCENARIO FOR THE FUTURE
As fir. Day, chief executive-designate of British Shipbuilders has
admitted, 'Nationalisation per se is not a solution for the British
shipbuilding industry's current problems, or for its more traditional 
18one'. Bearing in mind the wide range of influences outlined in 
chapter 1 , the nature of g_wnership of the industry will arguably make 
little difference - especially since the industry was already half 
state-owned already. In principle there could be certain economies 
of scale in marketing and design by having a single national 
organisation, but many of these hypothetical advantages are unlikely 
to materialise fully under the decentralised structure proposed. 
(iiorkeyParticipation may give rise to hopes of changes in attitudes, but
18. Times, 31 March 1976
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Harland and Wolff reminds us that worker participation does not 
necessarily imply profitable operations.
Disturbingly, the formation of British Shipbuilders bears many 
points of resemblance to the formation of UCS. A collection of yards 
with different styles of management and varying degrees of 
profitability are being lumped together under the same organisation. 
Redundancies in some yards will clearly be needed - as the Industry 
Secretary himself has emphasised - but, presumably in order 
temporarily to placate the unions, where, when and how large these 
redundancies are to be has not been specified, and therefore no 
specific measures to absorb them as they occur are being prepared.
The nationalised body will start life without a corporate plan - it is 
not expected to begin until 1978. In a report issued in August 1976 
the Public Accounts Committee called for a 'realistic and 
comprehensive strategy' before further state support is provided.^ 
However, this is just wishful thinking. Decisions are clearly going 
to have to be taken about the future of individual yards before the 
corporate plan is ready.
It can be expected that these decisions will be influenced by
political considerations and that the government will be unwilling to
leave them solely to British Shipbuilders. Indeed, fir. Day has made
it clear that in the case of unprofitable operations 'it will not be
20us fBritish Shipbuilders!) who close any yards'. The state body's
role would be to discuss the issue with the government. If the 
decision was to continue operations in a particular yard, the role of 
British Shipbuilders would be to act as administrator.
19. HC 556, Session 1975-6, para. 33.
20. Times, 28 October 1976.
If it is accepted that governments seek particularly to avoid 
large-scale redundancies in areas of high unemployment then it can 
be expected that the government will be unwilling to let all the 
yards making up any one pre-nationalisation firm close at the same time 
For example, the government is more likely to close one of the Scott 
Lithgow yards and the Scotstoun yard at Govan Shipbuilders rather than 
to close down Govan altogether. It can be predicted that a number of 
the remaining yards will require what will amount to a government 
subsidy, including yards which have already received considerable 
amounts of government assistance. In addition, because the problem 
in the mid 1970s is one of shortage of orders as well as lack of 
competitiveness the government may become involved in the speculatative 
building of ships. When the corporate plan eventually emerges, it can 
be guaranteed to show the need for considerable amounts of public 
funds.
In conclusion, the nationalisation of shipbuilding can certainly 
not be expected to remove the industry from the government's political
agenda.
CHAPTER 8
INFORMATION IN THE POLICY PROCESS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the role of the collection and appraisal of 
information in the shipbuilding policy process. It is concerned 
not only with the collection of information to assist policy 
formulation, but with monitoring the effects of government policy 
during the implementation stage and the relationship between 
monitoring information and information used in policy formulation.
In carrying out this examination, attention will be paid not only to 
the technical aspects of information requirements but also to their 
political implications.
8.2 REACTING TO PROBLEMS AND ANTICIPATING PROBLEMS
In chapter 1 it was suggested that problems confronting governments 
could be analysed in terms of two aspects: (1 ) the situation which 
the government wishes to avert; (2 ) the causes of the situation 
which the government wishes to avert. Information about the first 
aspect of a problem (e.g. the number of men about to be made 
redundant) is relatively easy to come by compared to information about 
the second aspect. However, British governments do not appear to be 
particularly good at spotting even this first aspect of a problem in 
advance. Even when the government is aware that a company is in 
difficulties, as with UCS in 1971 and Court Line in 1974, it may be 
surprised when the company announces that it is in immediate danger 
of collapsing altogether. This lack of anticipation is not confined 
to involvement in shipbuilding; the Expenditure Committee severely 
criticised the government over the rescue of the Chrysler car company
at the end of 1975s 'The Department's failure to see,- and certainly 
to bs prepared for the results of - some very plain indicators of 
(Chrysler UK's} intrinsic weakness is startling in view of the close 
contacts they told us they maintained with the company'. The 
committee concluded that the government had been at a disadvantage 
throughout the negotiations, partly because of the Chrysler 
Corporation's greater awareness of the situation.
Once a firm is in immediate danger, the government hardly has to 
seek out information that there is a problem - it will be asked to take 
action by management, shop stewards and local PIPs. Indeed, without 
these representations the problem could hardly be defined as a political 
one. However, the need to take a quick decision may leave the 
government with little time to assess the nature or scale of the 
problem or analyse the implications of various kinds of intervention.
The government may hold urgent talks with representatives of the firm 
concerned, but it may not have the time to assess the reliability of 
the information provided by the firm or to seek outside advice. Dust
how unreliable such information can be, and how quickly it can be 
shown to be inadequate was illustrated by the politically embarrass­
ing Court Line affair (see section 7.2). The extent to which the 
government has to rely on information at such times from a management 
which has got into difficulties is an example of a more general 
problem which governments face when seeking information about problems. 
Governments can rarely collect all the information they need 
directly: 'our interpretations are seldom based on our own 
observations; they rely heavily on the interpretations offered by 
others. Our trust in the interpretations is clearly dependent on
1 HC 596-1, Session 1975-6, para. 104
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our trust in the interpreters'.
One argument in favour of adopting a more anticipatory approach 
is that it is only in this way that there will be sufficient time to 
analyse the causes of a ptoblem and devise solutions to treat these 
problems (or to avoid them) rather than treat only the symptoms. An 
understanding of the economic environment in which the industry 
operates is necessary if proposed solutions are to be appropriate.
It is hardly original to suggest that governments should seek more 
information before taking action; in 1918 the Haldane Committee 
concluded:
'after surveying what came before us, that in the sphere of
civil government the duty of investigation and thought, as a
preliminary to action, might with great advantage be more
definitely recognised. It appears to us that adequate
provision has not been made in the past for the organised
acquisition of facts and information, and for the systematic
application of thought, as preliminary to the settlement of
3policy and its subsequent administration*.
However, there are both technical and political constraints on 
the extent to which an anticipatory approach and the advance collect­
ion of information are likely to be carried out by the British 
government. On the technical or administrative side, the government 
could in principle try to anticipate problems. At the beginning of 
chapter 3 it was suggested that there were indicators of performance, 
particularly share of world market, which could provide a warning to 
the government of possible future problems and the need for further 
investigation. At a conceptual level, this is similar to the mixed
2. March and Olsen, 1975, p.155.
3. Cd 9230, para. 12; quoted in Chapman, 1973, p.187.
scanning approach advocated by Etzioni, in which a broad scanning of 
all options is combined with detailed anlysis of areas revealed by 
the broad scanning as requiring in—depth examination.^ However, 
even after focussing on shipbuilding as a potential problem industry, 
the information requirements for adopting a planning approach to 
policy for the industry would still be formidable. The type of 
information required for shipbuilding policy planning and the 
characteristics of that information are set out in table 8.1. It cai 
be seen that this information attempts to take into account all the 
various influences on the industry illustrated in fig, 1.4.
Table 8.1 Information for policy planning
Types of information!
1* Environmental, information describing the social and economic 
aspects of the 'climate* in which the industry operates or may 
operate in the future. This information must take into account the 
effects of other domestic government policies on the industry.
2« Information about actions by other governments describing the 
past, present and likely future level of involvement by other 
governments.
3* Information about the industry indicating the industry's own 
strengths and weaknesses, particularly those factors making for 
success or failure in that industry.
Characteristics of information:
1. Information for p l a n n i n g  s h o u l d  n o t be compartmentalised by 
functions or institutional boundaries.
2. The i n f o r m a t i o n  s h o u l d  c o v e r  long time periods and show trends. 
It should attempt to assess future developments.
3. Non-financial and non-statistical data are important.
4. Wot c o n c e r n e d  with m i n u t e  details.
Note* Cf. Daniel (1971, pp.64-70)
4. Etzioni, 1967.
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As uib have already seen in section 1.4.2 and throughout the 
subsequent chapters, forecasting information quickly becomes out-of- 
date. This in itself does not rule out a planning approach, but it 
does require that information for policy planning must be continually 
reviewed rather than collected only at long intervals. The 
collection of information for planning is, of course, only one type 
of information required in the policy process. Information about 
the detailed effects of a policy will be necessary if adjustments are 
to be made to the way the policy is being implemented to ensure that 
maximum progress is being made towards fulfilling policy objectives. 
The types of information required for monitoring the effects of a 
policy in this way are set out in table 8.2.
Table 8.2 Information for monitoring
Types of information:
1. Statistical information. Management accounts^production 
statistics, cash flow statistics, profit figures, sales figures.
2. Non-statistical information. State of labour relations, quality 
of management, effects on local community.
Characteristics of information!
1. Information for monitoring should keep to organisational lines so 
that performance can be measured better and faults more readily 
identified.
2. The information will normally cover short time periods. It will 
largely relate to the past, but should enable future problems to be 
identified.
3. Non-financial and non-statistical data are important.
4. Largely concerned with detail.
As well as providing information for adjustments to the 
detailed application of a policy, monitoring information would also be 
used to enable the identification of design faults in the original
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plan and the alteration of objectives or budgets. Similarly, those 
responsible for monitoring and evaluation would need to be aware 
of the information used in policy planning to enable assessment of 
the extent to which deviations from desired performance are due to 
exogenous changes in the environment, poor performance within the 
firm, or inadequate impact of the policy whose effect is being 
measured. This would complete the idealised feedback model for 
information in a planning approach illustrated in fig. 8.1 .^
When we turn from this idealised model to the real world in 
which it would have to be applied, certain difficulties become 
apparent. First of all, some of the desired information may not be 
available - the actual effects of shipbuilding closures may not be 
known because the regional multipliers are not known. Secondly, the 
collection and appraisal of the information which is available will 
represent a diversion of resources which might have been used to help 
the industry itself.
More decisive in practice than the technical difficulties of 
developing an information system to assist a planned approach are the 
political factors which militate against the anticipatory approach 
which is a necessary prelude to planning. At any given time the 
total demands on the government's time and economic resources will be 
far greater than its ability to meet them. There is a temptation for 
governments to concentrate on current problems requiring action now 
rather than hypothetical problems where any adverse political effects 
of not taking action now will not occur until the future - and 
perhaps affect a different party. Because of the frequent reshuffling
5. For an analysis of the role of feedback models in political
science, see Deutsch, 1966.
Fie. 8. Id63.j. is6d model ox ini’oirma'fcion xn a planning approach
INFORMATION FOR 
MONITORING
(see table 8.2)
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of cabinet posts, an individual minister also faces the temptation 
to concentrate on issues with an immediate impact since 'He knows 
that he will probably not be in the same post long and may therefore 
not be held personally responsible for the consequences of his 
policies'.*’ Similarly, civil servants are likely to have moved on 
before any hypothetical crisis actually materialises.
On the other side of the coin, the rewards for foresight for both 
politicians and civil servants are negligible, and are just as likely 
to be reaped by others as by those actually responsible for the 
anticipatory action. The government is likely to regard the current 
political agenda as overcrowded without seeking to place further 
items on it. Real present problems will tend to crowd out 
hypothetical future ones.
Related to this is the problem of mobilising support for a 
policy. It may be necessary for a problem to become a real and 
present danger before it becomes possible to mobilise the support 
necessary to tackle it. This can be true within the government: as 
we saw in section 2.3, the Admiralty felt in the 1950s that the 
Treasury would not have been prepared to help with the reconstruction 
of the shipbuilding industry because the industry was not considered 
to be in difficulties. It can also be true of support for 
implementation of measures to tackle a problem: cooperation by 
management and unions may be seen as more likely if it is agreed that 
there is a crisis - though as chapter 5 showed, even then there may 
be difficulties.
Looked at in this way, we can understand why the Conservative 
government adopted the approach that it did in the late 1950s and
6 Headey, 1974, p.99
early 1960s. Even though there was increasing evidence that the 
industry would be in difficulties, the government chose not to 
intervene, partly because it had other problems to cope with, partly 
because it hoped that the labour market would cope with unemployment 
and partly because it hoped that the problem would never fully 
materialise. Only once the immediate problem had become obvious by 
1963 did the political costs of doing nothing seem too much.
By the mid 1960s the question of anticipating the shipbuilding 
industry as being a problem had become rather irrelevant, since it has 
been a continuous problem ever since. There might still have been a 
case for attempting to spot future problem firms within the industry, 
but this approach was not adopted (see particularly section 5.3.6).
If an anticipatory approach were to be adopted, an attempt would be 
made to identify firms at risk and direct aid to them in advance of 
any crisis. However, there are a number of difficulties with this 
approach. In the first place, it is impossible to be completely 
accurate in identifying firms at risk or quantifying the aid required. 
Secondly, discriminatory subsidies channelled only to firms considered 
to be at risk would arouse the ire of other firms in the industry, 
while indiscriminate subsidies to all firms in an industry are 
wasteful and most likely to be objected to and possibly matched by 
foreign competitors. As EEC readion to the Leyland and Chrysler 
rescues illustrates, rescue operations are regarded with less 
disfavour than subsidies devised to avert the need for such rescue 
operations in the first place.
This section has set out an idealised model of the information the 
government would need if it were to be at all successful in tackling 
the causes of the shipbuilding industry's problems, as well as 
examining some of the political reasons why such an approach might not
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be adopted. The following sections will examine the ways in which 
the government did collect and use information about the shipbuilding 
industry and assess the importance of information at various stages 
of the policy process.
8.3 THE ROLE OF INQUIRIES
8.3.1 Types of inquiry
Government-sponsored inquiries are one of the ways in which the 
government has sought to collect information about shipbuilding» 
though as will quickly become clear, these inquiries have not been 
solely to do with the collection of information. There has recently 
been a considerable amount of interest in the general role of 
inquiries in the British political system, though this has concent­
rated on their role in policy making rather than in the policy 
process as a whole.7 The recent literature has concentrated on 
royal commissions and departmental committees, though this is itself
an improvement on earlier work which considered only royal 
8commissions. However, this study of shipbuilding has shown that 
there are other forms which government-sponsored inquiries can take, 
and the role of consultants employed by the government has been 
particularly important. For the purposes of this study it is 
appropriate to divide inquiries into four types.
1.,_ Independent committee of inquiry. Some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of this type of inquiry have already been touched on in 
relation to the Geddes Committee in chapter 4. By definition it is 
composed of people with little specialist knowledge of the industry,
7. See Chapman, 1973; Rhodes, 1975; Cartwright, 1974. The much 
earlier Uheare, 1955, also has a chapter covering the whole 
range of committees to inquire (chapter IV).
. E.g. Hanser, 1965.8
and almost as soon as they have acquired some expertise they have to 
report and are disbanded. However good the committee, at least some 
of its recommendations are likely to be politically naive and 
committee members are unlikely to be fully aware of the problems of 
implementing its proposals. An advantage of this type of committee 
is that its independence may lead it to identify problems which those 
involved in the industry are reluctant to discuss. Independent 
committees can also perform a useful function in educating those 
making decisions affecting the industry. (This is similar to the 
'appreciative' role which Vickers describes royal commissions and
g
similar bodies as having). The Geddes Committee provides a very 
good example of this kind of inquiry. For some years after its 
publication its report was regarded almost as a bible for the 
industry. However, there are also dangers in this - people may pay 
, ireufficient attention to changes affecting the industry since the 
report was published,
2. Intra-industry inquiry. The SAC subcommittee on prospects was an 
example of inquiry of this type (see section 3.4). The disadvantages 
of this committee - disagreement between different interests on the 
committee and the politically unrealistic nature of many of its 
recommendations - are common to all committees of this sort* 'A 
Commission selected on^  the principle of representing various 
interests starts with a serious handicap against the probability of 
harmony in its work, and perhaps even of practical result from its 
labours'. Chapman suggests that it may be necessary to ensure that 
representatives of interests whose cooperation is necessary for
9. Vickers, 1965, p.50.
10. Cd 5235, para. 15; quoted in Chapman, 1973, p.179.
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implementing policies are included in a committee, but with the SAC
inquiry any advantages of this kind were outweighed by the lowest-
11common-denominator nature of the report.
3. Departmental inquiry. This refers to an examination of the 
industry by civil servants within a department with a view to 
preparing a report to be circulated to the industry, e.g. the DSIR 
Report (see section 3.3). Such inquiries should therefore be 
distinguished from internal departmental reviews of shipbuilding 
policy such as seem to have taken place in 1963-4, 1969-70, and 1971-2. 
The main advantages of this type of inquiry are that the department 
can draw on its own fund of information (much of the evidence to 
other types of inquiry comes from government departments), and in 
drawing policy conclusions will be more aware of the difficulties of 
implementing policies« The disadvantages are that any report 
produced may not seem to be objective, it may be politically 
embarrassing to have publicised strong criticisms of the industry 
made in a report, and it may prove difficult to secure acceptance of 
the report by the industry. Above all, a departmental inquiry runs 
the risk of failing to cover all influences affecting the industry 
or to take a sufficiently long-term approach (see section 8.1).
However, as was suggested in section 3.3, the DSIR Report can be 
regarded as one of the more successful reports in shipbuilding because 
its objectives were limited, realistic and capable of being influenced 
to a high degree by the government itself.
4. Inquiries by consultants. There are really two different 
functions which can be performed by reports from consultants (a term 
used here to include firms of accountants, merchant bankers and
11 Chapman, 1973, p«179
management consultants): (1 ) reports which could equally well have 
been prepared by committees, e.g. the Booz-Allen Report (see chapter 
6)j (2) work which because of the technical nature of the subject
matter is more appropriately carried out by consultants, e.g. the 
Hill Samuel Report on the formation of a new company to take over 
the UC5 yards (see section 6.3.6). m  general, reports from 
consultants are less likely than other types of inquiry to make 
specific policy recommendations - they are more likely to set out the 
implications of alternative courses of action. For the government 
such inquiries have the advantages of drawing on the acknowledged 
expertise of the consultants and having an air of objectivity. Since 
consultants can frequently produce a report more speedily than a 
committee this form of inquiry is particularly suitable when speedy 
advice rather than procrastination is sought. In addition to being 
employed directly by the government, consultants may also be employed 
by committees of inquiry to assist them in the more technical side of 
their work. The Geddes Committee used a firm of consultants in this 
way to provide them with a demand forecast (see section 1.4.2).
8.3.2 The purposes of inquiries
As well as discussing different types of inquiry we can analyse the 
different roles which inquiries can play. Each of the recent writers 
on the subject of committees of inquiry has suggested a number of 
purposes which committees or commissions can fulfil. Chapman lists 
the formulation of policy, a political role in the postponement to an 
indefinite future of decisions on embarrassing questions, the 
appreciation of a situation by the exposure of what the committee 
regards as the relevant facts, and an educational role in bringing to 
the attention of the public some of the issues involved in a
particular policy area*
Cartwright analyses the purposes of committees in terms of the 
extent to which they are concerned with obtaining information, 
advising the government on what sort of policy ought to be adopted, 
and making recommendations for action.12 3 14 He defines seven categories 
of purposes for committees? (a) to obtain information; (b) to 
obtain information and formulate policy; (c) to formulate policy;
(d) to formulate policy and propose action; (e) to propose action;
i' . .
(f) to obtain information and propose' action} (g) to.obtain information, 
formulate policy and propose action. The Geddes Committee vtes an example 
of the last category, since it combined all three functions.
Rhodes, in a chapter on the role of committees of inquiry in 
British government, adopts an interesting approach, since he seeks in 
his classification to link the reason for the use of committees with 
the probable consequences in terms of the ways in which governments
14
react to their reports. His fourfold classification is set out 
below, wxth a discussion of the relevance of each category to ship­
building inquiries.
1. ‘Committees set up reluctantly by a government under pressure, with 
the object of staving off that pressure; committee may well fail to 
agree, but in any case reports likely to be accepted to the extent that 
they recommend no action or only minor action». This sums up exactly 
the origins and fate of the SAC Report as described in section 3.4* 
the government set up the inquiry as a result of its embarrassment over 
the resignation of Sir Graham Cunningham and did hardly anything to 
implement the report's recommendations.
12. Chapman, 1973, p.184.
13. Cartwright, 1974, pp.101-4.
14. Rhodes, 1975, p.192.
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2. 'Committees set up to postpone an awkward issue; reports likely 
to be accepted to the extent that they indicate a solution not likely 
to be too troublesome'. There were no shipbuilding inquiries which 
fell clearly into this category, but if it is widened to include 
inquiries which were set up as a substitute for more decisive action, 
the 1963 MPBU inquiry into building components could be considered to 
fall into this category, though the report itself was of a highly 
technical nature (see section 3.5).
3. 'Committees set up because the government is in doubt qbout how 
an issue should be resolved; reports likely to be accepted to the 
extent that an acceptable solution is possible'. The Geddes Committee 
provides an example of this type; the government accepted the need for 
action of some kind but wanted advice on the approach which should be 
adopted. As we saw in chapter 4 it was happy to adopt the general 
approach suggested by Geddes. The DSIR Report could also be 
considered to fit into this category.
4. 'Committees set up where government is fairly clear what course
to adopt but needs independent backing before doing so; reports likely 
to be accepted to the extent that committee provides this backing'.
The Peat Marwick Mitchell Report (see section 3.4.2) is the best 
example of this kind of inquiry since it was clear that the government 
wished to take no action on cfedit facilities and commissioned the 
report in the expectation that it would show that lack of credit 
facilities had not been an important factor in the loss of orders by 
British yards. The Booz-Allen Report (see section 6.6) also fits 
into this category, since although the government was far from clear 
about its future policy at the time the report was commissioned, its 
objective was clearly to provide backing for the approach that it did 
decide to adopt rather than obtain advice on what that approach should
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be. It is interesting to note that both the reports in this category 
came not from committees of inquiry but from consultants, suggesting 
that this form of inquiry is the most suitable for governments which 
want to have 'independent1 back-up evidence rather than policy advice.
8.3.3 Role of inquiries in the policy process
The pattern that emerges from this examination of inquiries is one of 
a variety of forms of inquiry and a variety of purposes which they were 
expected to fulfil. They were not used as a systematic method of
collecting and appraising information relevant to policy making: 
their irregularity and the differing extent to which they attempted to 
collect information confirms this. Despite the difference in the types 
of inquiry they did have certain features in common. With the 
exception of the DSIR Report all were ad hoc arrangements with no 
continuing responsibility for reviewing their conclusions - even the 
SAC did not attempt to follow up the report of its subcommittee. The 
information contained in a report may quickly become outdated in an 
industry such as shipbuilding which is influenced by a large number of 
factors subject to rapid change. Insofar as the initial inquiry was 
a genuine exercise in collecting facts in a way not otherwise 
possible, this problem can only be resolved by setting up a further
• 4 15inquiry.
When a rapidly changing economic environment is combined with a 
separation between policy recommendations (Geddes Committee), policy 
decision (the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Technology) and 
policy implementation (the SIB and the Ministry of Technology) even 
the best report is likely to be left behind. Ad hoc inquiries by
1
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15. See also Dell, 1973, p.156
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apolitical bodies unaware of the political and administrative 
problems of implementation cannot be a substitute for continuous 
review. Edmund Dell, who was for a while a junior Labour minister 
at the Ministry of Technology, later said of the Geddes Report:
'Fed into a continuously learning administrative machine it 
would have dons some good. It would have alerted officials 
to important aspects of the industry. It would have improved 
the government's performance as 'sponsor' of the industry.
But it became a bible, a substitute for thought, a point of 
continuing reference when changed circumstances had made its 
recommendations much less relevant. In short, instead of an 
aid to learning it became a block in the way of learning.
The way to learn is to be involved in day-to-day administration',^6 
If the value of information and advice is reduced if it is not related 
to knowledge of what is involved in implementing proposals, then so 
also is the value of information about the detailed application of a 
policy if it is not fed back in a systematic way to those responsible 
for reappraising the policy for the industry.
Other aspects of the role of inquiries also take on a different 
light when viewed in terms of their place in the policy process as a 
whole rather than only their contribution to policy making. For 
example, one of the reasons for setting up the Geddes Committee rather 
than carrying out the inquiry within the Board of Trade was the 
department's workload. However, the temporary manpower gain in 
setting up a committee.looks less impressive when we find that the 
total number of civil servants plus SIB officials looking after the 
industry expanded markedly during the implementation stage (see section 
9.2.4).
16 Dell, 1973, p.170
Although the Geddes Report In particular can be seen as a brav/e
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attempt to adopt a longer term approach than simply reacting to 
individual crises, the setting up of inquiries is generally a 
reactive rather than an anticipatory act. The setting up of such an 
inquiry may be a reaction to political embarrassment (the SAC 
subcommittee) or to a clearly difficult situation for the industry 
where the government is unsure what action to take (the Geddes 
Committee). The role of inquiries can be seen, not so much as one 
of providing information for policy planning, as of the presentation 
of information and ideas which improve the chances of mobilising 
political support for policy proposals.
8.4 INTEREST GROUP REPRESENTATIONS AND ADVISORY COMMITTEES 
Information from interest groups in the industry provides a much more 
continuous source than government-sponsored inquiries. Ad hoc contacts 
between SRNA and the industry department took place as frequently as 
circumstances required; they were, for example, fairly frequent during 
the period in which the 8ooz-Allen Report was being prepared. Most 
of these contacts were between full-time officials of the SRNA and civil 
servants in the industry department (interview with former director of 
SRNA). More rarely, the president or other elected officials met 
ministers. Representations to the government about foreign government 
subsidies was part of the regular dialogue with the industry department; 
SRNA would tell the department if it thought that international 
agreements about credit terms had been breached. From time to time 
the Joint Industry Consultative Committee (JICC) which represented 
SRNA and the shipbuilding unions, would make a joint approach to the 
government. SRNA did on occasion coordinate with the Chamber of 
Shipping but, as was shown in section 5.5, the two industries are
often in competition for funds.
In addition to the ad hoc representations, there has for most of 
the period been a formal advisory committee for the shipbuilding 
industry. A PEP study on advisory committees in British government 
lists four advantages which advisory committees have over ad hoc 
arrangements: regularity, comprehensive personal contact, convenience,
17and formal commitment. While the last three do appear to apply to 
some extent to shipbuilding advisory committees, the first does not. 
Shipbuilding had no less than three successive advisory committees 
during the period; the (SBSRC) Shipbuilding and Ship Repairing Council 
replaced the (SAC) Shipbuilding Advisory Committee, and was in turn 
replaced by an Economic Development Committee (EDC).
The degree of discontinuity was even greater than this would 
suggest. Not only did the SAC fail to follow up the report of its 
own subcommittee, but it virtually ceased to function after the 
appointment of Vice-Admiral J.Hughes-Hallett as an additional 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport. Hughes-Hallett 
effectively acted as a channel for representations which might other­
wise have gone through SAC. With the setting up of the SBSRC in 
1967, the SAC ceased to exist. The SBSRC was appointed by the SIB, 
not by the government, and it was intended to act as a forum for the 
SIB to keep both sides of industry informed about its activities and 
to consult them about the state and prospects of shipbuilding, 
shiprepairing (over which the SIB had no powers) and marine engineering 
(for the work of the SBSRC see section 5.7.2). The SIB was required 
to recommend to the SB5RC appropriate machinery to replace the SBSRC's 
functions following its dissolution at the same time as the SIB. The
17 PEP, I960, p.86
chairman of the SIB wanted the role of the Doint Industry Consultative 
Committee to be expanded to take on these functions, but this was not 
acceptable to some members of the SBSRC. Because of this dis­
agreement there was a delay of twenty months between the dissolution 
of the SBSRC and the formation of aft . COC for the industry.
This period spanned the 1972 Industry Act and the Booz-Allen Report. 
During 1972 ad hoc contacts between SRNA and the government were not, 
however, any more regular than when formal consultative procedure 
existed, the implication being that formal advisory committees perform 
a role additional to rather than in place of ad hoc representations.1® 
Rather than providing a forum for the continuous exchange of 
information between government and industry, shipbuilding advisory 
committees have been characterised by a high degree of discontinuity. 
This is a characteristic which they shared with other institutions 
dealing with the industry - particularly government departments (see 
section 9.2).
8.5 MONITORING19
8.5.1 Introduction
This section discusses the information needed by the government to 
ensure that its objectives for a particular firm are being achieved 
and outlines the political implications of monitoring. The concern 
here is only incidentally with the content of the information collected 
or not collected by the government (the substantive implications are 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6). This section deals rather with the 
methods and problems of the collection and appraisal of information 
for monitoring purposes.
18. Interview with former director of SRNA. H  December 1972.
1 9 . Many of the points discussed in this section are also included 
in Hogwood, 1976b.
The term 'monitoring1 has often been used to describe activities 
connected with the collection and appraisal of information about firms 
to which the government has given aid, but it can mean anything from 
a review of quarterly reports to intervention at board level» 
Monitoring implies a degree of supervision, and information needs 
should be specified to reflect the degree of supervision intended.
If the type of supervision desired is not clearly thought out, then 
information requirements cannot be properly defined. If no prior 
thought is given to the action to be taken if performance deviated in 
particular ways from that desired, then the advantages to be gained 
from monitoring are lost.
8.5.2 Information within firms
The starting point of monitoring by government departments and agencies
is obviously internal monitoring within the firm. Unless the
government is to introduce a complete management reporting and
accounting system of its own within the firm, information collection
by the government can only be as good as information collection by the
firm. Collection of information by firms is not, of course, simply
a matter of supplying information required by the government;
adequate information is necessary for the firm to control its own
operations. However, the firm's ability to obtain this internally
required information can also have implications for government policy.
The Geddes Report on the industry in 1966 made a number of
criticisms of the state of management control information and financial
information within shipbuilding firms and listed what it considered
20essential information. In 197T the Shipbuilding Industry Board
published a manual, Accounting and Reporting for Managers in 
21shipbuilding.
20. Cmnd 2937, especially chapters 14 and 15.
21. SIB, 1971.
This outlined a basic system which defined minimum standards of 
accounting and reporting for major shipbuilding companies. Six 
years later, the Booz-Allen Report commented that while budgetary 
control systems existed throughout the shipbuilding industry in 1972 
they were generally limited in scope and effectiveness.22 Long- 
range corporate or financial plans, so important in assessing the 
need for government aid, existed in only two companies. Assessment 
of capital projects was often crude, and, while cash management was 
more effective than long-range planning, cash forecasts depended 
heavily on forecast dates of completion for ships and were often 
rendered inaccurate by failures to achieve expected dates. Even 
within firms, costs were analysed on differing bases by estimating 
and financial control departments in several yards; this often 
resulted in confusion when comparisons were attempted between 
apparently compatible data. This last point illustrates clearly that 
inadequate appraisal of information can be a problem not only between 
organisations, such as a firm and a government department, but also 
within a single organisation. The system recommended in the 
Accounting and Reporting manual referred to above was criticised by 
shipbuilding firms for its complexity and cost, but the Booz-Allen 
Report found that no company had developed a simpler and cheaper 
substitute.
These comments in reports sponsored by government departments or 
agencies clearly indicated deficiencies in the information systems 
of shipbuilding firms; both government departments and individual 
firms must have been aware of these criticisms. Stress has been laid 
here on the information systems of the firms because analysis of
22. Booz-Allen Report, 1973, chapter 17
monitoring by government departments and agencies alone would give a 
misleading picture. This might lead to the conclusion that the 
ineffectiveness of government intervention was wholly the result of 
inadequate appraisal by the government department or agency, whereas 
it was due at least in part to inadequate procedures within the firms. 
But, in turn, the government allowed this state of affairs to continue, 
partly because the government failed to realise just how inadequate 
some firms' information systems were and that these inadequacies 
made it difficult to assess whether government aid was being used 
effectively. Even where the government was aware of these inadequa­
cies it sometimes faced a dilemma, as the case of UC5 illustrated: 
the government could insist that a firm first installed adequate 
information systems and thereby ensure that it would go into 
liquidation, or it could provide aid even when it knew that the firm 
did not have the necessary systems to ensure that the aid was used 
effectively.
8.5.3 Monitoring in practice
Effective monitoring does not start after government aid has been put
into a firm, but depends on the collection of information and forecasts
before the aid is given, both to assess the need for the aid and to
measure any deviation from forecast performance. Under the
Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967 the SIB had to be satisfied that
shipbuilders fulfilled certain conditions before recommending aid.
Ministerial approval also had to be obtained before aid could be given,
which raises the problem, considered below, of how the minister was to
satisfy himself about the applications without duplicating the
investigations of the Board. The need for approval also slows down
23the decision-making process. The 1967 Act did not lay down any
23. Cf. Deutsch, 1966, pp.225-6: 'As an autonomous system grows more 
complex it may increase the length of channels and the number of 
stages through which messages must go before resulting in 
decisions. Ordinarily this may mean increased delay and slowness 
of response to changing information from the environment*.
procedures by which the SIB was to satisfy itself whether a 
shipbuilding firm should be granted aid. According to Sir William 
Swallow, the SIB chairman, the SIB tended to ask for the same 
information that the managing director of a company would ask for 
before he would approve an investment by his company - financial 
figures, production figures, sales and profits figures, etc.^ The 
SIB asked for outside advice when it felt that the SIB members' own 
expertise was not relevant, as in the assessment of asset values or 
financial figures which required an expert accountant.
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the successor depart­
ment to the Ministry of Technology, was asked in 1972 whether it was
satisfied that the department had had adequate information to judge
25and approve recommendations made by the SIB. Sir Anthony Part, the
Permanent Secretary at the DTI, admitted that it was very difficult to
give an unqualified yes to that question because information clearly
did not turn out to be adequate in a number of cases. Seemingly
sensible systems of financial control had been set up, but they did not
work as well as a number of very well qualified people had thought they
would. The department did sometimes have another specialist look at
SIB recommendations within the department with the help of the
26department's own accountants. Finally, the Treasury had to give 
its approval to the granting of aid. This formal 'line of approval' 
was to some extent short-circuited by SIB officials discussing 
applications for aid with civil servants in the department before they 
went to the minister for approval.
If the SIB was given little guidance about how to assess
•CM HC 362, Session 1968-9, Q.2223-6
•If)CM HC 447, Session 1971-2, Q.2496.
26. HC 447, Session 1971-2, Q.1265.
applications for aid, it was given none about its relationships with 
the firm after aid had been given. Edmund Dell later commented:
'the Board was given extraordinarily little guidance as to how to 
behave, particularly in the matter of supervising how companies it 
assisted actually used the assistance they received ... It had no
means of ensuring that groups did what was necessary to keep to their
27own targets'.
When the SIB was dissolved at the end of 1971 the DTI took over 
direct responsibility for aid to shipbuilding. The DTI said that 
where money was lent to a firm the department had a very strong 
interest in keeping an eye on the fortunes of that firm and seeing that 
the purposes for which the money was given were being adequately and 
efficiently pursued. The aim was to ensure that the Exchequer got
its money back and that the purposes for which the money was given
28were achieved.
There was a difference in the extent to which the SIB and the
DTI felt that they had the power to change management personnel as a
result of monitoring. The SIB felt that they did not have any power
to insist on a change of management, while the DTI said that if they
felt that the management of a firm receiving government aid was
29inadequate they w o u ld  t a k e  s t e p s  t o  i m p r o v e  i t .  T h e  D T I pointed 
o u t that the SIB did in fact 'lean on' the management of firms, 
especially UCS. The House of Commons Expenditure Committee concluded 
that the SIB regarded it as within their power to change management as 
a condition of financial assistance, but that once the money had been 
committed the SIB was unwilling to put further pressure on management.30
27. Dell, 1973, p.169. This confirms the SIB'3 own view; see 
HC 347-1, Session 1971-2, Q.453.
28. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2354-7.
29. HC 347—1, Session 1971—2, Q.449; HC 347-II, Session 1971-2,Q.
2358-60.
30. HC 347, Session 1971-2, para.104.
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There seem to have been special problems in devising procedures
for monitoring firms in which the government held shares* UCS, Cammell
Laird and Harland and Wolff (Northern Ireland government). One of
the problems of UCS was the nature of its links with the government.
For example, Mr. Hepper, the chairman of UCS, was unable to say to 
31whom he reported! This situation arose because UCS was what 
Mr. Hepper called a ’hybrid' - neither pure private enterprise nor 
nationalised industry.
The history of UCS provides a number of examples of inadequate
information being available, (see also sections 5.2,2 and 5.3.2).
The aid given to UCS at its inception in 1968 was made available before
a corporate plan was drawn up. The dilemma facing the SIB at the
time of the formation of UCS was whether to allow a new group to form
and new management to take control, or to say that since there were no
accurate figures support could not be given. The second alternative
would inevitably have led to closure of most of the yards on the upper
Clyde. When the corporate plan was delayed early in 1969, the SIB
gave further aid to keep the company going until the plan was
available. But, in the words of the then Minister of Technology,
•By the time the Corporate Plan could be submitted to the Shipbuilding
Industry Board, the progress made so far with the accounting
arrangements showed that the company needed more financial support
32than was originally envisaged'. Had better information been/
available from the start the decisions would have been different - a 
clear illustration of the importance of the quality of information as 
an influence on the outcome of political decision-making.
31. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2112.
32. HC 397, Session 1968-9, p.250.
The information provided at the time of the UCS corporate plan 
also turned out to be unreliable, and the government announced a 
direct loan in December 1969 after the SIB had refused further 
assistance. On each of the occasions when the SIB had agreed to give 
grants or loans in 1969 it had made arrangements for investigating the 
requests, and the Ministry of Technology asked a firm of accountants to 
report on UCS cash flow forecasting before they made their advance.^ 
However, the accountants who had reported in Dune 1969 had not 
anticipated that UCS would ask for a further £5m within two months. 
After the £7m loan direct from the government, the Ministry of 
Technology (and later the DTI) had quite a lot of information about 
UCS, even though the SIB still existed. However, as the Permanent 
Secretary at the DTI later revealeds
•One of the difficulties about this whole operation seems to 
have been that everybody went to the right sort of people to 
get the right sort of advice; they set up what ought to have 
been the right systems, they asked for the right kind of
returns that you expect a monitoring organisation to ask for
34and yet the whole thing went very badly astray1.
The quality of information was clearly also crucial in the last 
few months of UCS's existence. Indeed, one of the main reasons the 
government allowed UCS to go into liquidation was its complete lack of 
confidence in the company's ability to produce accurate and up-to-date 
information. Ironically, Mr. Hepper claimed that the delays in 
producing monthly accounts were the result of priorities in the 
accounting system, which had limited resources: the first priority 
was to prepare the details which led to the releasing of government-
33. HC 447, Session 1971-2, Q.1299-305.
34. HC 447, Session 1971-2, Q.1323.
guaranteed credits for shipowners ordering ships from UCS. The demand 
for information by government can itself have a material effect on a 
firm's ability to obtain necessary information about its internal 
functioning. However, it is part of the government's job in setting 
up 'the right system' to ensure that the accounting system of the firm 
which is being monitored is able to cope with the demands placed on it. 
Otherwise, 'the whole thing' will go 'very badly awry'.
Clearly, much of the failure of monitoring during the brief three- 
and-a-half years' existence of UCS was a failure to ensure that UCS 
itself had financial control systems which were adequate either for 
the firm's own purposes or for providing information to the government. 
The situation during the existence of UCS was also complicated by the 
existence of the SIB as an agency between government and shipbuilding 
firms. In Mr. Hepper's opinion, the SIB proved more of a hindrance 
than a help to both government and the company; he felt that direct 
contact between the company and the department would have been better.^ 
This problem was particularly acute after December 1969, when the SIB 
declined to recommend further aid for UCS. During the crucial period 
of 1970 covering the last few months of the Labour government and the 
first few months of the incoming Conservative government there was 
considerably less contact and supervision by the government than there 
had been earlier or was to be later.
The government, having set up an agency 'to deal with the industry', 
failed to develop adequate information procedures in situations with 
which the agency had not been designed to cope. Setting up an agency, 
or indeed any other kind of administrative arrangement, clearly does 
not provide a panacea to the problems of monitoring when the purpose 
of government involvement and the conditions necessary to achieve those
35 HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, Q.2178
purposes are unclear 36
8,5,4 Lessons from 1967-71
There were clearly important defects in the monitoring of information
from shipbuilding firms in the period 1967-71 and these caused
embarrassment to the government. As well as monitoring information
from firms and ensuring that the internal information systems of firms
are adequate, the government must 'monitor' its own procedures and
remedy any defects which it finds. The most systematic outline of
the lessons learnt by the government was given in a general statement
by Sir Anthony Part, then Permanent Secretary at the DTI, to the
37Committee of Public Accounts in 1972. The fact that this statement 
was made in the course of evidence on the shipbuilding industry shows 
the importance of the government's involvement in shipbuilding for the 
development of guide-lines of general applicability, though the 
government was obviously influenced by its experiences with other 
firms, such as Rolls Royce and the Beagle Aircraft Company. To avoid 
complicating the picture, Sir Anthony assumed in his statement that 
aid was to come direct from the government and not through an agency 
such as the SIB. Sir Anthony said that there were four 'problems' 
which might arise when a government intervened to help a company:
1. Because the help comes from the government other people might 
think that the government would be prepared to continue supporting the 
company whatever happened.
36 See section 9.3.3 and Young with Lowe, 1974, pp.201-B for a 
* discussion of the best machinery for 'project appraisal',
»monitoring1 and 'follow-up'. Some of the 'methods' of 
monitoring listed in Young with Lowe, 1974, p.201, are not, in 
fact methods of monitoring as such; for example, the appointment 
of a*government director does not in itself constitute monitoring 
a firm's activities, nor does the taking of a shareholding.
3 7 HC 447» Session 1971-2, Q.154BJ also included as an appendix 
in Dell, 1973, pp.232-4.
2. The government must avoid getting itself into a position that 
'would cause a private person to fall foul of section 332 of the 
Companies Act. (See section 6.2.2 for how this problem influenced 
the governments unwillingness to approve credit guarantees in late 
1970 for ships to be built at UCS).
3. If information about the company's performance and prospects is 
insufficient, the public investment in the company may be put at risk 
before the government becomes aware of the facts.
4. If the government asks for too much information or makes too many 
suggestions about the running of the firm it may erode the freedom
of action of the directors to an extent that would appear to diminish 
the responsibility for the management of the company and to give the 
outside world the Impression that the government's own commitment to 
the company was greater than the government intended.
The significance of these 'problems' is that they are problems 
affecting administrators rather than problems about monitoring. The 
real problems about monitoring are to define the desired effect of aid 
to decide what action the government would be prepared to take if the 
desired effect is not being achieved, and then to define what 
information is required to identify any failure to achieve the 
desired effect and to enable the necessary rectifying action to be 
carried out. Finally, the forms in which the information is to be 
supplied and the systems necessary to supply it, including the 
internal information system of the firm, can be settled.
Sir Anthony went on to suggest several 'pointers' which he hoped 
would cope with the problems he had outlined. A note of guidance 
incorporating many of these pointers and called 'Monitoring of 
Companies in which the Government has a Financial Interest' was issued
in December 1973. This note started by outlining the objectives 
of monitoring:
'The Government has a responsibility to Parliament and to the 
Public to monitor (i.e. to watch over) the progress of companies 
in which it has a financial interest. The objectives are*
(i) to check that public funds are used for the purposes for 
which they are made available and that the terms and conditions 
under which such funds were made available are not transgressed;
(ii) to assess the success in achieving the objectives for which 
public funds were supplied;
(iii) to ensure that the calls on Government funds are kept to a 
minimum compatible with the achievement of the objectives for 
which they were supplied;
(iv) to enable the Government to take appropriate steps to 
safeguard its investment'.
The action required to achieve these objectives varied according to 
the extent of the government's involvement; this note was concerned 
with situations where the government had 'or could have' a major 
financial interest. The basis for effective monitoring in these 
circumstances had three main elements:
•(i) identifying the company's objectives;
(ii) identifying the key risks and opportunities facing the 
company;
(iii) ensuring that the company's internal management information 
and accounting system is adequate'.
In considering what information was needed for monitoring purposes,
the government would so far as possible use material prepared for the
company's own management purposes, so as to keep the administrative
burden on the company to a minimum. The note concluded by outlining
38. This note is included in HC 303, Session 1974, pp.284-5,
Emphasis in the quotation is added.
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various kinds of accounts and other information uhich would ba needed 
from firms.
It is interesting to note that the identification of the company's 
objectives is specified in the DTI's note, but that the need for 
identifying the objectives of government involvement is not mentioned. 
The difficulty with the 'objectives of monitoring' as defined in the 
note is that they are not couched in terms which can be measured, so 
that it would be difficult to determine even in retrospect the extent 
to which they had been achieved - except, of course, where there was 
complete failure, as with UCS. Perhaps most significant of all is 
the definition of monitoring as being 'to watch over', with the 
implication of a passive role.
The arrangements outlined in the DTI note were not implemented
simultaneously for all companies to which the government had lent
39money, but were introduced gradually from early 1973. Training was
given to monitoring officers, who were responsible for monitoring
particular firms, and the number of firms covered was gradually
extended as staff pressures permitted. The Comptroller and Auditor
General has also been showing increased interest in monitoring by
including in his reports special sections on monitoring of firms in
40which the government is involved.
However, this increased concern by the DTI (now the Department 
of Industry) about the problems of monitoring has not prevented the 
recurrence of escalating demands by shipbuilding companies on public 
funds. In 1975 the Committee of Public Accounts noted of Govan 
Shipbuilders, the successor company to UCS, that 'the critical
3 9. HC 303, Session 1974, Q.150 of Session 1973-4.
40. E.g. HC 85, Session 1974-5, pp.xxxiii-xxxvi.
assumptions made about productivity and the level of losses had both
been falsified, with the result that the Department now estimated that
the total support from public funds over the five year period would
increase to £50—6Q million' from the £35m forecast in 1972.^ At
Cammell Laird the 1972 estimate of £14m of public funds for capital
works had already risen to £27m and might reach £32m, depending upon
the results of a legal dispute between Cammell Laird and the contractor
42for the capital works. The Department of Industry considered 
itself virtually committed to completing the approved reconstruction 
scheme and admitted that the contractual and industrial relations 
disputes which gave rise to the increased costs were matters over 
which they had no control and could not establish control. Both of 
these examples illustrate not so much shortage of information but that 
increases in public funds required have resulted from causes outside 
the direct control of the government and that the government feels 
placed in a position where it cannot take any action on the basis of 
new figures other than to pay more money.
Ii/e can see that the department's concern to secure what it 
considered necessary information from shipbuilding companies in which 
the government is involved has not prevented a recurrence of the 
situation which gave risB to the concern. However, it is clear from 
Sir Anthony Part's evidence to the Committee of Public Accounts in 
1972 that civil servants also have views about what is sufficient 
information: more than this they do not want to know. To understand 
the reasons for this we must consider the political implications of 
monitoring.
41. HC 374, Session 1974-5, para0 64.
42. HC 374, Session 1974-5, para. 67.
8.5.5 The political implications of monitoring
If the term 'monitoring' is not to mean merely the receiving and 
analysing of information it must include the implication that if a 
company's progress deviates from that desired by the government, 
action mill be taken by the government to remedy this. Information 
about firms is not 'neutral' — it can have considerable policy 
implications. Nor can guidelines to cover all contingencies be set 
out in legislation setting up an agency. Except in the short term 
these policy implications cannot be avoided by the failure to ensure 
that adequate information is provided. Problems won't disappear 
because the government doesn't know about them. Delays in 
receiving information can magnify the repercussions of a problem, as 
was illustrated by the UCS collapse.
It is interesting to note that three of the four 'problems' 
discussed by Sir Anthony Part and referred to in the previous section 
were concerned with areas of political embarrassment to the government 
and that with two of them the embarrassment would arise as a result 
of the government receiving too much information from a firm. The 
department's fear that too close a scrutiny of a company's activities 
will give the impression that the government's commitment to that
company is greater than the government intended is based on the
\
expectations which would have arisen when government involvement in 
individual firms was less widespread than today. Such expectations 
will alter with experience of the new situation} indeed, this is 
essential if the government is to have adequate procedures to ensure 
that the purposes for which aid is given are carried out.
This concern with minimising the government's 'responsibility'
and 'commitments' betrays a cultural trait of great importance in the
43relationship between the administration and firms. Edmund Dell
4 3. This point was made to me by Professor 3ack Hayward of Hull
University.
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puts it this way*
•In pursuance of this policy, therefore, government has attempted
to lay down a line of demarcation between its responsibilities
and those of the firm it is helping, and then to hold that
line* Thus it has negotiated aid that seemed necessary at
the time, and has then in effect told the assisted firm to get
on with it. It has assumed that the firm wishes to succeed
or survive, that it has, or has been given, the resources to
see the programme through to success, and that therefore all
subsequent decisions can be left to its commercial and 
44technical acumen.
In practice, the industry department found that lack of information 
could also be a political embarrassment and therefore formulated 
procedures which it hoped would rectify this. However, a reluctance 
to know too much continues: not only does the DTI note on monitoring 
quoted above set minimum requirements for information, it also sets 
maximum requirements. The industry department has never really faced 
up to whether the desired effect of aid can always be achieved without 
•interfering’ in the firms after the aid has been given.
8 . 6  CONCLUSION
To return to the discussion at the beginning of the chapter, part of 
effective monitoring is to be aware of problems before they become 
serious enough to prevent the purpose of aid being fulfilled.
Knowledge that there is a problem may produce action, but if this action 
is to be appropriate there must also be knowledge about the reasons 
for the problem. This will certainly require the collection of 
information about the individual firm before the aid is given, but it
44. Dell, 1973, pp.161-2.
will also require information about the more general economic'and 
other conditions in which the firm is operating - the type of planning 
information described in table 8.1. The government would need to 
be aware whether a sudden loss was due to poor internal management, 
a change in world demand, or the effect of other government policies 
(such as reducing the naval building programme or banning the sale 
of warships to certain countries). In practice, the government has 
not shown that it is aware of the interaction between these types of 
information.
Ide have already seen that the distinction between monitoring past 
aid and collecting information for new applications is blurred when 
there is a series of injections of aid. The analysis of aid to 
individual firms may in turn have implications for the reassessment of 
government policy for a particular sector, such as shipbuilding,or 
government industrial policy generally-the 1972 Industry Act following 
the UCS collapse provides an example. However, it is clear that 
•monitoring' as used by the Department of Industry is distinct from 
assessing the 'cost-effectiveness* of aid. That is, monitoring is 
seen as a method of financial oversight rather than being linked to 
an examination of the most effective use of public resources to 
achieve certain ends. The Department of Industry accepts the need for 
such cost-effectiveness studies in terms which would satisfy any 
Simonian rationalist:
•We have to examine cost benefit and we have to look at 
alternative use of resources, not only in relation to this 
firm (Govan), or indeed to the shipbuilding industry, but 
generally in regard to assistance that we are giving. Is 
this the most sensible use of this particular quantum of 
public money? Would we get better results from the national
point of view if we used it in other forms? ' 45  
Typically, however, the study actually being carried out
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department was confined to a retrospective examination of the support 
given to the UCS liquidator during 1971-3. Dust as information for 
policy making and for implementation have been collected in a 
fragmented way, so too has information for evaluation.
Looked at in terms of the role of information in the policy 
process we can better understand the outcome of the Geddes approach. 
The Geddes approach was an attempt at strategy formulation which, when 
embodied in legislation, was insufficiently flexible to allow for 
deviation from forecasts or learning about the environment. To deal 
with the problems which arose as a result, the government had to 
adopt a fragmented approach after all. The Conservative government's 
approach as set out in its Duly 1973 statement did not represent an 
attempt to introduce greater flexibility into a planning or 
anticipatory approach? rather it represented the acceptance of an 
entirely reactive approach.
The collection of information by the British government for policy 
making, monitoring and evaluation of involvement in shipbuilding have 
clearly not been developed within a general framework of information 
requirements. The argument here is not that the government has 
failed to live up to the idealised model of information in a planning 
approach set out in figure 8.1 . It was accepted at the beginning of 
this chapter that limits of knowledge and limits of resources 
restricted the extent to which this idealised model could be pursued 
The argument is rather that government information collection has been 
characterised by a high degree of fragmentation - both fragmentation
45. HC 374, Session 1974-5, Q.571.
between information collected for policy making, monitoring and 
evaluation, and fragmentation within those categories. Information 
has generally been sought on an ad hoc basis to match the ad hoc 
nature of the decisions about involvement. Since most aid to 
shipbuilding has been in the form of rescue measures, criticisms 
that inquiries or monitoring have failed to achieve a ’better* 
allocation of public funds should really be directed at the nature 
of the policies adopted rather than the inability of the information 
collection procedures to ensure the success of those policies.
3CHAPTER 9
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
9.1 INTRODUCTION
It is clear from the number of different government departments and 
other agencies referred to in preceding chapters that during the 
period covered by this study shipbuilding came under a variety of 
government departments and paragovernmental agencies (see table 9.1 ). 
This chapter analyses the reasons for each change and attempts to 
assess whether there was an underlying pattern which explains the 
number of changes. Given that there have been all these changes, it 
is important to determine whether they had any adverse effect on the 
ability of government to deal with the industry.
Table 9.1 Changes in responsibility for shipbuilding
Date Change
Nov. 1959
1960
1961 
1963
l a t e  1 9 6 4
1965/6 
Nov. 1966
March 1 9 6 7  
O c t ,  1 9 7 0  
end 1971
March 1972
1974
Transferred from Admiralty to Ministry of Transport; 
comes under Shipbuilding and Repair Group.
Transferred within MOT to Shipbuilding, Ports and 
Shipping Group.
Transferred within MOT to Shipbuilding and General 
Group.
Transferred within MOT to Shipping Policy and 
Shipbuilding Group.
Transferred to Board of Trade; comes under 
Engineering Industries Division.
Transferred within BOT to Division 4.
Transferred to Ministry of Technology; comes under 
Shipbuilding, Electrical Engineering and Chemical 
Plant Division.
SIB formally established.
Ministry of Technology merged into DTI.
Within DTI Shipbuilding Policy Division is set up* 
takes over residual functions of SIB. *
Formation of Industrial Development Executive within 
DTI.
DTI split up; shipbuilding comes under Department of 
Industry.
on
to
The analysis of institutional frameworks falls clearly within 
the ambit of public administration, and this chapter will indeed 
refer to criteria for the allocation of functions and issues of 
responsibility and control» However, it should be clear from 
earlier chapters that the policy process affecting shipbuilding, 
including the implementation stage, was a political process rather 
than a purely administrative one* It is therefore important in 
discussing what would be the ’best1 institutional framework for 
dealing with the industry to bear in mind that optimum arrangements 
in terms of administrative organisation may not be the most 
appropriate for dealing with what are essentially political inter­
ventions.
9.2 DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHIPBUILDING
9.2.1 Administrative criteria for the allocation of responsibility
This section is concerned not only with the way in which shipbuilding
was transferred between departments, but also the transfer which
took place between branches within departments. Before examining the
history of these changes in some detail, it is worth considering the
criteria which can be used to determine the allocation of functions.
Self refers to Gulik's four competing principles of organisation* the
purpose served, the processes employed, the persons or things dealt
1with, and the area covered. He goes on to suggest that three of 
these principles - the areal, client and process principles - cannot 
generally be assigned a dominant status and that despite the fact that 
goals 'do not come in neat, tidy and reasonably durable packets called 
"Major purposes’" the dominant principle of organisation must be major 
function or purpose. However, this can only be made a basis for
1. Self, 1972, pp.55-64.
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demarcating the work of government departments, Self suggests, by
’smuggling in’ some of the other principles of organisation by the
back door* Referring specifically to the Ministry of Technology,
which looked after shipbuilding between 1967 and 1970, Self saysj
•Th8 British Ministry of Technology (1964-70) sounded like a
process department, and certainly it has brought together a
large part of the technological resources available to British
government - but by no means all of them. Simultaneously
though, the Ministry of Technology was a client-based
department which had responsibility for a group of particular
industries, and a purpose-based department which was interested
to carry forward the policy goal of technological development' , 2 3
The existence of purely personal factors and departmental inertia are
recognised, but Self argues that these have mainly a delaying effect
and that the long-term evolution of government machinery does follow
rather more objective and logical patterns. Self accepts that it is,
in general, a fair conclusion to regard the allocation of functions
between government departments as a wholly political issue, so long
as politics is broadly understood as including the views of officials,
professional groups, clients etc.
Since we are also examining changes in responsibility within
departments, we will also be considering the criteria for such changes
and the relationship between internal changes and changes between
departments. C h e s t e r  and Willson show the significance of
administrative convenience in fitting minor functions into the system}
often new tasks will be fitted to existing ones with which they appear
3to have a close affinity.
2 , Self, 1972, p,58.
3 . Chester and Willson, 1968} see also Self, 1972, pp.63-4.
As well as assessing the relevance of these general views about 
the allocation of functions to the changes affecting shipbuilding we 
will want to examine how far these changes were directly related to 
the developments in policy outlined in earlier chapters.
9.2.2 Changes in departmental responsibility
Chanqes in departmental responsibility before 1959. Before 1916 
shipbuilding had not been under the wing of any government department
and during the First World War was greatly penalised as a result.for ships
Shipowners were reluctant to place order/ when they might be
immediately requisitioned, and the shortage of labour and materials
prevented shipbuilding firms from completing such orders as they did
receive. 'The industry indeed seemed likely to stop altogether
unless it was placed in the care of a department strong enough to
compete for men and materials with the Admiralty and the Ministry of 
4Munitions'.
In December 1916 The Ministry of Shipping was established under 
a Shipping Controller. The Admiralty's Transport Department was 
transferred to the Ministry of Shipping, which was also given respons­
ibility for supervising shipbuilding. The Shipping Controller 
introduced a programme for constructing standard ships. However, 
responsibility for shipbuilding did not remain with the Ministry of 
Shipping for long, since following considerable losses of ships during 
the early months of 1917 a great increase in the rate of construction 
was necessary. It was considered desirable that a single department 
should be responsible for both naval and civil shipbuilding, and this 
was achieved by transferring responsibility for the building and 
repair of merchant ships to the Admiralty in May 1917.
Chester and Willson, 1968, p.62.4
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A few weeks after the outbreak of the Second World War a new 
Ministry of Shipping was established (the old one having been dis­
banded in 1921); this took over all the shipping work of the Board of 
Trade and was also made responsible for merchant shipbuilding. 'This 
latter arrangement, however, worked no better than it had in the early 
months of 1917', and in order once again to place all shipbuilding
under one control, responsibility for merchant shipbuilding and repairs
5passed to the Admiralty in February 1940.
The transfer from the Admiralty to the Ministry of Transport. Those 
responsibilities of the Admiralty for shipbuilding which were defined 
under legislation were transferred to the Ministry of Transport by 
the Transfer of Functions (Construction of Ships) Order 1959, which 
came into effect in November 1959; these responsibilities were mainly 
of a regulatory nature and were no longer of any significance.
However, the government exercised its general prerogative by 
transferring at the same time the general responsibilities of the 
Admiralty as the sponsoring department for shipbuilding to the 
Ministry of Transport.
The transfer of shipbuilding, along with shiprepairing and marine 
engineering, was carried out as part of a general reallocation of 
functions that followed the abolition of the Ministry of Supply and 
the creation of a Ministry of Aviation. Grove has argued that there 
was not a strong case in peace time for dividing shipping and ship­
building between a civil department and a military supply department 
and that, though the Admiralty was a large customer and much research 
and development is of common application, the civil and military 
aspects are readily separable to a greater extent than in the
5 Chester and Willson, 1968, p.95
C! i
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production of aircraft.6 7 Ha also points out that the Ministry of 
Transport was already closely involved in the affairs of the ship­
building industry through the enforcement of safety regulations, which 
in the case of passenger ships applied while the ship was still on the 
drawing board.
Mr. Marples, the Minister of Transport, justified the transfer on
the grounds that 'shipping, shipbuilding and shiprepairing in any
sensible concern would be brought under the same management because
7they are now closely related'. This argument was a reflection of 
certain apparently common problems facing the industries at the end of 
the 1950s. The domestic shipping industry was undergoing a depression 
and this affected the UK shipbuilding industry, which at the same time 
faced increasing competition from German and Japanese yards. The 
government felt that a coordinated approach would be the best to 
tackle these difficulties. This attitude represented a hangover from 
the days of the symbiotic relationship between British shipping and 
shipbuilding described in section 2.4 and a failure to diagnose 
shipbuilding's problem as having to compete in world markets rather than 
to hang on to the coat tails of the British shipping industry. One 
of the immediate consequences of the transfer was that it was the 
Ministry of Transport rather than the Admiralty which had to deal with 
the consequences of the embarrassing resignation of Sir Graham 
Cunningham over the failure of the industry to agree to inquire into 
its prospects (see section 3.2).
Rather unusually, the Opposition decided to move a prayer against 
the Order transferring the regulatory powers on the grounds that the 
Ministry of Transport had 'a very sorry record' and already had a
6. Grove, 1962, p.98.
7. HC Deb.« 25 November 1959, col.510.
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3heavy workload.“ The debate in the House of Commons was a shambles.
The majority of members seemed unaware of the narrow, rather technical 
scope of the Order and frequently had to be called to order for 
trying to widen the nature of the debate. The implication i3 that 
the House of Commons is an inappropriate body for scrutinising the 
effects of changes in departmental responsibility.
Shipbuilding under the Ministry of Transport. During its period of 
sponsorship by the Ministry of Transport, shipbuilding came under 
various groupings of functions. Initially it was placed under a small 
section of its own - the Shipbuilding and Repair Group - under a 
Oeputy Secretary; this was subdivided into the Directorate of Merchant 
Shipbuilding and Repair (DMSR) and a Shipbuilding and Ship Repair 
Division under r ->ci an Assistant Secretary. In 1960 the Shipbuilding 
and Repair Group became part of a Shipbuilding, Ports and Shipping 
Group. The following year, shipbuilding became part of a Shipbuilding 
and General Group, which also included an International Inland 
Transport Branch, a Statistics Division, a General Division, and later 
the United Kingdom Railway Advisory Service! Shipbuilding spent its 
final year or so at the Ministry of Transport in a Shipping Policy and 
Shipbuilding Group, which also included two Foreign Shipping Relations 
Divisions and a General Shipping Policy Division.
The way in which shipbuilding was transferred between these various 
groups suggests that they were the result of conveniently sized 
groupings for organisational reasons rather than to find the grouping 
which would be most effective for bringing shipping and shipbuilding 
•under the same management* as desired by Mr. Marples. However, the 
effect of these frequent internal changes should not be exaggerated.
8. HC Deb., 25 November 1959, col.464.
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The same Assistant Secretary was in charge of the Shipbuilding and 
Ship Repair Division for most of its stay at the Ministry of Transport 
and because the industry was of special concern to the Permanent 
Secretary (who was also chairman of the Shipbuilding Advisory 
Committee), the Under-Secretary in charge of whatever group ship­
building happened to be under could be •short-circuited'. Ship­
building was initially put directly under a Deputy Secretary because 
of concern about the industry after its transfer. Later, in 1961, 
Elizabeth Ackroyd was brought in to head the Shipbuilding and General 
Group largely to deal with shipbuilding. This, together with the 
appointment of l/ice-Admiral Hughes-Hallett as an additional 
Parliamentary Secretary with special responsibility for shipping and 
shipbuilding, lessened the load on the Permanent Secretary, who 
previously had spent a disproportionate amount of time on shipbuilding. 
The forgotten transfer. In the list of ministerial appointments 
following the Labour victory at the October 1964 general election it 
was announced that Mr. Wilson was creating a new transport department
at the Board of Trade which would be responsible for shipping and 
g
shipbuilding. However, according to Mr. Wilson, 'It was always my
intention from the outset to transfer shipbuilding together with
machine engineering to the Ministry of Technology when that was
10properly established*. In sections of his memoirs dealing with
his first months in office Mr. Wilson also refers to his intention of
transferring shipbuilding to the Ministry of Technology but nowhere
mentions that his government at that time was actually in the process
11of transferring it to the Board of Trade. It appears clear
9. Times, 21 October 1964.
10. Harold Wilson in a personal communication to the author, 23 
November 1973. 1
1 1 . Wilson, 1971, pp.8 and 62.
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that he had no particular reason for wanting shipbuilding under the
Board of Trade, which was contrary to his expressed intention: »What
I decided to do - though it took a lot of time - was to make the
Board of Trade responsible for shipping (not ship-building)
Mr. Wilson states that he does not think he has any notes about why
shipbuilding was transferred to the Board of Trade when it was already
his intention to transfer it to the Ministry of Technology.
The reason for the transfer of shipbuilding to the Board of Trade
when it was already intended to transfer it to the Ministry of
Technology appears to lie with its relationship with the shipping
industry. Many shipowners had thought that the Board of Trade was
more appropriate than the Ministry of Transport because of the
international aspects of the shipping industry. For its part, the
Shipbuilding Conference, the predecessor of the SRNA, welcomed the
transfer: 'Closer and more direct contact with the Board of Trade,
which is so intimately concerned with commercial relations and
exports, the welfare of a wide range of industries, and the operation
of the Export Credit Guarantee Department, should be of benefit to the
13shipbuilding industry'.
Although the original announcement had stated that shipping and 
shipbuilding would be together in a transport department at the Board 
of Trade, during its stay at the Board of Trade, shipbuilding was in 
the Industries and Manufactures department and was separated from 
shipping. Within the Industries and Manufactures Department, ship-
12. Harold Wilson in a personal communication to the author 23
November 1973. Mr. Wilson states that he does not think he has 
any notes about why shipbuilding was transferred to the Board of 
Trade when it was already his intention to transfer it to the 
Ministry of Technology or why at the Board of Trade shipbuilding 
did not form part of a new transport department but was put in 9 
the Industries and Manufactures Department. H
13. Times, 22 October 1964.
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building was first of all in the Engineering Industries Division, 
which was responsible for plant and machinery, shipbuilding, ship­
repairing, metals except iron and steel, timber, woodpulp, paper and 
paper products, and most metal durable goods, and then in Division 4 
which looked after matters concerning shipbuilding, shiprepairing, 
metals except iron and steel, timber, woodpulp, paper and paper 
products and miscellaneous consumer good3. The latter grouping in 
particular suggests that shipbuilding was put in with the other 
industries simply to make up a division of a suitable size and that 
organisation to assist coordinated policy was not the main concern« 
Shipbuilding at the Ministry of Technology. The transfer of ship­
building from the Board of Trade to the Ministry of Technology in 
1966 provoked more Parliamentary Questions than any of the other 
transfers, reflecting political interest in the industry following 
publication of the Geddes Report in February 1966. Indeed, the 
transfer came at a very critical time in policy making and many MPs 
were concerned about the effect that this transfer would have on 
continuity of policy. The timing is illustrated by the fact that 
the Prime Minister announced on 16 Dune that shipbuilding would be 
transferred to the Ministry of Technology; Mr. Day, President of the 
Board of Trade made an announcement on 9 August that the government 
would be introducing legislation to set up a Shipbuilding Industry 
Board; and on 21 November the industry was formally transferred to
the Ministry of Technology, which thereby became responsible for
14piloting the legislation through the Commons. 14
1 4 . Wilson, 1971, p.270, states* 'Immediately following Douglas 
Day's statement, responsibility for shipbuilding and marine 
engineering passed, as I had earlier announced it would, from 
the Board of Trade to the Ministry of Technology', in fact 
the transfer took place three months later, as Mr. Wilson * 
himsfelf informed the Commons (HC Deb.. 6 December 1966, written 
answers col. 276—7),
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The government was particularly anxious to assert that there 
would be no delay in implementing the recommendations of the Geddes 
Report. The work done by the Board of Trade on the report was to 
be continued at the Ministry of Technology, which would be involved 
in any decisions made while shipbuilding was still at the Board of 
Trade. In reply to a Parliamentary Question the Prime Minister 
stated that* ’It is the intention to transfer to the Ministry of 
Technology at the appropriate time the greater part of the staff that 
handles shipbuilding business in the Board of Trade. The two 
departments will also continue to maintain after the transfer their
1 fipresent close working relations on matters of common concern’.lo 
Staff at a higher level than those dealing full time with shipbuilding 
were to be transferred.
The reason given by the Prime Minister for the change in respons­
ibility was that 'it had become more and more illogical to separate
17marine engineering from other aspects of the engineering industry'. 
There were, he said, serious difficulties of whether to have a 
horizontal or vertical organisation; that is, there was a case for 
shipbuilding being with shipping, and there was a case for it being 
with the rest of the metal-using industries. On balance, the 
government thought that the second alternative was the right answer. 
However, as was shown above, shipbuilding was not arranged 'vertically' 
with shipping within the Board of Trade, but was lumped in with a 
variety of other industries, including for a time some engineering 
ones.
During its period at the Ministry of Technology the shipbuilding 
industry was in the Shipbuilding, Electrical Engineering and Chemical
• HC Deb., 5 Duly 1966, col. 226.
HC Deb., 19 Duly 1966, cols. 380-2.
15
16 
17 HC Deb., 16 Duly 1966, col. 1659
Plant Division (ECS), one of five industry divisions at the Ministry. 
Mr, I. Maddock, Controller (Industrial Technology) at the Ministry 
wrote*
'On first encounter this may seem a strange grouping, but there 
is a similarity in many of the industrial problems of these 
industries. In each case, a unit may cost tens of millions 
of pounds, take a time measured in years to build, need the 
services of a great number of subcontractors and component 
suppliers, and call for a special relationship with the steel­
makers. These are the industries where long order books are 
common, and where the failure to capture the contract for even
4 0a single unit can be serious.'
As well as dealing with these industries concerned with very large 
capital equipment this division also dealt with related industries, 
such as component suppliers. This grouping clearly conformed to the 
principle of organisation by the processes employed which was referred 
to in section 9.2.1.
Within the ECS division, tv.; shipbuilding was originally the 
responsibility of one branch, which also dealt with shiprepairing, 
boat building and marine engineering. In 1969 the industry was split 
between two branches, a 'general* one dealing with marine engineering, 
shiprepairing, boat building, nuclear ships and hydrofoils, and planning 
and intelligence liaison with the SIB, and a 'technical' branch 
dealing with the Home Credit Scheme, R 4 0 projects, exports and 
overseas competition, international negotiations, and the Credit 
Guarantee Scheme.
The transfer to the DTI. The transfer of responsibility for the
18. New Technology, no.3, March 1967, p.3.
shipbuilding industry from the Ministry of Technology to the DTI in 
October 1970 was of a different nature to the transfers discussed 
above. It was merely part of the merging of all the functions of 
the Ministry of Technology except aviation into the new Department 
of Trade and Industry; this in turn was part of the general 
reorganisation of central government that took place at that time.
This transfer of responsibility therefore caused no real disruption 
in the administration of responsibility for the industry, as no 
physical transfer was involved. The shipbuilding industry remained 
at first in the ECS division with a Shipbuilding (General) Branch and 
a Shipbuilding (Financial Assistance) Branch. However, in late 1971 
a Shipbuilding Policy Division with three branches was created; this 
change coincided with the winding up of the SIB at the end of 1971 and 
the assumption of its residual functions by the DTI.
A further internal reorganisation of the DTI relevant to ship­
building was the setting up of the Industrial Development Executive 
and the appointment of a Minister for Industrial Development in March 
1972. In his statement announcing these proposals on 22 March 1972, 
3ohn Davies, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, said that
shipbuilding and machine tools were two industries in which he wanted
19the new Executive to take an immediate interest. In 1974, the 
incoming Labour government dismantled the DTI and shipbuilding came 
under the Department of Industry - essentially the old Ministry of 
Technology before it absorbed the Ministry of Power, though also 
taking in Posts and Telecommunications.
9.2.3 The overlap of responsibilities for the shipbuilding industry 
During the period 1959 to 1973 various aspects of the shipbuilding
19 HC Deb., 22 March 1972, col. 1551
industry have been the responsibility of departments other than the 
one sponsoring the industry. In some cases these responsibilities have 
been continuous throughout the period and are in no way specific to 
the shipbuilding industry. For example, responsibility for 
industrial relations in the shipbuilding industry, a matter of great 
importance to the industry's competitive position, has been with the 
Ministry of Labour, later the Department of Employment. The Admiralty 
and later the Ministry of Defence (Navy) has had a very important role 
as one of shipbuilding's most important and, in terms of ordering only 
in the UK, most consistent customers. Much of the research and 
development work done by the Navy is relevant to merchant shipbuilding 
and vice versa. In addition to the 'normal arrangements for inter­
departmental cooperation' between the Ministry of Defence and the DTI,
•there is extensive consultation at working level on many different
20aspects of shipbuilding technology'. It was because of Yarrow's 
role as a naval shipbuilder that it was the Ministry of Defence, 
rather than the DTI, which provided it with a loan early in 1971.
Research and development work in shipbuilding, except for 
warships, is now the responsibility of the Department of Industry, but 
it has not always been with the sponsoring department for the industry. 
UntilL1964 shipbuilding research and development came under the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), which in 
I960 published a controversial report on the research and development 
requirements of the industry (see section 3.3), However, the DSIR 
appears to have interpreted its brief rather widely, and the report 
dealt with labour relations, quality of management and the structure 
of the industry as well as more strictly technical matters.
20 HC Deb., 10 February 1972, written answers col. 443
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Following the abolition of the DSIR by the incoming Labour government 
in 1964, most of its functions, including those for shipbuilding 
research and development, were transferred to the new Ministry of 
Technology. When the general responsibility for the industry was 
also transferred to the Ministry of Technology in 1966, these two types 
of responsibility for the industry were united within a single 
department.
Regional responsibilities can also result in an overlap. In 
Northern Ireland shipbuilding has been the responsibility of the 
Northern Ireland Ministry of Commerce, a situation which continued 
after the introduction of direct rule. However, the SI8, which gave 
extensive help to Harland and Wolff in Belfast, reported on all its 
UK activities, including those in Northern Ireland, to the Ministry 
of Technology and later the DTI. Although by 1976 Harland and 
Wolff had been taken fully into state ownership, it remained under the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and was excluded from the 
government's nationalisation Bill, a move which led some Ulster 
politicians to believe that the government was planning an economic 
withdrawal from the province. In Scotland, the Department of 
Industry and the previous sponsoring departments have been responsible 
for shipbuilding, but the Scottish Office has obviously had an interest 
in the fate of Scottish shipyards, particularly those on the upper 
Clyde.
Overlaps can also occur on an ad hoc basis. The most interesting 
example of such an overlap is provided by government involvement in 
the Fairfields yard on the upper Clyde, described in section 4.3.
Here it was the Department of Economic Affairs through its 
responsibility for regional problems rather than the Board of Trade as 
the sponsoring department for shipbuilding which took charge. The 
Fairfield episdde showed that in favourable circumstances even the
opposition of a sponsoring department can be overcome. Another 
government department enthusiastically supporting a project is a 
most powerful kind of pressure group. Accordingly, it would be of 
advantage for interest groups to devote at least some of their 
attention to a government department which deals with matters only 
indirectly related to the project in which they are interested if 
that department is likely to be more favourably inclined towards it 
than the sponsoring department.
9.2.4 The overall effect of changes in responsibility 
The reasons for change. Between 1959 and 1972 divisions or groups 
which have covered shipbuilding (that is, sections under the charge 
of an under-secretary) have also covered ports, sea transport, 
shipping planning, international inland transport, shipping statistics, 
the United Kingdom Railway Advisory Service, foreign shipping 
relations, plant and machinery, metals except iron and steel, metal 
consumer durable goods, timber, woodpulp, paper and paper products, 
chemical process plant and electrical engineering. It is difficult 
to detect from this list any pattern or trend in the criteria used 
for changes in responsibility within departments.
The process of bringing about changes between divisions within a
21department is an informal one. Initially there are informal 
discussions between under-secretaries and a deputy secretary about 
workload. The deputy secretary might then present reallocation 
proposals to the permanent secretary. If there was a good case for 
them they would be passed by the permanent secretary and would then be 
examined by the establishments division, which would consider any extra 21
21. This paragraph is partly based on an interview with a civil 
servant dealing with shipbuilding. 14 August 1973.
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staff or facilities required. At no time would politicians be
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involved. The reason for the number of transfers of responsibility 
for shipbuilding between divisions was the need to achieve acceptable 
workloads rather than attempts to improve coordination of policy.
The growth of government involvement in shipbuilding and the 
consequent growth in the number of civil servants was only related to 
changes within departments insofar as this growth led to the 
imbalancing of the workload of a division. The experience of the 
shipbuilding industry seems to bear out Chester and Willson's view, 
referred to earlier, that administrative convenience is significant 
in fitting minor functions into the system.
In terms of change between departments, we can see a long-term 
change from grouping with the users of the industry's product (or 
rather with the users of some product of the UK shipbuilding industry 
and of its rivals) to grouping with producers of other goods. In 
this sense the changes can be explained in terms of a regrouping of 
major functions or purposes as argued by Self (see section 9.2.1). 
However, it is difficult to see why so many reallocations of 
responsibility were necessary to bring about this change. The transfer 
to the Board of Trade seems explicable only a£ the consequence of 
other changes in responsibility, while the Prime Minister's justifica­
tion of the change to the Ministry of Technology was less than wholly 
accurate. It seems more plausible to explain the changes in terms of 
the political fashions of the time. Shipbuilding is by no means the 
only example of transfers of responsibility in this way; civil 
aviation had been treated even more dramatically in the same period. 
These transfers of individual industries must also be seen in the 
context of the riot of institutional tinkering during the period, with 
the setting up and disappearance of departments like the Department
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of Economic Affairs, and the evolution and dismemberment of the DTI 
as a giant department to deal with all aspects of industry.22
Transfers between departments are obviously of a much more 
political nature than transfers between divisions and inevitably 
involve politicians:
'Machinery also depends to some extent in the quality of the 
Ministers available. For example, Ministries headed by 
Barbara Castle, one of our best administrators, were given 
additional powers - and in two cases she was moved to a new 
Department in order to create or re-organise it'.
Alternatively, a permanent secretary might suggest that his department 
is overloaded. In any case, the final decision would have to be 
cleared by the Prime Minister.
Changes in responsibility are very much seen as an internal 
matter for the government. The industry is never consulted in advance 
about a decision on changes in responsibility. It is not normal to 
send circulars to shipbuilders about a change in department, though 
one was sent out when shipbuilding was transferred from the Admiralty 
to the Ministry of Transport in 1959. When shipbuilding was to be 
transferred to the Ministry of Technology Mr. Wilson wrote a personal 
letter to the SRNA chairman announcing the transfer of responsibility; 
this reflected the SRNA's anxiety that the change should not impede 
the follow up to the Geddes Report. When there were changes between 
divisions within the same department, the change would probably be 
confirmed to the industry association in an informal telephone 
conversation.
22. For an analysis of departmental changes in central government 
up to 1974, see Clarke, 1975. 23
23. Harold Wilson, in a personal communication to the author,
23 November 1973.
Continuity of civil servants. Of course, lack of continuity in
0 , C-
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departmental and divisional responsibility does not necessarily 
reflect a lack of continuity in the senior civil servants involved.
Of the two senior civil servants listed as responsible for shipbuilding 
matters at the Admiralty in the 1959 Civil Service List one, the 
Director of Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs was listed in 1960 
amongst the five civil servants responsible at the Ministry of 
Transport. Within the Ministry of Transport, despite the changes of 
groups in which shipbuilding was included, a fair degree of 
continuity was maintained up to 1964, However, the continuity was 
sharply broken with the transfer from the Ministry of Transport to the 
Board of Trade, with only the Director and Deputy Director of Merchant 
Shipbuilding and Repairs appearing in the lists both before and after 
the transfer.
In contrast to this, when responsibility was transferred to the 
Ministry of Technology, all those in the list after the transfer had 
also been in the appropriate division at the Board of Trade, including 
the under-secretary, bearing out the Prime Minister's undertaking that 
the transfer would also involve civil servants at a higher level than 
those dealing full-time with shipbuilding. Within the Ministry of 
Technology a fair degree of continuity was preserved, though the 
growth in the number of senior civil servants involved in shipbuilding 
matters meant that a large proportion had no previous experience of 
the industry. The transfer of shipbuilding from the Ministry of 
Technology to the DTI involved the transfer of the entire division in 
which shipbuilding was included and, with one exception, those listed 
in 1971 had also been listed in 1970 as responsible for shipbuilding.
Turning to individuals, a remarkable record of continuity was held 
by Mr. A. Sutcliffe, who was Deputy Director and later Director of 
Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs from 1960 to 1970; the post was
mound up following his departure. The post of assistant secretary 
of the shipbuilding branch (after 1970 one of two branches) mas held 
from 1966 to 1971 - a crucial period in the development of government 
relations with the industry - by Mr. I/.I. Chapman, who had also been 
secretary to the Geddes Committee. Both the two branches concerned 
with shipbuilding at the DTI had as assistant secretaries men who had 
been civil servants involved in shipbuilding matters for five years 
previously, i.e. from the time shipbuilding had been under the Board 
of Trade. In this important respect, continuity of senior civil 
servants dealing full-time with the industry has been greater than the 
continuity of departmental responsibility.
Growth in the number of civil servants. The growth in government 
involvement has been paralled by a rise in the number of civil servants 
dealing full time with the industry. Under the Admiralty only two 
were separately identified in the Civil Service list; immediately 
following the transfer to the Ministry of Transport there were five,
The number was still the same when shipbuilding was transferred to the 
Ministry of Technology, but by its last year at that ministry there 
were seven. By 1972, when shipbuilding was in a division of its own, 
there were eleven. These figures are for senior civil servants, i.e, 
principal and above, who were dealing full-time with shipbuilding.
The pattern of growth for the total number of civil servants of all 
grades was rather different. When shipbuilding was transferred to 
the Ministry of Transport in 1959, sixteen civil servants were 
transferred, two of whom were senior civil servants; when ship­
building was transferred to the Ministry of Technology a total of 
nineteen staff was transferred, of whom five senior civil servants.
By 1972 there was a total of 42 posts, of which eleven were senior.
Thus until the late 1960s the growth in senior posts was more marked
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than the total growth, but thereafter both senior and total posts 
grew dramatically.
Of course, to get truly comparable figures of civil service 
manpower it would be necessary to include those who were involved in 
shipbuilding matters in other departments at various times. This 
would include those at the DSIR who looked after shipbuilding research 
and development. Further, while the employees of the SIB were not 
actually civil servants, they carried out work which would otherwise 
have been done by the responsible department. This is reflected by 
the fact that the total number of civil servants dealing with ship­
building rose from about twenty in 1970 to forty-two after the SIB was 
wound up. It is also important to remember that when crises arose 
they would command the attention of civil servants considerably senior 
to those dealing with the industry full-time, and even on occasion the 
Cabinet,
The effect of the changes. On each of the occasions when shipbuilding 
was transferred between departments plausible reasons for the change 
were advanced, though some of them do not stand up to much scrutiny. 
Looked at overall, however, shipbuilding came under five different 
departments within twelve years, and the three most important transfers 
occurred within eight years. Oust as it was possible to argue on each 
occasion that the new department was more suitable than the old, so it 
is possible to point out with the benefit of hindsight that no-one took 
an overall view that since each department was in some way suitable any 
particular disadvantages of shipbuilding being in that department 
might be outweighed by the disruption caused by the various transfers.24
24. For example, a former SRNA director in interview had no ob lectio 
to any of the departments, but did object to the number °
transfers. 11 December 1972.
This applies even more when the transfers between divisions within 
the same department are taken into account.
As was remarked earlier, these changes in responsibility for 
shipbuilding took place at a time of considerable general institution­
al change. However, this means that even less attention than there 
might have been otherwise has been focussed on the way in which 
transfers affect decision making about individual industries.
Sir Richard Clarke has estimated that it takes two years to weld a
department of considerable size together and five years to make it a
25really established entity. On a smaller scale, there must also 
be ’disruption costs’ for transfers of individual industries, even if, 
as we have seen above, there may be a reasonable degree of continuity 
of civil servants dealing with the industry. The fact that civil 
servants at the very top of the department may not be transferred is 
very important, since civil servants and industry representatives both 
agree that such transfers destroy contacts which have been established 
up to permanent secretary level. Transfers of responsibility also 
lead to changes over and above those occurring in the normal course 
of political life in the ministers to whom representations have to be 
made. In general, it seems fair to conclude that changes in 
responsibility for shipbuilding have had little to do with adapting 
the machinery of government to enable it to fulfil better changing 
needs and policies, and that they have, if anything, reduced the 
government’s ability to deal with the industry.
9.3 THE ROLE OF PARAGOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES
9.3.1 The general arguments
The already complex picture of changes in departmental responsibility
25. Clarke, 1971.
26. Interviews with a former director of the SRNA and a former 
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Transport, 'll December 1972 
and 19 November 1973*
for shipbuilding is further complicated by the existence of the
Shipbuilding Industry Board between 1967 and 1971 and the involvement
of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) with its specific
intervention over Cammell Laird. This section seeks to assess the
role of paragovernmental agencies as vehicles for shipbuilding
policy, as well as commenting on the more general value of agencies.
The Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the House of Commons
Expenditure Committee has considered the role of paragovernmental
27agencies at some length. Arguments presented to the committee in 
favour of agencies fell under three main headings*
( D  Businessmen are better able than civil servants to judge and 
handle the problems that arise.
(2) A certain measure of independence of government is a distinct 
advantage.
(3) At the same time the ultimate sanction of government authority 
gives the agency advantages over any privately-created institution.
Th8 view taken here is that these arguments in themselves do not 
present an adequate justification for intervention being carried out 
by paragovernmental agencies rather than directly by government.
The first two types of argument and the reasons why they are not 
accepted here are considered in more detail below (the third type
of argument is not considered here since we are concerned with the 
relative merits of agencies and departments rather than paragovern­
mental agencies and private organisations).
It could be pointed out in reply to the view that businessmen are 
better able than civil servants to handle problems that these problems 
would not have arisen in the first place if the businessmen in the 
firms concerned had been capable of running things without coming to the
' 374'
27, HC 347, Session 1971-2, chapters 7-9.
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government for help. However, this is rather a cheap point. Much
more important is the fact that insofar as businessmen's expertise is
relevant this can be provided without a full-blown paragovernmental
agency. Advice can be sought on an ad hoc basis by commissioning
reports from consultants, like the Hill Samuel Report on Govan
Shipbuilders, or it can be institutionalised, like the arrangements
following the 1972 Industry Act. (To be fair to the Expenditure
Committee, it should be pointed out that most of the evidence was
given to the committee before these arrangements were set up).
Following the March 1972 White Paper on Industrial and Regional
Development there was set up within the new Industrial Development
Executive at the DTI ano Industrial Development Unit, with staff
28recruited from the City, industry and government. Its role was 
described as being to help with appraisal and negotiation, principally 
in cases involving selective financial assistance, the monitoring of 
investments made by the department, and the undertaking of studies of 
problems affecting industry and particular sectors of it. Under 
the Industry Act there was also an Industrial Development Advisory 
Board (IDAB) to advise generally on industry-wide problems and 
specific major cases for selective financial assistance. In addition, 
non-statutory Industrial Development Boards were appointed for 
Scotland, Wales and those English regions with substantial assisted 
areas.
The crucial point about these post-1972 arrangements is, of 
course, that the actual decision gets taken within the government 
department, and this leads to the second set of arguments in favour of 
agencies - that a certain measure of independence of government is a 289
28. Cmnd 4942.
29. HC 429, Session 1972-3, p.6.
distinct advantage. (in practice, agencies may not be given complete 
independence: under the Industry Act 1975 and other recent legislation 
the Secretary of State may direct the National Enterprise Board (or 
the Scottish or Welsh Development Agencies) to provide selective 
financial assistance under the Industry Act 1972). The arguments 
advanced in favour of independence include: (1) there are too many 
government departments involved with any one industry; (2) companies 
are more prepared to give information to agencies than to the 
government; (3) an agency is less subject to changing political 
pressures than a government department; (4) there is value in being 
able to say that an independent body or group had recommended a 
particular course of action.
The first argument - that there are too many government 
departments dealing with any one industry may be true, but the setting 
up of an agency need not necessarily improve matters. Indeed, far 
from reducing the problem of proliferation, the establishment of an 
agency can make it worse. During the period 1967-71 naval ship­
builders still had to deal with the ministry of Defence, the Ministry 
of Technologyr^and the Ministry of Labour, but also had to deal with 
the SIB. When Cammell Laird got into difficulties, the SIB, the 
government and another agency, the IRC, were all involved.
The argument that companies are more prepared to give information 
to agencies than to the government appears to relate to the late 1960s. 
Experience of the 1972 Industry Act suggests that firms are prepared 
to give information to the government to get aid. The remarks of 
Bray where he is considering whether the 'agencies’ he recommends for 
each industry should be separate bodies like the SIB or integrated 
into a government department are very relevant to this point:
»these agencies would be at a disadvantage if they could not 
argue their case within the government machine, and whoever
f t  • '
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did argue for them would be exercising the real power.
There would thus have to be people in sponsoring departments
looking after agencies in any case. And firms do speak very
frankly to government if only because government has the power.
Also the proliferation of bodies makes for confusion already.
On balance it seems better to regard the industrial agencies
as organisational units within government departments ... The
success of a disaggregated approach depends on building up the
mutual confidence and understanding directly between firms and
the government. There is no short cut by government pretending
30not to be government*.
Chapter 8, particularly section 8.5 on monitoring, suggested that, 
unless information to an agency was duplicated to the government, the 
government would be at a disadvantage if it came to be involved 
directly. For example, a 120-page-long report by the IRC on Rolls- 
Royce was not made available to the government, and only came into the 
government’s possession after the IRC had been closed down. Far from 
the balance of advantage in the collection of information lying with 
an agency, there are distinct disadvantages when viewed in the context 
of the policy process as a whole as in section 9.3.3 below.
Another argument in favour of independent agencies was that they 
are less subject to political pressures than government departments.
Despite the fact that objectives such as promoting competitiveness 
are vaguer to apply in practice than might seem, this argument is 
undoubtedly correct. However, it is also irrelevant, because the 
existence of an agency does not in practice insulate the government 
from these pressures. The result is illustrated quite dramatically
30. Bray, 1970, p.274.
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by government involvement in the shipbuilding industry* between 1967 
and mid 1972 direct government aid was well over twice SIB aid. The 
detailed application of industrial policy is an inherently political 
activity, and it is naive to assume that particular kinds of 
institutional arrangements will exclude political pressures from 
influencing the implementation of policies.
The final argument to be considered here is that it can be 
valuable to politicians to be able to point to the advice of an 
independent group. This is undoubtedly true, and the last chapter 
drew attention to how inquiry reports had been used in this way by 
governments. However, there is no need for a full-blown agency to 
provide this advice. As we saw above, under the 1972 Industry Act 
the IDAB is merely advisory and can have its advice rejected (as over 
the Kirby cooperative) or it can be ignored altogether (as over Court 
Line). This, however, merely draws attention to the fact that 
politicians do not always want independent advice to resist political 
pressures. Even when an independent agency with executive 
responsibilities declines to provide assistance, as the SIB did with 
UCS in autumn 1969, the government may decide to intervene directly. 
The case being made here can be summarised as follows* (l) some 
of the arguments advanced in favour of agencies as against government 
departments turn out to be invalid in practice (e.g. that it gets 
round the problem of a multiplicity of departments dealing with an 
industry); (2) some of the advantages of agencies also apply to 
bodies without executive powers, such as the IDAB; (3) some of the 
arguments are based on the desirability of excluding political 
pressures, which is merely impossible.
9,3.2 Special features of the SIB
While the arguments discussed above were of a general nature, it is 
important to distinguish between multi-sectoral agencies, such as the 
IRC and the National Enterprise Board (NEB) and single-sector agencies, 
such as the SIB. Further differences are the expected lifetime of the 
agency and the nature of its funding — the SIB was seen from the start 
as a temporary body with fixed funds, though both its lifetime and 
its funds were later extended. There are also other differences 
between specific agencies which do not relate to these character­
istics: the IRC was not criticised by the witnesses to the 
Expenditure Committee as being a barrier between industry and 
government in the same way as the SIB was.
The main difficulty with single-sector agencies is that 
industrial companies often cross sectoral boundaries, and problems 
may not be confined to a single sector. This was clearly the case 
with Cammell Laird, where the group's difficulties went beyond the 
shipbuilding component of the group and the IRC had to be called in 
(see section 5.3.3). There, however, the situation was complicated 
by the fact that the IRC was specifically excluded from shipbuilding. 
This had been done to avoid overlap between the roles of the two 
agencies, but the problem of a gap arose instead. The problem of 
overlap is a potentially important one, however; it could arise on 
a geographical rather than a sectoral basis with the NEB and the 
Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies.
In retrospect, we can see that the Geddas timetable set for the 
SIB was too short; indeed, it now seems unrealistic to have intro­
duced a fixed time limit at all. The reason for imposing the limit 
- to compel a sense of urgency in seeking solutions - is laudable 
enough, but it did not seem to be a very effective way of forcing the
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pace. Dell, though in favour of a general agency, arguea that if 
there is to be an agency for an industry such as shipbuilding it 
should not be a temporary one, but should have a continuing 
responsibility for the funds it disburses - 'a responsibility from 
which it cannot be expected to be released by blissful death'.31 
A further problem faced by temporary agencies is the difficulty they 
may face in attracting competent staff, since they are unable to 
offer a career structure.
A small element of flexibility was built into the 1967 Act by 
allowing for the extension of the SIB's life for one year after the 
end of 1970. However, by then the SIB itself had become a 'lame 
duck' agency because it no longer had any grants left to disburse, 
despite the fact that the amount available to it had been increased in 
1968. By this time, of course, the government was giving aid to 
shipyards directly. By giving a fixed sum rather than one to be 
reviewed, say, every year, the government wanted to emphasise that it 
did not see its commitment as being open-ended. Yet, in practice, 
government assistance has proved to be open-ended both in terms of 
time and money, and setting up an agency with limited funds and limited 
life does not prevent this. It seems fair to conclude that, apart 
from being set an impossible task in any case, the SIB was at a 
further disadvantage because of its nature as a single—sector, 
temporary agency.
There are, however, circumstances in which single-sector agencies 
can be of some value, and there is an example of such an agency in the 
shipbuilding industry - the Shipbuilding Industry Training Board (SITB). 
Where there is a well-defined and politically non-controversial role 
to be played, an agency may well prove to be the best method. The 
converse is not true, however; setting up an agency does not make a 
problem well-defined or politically non-controversial.
3 1 . Dell, 1973, p.171.
9.3.3 Agencies and monitoring
3.8.1
This section both develops a particular aspect of the general
arguments about agencies developed above and expands on the issues
raised in the preceding chapter on information. The SIB was a vital
link in the flow of information connected with the processing of
applications. There is no logical reason why monitoring following
the giving of aid should be carried out by the same body that deals
with applications, though the distinction between monitoring past aid
and collecting information for new applications does blur when there
is a series of injections of aid. Mr. Aubrey 3ones, former chairman
of the National Board for Prices and Incomes, expressed the view to the
House of Commons Expenditure Committee that if a paragovernmental
agency is used to give financial assistance the monitoring of the
financial, production and marketing performance should be carried out
32by a separate auditing section. The Expenditure Committee thought 
that this principle could have equal relevance if the assistance was 
given directly by the government. The danger with this suggestion 
is that there must be adequate feedback between monitoring and 
application-processing sections, since one of the aims of monitoring 
past aid should be to improve tfe appraisal of information given in 
support of applications.
There is also a danger that the existence of an agency may hava 
adverse effects on communication between a firm and a government 
department. In fir. Hepper's opinion, the SIB had proved more of a 
hindrance than a help to both government and the company} direct 
contact between the company and the department would have been better.33
32. HC 347, Session 1971-2, para. 260.
33. HC 347-11, Session 1971-2, q.2178.
The House of Commons Expenditure Committee concluded that the 
government should have been more directly and closely involved in DCS, 
at least from mid-1969, despite the existence of the SIB.34 During 
the crucial period of 1970 covering the last few months of the 
Labour Government and the first few of the incoming Conservative 
government there was considerably less contact and supervision by the 
government than there had been earlier, or was to be later. As for 
the SIB, the committee thought that from the time of refusing to 
recommend further financial support in December 1969 the SIB must 
inevitably have been less effectively concerned in the affairs of UCS, 
particularly since, on their own argument, they no longer had 
available the financial lever. The fact that the SIB was nearing the 
end of its existence may also have affected its sense of involvement - 
a further illustration of the special problems associated with 
temporary agencies discussed above.
The government, having set up an agency to deal with the industry,
failed to develop adequate procedures in situations with which the
agency'/ bad not been designed to cope. In his advocacy of an
incremental approach to policy making, Lindblom arguesi ’Suppose that
each value rejected by one policy-making agency were a major concern
of at least one other agency. In that case, a helpful division of
labour would be achieved, and no agency need find its task beyond its 
»35capacities. In practice, as we have seen, such an arrangement may
lead to gaps in monitoring rather than ’a helpful division of labour’.
On the general question of whether an agency is better than a 
government department at monitoring the use of money, the Expenditure
34. HC 347, Session 1971-2, para. 115.
35. Lindblom, 1959, p.85.
Committee's conclusion seems sounds an agency is not in itself 
better, assuming that both government department and agency can call 
equally for outside advice of high quality.35 Both government 
departments and agencies also require internal expertise if they use 
outside experts - they need to be able to appraise the appraisal of 
experts and in particular any p o l i c y  I m p l i c a t i o n s  of information.
These implications are frequently political, and no kind of 
institutional arrangement u/ill be successful at preventing politicians 
Intervening, and frequently taking direct action.
9.3.4 Conclusion
The criticisms advanced above about the value of paragovernmental 
agencies should not be considered as criticisms of those responsible 
for an agency. Indeed, Sir William Swallow, seems to have been 
entirely the right man for the job of chairman of the SIB; what is 
at issue is whether he should have been asked to take on this 
(impossible) job. Nor have most of the criticisms been of the idea 
of paragovernmental agencies in the abstract, but of the way they 
have to operate in practice. The SIB faced special problems as a 
single-sector temporary agency, but many of the comments apply to any 
agency where its actions will have important politicial consequences.
Above all, this section suggests that the role of agencies in 
implementing policies cannot be properly assessed if it is considered 
in isolation from other aspects of the political process. In the 
final section of this chapter the SIB'a role will be assessed in terms 
of the way it related to government departments and to the policy 
process as a whole.
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9.4 DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN THE POLICY PROCESS
The institutional framework for government involvement in shipbuilding 
has been characterised by a high degree of discontinuity and 
fragmentation. Like the information needs of government considered 
in chapter 8, the institutional framework has been determined in an ad 
hoc way. In part this has reflected the ad hoc nature of government 
involvement, but many of the institutional changes were not directly 
related to changes in policy approach and can best be explained in 
terms of administrative (i.e. civil service) convenience and 
contemporary political fashions. The apparently clearest attempt to 
match institutional arrangements to policy requirements - the setting 
up of the SIB - turns out on examination of its activities in terms of 
the policy process as a whole to have contained a number of defects.
The SIB was seen as an instrument for implementing the Geddes 
strategy — a concrete manifestation, intended to continue for a number 
of years, of what was seen at a particular point in time as the 
desired strategy. The economic and other influences affecting the 
industry deviated from the forecasts or necessary conditions defined 
by Geddes, but while the SIB in its dealings with firms might receive 
information feedback about changed factors it did not have the ability 
to reassess its role, which was defined by statute. The relevant 
government departments had to take fragmented response measures to 
tackle problems which were outside the SIB’s terms of reference.
However, the very existence of the SIB must have reduced the 
department’s ability to get feedback from day-today contacts.
The experience of the SIB indicates limitations in the use of 
agencies. Even if such agencies could be made entirely self- 
regulating in pursuit of stated objectives in order to respond to 
changes in the environment of the industry, this would be unlikely
to be acceptable to British constitutional practice, since such 
responses would almost inevitably involve resource allocation. It 
would also be rather pointless, since the evidence suggests that 
governments frequently change the objectives they are pursuing as 
they react to new problems. This last point applies to all attempt 
to introduce a planning approach, or indeed to match institutional 
arrangements to objectives. The problem cannot be defined solely 
in terms of administrative flexibility, since the issues are also 
political ones.
CHAPTER 10
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CONCLUSIONS
10.1 A TYPOLOGY OF GOVERNMENT—INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIPS 
One of the themes which emerges quite clearly from this study is that 
the problems of government relationships with shipbuilding firms have 
not been simply those of government relationships with private firms. 
This study has not been of government involvement only in the private 
sector but of the role of the government in industrial change, 
whatever the nature of ownership of the firms involved. The extent 
of government ownership of shipbuilding firms has varied from zero at 
the beginning of the period covered by this study to proposals for 
nationalisation of all the larger firms by 1976, with a variety of 
partial shareholdings in between. It is possible to see a pattern in 
the nature of government involvement, both in terms of a number of 
categories and in terms of the development of government involvement 
over time. Five possible categories are set out below.
1. 'Pure* private enterprise (i.e. receiving only automatically 
available grants and allowances and subject to wage restraint etc.).
The UK shipbuilding industry fell into this category before 1959. in 
this category the relationship between government and shipbuilding 
firms is not a special one; problems affecting the industry are either 
not sufficiently politically salient to cause the government to give 
selective assistance or it is hoped that general aid to industry will 
be adequate. There are relatively few problems about monitoring and 
control by the government. The main problem is that such a general 
framework is unable to prevent crises affecting individual yards 
arising, with demands for specific government action to deal with them.
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2. Assisted private enterprise (receiving aid specific to that firm 
or industry; no government shareholding). An example of this type
of firm was Swan Hunter prior to nationalisation or, to take an example
outside the shipbuilding industry, Chrysler UK after the government
had sold its shareholding. By providing direct assistance in thisit
way the government hopes that/is focussing aid where it is most needed. 
Once aid has been provided in this way the problem arises of how to be 
sure that the aid is being put to best use and to receive adequate 
warning of future crises. The lack of a shareholding can reduce the 
government's feeling of responsibility for the fate of the firm, and 
this was undoubtedly a major influence in the government's refusal in 
1975 to take Chrysler as a gift.
3. Hybrid enterprise (mixed state and private shareholdings). UCS 
prior to its liquidation was an example of this type of enterprise, as 
is British Petroleum. In the UCS case, however, the company was also 
receiving direct assistance from the government. Previous chapters 
have made it clear that the taking of a shareholding does not in itself 
solve the problem of defining what ought to be the relationship between 
government and a firm to which it is giving assistance. Although 
Young and Lowe list the taking of an equity shareholding as a method
of monitoring, it is clear that owning shares is not itself a method 
of monitoring - it is not a means of collecting the information which 
the government needs about a firm and will have to collect irrespective 
of whether it has a shareholding in that firm. Indeed, as became 
particularly clear in section 8.5.3, there can be special problems 
in hybrid firms of management being unclear about their responsibility 
to the government.
Young with Lowe, 1974, p.201-8.
4. State-owned enterprise (100$ or near 100$ government shareholding). 
Govan Shipbuilders, Court Shipbuilders after 1974 and Harland and Wolff 
after 1975 are examples of this type of firm, as is British Leyland 
after 1974. One of the strangest developments of the early 1970s was 
the emergence of firms which are wholly government-owned but which lie 
in the private sector. The distinctions between such firms and 
nationalised ones are that* (1) publicly-owned but not nationalised 
firms are not normally brought into public ownership through 
legislation and their responsibilities to the minister are not, 
therefore, statutorily defined; (2) such firms are more likely to 
have been brought into public ownership as part of a rescue operation 
than as a result of a manifesto pledge (indeed a Conservative 
government is just as likely as a Labour government to bring firms into 
public ownership in this way); (3) the ad hoc way in which this fb.rm 
of public ownership has arisen is reflected in the fact that this 
form of ownership affects individual companies, whereas nationalisation 
affects whole industries. This form of ownership presents the 
government in an acute form with the problems it faces when it has only 
a part shareholding* the extent to which it should seek to control 
the operations of the company and its legal and moral responsibility 
for creditors and employees should the firm continue to be in difficulty 
and the government wish to wash its hands of it.
5. Statutory nationalised industries. UK shipbuilding if and when 
the government's legislation is passed will fall into this category, 
though the government intends the new corporation to be different in 
terms of worker participation and decentralisation from traditional 
nationalised industries (see section 7.6). This form of relationship 
has at least superficially the attribute of familiarity. The 
problems are considerable, but have at least been met before* the
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certainty of political interference even after a plan has been agreed 
between the minister and the industry, and the problems of ministerial 
and parliamentary accountability. The distinction between complete 
public ownership and nationalisation is well illustrated by the 
exclusion of Harland and Idolff, a wholly government-owned company, 
from the bill to nationalise shipbuilding and the campaign in Northern 
Ireland to have it 'nationalised' along with the rest of the industry.
Although each of these categories has special features and special 
problems, government does not itself seem to have analysed its 
relationships with shipbuilding firms or the industry as a whole in 
these terms. The relationship has been determined in an ad hoc way 
and the problems have been identified after they have arisen (though 
even then they have not always been identified as problems stemming 
from the relationship). For each category the government has been 
unclear about how much information it needs or wants, how much control 
over the firm it is willing or able to exercise, and what its resulting 
responsibilities are to creditors, shareholders and employees. Nor 
for that matter has it been clear what the initial or continuing 
objectives of involvement were, and if that is unclear the other aspects 
of the relationship cannot be properly defined.
It is possible to discern a clear pattern over the seventeen years 
since 1959 of movement of the shipbuilding industry through all five 
categories from 'pure' private enterprise to statutory nationalised 
industry, A similar pattern can be traced for some individual firms 
such as those on the upper Clyde, However, underlying this process 
there has not been a conscious decision gradually to increase the 
proportion of public ownership. Rather, the pattern is the outcome 
of separate decisions in reaction to individual crises. As government 
policy became more and more difficult to express in 'commercial' terms,
so assisted private enterprise seemed less and less appropriate as 
the funnel through which public funds were poured.
/  y  - •  •>
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Shares can in fact be taken by the government for a variety of 
reasons. Of these the explicit desire to bring the industry into 
public ownership, as exhibited by the 1974 Labour government’s 
nationalisation proposals, is the exception rather than the rule. 
Government’s may have a shareholding in a company almost by accident* 
the reason the government started off with a 17.5% shareholding in UCS 
was not the result of a deliberate decision to do so but the consequence 
of the government’s 50% shareholding in Fairfields. When the public 
shareholding was increased in mid 1969 the SIB, so far from seeking to 
gain control of the company, deliberately confined the size of the 
shareholding it took to avoid having a majority public shareholding 
(see section 5.2.2). One reason given for taking a public share­
holding is to ensure that the government benefits from any profits 
arising from the assistance that it has given; in practice, such 
benefits have not materialised. A more realistic reason for taking a 
shareholding is that, unlike a loan, it does not carry a commitment by 
the firm to repay the funds invested by a specific date. Even when a 
government would prefer not to take a shareholding or would rather have 
some element of private shareholding, for example the Conservative 
government and Govan Shipbuilders, the government may be compelled to 
take a shareholding because the lack of prospects of viability means 
that private investors are unwilling to put in any money.
Apart from the type of assistance and the level of state owner­
ship of shares, relationships between the government and firms can also 
be complicated by the customer-client relationship involved in placing 
orders for naval ships. The reduction of the number of yards to be 
invited to tender for ships as recommended by both the Geddes and
Booz-Allen Reports had important implications for a number of firms 
in the industry. However, the use of naval orders to plug gaps in 
the order books of non-specialist yards illustrates the continuing role 
of such orders as an ad hoc instrument of government policy. In 
general, firms for which naval orders are a large part of their total 
orders are in a highly dependent relationship with the government. 
However, the dependence is mutual. Tor strategic, as wall as for the 
more general employment reasons, governments cannot afford to let 
specialist naval builders collapse. Accordingly, the government will 
attempt to ensure that they have a reasonable level of profitability, 
and will provide funds if one of them should get into difficulties, as 
with Yarrow in 1971.
Relationships between the government and industry can also be 
complicated by the existence of paragovernmental agencies dealing with 
some aspects of policy towards the industry. As was shown in section
9.3, the setting up of an agency may do nothing to solve the essentially 
political problems of communication, control and responsibility.
Indeed, when viewed in terms of their role within the policy process 
as a whole their existence can hinder a clearer definition of what the 
government sees as being its relationship with the firms to which it 
has given aid.
This confusion over the relationship between government and 
industry has not been confined to government alone. The House of 
Commons, too, seems ill-adjusted to scrutinise the variety of 
relationships between government and firms. Partial or complete 
government shareholdings seem to be considered to be in the private 
sector and therefore come under the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee 
of the Expenditure Committee, while nationalised industries come under 
the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries. Thus Govan
Shipbuilders as a 100% publicly owned 'private' firm was examined by 
the Expenditure Committee and the Public Accounts Committee, but as 
part of a 100% publicly owned Nationalised industry it will presumably 
come under the Nationalised Industries Committee.
Businessmen, too, are often confused about their relationship 
with the government. This is shown not only by Mr. Hepper's comment 
that as chairman of UCS he did not know to whom he should report, but 
also by the public attempt in 1976 by Sir Kenneth Keith, chairman of 
the state-owned Rolls-Royce (1971 ), to have his relationship with the 
National Enterprise Board and the government clearly set out.
The development of government involvement in the shipbuilding 
industry suggest that a simple classification into private and public 
sectors is becoming increasingly irrelevant because of the variety of 
types of government assistance and the ways in which shareholdings can 
be held. This pattern will become more complicated with the intro­
duction of planning agreements as a result of the Industry Act 1975.
This makes all the more strange the assertion by the then Prime Minister 
Mr. Harold Wilson,- to a meeting of the Socialist International in 
1974 that 'confidence demands that a clear frontier must be defined 
between what is public and what is private industry'. The British 
government appears to be unaware of the blurring of this distinction 
between private and public sectors as a result of government 
involvement, far less the need to work out what its relationship should 
be with firms in each of the categories listed earlier or how to cope 
with changes between categories.
2. Mackenzie, 1976, p.7 has also come to the conclusion that'the 
distinction between public and private sectors is now so riddled 
with anomalies that it must be re-thought'.
3. Times, 1 Duly 1974.
10.2 CAN GOVERNMENTS MAKE AN INOUSTRY COMPETITIVE?
10.2.1 Defining competitiveness
In discussing shipbuilding policy politicians have not made clear what 
they mean by such phrases as 'promoting competitiveness' or the even 
more ambiguous 'prospects of viability'. One difficulty in arriving 
at an operational definition is that 'competitiveness' is a relative, 
not an absolute, term. That is, it invokes a comparison between one 
firm's (variable) performance and another firm's (variable) performance. 
Measures to improve UK performance up to the existing performance of 
competitors are likely to be inadequate, even if successful, since 
those competitors will also be trying to improve their performance.
It will be difficult to anticipate just how much the performance of 
competitors may improve. There are three ways in which a government 
can try to make an industry 'competitive'.
1, Not intervene. If the government refrains from rescuing firms in 
difficulty, all loss-making firms will go out of business (though their
Vphysical assets and workforce may be taken over other firms). By 
definition, all remaining firms are competitive. Presenting this 
option in this stark way shows that government policy is not really 
about making the industry competitive in this sense at all. Insofar 
as the government does wish the industry to be competitive this is 
subject to employment preservation constraints.
Until the mid 1960s governments did not intervene to assist 
individual yards in difficulty, and as a consequence a number of yards 
ceased operating. However, governments took fright when they were 
faced with large-scale localised redundancies in areas with above 
average unemployment. Governments are, however, still prepared to 
stand back if the employment consequences are small enough, as the 
Labour government's refusal to rescue Drypool illustrated (see section
7.4). An echo of the non-interventionist approach remains in the 
oft-proclaimed but rarely acted-on intention expressed by governments 
that they are not prepared to give open-ended support to yards which 
are unable to compete otherwise.
As chapter 6 showed, there are considerable political difficulties 
in trying to carry out a general policy of non-intervention; the 
short-term political pressures which seem to predominate are over­
whelmingly in favour of intervention where the number of jobs at stake 
is large. A policy of non-intervention need not necessarily mean a 
dramatic decline in the total number employed in the industry as a whole, 
as some yards have actually expanded to the extent that they have 
experienced labour shortages. However, all the evidence of previous 
chapters suggest that it is not the aggregate figure for the industry 
as a whole or even the figure for a specific estuary that' is 
politically significant, but threatened redundancies in a specific 
location irrespective of expansion elsewhere.
The snag is that once you have removed the market definition of 
competitiveness it is difficult to decide what is the «optimum» size 
of the industry. A comprehensive anticipatory strategy (rather than 
an ad hoc rescue approach) to take account of the employment 
preservation instincts of government would be for the government to 
stipulate the size of employment in shipbuilding it desired, including 
its distribution, and ask how much this would cost; it could then 
trade off jobs against aid at the margin. However, this approach 
would be subject to a number of difficulties in practice* (1 ) it 
would be subject to the usual forecasting uncertainties; (2 ) it 
assumes that the government's objective of employment preservation is 
clear cut, but while the evidence suggests that it is predominant in 
practice, the government's stated objectives may be multiple and
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conflicting, and only by ex post analysis can the predominant 
objective be determined; (3) the amount of aid required to preserve 
employment depends on behaviour by those in the industry, but this in 
turn can be affected by the knowledge that the government wishes to 
preserve a certain amount of employment.
Two ways in which the government might try to make an industry 
'compete1, other than by allowing the market to eliminate unprofitable 
firms are set. out below; both have been reflected in government policy 
in practice. Both these approaches are likely to be wasteful in 
resource allocation terms, even given market imperfections over space 
and time in the reallocation of resources and manpower employed by a 
particular company. It was argued in section 6.3.8 that the regional 
economic implications of such market imperfections are sometimes 
exaggerated and do not justify the sums of money spent on keeping people 
in their existing jobs. If the aim were to optimise resource 
allocation, policies would be better directed at reducing the market 
imperfections, of which some, such as council house policy, are 
government induced, rather than by diverting additional resources to 
freeze the existing pattern. However, for the moment it is assumed 
that governments will try to preserve employment in existing shipyards 
anyway and we are merely examining whether there is more than one way 
of doing this. Later in the chapter we will drop the assumption that 
employment has to be preserved in shipbuilding.
2. Pump-priming. The assumption here is that by giving a certain 
amount of aid for a period a firm will thereafter be able to compete 
without further assistance. Pump-priming aid can be either to improve 
physical facilities or to alter behaviour in the desired way. This 
was the Geddes approach, and was briefly tried by the government in 
1967-9. Subsequent aid has sometimes been described in pump-priming
terms, but is more properly considered under the subsidies and rescue 
operations heading below. The experience with shipbuilding policy in 
1967-9 suggest that it is very difficult to be successful with a 
pump-priming approach. Particular difficulties are caused if 
competitiveness has to be achieved with a given size of workforce.
If a firm has not carried out investment or improved its performance 
in the absence of aid then it is prime facie not the best suited to 
put that aid to best use unless management at board and plant level is 
altered. (This conclusion should be qualified to the extent that the 
need for government loans for investment has arisen because of the 
imperfect capital market in the UK or difficulties in raising funds 
because of the threat of nationalisation). It is arguable that the 
management of change requires greater competence than the management 
of the status quo. Even given the most competent management, however, 
a pump-priming approach faces considerable difficulties, which are 
elaborated in sections 10.2.2 and 10.2.3. These difficulties 
frequently result in pump-priming developing into rescue operations.
3. Subsidies and rescue operations. This approach rests on the 
assumption that a firm or industry is incapable of competing without 
long-term subsidy, though rescue operations may be disguised as pump- 
priming exercises. To include this as a way of making the industry 
•competitive* seems to go against the common-sense understanding of 
the word, and its inclusion here is justified only because politicians 
have stretched the meaning of the word in this way. In this sense,
•to compete' can be taken to mean 'to survive'. Calls for aid to 
British shipyards are sometimes justified by claims that foreign 
shipbuilders are receiving subsidies or other devious forms of 
assistance but, apart from a healthy scepticism about some of these 
claims (see section 1.4.3), it is not immediately obvious that such
foreign assistance should be matched yen for yen. The decision about 
how far to match aid given to competing countries is a political one, 
as much as is the decision about how far to go beyond this in bailing 
out individual companies*
If an anticipatory approach in dispensing subsidies were adopted 
an attempt would be made to identify firms at risk and direct aid to 
them in advance of any crisis which might involve redundancies. The 
difficulties with this approach are in part forecasting (it is difficult 
to be completely accurate in identifying firms at risk or quantifying 
the aid required) and in part political (discriminatory subsidies 
channelled only to firms at risk will arouse the ire of other firms 
in the industry). On the other hand, indiscriminate subsidies of the 
kind introduced in 1972—5 are wasteful, and if long-term are most 
likely to be objected and possibly matched by foreign competitors.
The temptation is therefore to adopt a reactive approach and rescue 
firms only where there is an immediate and present danger of 
redundancies. Given the assumption that the government's aim is 
employment preservation within shipbuilding firms, this policy of 
reacting to circumstances can be seen to be both rational and less 
wasteful of resources than some alternatives. On almost any other 
basis, however, this approach is profoundly wasteful; in order to 
preserve ultimately 6,200 shipbuilding or similar jobs on the upper 
Clyde, the government set aside between 1967 and 1975 up to £102m for 
UCS (excluding Yarrow) and Govan Shipbuilders and Marathon. This works 
out at about £16,000 per job 'preserved'. For each separate injection 
of aid the figures were much lower, but because the rescue approach 
suppresses the undesired state of affairs but may do little to deal 
with the causes producing the crises, the problem and the need for 
rescue are likely to recur.
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To minimise its outgoings, the gov/ernment may try to combine 
pump-priming with rescue operations. In view of the difficulties set 
out in sections 10.2.2 and 10,2.3 it would be foolish for the 
government to assume that this u/ould eliminate the need for future 
rescue operations, though it might reasonably hope that somB attempt 
to bring about improvements might reduce the amount required for the 
next rescue operation from what it would otherwise have been. 
Unfortunately the incentive to improve performance is reduced if the 
workforce believes that whatever happens it is likely to be rescued 
anyway.
The above analysis is based on the assumption that governments 
are concerned to preserve employment in shipbuilding firms; this 
conforms with observed government practice in the 1960s and 1970s.
If, however, we assume that this approach is second-best to a more 
generalised one where it is assumed that governments simply want to 
avoid large-scale additions to the numbers of unemployed in areas with 
already high unemployment, then we can examine policy options which 
may have little to do with enabling shipyards to sell ships in the 
face of competition from other yards. These options will be examined 
in section 10.4
10.2.2 Generalising about implementation
In chapter 1 Pressman and li/ildavsky's an^sis af implementation and 
King’s concepts of ‘dependency relationships' and 'non-compliance' were 
outlined as having a possible relevance to the analysis of shipbuilding 
policy. During subsequent chapters the implementation of particular 
aspects of government shipbuilding policy was considered. This 
section aims to generalise the analysis of implementation in the authors 
referred to and in the present study in a way which will enable broad 
conclusions to be drawn about the implementation of shipbuilding
policy - or a wide range of other policies.
Pressman and Ulildavsky deliberately chose a case study of a project 
which operated in a sympathetic environment; virtually all 
participants were agreed on the ends to be pursued. They did so in 
order to illustrate that implementation can be difficult even in such 
a sympathetic environment. Internationally competing industries, on 
the other hand, operate in an environment part of which is inherently 
hostile. Decisions by other countries are likely to be detrimental 
to the U K industry (though not necessarily so), and if such decisions 
have a strong effect on the UK industry they will impede successful 
implementation.
Another issue of importance in generalising about implementation 
is the determination of when the implementation stage is taken to begin. 
Pressman and Uildavsky start their study once intitial projects within 
a programme had been approved. However, difficulties can arise even 
at the stage of finding suitable projects, which provides an early 
pointer to faulty programme design. For example, a programme launched 
in 1975 in the U K  t o  encourage investment in the machine tool industry 
by providing concessionary loans of up to 50%  of eligible costs or the 
equivalent in interest relief grants met with such a disappointing 
response that it was changed a year later to a straightforward grant of 
25^. Chapter 5 showed that there may be difficulty in securing initial 
projects which conform with the desired approach; and, despite the 
industry's obvious need for money, not all the SIB funds available for 
loans was taken up. It therefore seems appropriate to consider 
implementation for this study to start one stage further back than 
Pressman and li/ildavsky, that is to include the 'clearances' associated 
with project submission and approval.
B o t h  Pressman and Wlldavsky and King carry out their analysis in 
terms of one or two time-related chains of identifiable and discrete 
decisions. This may not be appropriate when full implementation 
depends on patterns of behaviour requiring frequent or perhaps 
continuous performance in a certain way. This distinction can be 
brought out by pointing out the difference between a trade union 
signing an employment charter and its members cooperating in improving 
performance from day to day. There may not be so much a decision 
£oint as a continuous potential or actual veto by perhaps even a small 
group of workers in the industry. This is, of course, relevant not 
only to shipbuilding but a number of other industries in which the 
government is involved, notably the car industry.
Another area of influences where it is not appropriate to think 
in terms of decision points are those which are determined through a 
market or as a result of a general phenomenon. Thus demand for ships
is the result of a multiplicity of choices going back eventually to 
purchases by consumers, while inflation has a profound effect on the 
success of shipyards. The choices which bring about inflation are 
not taken with a view to their effect on shipbuilding (though choices 
made by the government can be identified as specially significant).
Even where it is appropriate to talk of decision points, because 
competitiveness is a relative concept there is not a single chain of 
decisions, but a chain of decisions for each country (for each firm 
in fact). Promoting the success of an industry competing in a world 
environment is a far more complex undertaking than the relatively simple 
project examined by Pressman and liiildavsky. There are far more 
decision points, as well as a wide range of other influences involved 
and we should therefore expect implementation to be much more complex 
and the chances of a favourable outcome more remote.
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Clearly, very feu of the influences on the success of government 
industrial policy can be seen in terms of 'non-compliance' (one of 
the terms used by King) because this carries the implication that the 
person or organisation whose c o m p l i a n c e  is d e s i r e d  is in a hierarchically 
inferior position to the person or organisation requesting compliance.
This is inappropriate for analysing many of the influences affecting 
the success of British shipbuilding - Dapanese shipbuilders can hardly 
be expected to be 'compliant' to the British government's wishes'
The term 'non-performance' (also used by King) is more generally 
applicable if it is taken to refer not only to specific decisions but 
to situations in which a desired set of circumstances does not prevail.
It seems appropriate to consider the outcome of government 
industrial policy as being determined, not by a single chain of 
decisions, but by a flow of decisions and performance which contains 
several chains of decisions and performance in a number of contexts.
This flow is illustrated in simple form in fig, 10.1. This flow can 
be broken down into various components, each of which have different 
probabilities of producing results favourable to the desired outcome.
1. Intra-UK clearances
A. Intra-agency clearances (including government departments where 
directly responsible). Given the basic sympathy with the desired 
outcome, there is a very high probability of favourable clearances, 
including the approval of suitable projects.
8. Intra-governmental clearances, (i) Industry specific, such as 
approval of SIB recommendations by the Ministry of Technology and 
Treasury; the probability of favourable clearances is fairly high, 
though political considerations may result in decisions which do not 
conform with the desired outcome as originally stated, (ii) j\jon. 
industry specific, such as rating policy, tax policy, steel prices;
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the probability of a favourable decision simply to meet shipbuilding 
needs fairly low.
C. Non-governmental decision points (especially within shipbuilding 
firms). The probability of decisions favourable to competitiveness 
varies considerably. The probability of accepting government aid is 
high, though as the failure to take up all the SIB loans illustrated, 
it is by no means certain. The probability of unions agreeing to 
union mergers to the extent recommended by Geddes was very low,
2. Intra-UK performance
A. Within the firm; for example, the day-to-day speed of operations 
or industrial relations at plant level. The probability of achieving 
full desired performance is low in many cases because this depends on 
attitudes and relationships which it is difficult for the government 
to change.
B. Within the British economy; for example, inflation, labour 
shortages and the external value of the pound. The British government 
may have some degree of control over these, but the chances of changes 
being made specifically to assist shipbuilding are low.
3, Extra-UK decision points
These cover decisions by foreign shipbuilders and their governments.
The probability of their decisions being favourable to the UK industry 
is low; for example, a decision to expand capacity or introduce new 
equipment is likely to reduce the UK share of orders.
4. Extra-UK performance
A, Foreign shipyards. It is almost certain that at least some 
competitors will improve their performance. Many competitors have
behaviour patterns more conducive to securing maximum output from new 
equipment than yards in the UK. Because of this, the problem cannot 
be regarded as the UK trying to pass a fixed level of performance,
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because the threshold of profitable performance is constantly 
advancing.
B. The world economy; for example, the demand for various types of 
ship. This is one of the factors most difficult to predict. In the 
long term, countries best able to adapt to demand for new types of ship 
should do best. However, the UK can sometimes be at a comparative 
advantage: because it had not gone in for the construction of large 
tankers on such a scale as Japan, the UK suffered less severely than 
Japan in the slump in the mid 1970s.
5, »nixed" decision points
This refers to decisions which involve clearances by both UK and foreign 
countries; for example, OECD and EEC agreements affecting government 
assistance. In general, the UK may be able to veto any adverse change 
from the status quo, but will find it difficult to secure a change in 
the status quo favourable to the UK but adverse to competitors. For 
example, in 1976 the EEC gave only a grudging acceptance to the UK 
government’s inflation-cushioning aid to shipbuilders on the under­
standing that it was temporary and would gradually be applied more 
restrictively. A further problem with international agreements is that 
of enforcement. British shipbuilders have argued that some competitors 
are not observing the conditions of OECD agreements in trying to obtain 
orders in the mid 1970s slump.
Fig. 10.1 illustrates these influences in terms of a flow of 
decisions and performance over time. The same influences can be 
depicted more abstractly as in fig. 102 in terms of the distinction 
between government programmes, recommendations directed at non­
governmental actors and epiphenomenal influences, and of the distinction 
made in section 1.5 between implementation/non-implementation and
successful/unsuccessful implementation. In practice, there will be
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considerable interaction between the government's programme, non­
governmental actors and epiphenomenal influences before the stage where 
each separately has an influence on the outcome. Fig. 10.2 does 
illustrate that failure to achieve the outcome desired by the government 
can arise in one or more of a number of ways, even after the government 
has announced its policy or passed relevant legislation*
(a) non-implementation of government policy;
(b) unsuccessful implementation of government policy;
(c) non-implementation of recommendations directed at non-governmental 
actors;
(d) unsuccessful implementation of recommendations directed at non­
governmental actors;
(e) epiphenomenal influences which are different from those expected.
There are, therefore, a whole range of influences which can affect
the ability of the government to secure the outcome it desires. The 
overall effect which they have on the probability of success is 
analysed in the next section.
10.2.3 The improbability of success
The previous section considered in some detail the extent to which 
success at achieving competitiveness depends on appropriate decisions 
being taken and levels of performance achieved by a wide range of 
individuals and institutions. In some areas there was a high 
probability of favourable decisions being taken, but in others there 
was a very low probability of favourable circumstances obtaining.
Even if there had been only seven decisions to be taken in a single 
chain of decisions and there was a 9 Q % chance of a favourable decision 
in each case, the overall chances of success are less than 50$.^
4. Cf. Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973, pp. 107-9; King, 1975, pp.292-3.
406
''407
In practice, as section 10,2.2 showed, many important decisions have 
a much lower chance of being favourable, there are many more decisions 
involved than only seven, and there is more than one chain of decisions 
involved. It is also important to remember that decisions are rarely 
on/off decisions in thB sense of being wholly favourable or wholly 
adverse; they may provide only part of what is needed or result in a 
delay.
This analysis suggests that a policy by the British government to 
make the shipbuilding industry competitive within a fixed time period 
was and is almost bound to fail. This remains true even when allowance 
is built in for increased costs or delays in achieving this objective. 
This more general conclusion reinforces the argument at the end of 
chapter 5 that the success of the Geddes strategy would have required 
the existence of a set of circumstances many of which would have been 
unlikely individually and which in combination were virtually impossible. 
Too much should not be made of these unfavourable circumstances, 
however; world demand for ships in the late 1960s and early 1970s was 
very favourable compared to the slump facing the industry in the mid 
1970s. These arguments apply mainly to the pump-priming approach, but 
as the analysis of Conservative policy in chapter 6 showed, even making 
the industry competitive by not bailing out uncompetitive firms is not 
guaranteed successful completion because the government was unwilling 
to take the decisions to follow it through in individual cases.
Successful implementation depends on two related points* the 
degree of control which the government can exercise over the influences 
on the outcome of a policy, and the government’s political willingness 
to take the decisions necessary to follow up its declared policy.
This study has shown quite clearly that the government has very little 
control over many of the most important influences on the shipbuilding
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industry's ability to conpots. In part this is bacausa thars are 
technological or economic factors determined at global level, but in 
part because it is not considered acceptable in Britain for the 
government to use coercive means to force, say, workers to man new 
machinery at optimal levels (even if coercion could be guaranteed to 
achieve the desired effect). This lack of control by the government 
over these influences does not mean that they are insurmountable, but 
the irony is that the British shipbuilding firms which have coped 
with them best have generally been the ones in which the government 
has been involved least. Government involvement does not seem to be 
a wholly adequate substitute for deficiencies in a firm, whether due to 
location, poor facilities, managerial ability or poor productivity.
Given the conditions likely to prevail, a policy of trying to make 
otherwise badly uncompetitive firms •viable* at some future date through 
government assistance is quite likely to fail. Failure is not 
guaranteed, b u t success depends to a considerable extent on the 
existence of favourable conditions over which British governments have 
little control. Where success is so sensitive to influences over 
which the government has little control, or is unable even to predict 
reliably, it is fair to suggest that faulty policy design is involved 
if favourable conditions are assumed.
The above discussion has been based on the assumption that 
government policy has often been underlain by the hypothesis that a 
fixed amount of government assistance would produce competitiveness, and 
it has been argued that this hypothesis is quite likely to be incorrect 
in practice because it depends on a large number of conditions which 
in aggregate are unlikely to occur. Though it has not always been 
made explicit by governments, policy has also normally rested on the 
hypothesis that a fixed a m o u n t  o f  government assistance would produce
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This is even less likely to be true than the simpler hypothesis, 
because some measures to improve competitiveness may reduce the amount 
of labour required for a given output or for particular skills within 
a shipyard. When this hypothesis was falsified in practice, it was 
reversed* a fixed amount of labour and productivity levels which 
improved to some extent would imply a particular level of loss and 
government funds to meet this. However, even then, as experience 
with Harland and Wolff and Govan Shipbuilders has shown, there is a 
high probability that hoped-for productivity levels will not be 
achieved. This is because, as governments have discovered to their 
embarrassment, they have little control over productivity levels.
Even where the government does have a high degree of control, 
however, it may not choose to exercise that control in the way that 
would be indicated by its own declared policy, m  other words, there 
is by no means 100% certaintity that governments themselves will take 
the necessary clearance actions to implement their stated policies.
This was illustrated by the Labour government stepping outside the SIB 
framework, which it had itself sat up, to rescue UCS in 1969, and by 
the Conservative government's aid to the upper Clyde yards despite its 
supposed policy of no special assistance for the industry. These 
examples show that implementation is not simply a matter of administrat­
ive techniques, an appropriate institutional frame work or good 
monitoring - though these are important - but also of continuing 
political decisions.
Just as there has been faulty policy design because of lack of 
government control over important influences, so there seems also to be 
design faults in the political aspects, since policies seem to be 
formulated without full consideration of what the government's own
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reaction is likely to be to events which experience shows are all too 
likely to occur. If we think of policy as the implementation of 
decisions rather than the theory underlying government declarations, 
then British shipbuilding policy in practice has largely been the 
result of responses by the government to individual problems rather 
than the successful working through of declared policies, even where 
these have been embodied in legislation.
In their study of government intervention in the mixed economy, 
Young and Lowe draw attention to the way in which the government has 
sought to gain influence at the level of the firm because of the 
•bottleneck* by which general macroeconomic and non-regulatory 
measures fail to persuade firms to alter their behaviour in the desired 
way.5 However, this study has shown that operation at the level of 
the firm is also beset by frustrations and failures. These cannot 
be overcome simply by improved project appraisal and better monitoring 
as discussed both in this study and in Young and Lowe, though such 
Improvements would undoubtedly improve the quality of involvement. 
Ultimately the problem rests with the government's lack of control 
over events (not simply over management discretion) and its lack of 
political willingness to follow through the implications of its own 
declarations.
10.3 THE RELEVANCE OF MODELS OF POLICY MAKING
Clearly, British policy making on shipbuilding has not conformed to 
either of the synoptic models, the rational-comprehensive model or 
the Simonian rationality model, described in chapter 1. The synoptic 
approach, has, however, been valuable in this study as a tool in 
analysing government policy. Only by being synoptic in analysing the
5. Young with Lowe, 1974, especially chapter 3.
influences in shipbuilding and on government policy has it been 
possible to assess the reasons for the failure of government policy 
and to suggest that in principle it is very difficult for governments 
to make an industry competitive. Narrowness of focus in determining 
government policy has been responsible for the exaggeration of the 
potential impact of government intervention.
However, a more synoptic policy-making approach would not have 
ensured the success of government policy. What it would have done 
would have been to draw attention to the higher probability of failure 
than of success, the need for more funds initially if the government 
was serious in wanting to make a short-term impact, the need for 
greater anticipation and flexibility in a rapidly changing environment, 
and, related to the previous point, the need to regard the policy 
process as a whole to ensure adequate monitoring and feedback of 
information to policy makers.
Certainly, a synoptic planned approach of a static nature would, 
if anything, have made things worse; for example, if all alternatives 
and consequences had been reviewed and a fixed plan laid down for the 
next ten years. The fate of the Geddes approach, as embedded in 
legislation, which in a limited way represented a move towards a more 
synoptic approach, illustrates the difficulties which arise when a 
forward projection is made at a fixed point in time and is not 
subsequently subject to continuous review. A more planned and a morB 
synoptic approach than the one adopted by the British government would 
have to be a dynamic one, with continuous feedback and review as 
outlined in section 8.1, if it were to be able to cope with the 
certainty of large unpredictable changes in major influences on the 
industry.
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What are the chances of the British government adopting such an 
approach in government industrial policy? The chances are almost 
negligible, for two main sets of reasons. The first, and less 
important, consists of the inherent limitations in policy makers of 
knowledge, understanding, ability to forecast, and ability to compare 
options. Even given these limitations, the costs in manpower and 
finance of a more synoptic approach would represent a much larger 
proportion of the total costs of the p o l i c y .  The more important set 
of reasons is political. Policy makers in Britain rarely want to 
make or are capable of making all their objectives or preferences 
clear. There are also few incentives for ministers or civil servants 
to take a long-term view and set aside current problems in favour of 
those which might preoccupy their successors. There is little 
incentive to spend more time and money on being more synoptic if the 
result may be to indicate not only that a favoured project has a low 
chance of success, but that there is a considerable degree of uncertainty 
even about the size of that limited chance.
Of the models of policy making outlined in chapter 1, the one which 
clearly comes closest to describing how British government shipbuilding 
policy was made is the incremental model of Lindblom. Ends and means 
have not been distinct; thus policy on some occasions has not been 
simply to preserve employment (ends), but to preserve employment 
through promoting competitiveness (means confused with ends). The 
analysis which was carried out by the government before taking decisions 
was limited in a number of ways; important possible outcomes were 
neglected, though not simply in the favourable sense mentioned by 
Lindblom of reducing the information requirements of decision makers.
One of the important possible outcomes which government neglected was 
that its policy had a very high chanca of failure; another was that
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one of the outcomes might be redundancies, w h i c h  would lead to the 
government intervening further.
However, some qualifications should be made to the statement that 
the incremental model is the closest to describing British shipbuilding 
policy in practice. The first concerns the size and nature of financial 
commitment which can properly be considered 'incremental'. in terms 
of total public expenditure or of expenditure on industrial policy as 
a whole, most decisions about aid to shipbuilding have represented only 
a small proportion of total expenditure and could therefore be 
considered incremental. In terms of shipbuilding policy only, 
however, it is clear that decisions have varied in the extent to which 
they can be regarded as incremental, both in terms of the size and the 
nature of the commitment. Decisions to provide further assistance to 
a firm which has already received help are clearly different in nature 
as well as normally in scale to decisions such as the introduction of 
the Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967 or of general subsidies under the 
Industry Act 1972. Similarly, aid to individual yards which had 
already received assistance could vary considerably in size, with 
Scott Lithgow receiving a further £1.5m in loans and Govan Shipbuilders 
being given an initial package of £35m. Thus there seems to be a need 
to distinguish between incrementalism as a non-synoptic approach to 
decision making, which characterises almost all British government 
decisions about shipbuilding, and incrementalism as involving 'small 
steps from the existing policy, since some of the sums of money involved 
in shipbuilding policy decisions were considerable and some of the 
decisions represented changes in declared policy b y the government.6
6 Cf. Bailey and O'Connor, 1975
Similarly, thera seems to be a need to distinguish between 
incrementalism in the two senses already referred to, and increment­
alism as a way of making decisions by compromises amongst a number of 
participants in the policy process, with each attempting to bargain 
with the others to secure the best deal for themselves. This process 
of 'partisan mutual adjustment' is clearly linked in Lindblom's 
analysis with incrementalism as a non-synoptic or non-comprehensive
approach, and as an approach involving only s m a l l changes from existing 
7policies. However, this connection need not necessarily exist in
Q
logic or in practice. As chapters 8 and 9 have shown, there were a
large number of government departments, paragovernmental agencies and
committees to inquire and advise involved in the shipbuilding policy
process, but the relationship between them was not normally one of
partisan mutual adjustment amongst competing or bargaining participants.
The multiplicity of institutions involved was rather a reflection of
fragmentation in the policy process: both fragmentation between bodies
responsible for policy recommendations, policy selection, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation, and also fragmentation over time between
bodies responsible for the same activity.
A further qualification about the appropriateness of the
incremental model relates to the way in which under the model policy is
determined through a series of 'successive limited comparisons'. Thus
Lindblom argues that if a policy maker 'proceeds through a succession
of incremental changes he avoids serious lasting mistakes in several 
gways'. One of these ways is that 'past sequences of policy steps 
have given him knowledge about the probable consequences of further
7. See e.g. Lindblom, 1959.
8. Bailey and O'Connor, 1975, p.91.
9. Lindblom, 1959, p.86.
similar steps'. (To this extent, Lindblom is arguing as an advantage 
of his model uhat could be obtained through a planning model with 
feedback). The assumption in Lindblom's claim is that governments 
will not take further steps of a similar nature if previous ones have 
failed. However, despite the fact that injections of money into 
firms have failed to produce competitiveness, British governments 
have persisted in injecting further sums on a number of occasions, 
normally with equally unsuccessful results. In part, this is because 
there has never been full analysis of the reasons for the failure of 
previous aid, but in part it is because government policy has consisted 
of reaction to a number of separate crises rather than to approach the 
problem from the start as involving a series of related incremental 
choices.
Thus the incremental model can imply a number of logically separate 
things: a non-synoptic approach, decisions which do not differ 
significantly in nature from previous policy, decisions which involve 
relatively small extra commitments of funds, decisions made as a result 
of bargaining amongst a number of participants, and making decisions in 
terms of a series of small-scale commitments. While noting that 
British shipbuilding policy has tended to conform more to the 
incremental model than to the rationality model, it may therefore be 
more useful to describe British shipbuilding policy not as incremental, 
but as non-synoptic, fragmented, reactive and ad hoc.
It is appropriate to conclude this section on the relevance of 
models by pointing out that the British government has never used them 
as a guide to how it ought to make policy for the shipbuilding 
industry. It has never made an explicit decision about how it ought 
to make decisions about the shipbuilding industry. The fact that 
British shipbuilding policy has conformed more to the incremental model
than to the rationality model does not «fleet a deliberate decision 
by the British government that this *as a preferable oay to make policy.
10.4 THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE
10.4.1 The political salience of shipbuilding 
The two major British political parties have at times adopted 
considerably different stances in their declared policies towards the 
shipbuilding industry. Yet both have ended up giving considerable 
sums of money to the industry. Even after allowing for the effects of 
inflation there has been a steady trend which has continued irrespective 
of the party in power for the sums of money involved to increase.
Both the Labour party's policy of enabling the industry to stand on 
its own feet in the future by providing a limited amount of pump-priming 
aid and the Conservative's non-interventionist approach were abandoned 
when confronted with the prospect of large-scale redundancies.
T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t we should look for underlying determinants of 
government behaviour which are more powerful than ideology. The 
pattern of government involvement described in this study suggest that 
the political salience of an industrial problem, in the sense of the 
amount of government time and public funds which it can command, is 
strongly determined by a number of locational factors. The first of 
these is the importance of individual firms or yards as employers at 
community level because of the large unit size of plant (i.e. yard); 
large-scale highly localised redundancies are more politically salient 
than the same number of people made redundant in small-scale dispersed 
redundancies. Secondly, redundancies in areas of relatively high 
unemployment will attract more attention than those in areas of lower 
unemployment. Here, however, there is a temporal aspect in addition 
to the locational one. During the 1960s and 1970s the long-term rate
of unemployment rose steadily, and this undoubtedly increased the 
political importance of averting large-scale redundancies. It is an 
interesting reflection on the political significance of relative 
unemployment rates that the 'high' unemployment levels of shipbuilding 
areas in the m id  1 9 6 0 s  a r e  well below the UK average rate In 1976.
The final locational aspect of political salience is the existence of 
special non—industrial political problems for the government in some 
areas; thus since the late 1960s civil strife in Northern Ireland and 
the rise of nationalism in Scotland have ensured special attention for 
industrial problems arising there. These locational aspects of 
political salience are mutually reinforcing in a way which is illustrated 
diagrammatically in fig. 10.3. Most shipyards score high on at least 
two of these locational aspects. Drypool was the exception which 
proved the rule, since its yards were not particularly large and not 
in an area of particularly high unemployment and were not rescued. 
Similarly, aid to the car industry can in part be explained by the 
large size of plant in the industry. In particular, the government's 
rescue of C h r y s l e r  a t  the e n d of 1975 and the form which that rescue 
took were heavily influenced by the problem of the Linwood plant, a 
large plant in an area of relatively high unemployment (not far from 
the shipyards on the upper Clyde) with a special political problem 
(nationalism, particularly after the adverse reaction to the November 
1975 White Paper on devolution).
Having established the significance of these locational (or, in 
a loose sense, regional) factors, it is important to avoid falling into 
the trap of regarding the government simply as a maximiser of either 
the regional economic interest or its own political advantage in 
electoral terms at regional level. Much of the aid to shipbuilding is, 
in fact, very difficult to justify in regional economic terms (see
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particularly section 6.3.8). The hypothesis that governments in
assisting a particular industry seek only to maximise local electoral
advantage does not stand up very well either. If anything, we know
even less about the electoral impact of decisions affecting a
particular locality than we do about their economic impact. For
effectexample, political scientists have no idea of what/rescuing a yard or 
factory has on the votes of employees and others in the affected 
constituencies or whether there is a ’spillover' effect to other 
constituencies. From looking at constituency voting figures and the 
distribution of t h e  employees of Govan Shipbuilders it seems unlikely 
that the Conservatives could have hoped to gain any Clydeside seats by 
rescuing the upper Clyde yards or have risked the loss of any of the 
few remaining Conservative seats if they had allowed the yard to go 
under (on the assumption that most shipbuilding workers don't vote 
Conservative anyway). Thus government behaviour may be 'irrational* 
not only in terms of regional economics but also of local political
advantage.
The l o c a t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  of the political salience of the ship­
building industry seem rather to operate through the reactive nature of 
government decision making in Britain (see especially sections B.2 and 
10.2). Large plant size and concentration in areas of high unemploy­
ment are more visible, more likely to be reported by the press, and 
more likely to be the subject of a campaign by the workforce and others 
in the locality. In reacting to the problem, governments see the 
easiest way to make the problem 'go away' as being to provide aid to 
preserve at least some of the existing jobs.
10. Figures on the distribution of employees supplied by GovanShipbuilders.
The above are not the only factors which influence the 
government's willingness to provide aid. Another very important 
factor is how the government perceives the market for the firm's 
product. If the overall market is expanding, then even when the 
share held by a firm or the national industry as a whole is declining, 
the government is less likely to allow redundancies than if it 
considers that the market for the product is contracting. Thus the 
government tolerated the severe contraction of the coal industry in 
the 1950s and 1960s because it considered the industry to be a 
declining one. In the early 1960s during the shipbuilding order 
slump, the Conservative government saw some contraction as inevitable 
and allowed yards to close. From the mid 1960s to the early 1 9 7 03 
world demand for ships was expanding, and governments normally bailed 
out yards to give them a chance to 'compete' for a share in this 
expanding market. Other things being equal, it would be expected 
that the present (1976) government would be more prepared to tolerate 
redundancies because of the world-wide slump in orders, and the 
Secretary of State for Industry did, indeed, declare in 1976 that he 
sees redundancies as inevitable. However, the reduced marketability 
of the product is here at least partly balanced by increased
unemployment and the special political problems faced by the government 
especially in Scotland.
10.4.2 _ The continuing problem of industrial change 
As we have seen in this study, attempts to avert large-scale localised 
increases in unemployment have taken the form of preserving existing 
jobs. This is often because governments have little time to make 
decisions and have no alternatives available. However, if the problem 
is seen as one of averting large-scale increases in local unemployment
/either by subsidising workers in their existing jobs or by providing 
some alternative employment, the issue becomes a general one of 
coping with the consequences of industrial change. Within any 
industry, whether growing or contracting at aggregate national or 
regional level, there are likely to be some firms in danger of 
collapse or which could become more competitive if they could shed 
some of their workforce without the industrial relations problems 
which frequently attend redundancies.
The consequences of industrial change are one of the main features 
of British society, yet the British government, because of the fragmented 
and reactive way it operates, has no coherent policy to tackle these 
consequences. As a result, it makes a series of ad hoc decisions to 
avert the consequences by trying to freeze the change. Britain can 
probably carry the burden of bailing out its shipyards in perpetuity, 
but not its shipyards, a large part of its car industry and an 
increasing number of other firms. This study has indicated that the 
government can hope for little success in averting the problem by 
aid designed to get the firm 'back on its feet'.
Insofar as the real problem is that of industrial change, 
governments are more likely to be successful if they seek to tackle the 
problem directly rather than try to suppress the symptoms of industrial 
change. The evidence presented in this study suggests that 
governments aren't very good at seeking to promote industrial change 
within firms that have got into difficulties. However, since the 
government has tended to intervene only because of the painful 
consequences of large-scale redundancies, the logical short cut to 
take is to make the consequences of those redundancies less painful 
rather than take increasingly expensive and not altogether successful 
courses of action to prevent the redundancies taking place at all.
/V "
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Existing redundancy payments and unemployment benefit are designed to 
enable workers to get through a period of job transition, but these 
are obviously not yet enough for workers to accept redundancies without 
resistance. (The surprisingly high number of volunteers for 
redundancy at Chrysler's Linwood plant after the rescue of the firm 
at the end of 1975 was probably due to the fact that workers had been 
on short time for a considerable period). It would be cheaper for 
the government in some circumstances to offer workers involved in 
large-scale redundancies in areas of high unemployment much larger 
redundancy payments (i.e. a non-incremental increase). It would have 
been cheaper to have given the workers of Govan Shipbuilders £10,000 
each than to have set the new company up.
Apart from making it more likely that workers will willingly 
yield up their jobs if the company is no longer profitable, the 
government would, of course have to take measures to make it easier 
to find new jobs. In other words, the government could subsidise 
changes of jobs rather than preservation of existing jobs. It is 
nothing short of crazy that the government should have poured millions 
of pounds into the upper Clyde yards at a time when the lower Clyde 
yards were crying out for workers. One contribution to tackling this 
problem might have been for the government to subsidise transport or 
new housing specifically for workers changing their jobs.
It could be argued that such measures, which effectively amount to 
buying out imperfections in the labour market, fail to meet the 
criticism that new jobs would not be specifically matched in terms of 
time or location to the redundancies. There is no doubt that this is 
one of the important factors in resistance to redundancies. However, 
it is still possible in principle to meet such objections without 
necessarily preserving existing jobs. It may not always be possible
to anticipate threatened redundancies, but the working party which 
reported on the formation of UCS made it clear that redundancies would 
be necessary, and if the government had chosen to it could have made 
alternative arrangements. Here economists could make a direct 
contribution. Instead of all-or-nothing comparisons of the cost of 
keeping the men in existing jobs with the cost of having them 
unemployed, it should be possible to assess whether it would be cheaper 
per job preserved per year to keep some or all of the men employed in 
shipbuilding or to subsidise new industrial operations in addition to 
normal regional aids (many of which are, in any case, available to 
shipbuilding). In any case, the government could announce in advance 
of the analysis that it would ensure either that the bulk of the 
workforce were given alternative jobs without the need to go through 
the normal labour market or that it would provide the necessary subsidy 
for existing jobs in the unlikely event that this was shown to be the 
long-term optimal use of public funds (optimal, that is, given that 
large-scale redundancies in sensitive areas are to be avoided). This 
represents a change of policy only insofar as it proposes that 
governments announce in advance what recent history suggests they will 
do anyway, though by leaving it until redundancies are imminent the 
option of considering alternative job creation is normally closed.
Prior announcement of a government commitment to provide jobs one way 
or another ought to make it easier for a firm to secure the cooperation 
of its workers in deciding the optimal size of workforce, with or 
without pump-priming aid.
In suggesting alternative new industrial operations, it would be 
sensible for economists to suggest operations with low unit size of
plant so that if some of them fail, as they surely will do, the economic 
and political impact will be reduced. As far as possible, alternative
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employment should not be sensitive to cycles in world trade. No 
matter how efficient a shipbuilding firm is, it is likely to do badly 
when there is a world slump in orders, as there was in the early 1960s 
and there is at the present time. It is arguable that, far from there 
being special reasons for preserving shipbuilding in depressed regions, 
shipbuilding is precisely the wrong sort of industry to have in a 
politically sensitive area of high unemployment.
However, while sound in principle, such an approach of matching
specific new jobs to specific redundancies would face many of the
same problems in practice which have led to the failure of shipbuilding
and other industrial policies in the past. First of all, there would
be the need for improved monitoring of the state of shipbuilding firms
to provide enough advance warning of the need for alternative jobs.
Secondly, there is little evidence to suggest that governments would be 
at
any better/choosing new firms which would be successful or require only 
a specified level of subsidy than they have been at determining the 
need for subsidy to maintain existing jobs. Above all, as section
10.2 has illustrated, there is a world of difference between specifying 
an approach for the government to adopt and being able to guarantee the 
desired outcome. It is perhaps worth remarking that Sweden, often 
held up to British governments as a model of how to cope with job 
transition, has reacted to the problems of its shipbuilding industry in 
the same way as the British government - by rescuing individual yards 
and by providing subsidies. At the beginning of November 1976, the 
Swedish government announced aid of over £311m, largely to meet 
expected shipbuilding losses, though with some money going towards 
costs related to the planned shutdown of one of the yards.
Accordingly, one is left with the tentative proposition that moves 
towards treating the problems of the shipbuilding industry as part of 
a general problem of industrial change rather than of
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existing shipbuilding jobs in existing locations ought in principle 
to lead to fewer of the difficulties and less of the waste of money 
associated with the approach adopted by governments in the 1960s and 
1970s while taking into account the factors which appear to give the 
industry political significance, but that this alternative approach 
would by no means eliminate the economic and political problems of 
the existing approach.
The inclusion of such options as encouraging labour mobility or 
providing specific alternative employment would represent a move away 
from a fragmented or incremental approach and towards a 'rationality* 
or planned model, albeit a very limited one. More alternative courses 
of action would have to be considered, more consequences analysed, and 
a more anticipatory approach adopted. Here, of course, lie the reasons 
why such an approach is unlikely to be adopted by a British government, 
To promote such an approach would be to advocate not merely a change of 
policy, but a whole change of style of government. The task of 
implementing such a change of style would be even more daunting than 
making UCS or Govan Shipbuilders profitable.
For all the innovations designed to introduce a more planned 
approach to government, such as PESC and PAR, there is relatively 
little sign of this having any impact on industrial policy. The CPRS 
may produce a concise report on the car industry, but on the same day 
the government announces that it is rescuing Chrysler, in flat 
contradiction to the implications of that report. The government 
proclaims that it intends to back winners, but still rescues Govan 
(again), Harland and Wolff (again) and Cammell Laird (again). The 
much vaunted 1975-6 industrial strategy is nothing more than a 
collection of reports on individual industries: it has nothing to say 
about the general problems of industrial change. Vet the pace of
industrial change is likely to increase rather than diminish, and 
problems of threatened redundancies will continue to exist, whether 
due to technological change, incompetent management or poor productivity. 
The most likely response to this problem is a continuation of the 
existing fragmented, reactive, and expensive policies.
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